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Full text of "Iraq's nuclear weapons capability and IAEA inspections in Iraq : joint hearing before the Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, first session, June 29, 1993"

IRAQ'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY AND 
IAEA INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ 



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o^x^x HEAKING 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEES ON 
EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST 

AND 

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 



JUNE 29, 1993 



Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 










- / ? 






U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
71-W4 CC WASHINGTON : 1993 



For sale h\ the U.S. Government Printing Office 
Superintendent of Documents. Congressional Sales Office, Washington. DC 20402 
ISBN 0-16-041691-4 



\ / IRAQ'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY AND 
J IAEA INSP ECTIONS IN IRAQ 

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„^xx,x HEARING 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEES ON 
EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST 

AND 

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS 
FIRST SESSION 



JUNE 29, 1993 



Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 




'C J 






U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
71-404 CC WASHINGTON '. 1993 



For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 
Superintendent of Documents. Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402 
ISBN 0-16-041691-4 



COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 



LEE H 

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut 

TOM LANTOS, California 

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota 
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California 
ROBERT A. BORSKI, Pennsylvania 
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia 
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida 
ERIC FINGERHUT, Ohio 
PETER DEUTSCH, Florida 
ALBERT RUSSELL WYNN, Maryland 
DON EDWARDS, California 
FRANK McCLOSKEY, Indiana 
THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio 

(Vacancy) 

Michael H. Van Dusen, Chief of Staff 

RICHARD J. GARON, Minority Chief of Staff 

Jo WEBER, Staff Associate 

DEBORAH BURNS, Staff Associate 



HAMILTON, Indiana, Chairman 

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York 
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania 
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin 
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois 
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 
DAN BURTON, Indiana 
JAN MEYERS, Kansas 
ELTON GALLEGLY, California 
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 
DANA ROHRABACHER, California 
DAVID A. LEVY, New York 
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 
LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida 
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 



(ID 



Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East 

LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana, Chairman 
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT A. BORSKI, Pennsylvania JAN MEYERS, Kansas 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio DAVID A. LEVY, New York 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

PETER DEUTSCH, Florida 
TOM LANTOS, California 

KATHERINE A. WlLKENS, Staff Director 

DEBORAH E. BODLANDER, Republican Professional Staff Member 

MARTIN SLETZINGER, Professional Staff Member 



Subcommittee on International Security, International Organization and 

Human Rights 

TOM LANTOS, California, Chairman 
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

FRANK MCCLOSKEY, Indiana DAN BURTON, Indiana 

THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio 

ROBERT KING, Staff Director 

MICHAEL ENNIS, Republican Professional Staff Member 

KENNETH R. TlMMERMAN, Professional Staff Member 

BETH L. POISSON, Professional Staff Member 

Maryanne Murray, Professional Staff Member 

(in) 



CONTENTS 



WITNESSES 

Page 

Hon. Robert L. Gallucci, Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, De- 
partment of State 3 

Jules Kroll, president, Kroll Associates 21 

Gary Milhollin, professor, University of Wisconsin Law School and director, 
The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control 25 

Jay C. Davis, director, Center for Accelerator Mass Spectrometry and pro- 
gram leader, Geoscience and Environmental Research, Physical Sciences 
Directorate, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 29 

Lawrence Scheinman, professor of government and associate director, Peace 
Studies Program, Cornell University 33 

Material Submitted for the Record 

Response by the Department of State concerning Iraqi alleged illegal banking 

practices 9 

Response by the Department of State concerning suspected smuggling of 

goods by German companies into Iraq 10 

Response by the Department of State concerning Iraq's attempt to acquire 

French-made spare parts 10 

Response by the Department of State concerning the effectiveness of IAEA's 

safeguarding of nuclear materials 21 

APPENDLX 

Prepared statements: 

Hon. Robert L. Gallucci 47 

Jules Kroll 50 

Gary Milhollin . 55 

Jay C. Davis 61 

Lawrence Scheinman 68 

Staff report entitled "Iraq Rebuilds Its Military Industries", prepared by 
Kenneth R. Timmerman, staff of the Subcommittee on International Secu- 
rity, International Organizations and Human Rights 77 

Article from February 1, 1993 issue of The New Yorker, entitled "The Iraqi 

Bomb", by Gary Milhollin 129 

Article from the New York Times, April 26, 1993 entitled 'Iraq's Bomb— 

An Update", by Diana Edensword and Gary Milhollin 138 

Op-ed from the New York Times, April 24, 1992 entitled "Iraq's Bomb, Chip 

by Chip" 139 

Article from The New York Times Magazine, March 8, 1992 entitled "Building 

Saddam Hussein's Bomb", by Gary Milhollin 140 

Written statement for the record by the International Atomic Energy Agency . 146 
Exchange of correspondence between Paul Leventhal, Nuclear Control Insti- 
tute and IAEA Director Hans Blix 160 

Article entitled "Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in a Changing 
World Order" by Lawrence Scheinman, which appeared in Security Dia- 
logue, volume 23, number 3, September 1992 178 

Report of a July 1993 Staff Study Mission to the IAEA, Vienna, Austria 196 



(V) 



IRAQ'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY AND 
IAEA INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ 



TUESDAY, JUNE 29, 1993 

House of Representatives, 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and 
on International Security, International Organi- 
zations and Human Rights, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m. in room 
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton 
(chairman) presiding. 

Chairman Hamilton. The Subcommittees on Europe and the 
Middle East, on International Security, International Organiza- 
tions and Human Rights and on Economic Policy, Trade and the 
Environment meet today in open session to discuss the Iraqi nu- 
clear program and the role of the United Nations and the Atomic 
Energy Agency. 

Today we will hear first from Assistant Secretary of State Robert 
L. Gallucci. 

Second, we will hear from a panel of private witnesses, including 
Jules Kroll, President of Kroll Associates; Gary Milhollin, Director 
of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control; Jay Davis, the 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; and Lawrence 
Scheinman, Professor of Government, International Law and Poli- 
tics, Cornell University. 

We have several topics of interest to the subcommittees, includ- 
ing: The post-Gulf War experience of IAEA in inspection, disposal, 
and monitoring of Iraq's nuclear weapons program; assessments of 
the current status of Iraq's nuclear weapons activities; and the as- 
sessment of our witnesses of the lessons learned by the inter- 
national community of the Iraqi experience and their recommenda- 
tions of how to prevent a similar incident from recurring in the fu- 
ture. 

We welcome our witnesses before the subcommittees and are 
pleased to have them with us today. We have a lot of ground to 
cover. I want to advise the witnesses that we anticipate, once the 
House goes into session, a series of notes. We don't know how 
many at this point. But we may have to make some adjustments 
in the schedule as we move along. 

Mr. Gallucci, we are very pleased to have you. Your statement, 
of course, will be entered into the record in full. And before you 
proceed, I will ask my colleagues first if they have any comments 
to make. 

(1) 



Mr. Gejdenson. 
Mr. Lantos. 

A CRITICAL JUNCTURE FOR U.S. POLICY IN THE GULF 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to commend 
you for holding this hearing. This hearing comes at a critical junc- 
tion for U.S. policy in the Gulf, and for the new collective security 
system that is emerging from the end of the cold war. 

Through his despicable attempt to murder former President 
Bush, Saddam Hussein has shown once again, if anyone needed re- 
minding, that he is not fit to play a role on the world's stage. And 
yet, in recent months Saddam has attempted, with some success, 
to divide public opinion and drive a wedge between the United 
States and its allies. In the Muslim world, we hear many voices ris- 
ing, even from Egypt, that the United States is "over-reacting" or 
being "too harsh" toward Saddam, while ignoring the fate of the 
Bosnian Muslims who are being massacred daily by Serbian thugs. 
In Western Europe, U.S. allies such as France have become in- 
creasingly reticent at the U.N. to support U.S. military action 
against Saddam, lured once again by the scent of financial profits. 

Following Operation Desert Storm, which I strongly supported, 
Iraq has become subjected to the most rigorous international sanc- 
tions ever imposed on any nation since World War II. Its weapons 
plants have been subject to repeated inspections by United Nations 
teams. Its assets abroad have been frozen. And yet, Iraq continues 
to flaunt its military power, massacring its own citizens in the 
North, and Iraqi Shiites in the South. 

The question arises: What will happen if Saddam Hussein suc- 
ceeds in driving a wedge between the United States and its allies 
and the U.N. sanctions are lifted? 

SUMMARY OF SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 

I called for a staff study, which has been distributed; and I will 
summarize just a few of the staff report's findings. 1 

Despite ongoing inspections by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and the U.N. Special Commission, Iraq has managed to re- 
construct 80 percent of the military manufacturing capability it 
possessed before Desert Storm. Neither the U.N., nor the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency, has been able to do anything 
about this. 

Despite the U.N. embargo, Iraq has succeeded in reinvigorating 
its clandestine procurement network, relying on known front com- 
panies in Jordan, France, and Germany to purchase critical items 
and spare parts for its weapons industries. 

Despite the U.N. trade embargo, Iraq continues to ship oil to Jor- 
dan, and to Iran, using this money to feed its procurement network 
and to rebuild its weapons plants. 

Today, Iraq is manufacturing T-72 tanks, artillery munitions, 
and even short-range ballistic missiles, and is operating more than 
40 major weapons plants. 



x The full text of the report appears in the appendix on p. 77. 



Iraq has repaired and returned to service most of the 2,500 main 
battle tanks and 250 fixed-wing aircraft that survived Desert 
Storm. 

Of the more than 850 machine-tools that have now been identi- 
fied and catalogued at Iraqi nuclear weapons plants by the IAEA, 
only a handful have actually been destroyed or subjected to future 
monitoring. Furthermore, the 850 machine-tools and dozen or so 
large computers constitute but a small fraction of the more than 
$ 14 billion worth of high-tech manufacturing gear imported by Iraq 
during the late 1980's. This leaves an immense production capabil- 
ity intact, which is already being used to manufacture conventional 
weapons and which could be applied in short order to a resumption 
of the nuclear weapons program once U.N. sanctions are lifted. 

The Chairman of the U.N. Special Commission, Ambassador 
Ekeus, is fully aware of Saddam's intentions. As he recently 
summed it up before the Washington Institute, Iraq's weapons pro- 
grams are likely to "grow up like mushrooms after the rain" once 
the United Nations sanctions are lifted. 

I think it is critical, Mr. Chairman, that we paint a coherent pic- 
ture of Iraq's attempt to rebuild its complex military capabilities, 
its support for terrorism in this country and elsewhere, and that 
we recognize that Saddam's Iraq continues to represent a major 
threat to the peace of this world. 

Chairman Hamilton. I thank the gentleman. 

Any other opening statements from my colleagues? 

If not, Mr. Gallucci, you may proceed, sir. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT L. GALLUCCI, ASSISTANT SEC- 
RETARY FOR POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT 
OF STATE 

Mr. Gallucci. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee, I am pleased to have 
the opportunity to discuss our assessment of the nuclear situation 
in Iraq and the U.N.'s capabilities to deter or detect any efforts by 
Iraq to regenerate its nuclear weapons program. 

In these remarks, I would like to briefly describe the work of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency in Iraq, some lessons learned, 
and the continuing need to give our fullest support to the IAEA as 
part of our overall nonproliferation efforts. 

Under the auspices of the U.N. .Security Counsel Resolution 687 
and with the assistance of the U.N. Special Commission, 
UNSCOM, the IAEA his conducted 20 nuclear inspections of Iraq 
since the end of the Gulf War in April 1991. 

These inspections have forced Iraq to disclose, destroy, or render 
harmless all of the major nuclear weapons facilities and equipment 
that we are aware of, including several enrichment sites, research 
facilities, and weapons design facilities. Along with the damage in- 
flicted by the war and subsequent military actions, we believe 
these inspections have effectively put the Iraqi nuclear weapons 
program out of business, at least for the near term. 



A LONG-TERM NUCLEAR THREAT 

Over the long-term, however, Iraq still presents a nuclear threat. 
We believe that Saddam Hussein is committed to rebuilding a nu- 
clear weapon capability using indigenous and imported resources. 

Iraq retains the most critical resource for any nuclear weapons 
program, namely skilled personnel and expertise. 

Iraq also retains a basic industrial capability to support a nu- 
clear weapons program, including a large amount of dual-use 
equipment and facilities. 

If sanctions are lifted, Iraq would have access to additional finan- 
cial resources to refuel overseas procurement activities. 

Finally, Iraq has still refused to provide the U.N. with details of 
its clandestine procurement network, a network which could, there- 
fore, be reactivated in the future. 

To deter or detect regeneration, we need to assure that the IAEA 
and the Special Commission receive the political, technical, and fi- 
nancial support to implement their plans for long-term monitoring 
in Iraq. These plans are contained in Security Council Resolution 
715, a Resolution that Iraq has so far refused to accept. 

The Security Council will need to enforce the rights of the IAEA 
and Special Commission under Security Council Resolution 687 
and 715, especially, the right to conduct challenge inspections with- 
out obstruction from the Iraqi authorities. 

We must also provide technical support and information to the 
IAEA and Special Commission, including assistance in the use of 
technical monitoring devices such as water sampling, to detect cov- 
ert nuclear activities. 

To address the risk of overseas procurement, we must continue 
to press Iraq to reveal its foreign suppliers and work with other 
suppliers to assure effective monitoring of exports to prevent diver- 
sion. 

Iraq, no doubt, will continue to test the U.N.'s resolve to continue 
inspections, especially if it perceives that support for them is wan- 
ing. As in the past, Iraq will use tactics such as delays or refusing 
access to sites, denying information, harassing inspectors, and re- 
fusing to accept Security Council Resolution 715 to reduce the ef- 
fectiveness of the inspections. 

THE CAMERA DISPUTE 

Recently, Iraq's efforts to undermine long-term monitoring has 
focused on two issues. Iraq has refused to allow the Special Com- 
mission to install cameras at two rocket motor test stands and has 
refused to destroy certain chemical weapons precursors and related 
chemical weapon equipment. 

On June 18, the Security Council adopted a Presidential State- 
ment that Iraq's refusal to cooperate with the Special Commission 
in these matters constitutes a "material and unacceptable breach," 
of U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 and a violation of Resolu- 
tions 707 and 715. The Statement warned of, and I quote, "serious 
consequences." 

On June 22, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali met with 
Tariq Aziz to discuss the Presidential Statement. Aziz said the 



issue could be discussed in a technical meeting with the Special 
Commission on July 12. 

On June 24, Special Commission Chairman Rolf Ekeus told the 
Iraqi Foreign Minister that the meeting cannot take place until 
Iraq complies with the Council's demands. We strongly support 
Chairman Ekeus in this decision. 

LESSONS FOR THE IAEA 

I would like to relate the lessons of Iraq to the strengthening of 
the overall IAEA safeguards system, a system that plays a critical 
role in the international effort to prevent nuclear weapons pro- 
liferation. 

Fundamentally, the revelations about Iraq demonstrated the 
need for the international community to strengthen the Agency's 
ability and authority to detect undeclared nuclear activities outside 
declared safeguarded facilities. 

In response, the IAEA's Board of Governors has taken a number 
of important steps to improve safeguards, reflecting the view that 
the IAEA should give a higher priority to detecting covert nuclear 
activities. 

The Board has reaffirmed the Agency's right to perform special 
inspections whenever necessary to permit it to fulfill its safeguard 
obligations including access to undeclared sites. 

The Board has determined that the Agency may rely on informa- 
tion supplied by member states when seeking a special inspection. 

The Board has strengthened obligations to provide notice and 
early submission of design information on new nuclear facilities or 
changes to existing facilities. 

And the Board has established a voluntary system for reporting 
on nuclear exports and imports. 

Mr. Chairman, in our view, these changes have substantially 
strengthened the IAEA safeguards system, which is essential to en- 
suring that fullscope safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Trea- 
ty are fully implemented. We have already seen evidence of this 
new determination in North Korea, South Africa, and Iran. 

We believe that the IAEA's experience in Iraq has resulted in a 
substantial improvement in the IAEA safeguard system. And with 
the support of member states, it will continue to be an important 
part of the international nonproliferation regime. 

Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to try to answer any questions 
that the committee may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr/ Gallucci appears in the appen- 
dix.] 

Chairman Hamilton. OK Thank you very much, Mr. Gallucci, 
for your statement. 

Now, the IAEA believes that it has discovered all of Iraq's nu- 
clear program. And it believes that it has substantially reduced or 
eliminated Iraq's nuclear program. Do you agree with that assess- 
ment? 

Mr. Gallucci. I wouldn't, Mr. Chairman, put it exactly that way. 

I would say that the IAEA, the Special Commission, and we in 
the U.S. Government, believe that the elements of the nuclear pro- 
gram — that we are aware of— have been essentially destroyed. 



Chairman Hamilton. How confident are you that you are aware 
of everything they are doing? 

Mr. Gallucci. Mr. Chairman, I think we have a fairly high de- 
gree of confidence. But it would be unreasonable, I think, to take 
the position that we know what we don't know. 

INTELLIGENCE FAILURE BEFORE DESERT STORM 

Before the end of the Gulf War, our intelligence community and 
the intelligence communities of others in the West, had focused on 
Iraq's nuclear program. And it is clear, in retrospect, that they got 
it wrong and that there were large elements of the Iraqi nuclear 
program unknown to the intelligence communities. 

Chairman Hamilton. And that it was much farther advanced 
than U.S. intelligence believed? And it was much farther advanced 
that the IAEA believed? 

Mr. Gallucci. I think those two statements are certainly true, 
Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Hamilton. Now, what has to happen in Iraq before 
you have a high degree of assurance that you know everything 
there is to know about their nuclear program? 

Mr. Gallucci. Mr. Chairman, I think we have a high degree of 
assurance now. I am just reluctant and unwilling to say that we 
are absolutely certain. 

The Special Commission and the IAEA can go and have gone ev- 
erywhere we have reason to believe there is something related to 
Resolution 687 to find. And we have had that kind of assessment, 
that is, the Special Commission and the IAEA has. 

Chairman Hamilton. IAEA was able to go anywhere they want- 
ed to go in Iraq and see anything they wanted to see in Iraq? 

Mr. Gallucci. Yes, sir. 

Chairman Hamilton. Now, there have been some criticisms, of 
course, of the IAEA — which some of our witnesses later today will 
make — that it does not share information it collects from its inspec- 
tions and fails to use that information to collect further information 
from other sources; that some of its managers and inspectors have 
been timid in pursuing their mission in Iraq and have played the 
game largely according to the rules that the Iraqis have set; that 
they are too eager to claim that they have found everything that 
there is to find; that they haven't followed up on leads that have 
been gained from inspections' that a lot of their people don't have 
proper experience with nuclear weapon materials. 

What do you say to all of those criticisms? I am sure you have 
heard them. 

CRITICISMS OF THE IAEA 

Mr. Gallucci. Mr. Chairman, with respect to the professional- 
ism of the Agency, I think the Agency has a very high degree of 
professionalism, and they have the right kind of people working as 
inspectors doing a very good job. 

I want to pick up on a couple of the points you made that have 
been raised in criticism of the Agency. The point that there may 
not be nuclear weapon expertise in the Agency is sort of an unfair 
one, even though to the extent that it is accurate. 



We wouldn't necessarily want the Agency to be an expert in nu- 
clear weapons design and development. But the Agency can have 
attached to it, for an inspection, as it has in the case of Iraq, those 
experts that it needs to do an inspection job when nuclear weapons 
expertise is required. 

With respect to what we have learned from Iraq and what the 
Agency has learned, what I tried to focus on in my prepared re- 
marks is that the world learned that the IAEA's mandate, up until 
the time of Iraq, was to inspect facilities that were declared to it 
by the state in which they were conducting the inspections. 

So the IAEA focused its efforts at the declared facilities at the 
Tuwaitha site in Iraq. When it was discovered after the war that 
there were a great many other facilities, the movement within the 
Agency and the international community that had already begun 
to have the Agency conduct special inspections of undeclared sites 
and facilities, that movement produced a change in Agency oper- 
ations which we have seen take good effect in the case of North 
Korea within the last 6 months. 

So I would say that while the Agency has always been a profes- 
sional agency, its ability to do more than inspect the sites that 
were declared to it was limited until fairly recently. 

A lesson was learned, I think, by the international community; 
and with the support of the member states, the Agency has 
changed its approach and now can and does inspect undeclared fa- 
cilities that are identified to it by member states that make that 
information available. 

MONITORING WILL DETECT FUTURE NUCLEAR ACTIVITY 

Chairman Hamilton. Your statement says that "in the near 
term." You might define near-term for me. What does that mean, 
first of all? 

Mr. Gallucci. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. The context of the sen- 
tence refers to my statement? 

Chairman Hamilton. They effectively put the Iraqi nuclear 
weapons program out of business, at least for the near-term? 

Mr. Gallucci. As long as long-term monitoring continues. 

While it is to continue indefinitely under 687, any failure of the 
Security Council to sustain that position, we believe, would result 
ultimately in the regeneration of the nuclear weapons program in 
Iraq. 

Chairman Hamilton. And you. still believe that they present a 
nuclear threat and that Saddam wants to rebuild his nuclear weap- 
ons capability? 

So you have, on the one hand, a leader who wants to rebuild his 
nuclear ability and his ability to conceal the program. And, on the 
other side, you indicate that if the IAEA is able to proceed under 
U.N. Resolutions and to monitor, that we think that the IAEA can 
determine if they launch upon a nuclear program. 

Is that right? 

Mr. Gallucci. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I think that is correct. 

Chairman Hamilton. And now you say the Security Council will 
need to enforce the rights of the IAEA and UNSCOM. 

How are we doing so far? 



8 

Mr. Gallucci. I think we are doing reasonably well, Mr. Chair- 
man, but not perfectly. Certainly, with respect to inspections, the 
IAEA and Special Commission teams have gone where they think 
they need to go, and under the circumstances that they thought 
they needed to conduct the inspections under. 

At the same time, however, I noted in my remarks that the 
Iraqis have, so far, not formally accepted Resolution 715. They 
have not accepted it at all. They did accept 687. 115 is, in fact, the 
Resolution that describes the program for long-term monitoring in 
Iraq. And it is, over the long-term, essential that that resolution be 
accepted by the Iraqis. 

RELUCTANCE TO PUBLISH IRAQ'S SUPPLIER LIST 

Chairman Hamilton. Before I turn to some of my colleagues, let 
me just ask about one aspect of this now. 

A very important part of keeping their nuclear capability elimi- 
nated would be to stop foreign suppliers from sending stuff into 
Iraq. 

Do we know who these foreign suppliers are? 

Mr. Gallucci. Mr. Chairman, during the years before the war, 
there were a great many foreign suppliers to the Iraqi programs, 
weapons of mass destruction, not only nuclear but chemical, bio- 
logical, and ballistic missile programs. 

Chairman Hamilton. Do we know who they were? 

Mr. Gallucci. We have substantial knowledge of what compa- 
nies and what countries and what those countries provided. 

Chairman Hamilton. Why don't we publicize it? 

Mr. Gallucci. Mr. Chairman, some of that information is avail- 
able to us by virtue — or is available to the Special Commission and 
the IAEA by virtue of their inspections. 

Both the IAEA and the Special Commission have taken the posi- 
tion that information that they have about these suppliers, if pub- 
lished, would diminish the cooperation of the governments in the 
continuing efforts of the Special Commission and the IAEA to do 
their job. 

Chairman Hamilton. Do we know the name? 

Does the U.S. Government know the names? 

Mr. Gallucci. We know the names, certainly, of some companies 
based upon intelligence. 

Chairman Hamilton. Why don't we publicize it? 

Mr. Gallucci. I am sure there are a variety of reasons, but the 
one that immediately occurs to me is sources and methods, Mr. 
Chairman. 

Chairman Hamilton. You mean to publicize the names of the 
companies would reveal sources and methods? 

Mr. Gallucci. In some cases, Mr. Chairman, I think it would. 

In other cases, I don't know that there would be any good to 
come from it; and there might be some diplomatic disadvantage. 

Chairman Hamilton. One good thing that might come is that 
they stop supplying the stuff. 

Mr. Gallucci. Well, currently, Mr. Chairman, they are not. And 
when we have information that a company in another country is 
cooperating in anyone's production of weapons of mass destruction, 
we work with that country 



Chairman Hamilton. You are confident that suppliers are not 
supplying materials that could be helpful in the nuclear program? 

Mr. Gallucci. With respect to Iraq, yes, sir I am confident of 
that. 

Chairman Hamilton. No materials are going into Iraq today 
that could be used by their nuclear program? 

Mr. Gallucci. As always, I am going to say to the best of my 
knowledge. But I think our knowledge is very good. 

Chairman Hamilton. Mrs. Meyers. 

Mrs. Meyers. Mr. Chairman, I have in front of me a document, 
that I presume is a public document that I believe was prepared 
by Mr. Lantos' subcommittee. And I would like to read a paragraph 
from that document and get you to respond to that if you would 
and maybe ask some other questions. 

Wall Street investigator Jules Kroll, who has been tracking 
Iraq's procurement efforts in Jordan, alleges that the Iraqi Govern- 
ment transferred $5.2 billion in government funds to the Arab 
Bank in Amman, just as Operation Desert Storm was ending, to es- 
tablish a new military infrastructure for Iraq. In addition to this, 
he alleges that the Central Bank of Jordan is laundering secret 
Iraqi funds in Switzerland through commercial banks such as the 
Jordan Housing Bank, the Jordan Gulf Bank, and the Arab Finan- 
cial Corporation. He talks about how German companies are break- 
ing sanctions and that they are helping Iraq to develop upgraded 
Scud missiles. 

And then he says that: Unconfirmed reports from Kuwaiti 
sources warned that commercial contacts have intensified in recent 
months between major French defense exporters and Iraqi agents 
in Europe in view of renewing the supply of spare parts for Iraq's 
fleet of Mirage F-l fighter bombers. 

Now, can you comment on all of that? 

That doesn't sound to me like we are seeing any build-down of 
defense efforts. And it certainly sounds like we are seeing a build- 
up of nuclear capability. 

JORDAN BANKING FRONTS 

Mr. Gallucci. Mrs. Meyers, first let me try to speak to each one 
of these and then to the general point. I am afraid I am unaware 
of the banking activity in Jordan just prior to the war. And I just 
cannot speak to that. I have no information about that. But I would 
take that question for the record if you would like. 

[State Department response follows:] 

We have no evidence that any transfer of funds was effected by the Iraqi Govern- 
ment through the Arab Bank in Amman in the period just after Desert Storm, nor 
any evidence of post-war involvement by the Central Bank of Jordan in laundering 
secret Iraqi funds through Switzerland. 

Because much of Iraq s legitimate trade involves Jordan, it is not uncommon for 
Jordanian banking institutions to show evidence of activity with Iraq. It is not im- 
possible that Iraq therefore may be able to use Jordanian banks for other activities 
as well. When we have discussed financial issues with the Government of Jordan, 
they have assured us of their compliance with sanctions prohibiting unauthorized 
release of funds to Iraq. 

With respect to a German company breaking sanctions by provid- 
ing equipment that would upgrade Iraqi Scud capability, I have no 



10 

information about that. I would personally view that as extremely 
unlikely 

Mrs. Meyers. Have you seen this report? 

Mr. Gallucci. I don't know what you are holding, Mrs. Meyers. 

Mrs. Meyers. Mr. Lantos, have you distributed this report? 

Mr. Lantos. It is a staff report which is available. And if Mr. 
Gallucci doesn't have it, we will be happy to provide it. 

Mr. Gallucci. Is that just available todav? 

Mr. Lantos. You have now been supplied a copy. 

Mr. GALLUCCI. I can assure you, I will read it very carefully. 

SMUGGLING FROM GERMANY AND FRANCE 

The German company — again, let me say I was unaware of that. 
I find it unlikely, but we will certainly look into that. 
[State Department response follows:] 

The German Government has acknowledged that German companies account for 
a sizable number of items discovered in Iraq's WMD programs. But the German 
Government has also continued its exemplary cooperation with UNSCOM, the 
IAEA, and other governments in identifying and punishing offenders. UNSCOM and 
the IAEA have learned a great deal from information made available by German 
investigators, and have acted on this information to discover and destroy items in 
Iraq. 

Some of the shipments of German materials mentioned in the report to Iraq oc- 
curred prior to the Gulf War. We are aware of these cases, and have supported 
UNSCOM's and the IAEA's efforts to track down the equipment. For the cases of 
sanctions-busting after the war, we have heard similar reports. We routinely contact 
the source country government when we are made aware of supportable evidence 
of sanctions-busting. We do not currently have any more significant detail on any 
of the suspected smuggling cases mentioned in the report. 

I would say the same about the French contacts. If they would 
involve a French company breaking sanctions that now exists, U.N. 
sanctions under Resolution 687, I would find that unlikely as well 
but not impossible. So I will look into that as well. 

[State Department response follows:] 

We are aware that Iraq would like spare parts for its French-made Mirage F-l 
aircraft, and that Iraq has made attempts at getting parts into Iraq through the 
sanctions. We have no confirmed deliveries of such parts, however, We will continue 
to watch. 

Let me say something more general though, because I fear there 
may be a misunderstanding about what was accomplished with 
687. It did a number of things; but in the areas that we are ad- 
dressing, as I understand it, this morning, we are focusing on the 
nuclear capability of Iraq and Resolution 687 in referring to weap- 
ons of mass destruction including nuclear capability and provides 
for, essentially, the destruction of such capability in Iraq in a cer- 
tain, detailed way. 

It does not, however, prevent or provide that Iraq cannot have 
a conventional weapon capability. 

Mrs. Meyers. What do you call the Scud delivery system? 

Mr. Gallucci. U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 does not 
deny them a conventional weapon capability. With respect to the 
Scud capability, anything over 150 kilometers in range is pre- 
cluded. And certainly a Scud capability is precluded. 

To the best of our knowledge, the Scuds that we have been able 
to identify and locate have all been destroyed. We cannot exclude 



11 

the fact that there may still be Scud or Scud variants hidden some- 
where in Iraq. And we, supporting the Special Commission, will 
continue to look for them. 

Yes, you are absolutely correct that capability should be de- 
stroyed. And if there were any cooperation with it, we should do 
what we could to cut it off, since it would be inconsistent with the 
Security Council Resolution. 

Mrs. Meyers. Do you think that we can safely assume that as 
long as Saddam Hussein and his party are in power that that gov- 
ernment will do everything possible to acquire nuclear weapons? 

Mr. Gallucci. I think that is a very safe assumption. 

Chairman Hamilton. Mr. Gejdenson. 

Mr. Gejdenson. What are we doing to try to preclude Iraq from 
getting fissionable material? 

Mr. GALLUCCI. The most important thing, I think, is that we sup- 
port the Special Commission and the IAEA in inspecting, contin- 
ually, everywhere that we have any reason to suspect there may 
be anything having to do with either enrichment or reprocessing. 

And at the same time, we focus as much of our energies as we 
can of assuring ourselves that nobody is exporting anything to Iraq 
that would provide a fissile material production capability or di- 
rectly provide fissile material. 

Mr. Gejdenson. One of the things that makes us nervous is that 
when the Soviet Union was together, it had probably a better pro- 
gram than the West for preventing that kind of material from leav- 
ing its control. The West always had some breaches, but we seemed 
to be doing all right. 

Now it seems to me we have a significant worry involving the 
former Soviet Union and its entities. And if you look at our record 
with Iraq, there were a number of signals along the way. 

What I wonder is, following the chairman's question on the list 
of companies that sold to Iraq, are we a little compromised in this 
situation? 

MDCED SIGNALS ON NONPROLIFERATION 

We should have gotten a signal that there was a reason to worry 
about Iraq. The Israelis bombed the Osirak reactor, at least they 
thought there was a nuclear threat there. 

In 1982, when many people were concerned about Saddam's be- 
havior and there was good indication that he was arming terror- 
ists, we took him off the terrorists list. 

In 1989, President Bush signed NSD 26 that basically was a 
message to help Saddam Hussein. Now what I am left with is two 
things. One, maybe we are doing as good a job as we can under 
the present multilateral agreements to prevent Iraq from getting 
new weapons capabilities. 

But it seems to me that, one, it is clear that you need a multilat- 
eral response in all these areas: chemical, biological, and nuclear. 
It is also clear that our multilateral responses are wholly inad- 
equate and that we have done things that have undermined the 
isolation of governments like Saddam Hussein's over the last dec- 
ade. 

Clearly other countries now are providing missile technology to 
Iran, if not to Iraq as well. At one point we found a White House 



12 

document where, in a debate over what they were selling to Sad- 
dam Hussein, somebody used the fact that Iraq was a signatory to 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a reason for the treatment 
of Iraq. 

How do we become more vigilant internationally when our own 
resolve is in question, as it was from 1982 to the invasion of Iraq? 

We seem to have other political and economic motives. We 
thought we could use Saddam Hussein. Other countries seem to 
think it is OK to sell missile technology to the Iranians. 

You have worked with international organizations and you have 
worked at the State Department. We have got to be a little purer 
in this game and stop using our politicians as a frontline. 

How do we communicate to our allies, who do not have a serious- 
ness about controlling nuclear proliferation, the importance of lim- 
iting weapons availability? 

Mr. Gallucci. Mr. Gejdenson, I think the answer to the ques- 
tion — I take the question: How can we do better? 

NONPROLIFERATION HAS BECOME A POLICY PRIORITY 

I think that, in the first instance, we have to identify the prob- 
lem of nuclear weapons proliferation, as well as the other problems 
of proliferation — chemical, biological, and ballistic missile — as a 
primary national concern and an objective to do something about 
it. And I think this administration has done that. 

Then we have to act consistent with that. And that means a 
number of things. I think it means supporting international insti- 
tutions that are designed to be elements in overall nonproliferation 
strategies. The International Atomic Energy Agency is one such 
agency. No agency and no institution is perfect. The IAEA has 
come a long way. And the thrust of much of my remarks this morn- 
ing is that it has come a long way recently and as a result of what 
happened in Iraq. 

And I would — as you listen to the rest of the testimony this 
morning, I would be concerned that one draw conclusions from 
parts of that testimony that may be critical of agency activity that 
would lead to a loss of support. Because as a representative of the 
administration on this issue, I think supporting the IAEA is one of 
the critical things that needs to happen. 

Mr. Gejdenson. Reports claim we now have the North Koreans 
making some adjustments, but I fear that they are just getting bet- 
ter at hiding things. I don't have an answer on how we get multi- 
lateral — I mean, can we feel confident that the Iraqis have no fis- 
sionable materials today? 

Mr. Gallucci. I am trying this morning not to make anybody 
feel real good about Iraq or North Korea. It is just that we have 
to engage these countries. I don't think that turning our back is the 
answer. 

Mr. Gejdenson. I agree. How do we get our allies, and ourselves 
at times, to not see any short-term political gain — as we obviously 
saw from 1982 to the invasion of Kuwait when, in the case of Iraq, 
we wanted to play off the Iranians or others in the area — to be 
more important than the transfer of technology that has incredible 
consequences today? What do we do to get them to focus on it? 



13 

Mr. Gallucci. Without rehashing the previous 8 years or so of 
history, I would say that very often a nonproliferation objective is 
embedded in regional analysis as other objectives as well. And 
sometimes the nonproliferation objective is best pursued within a 
regional context. Sometimes it isn't. 

RATIONALIZE U.S. EXPORT CONTROL LAWS 

Mr. Gejdenson. You know, in the last 10 years we were stopping 
the sale of bank credit cards to England while we were selling 
things to Iraq that needed nuclear licenses. It seems to me that if 
we are going to lead, we have to rationalize our export control laws 
to focus on the things that matter and get our friends to do the 
same. 

Chairman Hamilton. Mr. Manzullo. 

IRAQ'S BW PROGRAMS 

Mr. Manzullo. Thank you. 

Mr. Gallucci, I would like to return to a question posed by Mr. 
Hamilton. To your knowledge, have there been any sales to Iraq in 
violation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention? 

Mr. Gallucci. Not to my knowledge, that I can think of. No, sir. 

Mr. Manzullo. The companies to which you referred were en- 

faged in some type of commerce of biological weapons which you 
id not want to reveal 

Mr. Gallucci. I see. My reference earlier to information that I 
am sure the U.S. Government has on cooperation that companies 
engaged in with Iraq prior to the war, companies in other coun- 
tries, clearly are over a number of the areas of weapons of mass 
destruction. 

I myself don't know whether there was any cooperation in the 
area of biological weapons. I know in general terms what the Spe- 
cial Commission found. And I know what the Iraqis declared on the 
eve of the first biological weapons inspection. 

But I don't believe that got to the point of your question, which 
is, what was supplied by external suppliers? And off the top of my 
head, sir, I don't have any information about that. 

Mr. Manzullo. Do you believe that Iraq, at present, possesses 
biological weapons? 

Mr. GALLUCCI. I would say that it is highly unlikely, but I can't 
exclude the possibility. The Iraqis declared themselves to have had 
an offensive biological weapons program, which they told the Spe- 
cial Commission they had abandoned. I believe they said they 
abandoned it in the fall of 1990. They provided some examples or 
specimens of biological agents they had produced to the commis- 
sion. But they said that the program was no longer existent. 

There were a fairly large number of inspections that were aimed 
exclusively or partly at least at uncovering biological weapons ca- 
pability in Iraq, as I am sure you know, since the capability to 
produce biological weapons is fundamentally a dual-use capability. 
Many of the same pieces of equipment that one uses in a pharma- 
ceutical or some other area of legitimate industrial activity are also 
useful for a biological weapons program. 

And that is why I am reluctant to say that such a program 
doesn't exist. 



14 



CW STOCKPILES 



Mr. Manzullo. What about chemical weapons? 

Mr. Gallucci. The situation there is quite different. There were 
literally thousands of fabricated chemical weapons munitions of all 
kinds, from missile warheads to rockets to artillery shells, and ad- 
ditional thousands of tons of chemical agent, both mustard and 
nerve agents, and tens of thousands of tons of precursor chemicals 
in Iraq. 

And at the present time, and for some time, the Special Commis- 
sion has been, with the assistance of the Iraqis, drilling and drain- 
ing munitions and neutralizing chemical weapons and chemical 
agents. And that is going to continue for some time. The capability 
to produce chemical weapons was located at a few sites. Most of 
that has been destroyed, all that was exclusively designed and pre- 
pared for chemical weapons production. 

There are still additional things that need to be destroyed that 
the Special Commission is working on with the Iraqis. I could not 
offer assurances to you — nor, I think could anybody else — that 
there are not stockpiles of at least mustard agent weapons some- 
where in Iraq buried or hidden. It is impossible to give any assur- 
ance to that. 

The inspection regime, however, permits, as I have indicated be- 
fore, the Special Commission to go anywhere it deems necessary to 
do an inspection. And whenever the Special Commission has re- 
ceived information that there is something to look at, whether it 
be chemical weapons themselves, agents, precursors, or equipment, 
they have gone there. 

And there has been in the chemical areas, as in other areas, a 
process of peeling the skin on the onion and disclosing what there 
is in Iraq. But I cannot preclude that there is not more that the 
Special Commission and we do not know about. 

Mr. Manzullo. Do you feel that the chemical weapons that Iraq 
currently possesses were manufactured by that country or shipped 
externally from another country. 

Mr. Gallucci. I am certain that at least a large quantity — and 
I am sure that all of the chemical weapons were fabricated in Iraq. 
They have the capability to do that, and they are well able to. 

Chairman Hamilton. Mr. Lantos. 

Mr. Lantos. Thank you. 

Mr. Gallucci, you have been a very effective and able public serv- 
ant for many years, and the character and tone of my questions is 
not directed at you but at the palpable failure of our Government 
to pull together a coherent policy with respect to Iraq. So let me 
attempt to do that and ask you to comment on some questions. 

I don't think that these items we read on the front pages — that 
Iraq is harassing the inspectors from the International Atomic En- 
ergy Agency, that they are threatened, that they are intimidated, 
that their hotel rooms are bugged — and the attempt to assassinate 
the former President of the United States — which has now been 
fully confirmed to my satisfaction — can be understood separately. 
The attempt by Iraq to rebuild its conventional and 
nonconventional military capabilities is linked to its attempt to in- 
timidate the United Nations. I certainly consider it at least a possi- 



15 

bility that the successful FBI preemption of the attack on U.N. 
headquarters in New York was Iraqi-sponsored or financed. They 
have a beef with the United Nations, with the United Nations Se- 
curity Council, which maintains the sanctions regime. I think they 
all hang together. And I think if we look at tiny little parts and 
deal with tiny little parts, we are in danger of being like a child 
who looks at a complex picture which is a puzzle and doesn't see 
what is in that picture, which can be a very clear image of some- 
thing. 

THE BOMBING OF IRAQI INTELLIGENCE HQ 

So let me first just say for the record what a brilliant move it 
was by the President to bomb the facility that we did 48 hours ago. 
It was described by some of the press as an empty building. It was 
anything but an empty building. It was the symbol of torture for 
the Iraqi people. 

And I would like to just quote half a paragraph from an item ap- 
pearing in today's Washington Post by Jim Hoagland referring to 
that facility. 

"But Baghdadis know that thousands of innocent Iraqi civilians 
have been tortured to death in [this intelligence] compound. In 
April 1980, in one of the most gruesome and significant assassina- 
tions that occurred there, Saddam's secret police drove nails into 
the skull of Bakr Sadr, an important Iraqi Shiite religious leader, 
after raping his sister before his eyes. Other dissidents were 
poisoned with thalium. The compound was the center of Saddam's 
foreign espionage and terror operations." 

So I think it is important to realize that our Government, within 
the last 2 days, took action to strike at the symptom and substance 
of the center of Iraqi terror and intelligence operations. This is the 
framework in which this hearing is taking place. 

Now, I found your testimony, your prepared testimony, and your 
answers to Chairman Hamilton's questions, somewhat in conflict. 
And I would like to ask you, if I may begin with this, to clarify this 
conflict. 

In your prepared testimony you say, "Iraq, no doubt, will con- 
tinue to test the U.N.'s resolve to continue vigorous inspections, es- 
pecially if it perceives that support for them is waning, as in the 
past. Iraq will use tactics such as delaying or refusing access to 
sites, denying information, harassing inspectors, and refusing to ac- 
cept U.N. Security Council Resolution 715 to reduce the effective- 
ness of the inspections." I am still quoting. "Recently Iraq's efforts 
to undermine long-term monitoring have focused on two issues: 
Iraq has refused to allow the Special Commission to install cam- 
eras at two rocket motor test stands and has refused to destroy cer- 
tain chemical weapons precursors and related equipment. 

"On June 18, the Security Council adopted the Presidential 
Statement that Iraq's refusal to cooperate with the Special Com- 
mission in these matters constitutes," I quote, "a material and un- 
acceptable breach" — a material and unacceptable breach — "of U.N. 
Security Counsel Resolution 687 and a violation of Resolutions 707 
and 715. The Statement warns of serious consequences." 



16 

A HISTORY OF LIES AND DECEPTION 

Now, if this is your prepared testimony on behalf of the Depart- 
ment of State, I find it incomprehensible that in response to ques- 
tions by the chairman you say that we believe that declared facili- 
ties are known to us, and of course, there may be undeclared facili- 
ties. But how can we deal with undeclared facilities? I mean, the 
whole history of Saddam's performance, both before and after the 
invasion of Kuwait, was one of deception and lies and attempts to 
evade the leaky system of Western controls. 

We now know — and I am sure you do — that a large number of 
firms in Germany, France, and other countries, functioned as pur- 
chasing agents for Iraq, that a large number of Jordanian compa- 
nies functioned in this capacity, that there were large transfers of 
financial resources so that Iraq would be able to avoid the freeze 
on its assets. 

And we all understand that there has been an enormous rebuild- 
ing of Iraq's military capability. 

Now it was just days before the invasion of Kuwait that the 
State Department gave such an optimistic picture that we can do 
business with these people, and we can work with these people. 
And I would hate to see this administration fall into the same trap. 
We are dealing with Saddam Hussein, who, according to the state- 
ments and actions of the President of the United States, 3 days 
ago, attempted to assassinate the previous President of the United 
States. 

Is it really that difficult to pull together all the information with 
all of the resources of the administration to demonstrate that Iraq 
is hell bent — hell bent on developing or redeveloping or restoring 
its nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional facilities? 

Mr. Gallucci. Mr. Lantos, may I respond? 

Mr. Lantos. Please. 

Mr. Gallucci. I suppose the written record will show, but I don't 
believe I ever said — and if I did, let's change the written record. 

I don't believe I said that we are inspecting and destroying facili- 
ties only that Iraq has declared. I yield to no one in my belief that 
Iraq lies and has repeatedly lied, gets caught at having lied, and 
lies again, without any show of remorse. And I have personal expe- 
rience with that chain of events. 

Mr. Lantos. Could you tell us about that, your personal events. 

IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM HAS BEEN "KNOCKED FLAT" 

Mr. Gallucci. I could, Mr. Lantos, and I will. But I need to — 
if I could first make one other comment here. The point I wanted 
to make earlier and in the testimony that you quoted, was that we 
have — we the United States and other governments who have fo- 
cused their energies on the Iraqi situation with respect to weapons 
of mass destruction, particularly the nuclear program — have pro- 
vided information to the IAEA and the Special Commission on 
every place that we could identify; and that, therefore, the agent, 
the IAEA and the Special Commission, could identify. They nave 
gone to each place and any time they have found anything that de- 
served to be destroyed under 687, it has been destroyed. We believe 
that program has been knocked flat. 



17 

Two other additional points that I have made I need to make 
again. We believe that program has been knocked flat. We cannot 
be absolutely certain that there isn't something hidden we haven't 
found. And nobody, I think, is going to want to make that assertion 
to you. 

And the second point is that, given the intent that we believe 
that regime, Saddam Hussein, has to rebuild the nuclear program 
and the other programs, given the resources that would fall to that 
government if the embargo were lifted and if they could sell oil, 
and given the fact that it is an industrial society and the experts, 
the scientists, and the engineers are still there, we believe they 
could, in the proper environment, rebuild. And, therefore, we be- 
lieve the sanctions are vital and the long-term monitoring of the re- 
gime is absolutely vital that the IAEA and the Special Commission 
would implement. 

Chairman Hamilton. Do you have another question? 

Mr. Lantos. Yes, I do. 

With what degree of assurance can you say that no other coun- 
try, ranging from Jordan to individual companies in Western Eu- 
rope, is Functioning today as a front organization for Iraq's military 
procurement network? 

Mr. Gallucci. At the current time, I am unaware of any organi- 
zation acting in the way that you just described. I cannot exclude 
the possibility. But I myself am unaware of companies breaking the 
embargo and acting in that way. 

Mr. Lantos. Are you aware that as we speak German customs 
is investigating well over 100 German companies with respect to 
this issue? 

Mr. Gallucci. I am not. 

Mr. Lantos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Hamilton. Mr. Hastings. 

IRAQ IS STILL PREVENTING INSPECTION FLIGHTS OVER BAGHDAD 

Mr. Hastings. Thank you, Mr. Gallucci, for being patient. I will 
be brief. 

Iraq has demanded that IAEA and UNSCOM not fly over Bagh- 
dad proper. And this is a demand, of course, which has been re- 
jected but apparently not directly challenged. 

The demand that Iraq makes conflicts with United Nations Secu- 
rity Council Resolution 707. 

My question, Mr. Gallucci, is why has IAEA and UNSCOM not 
tried to fly over Baghdad proper to challenge Iraq on that restric- 
tion? 

And, second, what is the United States doing to help the inspec- 
tors gain unrestricted access and achieve their rights under the 
United Nations cease-fire Resolution? 

And should military action be contemplated in this case? 

Mr. Gallucci. Mr. Hastings, the specific case you referred to of 
the overflight of helicopters of Baghdad proper, which the Iraqis 
have refused to permit the Special Commission to do, is one of a 
number of cases in which we have had noncooperation from the 
Iraqis. And they vary in importance. And when they get important 
enough, then, in the past, actions have been taken by the inter- 
national community. 



18 

In each individual case, an assessment in the first instance is 
made by the Chairman of the Special Commission, Rolf Ekeus. 
Then he takes it to the Security Council, and the Security Council, 
of course, needs to consult to see whether that incident is of suffi- 
cient moment to act. That is the sequence we have been proceeding 
under for the last year and a half or so. 

I know that the Special Commission regards the Iraqi refusal to 
permit the helicopter flights as an infringement on their inspection 
activities, and they very much want to conduct those flights. They 
have been taking other steps to compensate. They are not as effi- 
cient. They are not as good. But I don't think they have been fun- 
damentally hampered on their ability to move about. 

I think over the long-term it is like Resolution 715. Acceptance 
by Iraq is something that the Special Commission will want to 
have and will insist upon having. 

As I say, in a general way, though, every time an issue like this 
comes up, we in the United States need to consult with our allies 
and see what action is appropriate. Right now we have a case be- 
fore us where the Iraqis are refusing on two issues: one, the sta- 
tionary cameras at the test stand, and two, some movement of 
chemical precursors and equipment. This is a matter on which the 
United States will consult the Security Council and others; and ap- 
propriate action, I am sure, will be taken if this issue isn't other- 
wise resolved. 

But we must, in every case, ensure that the case before us is one 
that will sustain whatever action is contemplated. 

Mr. Hastings. Saddam is saying you can't fly over Baghdad. The 
U.N. is saying that this is an inappropriate response to unre- 
stricted access. If then we don't fly over Baghdad what we are say- 
ing, in essence, is that all of your clandestine procurement opportu- 
nities are being fostered; or at least, if they are happening in Bagh- 
dad, we aren't immediately in a position to do anything about it. 

I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, but I couldn't resist a followup. 

Mr. Gallucci. Let me followup. It is not that the Special Com- 
mission cannot move around with freedom in Baghdad. It does 
that. It has any number of vehicles available to it, and it moves 
all about Baghdad. 

There is an advantage to being able to move about with heli- 
copters and to do monitoring with helicopters. And that is some- 
thing that we support the Special Commission in seeking to have. 
They have compensated, as I said. And they do have movement 
and access. 

Chairman Hamilton. Mr. Fingerhut. 

CONCERN OVER IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM 

Mr. Fingerhut. Thank you. 

I know we are here to talk about Iraq; but in your written testi- 
mony and also in a number of other questions, including Mr. Lan- 
tos' and others, we expanded the scope of the discussion a little bit. 
And since I think we have covered Iraq pretty thoroughly, what 
disturbed me about the issue of the nuclear proliferation is that, 
even in the case of Iraq, where we have extraordinary access as a 
result of the Gulf War and where we have the United Nations 
backing up, literally day-by-day, as we do battle with Saddam Hus- 



19 

sein over inspections and all of the technicalities of the important 
work in which you are engaged, even there we still have some 
question as to whether or not we have effectively stopped Saddam 
Hussein from getting back into the nuclear weapons business. 

How much behind the eight ball must we be in all of the neigh- 
boring countries — Iran particularly concerns me, but other coun- 
tries do as well — where we don't have the kind of constant atten- 
tion and access and international backup that you have in Iraq? 
And what would it take — I guess two questions. 

First, how concerned are you that, as we sit here and critically, 
but also in a way, sort of self-congratulatory way, applaud our 
work in Iraq — how close are we to losing the game in neighboring 
countries? 

And what would it require of us if we were serious about making 
these same efforts in other countries? 

Mr. Gallucci. I think that the point is that we are engaged ac- 
tively in addressing the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation 
in neighboring countries and in countries in other regions. The 
point is that it will require active engagement. You are absolutely 
correct. 

There are countries with regimes that are dedicated to the acqui- 
sition of nuclear weapons, we believe. And we must be as dedicated 
to preventing their acquisition. The means to doing that, I think, 
in the first instance, is the acquisition of information about their 
intentions and how they are proceeding. 

And so, I think, in the first question — and I think it is embedded 
in the question that you asked — is how good is our information and 
are we putting enough resources in the effort to prevent prolifera- 
tion? I think the answers are moving initially in that direction, and 
our information in some cases is very good and in other cases not 
so good, depending on how difficult the problem is. 

In terms of the activity that we launch after we have informa- 
tion, part of that is diplomatic activity to prevent exports. As hard 
as it is to believe, most countries do not build nuclear weapons in- 
digenously. They purchase the equipment and facilities they need 
to produce the fissile material and to produce the triggering mecha- 
nism. 

That gives us an opportunity to prevent sensitive exports to 
countries that wish to build nuclear weapons. And we are doing 
that. So I think that is extremely important. 

The final element is the international regimes. And I would put 
at the top of the list the international safeguards regime. 

THE U.S. SEEKS A NUCLEAR EMBARGO ON IRAN 

Mr. Fingerhut. Should we be at five-alarm stage in any of the 
neighboring countries or, indeed, in another region? Obviously, we 
have talked about North Korea and Iran. 

Mr. Gallucci. I don't know how many alarms are appropriate. 
But very high on our list is our concern about Iran. It is not so 
much of concern because of their present capability to produce nu- 
clear weapons but rather their intentions. Given the enormous fi- 
nancial resources available to them, and our concerns that are 
based upon their interest in acquiring research reactors — heavy 
water moderated or graphite moderated natural uranium reac- 



20 

tors — our position is that we would like no country to engage in nu- 
clear cooperation of any kind with Iran in light of the political ori- 
entations of its regime. 

Chairman Hamilton. Mr. Fingerhut, I apologize for interrupting. 
We have a series of votes on the floor. We will have to recess at 
once. When we get to the floor, we will see how long it is going to 
take us to vote. But I am told there will be one 15-minute vote 
which is pending now, and then several shorter votes. I am not too 
sure how many at the moment. 

Mr. Gallucci, what is your schedule? Do you have to leave very 
shortly? 

Mr. Gallucci. Yes, I do, as a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Hamilton. I think we will have to excuse you with ap- 
preciation for your testimony this morning and thank you for it. 

I don't think it is going to be possible to keep you here because 
it is going to be at least a half-hour or more before we are able to 
get back. 

So we will recess now. 

Mr. Oberstar. 

Mr. Oberstar. May I pose a question for the record? 

Chairman Hamilton. Certainly. 

SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL 

Mr. Oberstar. In subsequent testimony from the Nuclear Con- 
trol Institute, a statement is raised that I would like you to re- 
spond to, and that is that the IAEA continues to perpetuate the 
myth that its safeguards on nuclear materials are effective and 
goes on to state that the materials are fundamentally 
unsafeguardable and the proof came at the time of the Gulf War 
when Iraq secretly removed its nuclear stockpile to the Tuwaitha 
facility. 

In your statement you say, "We must continue to press Iraq to 
reveal its foreign suppliers, and work with other suppliers to en- 
sure effective monitoring of exports to prevent diversion." That 
seems, to me, rather naive, to believe that Iraq will voluntarily re- 
veal information. 

So I would like your comment on the Nuclear Control Institute 
statement. And I would like a comment on what specific things the 
United States is doing, not just to be polite with Iraq but to press 
our allies — this is no great secret, you know, who these suppliers 
are and how to apply pressure to them. 

And since we don t have time for you to respond, I will just leave 
it at that. 

Mr. Lantos [presiding]. You will submit the response in writing, 
Mr. Gallucci? Or would you like to comment on it now? 

Mr. Gallucci. I would like to briefly comment, and I will also 
provide in it writing. 

On the question of pressing the Iraqis to provide the names of 
their suppliers, I think we should, and do, press the Iraqis to pro- 
vide what they ought to provide. That doesn't mean that we expect 
them to. And I don't believe that we are naive when it comes to 
the State of Iraq and their leadership. 

With respect to the safeguarding of material and what I assume 
is meant in the quote by the Nuclear Control Institute, this raises 



21 

the difficulty of assuring that fissile material — that is to say ura- 
nium or plutonium, subject to safeguards — can be assuredly pre- 
vented from becoming a part of a nuclear weapons program. They 
can be subject to safeguards, which means that material can be ac- 
counted for. It doesn't mean that there is an assurance that it will 
not be taken out of safeguards and used for weapons. 

The basic misunderstanding is what one can expect from safe- 
guards. Safeguards cannot prevent. Inspectors are not policemen. 
They can provide assurances on where it is located. That is all we 
ask of it, and that is all we could expect of it. It requires for states 
to do otherwise. 

[The response by the Department of State follows:] 

The argument suggests that safeguards are fundamentally flawed because Iraq, 
during the course of the war, removed the fuel from its research reactors and moved 
that fuel to a secret location to secure the fuel against attack. However, Iraq 
promptly informed the IAEA that the fuel was removed. They told the IAEA that 
the new location would remain secret during the war to protect the fuel from attack. 

Iraq's actions do not indicate that this nuclear material is unsafeguardable; they 
indicate that IAEA safeguards were designed to provide assurances during times of 
peace. The IAEA's record of verifying nuclear materials accounting demonstrates 
that nuclear materials are safeguardable, and that the IAEA is up to the job we 
give it. 

Before the Gulf War the international community did not accept the premise that 
the IAEA should search for covert nuclear activities. Iraq's secret enrichment pro- 
grams, uncovered after the Gulf War, demonstrated that the IAEA must be 
strengthened and given the tools to detect covert nuclear activities. The IAEA's 
Board of Governors has acted and we are now giving the IAEA the necessary tools, 
including wider access, more kinds of information, and environmental monitoring 
capabilities. 

Mr. Lantos. Mr. Gallucci, on behalf of the committee, I want to 
thank you very much for your testimony. 

The subcommittees will be in recess for approximately 30 min- 
utes. 

[Whereupon a brief recess was taken.] 

Mr. Lantos [presiding]. The hearing of the joint subcommittees 
will resume. 

We would like to ask the four witnesses of the second panel — Mr. 
Jules Kroll, Gary Milhollin, Jay Davis, and Lawrence Scheinman — 
to please take their seats. 

I am delighted to have all of you. I want to apologize for the dis- 
jointed character of the hearing, but we are still in a heavy voting 
mode, so we will undoubtedly have some interruptions. 

We will begin, with you Mr. Kroll. 

Your prepared statement will be entered in its entirety in the 
record. You may proceed in any way that you choose. I would ask 
to you speak very close to the microphone. 

STATEMENT OF JULES KROLL, PRESIDENT, KROLL 

ASSOCIATES 

Mr. Kroll. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your interest in this 
subject and staying the course while many others have not. I think 
my statement is rather self-explanatory; and in the interest of 
time, I have a few statements to make and will let the written 
record speak for itself. 

Mr. Lantos. You will summarize the prepared statement? 



22 

Mr. Kroll. Yes. I think the key point that I would like to 
present today, very simply, is that the network and the arrange- 
ment that was set up in the years prior to the invasion of August 
of 1990 still exists. Some of the players have changed, but the 
strategy is essentially the same. Some of the air has gone out of 
the balloon, but the balloon itself exists. And some of the same per- 
sons that were active before still exist in the same roles as they 
previously had. 

That is my first point, very simply. 

SMUGGLING ACROSS THE BORDERS 

Secondly, that in an age where we depend so much on technology 
and satellite photos and cameras, et cetera, to track what's going 
on in the world, some very fundamental observations indicate to us 
that things are going on. In particular, if one were to stand at the 
border, or the borders, of Iraq — at the Jordanian/Iraqi border, at 
the Syrian border, at the Iranian border — you would see on any 
given day hundreds and hundreds of semitrailers and other forms 
of large vehicles going into Iraq and leaving Iraq. And the degree 
of inspection at the various points along those borders is extremely 
modest. 

The fact is that, without human inspections, without technical 
use of equipment to monitor what is coming over those borders, no 
one really knows what's in those trucks. Steel can easily be buried 
underneath lettuce, and military equipment can easily be buried 
underneath pharmaceuticals. And it is, very simply, a question of 
needing a policeman on the beat in each of those locations. 

So I have two essential points to make: One is the kind of pro- 
curement network that existed previously still exists. Many of the 
same businessmen who were operating in France, Germany, the 
UK, Switzerland, Austria and other countries, are still there. Many 
of those people are still individuals of immense wealth. The ques- 
tion is still an open one as to whose wealth is that, really? 

Clearly 

Mr. Lantos. Are you suggesting that these individuals may well 
be using Iraqi Government funds on behalf of the Iraqi Govern- 
ment and are used merely as facades, as surrogates, as front orga- 
nizations to pursue the procurement policy of Iraq? 

Mr. Kroll. I think that is a distinct possibility. 

One of the lessons we learned from the prior procurement net- 
work, a part of which was exposed TDG, Matrix Churchill, et 
cetera, in some of the other countries, is that seemingly commercial 
enterprises were run as Iraqi front organizations. 

And I don't believe that has changed very much. You still have 
some individuals who were active today as they were then. 

I think at this point, it might be more productive in terms of the 
use of time and the time of the other witnesses if you had some 
questions for me in your areas of interest. I would like to try to 
respond. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kroll appears in the appendix.] 

Mr. Lantos. Well, we do have a number of questions to ask of 
you. But before I come into questions, I want to ask you to com- 
ment on the general issue of the financial network. 



23 



THE ROLE OF JORDAN 



In your prepared statement, and I quote, you are saying the fol- 
lowing: "The financial network, until recently under the control of 
Barzan Al-Tikriti, Saddam's half brother and formerly Iraq's per- 
manent representative to the U.N. in Geneva, continues to transact 
business out of Switzerland. 

"The military procurement network, under the control of Hussein 
Kamel, Saddam's son-in-law and former head of the Ministry of 
Military Industrialization, has received more publicity as a result 
of the Matrix Churchill investigations in the U.S. and abroad. Al- 
though several of these individuals and companies have been ex- 
posed, we believe that the network has been, or will be, reestab- 
lished." 

What do you think is the role of Jordan in all of this at the mo- 
ment? 

Mr. Kroll. Well, the role has changed somewhat. I think in the 
spring of 1992, due to the pressures from the United States, the 
level of activity going from Jordan to Iraq and back was somewhat 
reduced. 

However, one must realize that a substantial portion of the com- 
mercial infrastructure of Baghdad moved lock, stock, and barrel to 
Amman where trading activity, commercial activities, financial ar- 
rangements, were more easily and more freely set up. I don't think 
that that has changed very much. 

I think today if you want to seek to do business with Iraq on any 
series of subjects, you are more likely to be able to conduct that 
transaction in Amman. So it is still a very important location. I 
don't mean to necessarily imply that this is something backed and 
sponsored by the Jordanian Government. 

I found the King's comments in recent weeks to be very interest- 
ing regarding Saddam Hussein. But Jordan is clearly at the center 
of commercial transactions vis-a-vis Baghdad. 

I think the second most important location is Geneva, and the 
third is Vienna. 

IRAQI ASSETS ABROAD 

Mr. Lantos. Now, what is the extent — even if you can just give 
us a ballpark figure — of preexisting Iraqi resources which were 
moved out of the country so as to avoid the freeze on Iraqi assets? 
Are we talking about billions? 

Mr. Kroll. Yes. 

Let me try to break those into three categories of assets. There 
are the assets that are well known and documented that are cur- 
rently frozen. Those are in the billions. Many of those assets sit in 
banks today and are demarcated as the assets of the Iraqi Govern- 
ment. 

I think the second level of assets, also in the billions, are monies, 
stock in companies, gold, that was moved out either shortly before 
the invasion or shortly after the invasion. That would be the second 
category. 

And then you have the third 

Mr. Lantos. And you say that the second category, which are ba- 
sically Iraqi Government assets, are currently at the disposal of the 



24 

Iraqi Government, contrary to United Nations Security Council 
Resolution, and used to obtain military and other supplies? 

Mr. Kroll. Yes. My problem with giving precise estimates is 
that we don't know. Without a chance to look at the books and 
records of the financial institutions in question, which I think is 
critical because you can have all the inspectors and all the cameras 
and all the spy satellites you want, but quite often in a business 
matter you are going to learn more from books and records than 
anything else. 

Mr. Lantos. But you believe these are in the billions? 

Mr. Kroll. Yes, they were. I think it has been diminished some- 
what. They are no longer paying quite as frequently in gold. That 
has essentially stopped in the last 6 to 9 months. But it is in the 
billions. 

SLEEPING ASSETS 

The third category of assets are assets that I would call sleeping 
assets. These are assets that have appeared for years and belong 
to individuals in companies that are really a mix of Saddam's per- 
sonal assets, the assets of the Ba'athist regime and the Iraqi Gov- 
ernment. And this category, as well, is very substantial, I would 
say in the billions. 

Estimating the precise amounts of these is difficult without ac- 
cess to the books and records. I would urge the international com- 
munity to spend more time trying to get at those books and 
records. I think we would learn a great deal. 

Mr. Lantos. I will ask this question of all witnesses, and since 
you are our first one, you are getting this question first. There are 
certain sanctions currently in effect on Iraq. In order to achieve the 
goals of the international community, which aims basically at sta- 
bilizing the region and of having a modicum of peace, do you be- 
lieve that sanctions currently imposed on Iraq should be, one, lift- 
ed; two, weakened; three, maintained; or, four, strengthened? 

Mr. Kroll. Again, given where I come from and given my per- 
spective on this, I would argue for strengthening those embargoes, 
in part, because you need to analyze how effective the embargoes 
have been to date. They have been partially effective. 

I think the direct sale of oil has been pretty much stymied. 

Mr. Lantos. Not entirely? 

Mr. Kroll. No. There is significant movement that we know of, 
but of a limited amount, moving over the borders by these trucks 
with these enormous tanks underneath. We believe, but cannot yet 
substantiate, that there are countries friendly to Iraq that are sup- 
plying credit by selling their own oil and giving credit to vendors 
who wish to sell things to Iraq without literally having to sell Iraqi 
oil. We have a proof problem there. 

But given the fact that Iraq has rebuilt so much of their infra- 
structure, they have clearly not done it purely out of existing in- 
ventories and parts and supplies. So they have gotten it from out- 
side. 

With the passage of time and with the international community 
weakening by the day because of their desire for commercial gain, 
logic tells me that what you'll have is increased desire for increased 
trade. 



25 

The number of delegations going to Baghdad and going to 
Amman seeking to sell things is not diminishing; it is increasing. 
And that is where the pressure will continue to come from. 

I think we need to strengthen the embargo if we want to achieve 
the purpose of the U.N. resolutions. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Kroll. 

We will need to briefly suspend the hearing because we have a 
vote. We will resume in about 10 minutes. 

The meeting is in recess. 

[Whereupon a short recess was taken.] 

Mr. Lantos. The joint hearing of the subcommittees on Europe 
and the Middle East, on Economic Policy, Trade and Environment, 
and on International Security, International Organizations and 
Human Rights will now resume. 

Our next witness is Mr. Milhollin. 

Your prepared statement will be entered into the record in its en- 
tirety. You may proceed in any way that you choose. 

STATEMENT OF GARY MILHOLLIN, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY 
OF WISCONSIN LAW SCHOOL AND DIRECTOR, THE WISCON- 
SIN PROJECT ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL 

Mr. MILHOLLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am pleased to have this opportunity to address these three dis- 
tinguished subcommittees. 

I would like to begin by giving a little background on this situa- 
tion. I think it is useful to point out that in roughly 1 month we 
will pass the third anniversary of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. If Iraq 
had not invaded Kuwait, it is very likely that Saddam himself 
would be passing a milestone about now: He would be assembling 
his first atomic bomb. 

Two U.N. inspectors, David Kay and Jay Davis, have estimated 
that at the time of the invasion, Iraq was 18 to 30 months away 
from producing its first critical mass of nuclear weapon material. 
We have now passed the 30-month mark. 

THE IAEA WAS ASLEEP AT THE SWITCH 

One of the most frightening things about this possibility is that 
the International Atomic Energy Agency did not and never would 
have detected it. Before the invasion, the Agency rated Iraq's com- 
pliance as exemplary. And in fact it was exemplary at the locations 
where they inspected, but they did not inspect where Iraq was 
making the bomb. The Agency only inspects locations that are de- 
clared by the country being inspected, and so far no country has 
made a bomb at a disclosed site. 

Now, Iraq is a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, as 
such, it promises not to make the bomb and it promises to declare 
all of its work with plutonium and enriched uranium to the IAEA. 
Iraq secretly broke both of these promises at the time when the 
Agency was rating its performance as exemplary or its compliance 
as exemplary. 

Mr. Lantos. Mr. Milhollin, what you are saying is so imminently 
sensible and reasonable that I wonder how long this charade will 
continue on the part of much of the international community of 
concluding that, since declared sites appear not to be production fa- 



26 

cilities for nuclear weapons, we can say with a high degree of as- 
surance that nothing is happening. 

And as you point out, all of the activity that is interestingly tak- 
ing place, obviously, is at undeclared sites. And since undeclared 
sites are difficult to find in some instances, the degree of assurance 
that the international community has vis-a-vis Iraq, Iran, North 
Korea, whatever, is really — by force is — very limited, isn't it? 

Mr. MlLHOLLlN. Yes, it is. And it turns out, if you simply look 
at the history of the development of bomb programs around the 
world, you see that international safeguards have been pretty 
much irrelevant to this activity, precisely because it has not oc- 
curred at sites that were inspected. 

We were lucky in Iraq. If Iraq had not invaded Kuwait, this 
strategy would have worked. They could have joined the Non-Pro- 
liferation Treaty, enjoyed all the benefits and still have developed 
the bomb. 

Iran is following the same strategy and so is Libya and so is 
North Korea. In a sense, though, it is unfair to criticize the Agency 
for not doing a job that it was not set up to do. The Agency's pri- 
mary function has been to promote the spread of nuclear tech- 
nology. It runs training programs; it sends out experts of its own; 
and, most of all, it agrees to inspect exports by more advanced nu- 
clear countries to less advanced nuclear countries. 

THE IAEA'S CONFLICT OF INTEREST 

If a supplier, for example, wants to sell a reactor to a country 
like India or Pakistan, the Agency provides a guarantee that the 
reactor's plutonium will not be used to make nuclear weapons. 
Without this guarantee, it would not be possible politically to make 
the sale. The result has been that because the Agency stands ready 
to cooperate in nuclear exports, nuclear technology has spread 
more rapidly around the world. India and Pakistan both got reac- 
tors under Agency safeguards. And since getting those reactors, 
both countries have made the bomb. 

The Agency has a built-in conflict of interest. If it catches some- 
body making a bomb with an export, that means that the export 
was too dangerous to have been sold in the first place and should 
not have been promoted. 

So there is an institutional incentive at the Agency always to 
find that nothing is wrong. 

In the United States, we had this same problem with the old 
Atomic Energy Commission, it had the dual functions of promotion 
and inspection until Congress wisely split those functions in 1974. 

Now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulates nuclear 
power, and the Department of Energy promotes it. The regulation 
of nuclear power in the United States gained great credibility from 
this separation. It seems to me that we ought to do the same thing 
internationally and separate the Agency's promotion function from 
its inspection function. I think the Agency would gain great credi- 
bility from this, and it would get over this problem of a conflict of 
interest. 



27 

THE CHINESE REACTOR SALE TO IRAN 

I'd like to mention the fact that the Chinese are now planning 
to sell a reactor to Iran, as everyone knows. The reactor will be at 
least 300 megawatts, enough to make enough plutonium for 10 
bombs per year at a minimum. 

The Agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency, stands 
ready to cooperate with this deal and make it politically possible 
to achieve the export. 

So, in Iran, we will be essentially relying on a piece of paper 
signed by the Iranians saying that the plutonium from this reactor 
will not be diverted. The United States opposed this deal because 
it is a giant nuclear technology transfer to Iran, moving them a 
long way down the road to nuclear weapons, regardless of what 
promises are made. 

The IAEA, however, stands ready to cooperate with it. The sub- 
committee has asked specifically about Iraq. So far as we can tell, 
from the Special Commission, which is in charge of the chemical 
and missile inspections, there has been good progress in destroying 
chemical agents, munitions, and precursors. The commission ex- 
pects to have destroyed all of them by the end of this year. 

With respect to missiles, the U.N. inspectors report that they 
have narrowed the uncertainty as to how many Soviet-supplied 
Scuds the Iraqis may have left. The uncertainty is in the number 
launched from 1980 to 1982. And the Iraqis have not provided the 
kind of documentation necessary to substantiate their claims. So 
there is an outstanding issue there. 

I think the committee has already alluded to the current dead- 
lock over destroying equipment used to make chemical weapons 
and the deadlock over placing cameras at missile test sites. Those 
issues are still outstanding. 

I expect that the Special Commission will demand that they be 
resolved because it goes to the core of their inspection and monitor- 
ing efforts. And so I think there is a real live question now about 
what we must do to get Iraq to back down and cooperate. 

I would like to make a few other points. First of all, I think the 
inspectors deserve a lot of credit. They have carried out a difficult, 
dangerous job that is physically and mentally exhausting and dan- 
gerous even to their safety. They, I think, deserve the greatest pos- 
sible support and cooperation from the Agency's management. But 
I don't think they have always received it. 

THE IAEA CHIEF INSPECTOR HAS "UNDERMINED" MORALE 

The chief inspector, in particular, has said repeatedly to the 
press that, in effect, there is nothing more to find in Iraq. I think 
the effect of these statements has been to undermine the ability of 
the inspectors to to keep their morale up and keep the pressure on 
the Iraqis. 

The Special Commission doesn't agree with the statements by 
the chief inspector. The Special Commission thinks there are still 
things to find. And the Special Commission doesn't think the Iraqis 
have given up their desire or their goal to make nuclear weapons. 
And as we have just heard this morning, neither does the U.S. 
Government. 



28 

The Special Commission, and I think also the U.S. Government, 
hopes the following things can still be found in Iraq. These are 
things that we are still looking for. 

First we are still looking tor parts of the giant machines that 
Iraq used to enrich uranium. These particular parts will tell us 
how much uranium they managed to enrich and at what level of 
enrichment. 

There also is a part of the centrifuge program that we think still 
exists that hasn't Seen found. 

Also, the identities of the Iraqi nuclear personnel have not all 
been established, and we don't know what these persons are doing. 

We don't have all the records of explosive tests that Iraq carried 
out to see how far they got with nuclear weapons design. 

We have never found the entire database describing all the nu- 
clear weapon programs. That is very important. We know it exists, 
but we haven't found it. 

Nor have we identified Iraq's foreign sources of technical advice 
so we can cut them off. 

And we have not identified Iraq's network of foreign suppliers. 
These mercenaries stand ready to go back into action as soon as 
Iraq gets the money to pay them. 

SPLITTING THE IAEA'S FUNCTIONS 

Finally, the subcommittee has asked me to comment on how the 
International Atomic Energy Agency's inspections can be improved. 
I could recommend that the Agency's functions be split up so as to 
get rid of the conflict of interest, as I have already said. I think 
the Agency should continue to inspect declared locations. It knows 
how to do that. 

But I think we need a new entity that can look for undeclared 
locations. I think the entity should report directly to the Security 
Council, which can back it up with force whenever it runs into 
noncooperation. 

The new entity also should be able to use and receive and protect 
intelligence information. The current agency does not have that ca- 
pability. 

U.S. intelligence officials say that the Agency has been a one-way 
street: Information goes in, but no information comes out. That is 
because the Agency still regards its safeguarding functions as con- 
fidential. 

The Agency's inspections play only a minor role in the effort to 
stop the bomb. As I said already, in countries like Israel, India, 
Pakistan, and South Africa, the Agency's inspections have been vir- 
tually irrelevant. We need more powerful tools. I would say that 
they include, first, tougher diplomacy; second, trade sanctions; 
third, aid cutoffs; and, fourth, denials of technology through export 
controls. 

It is important to keep the Agency's inspections as strong as pos- 
sible, and it is certainly possible to improve them. But I think it 
would be a mistake to think that by tinkering with the Agency's 
inspection system we are going to seriously affect proliferation. 

Mr. Lantos. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Milhollin appears in the appen- 
dix.] 



29 

Our next witness is Mr. Jay Davis of the Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory. 

Your prepared statement will be entered in the record in its en- 
tirety. You may proceed in any way that you choose. 

STATEMENT OF JAY C. DAVIS, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR AC- 
CELERATOR MASS SPECTROMETRY AND PROGRAM LEADER, 
GEOSCDENCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH, PHYSICAL 
SCIENCES DD1ECTORATE, LAWRENCE LrVHERMORE NA- 
TIONAL LABORATORY 

Mr. Davis. Thank you. Today's hearing is particularly timely, as 
yesterday was the second anniversary for the unannounced inspec- 
tion and subsequent truck chase at Fallujah 

Mr. Lantos. Could you briefly describe that episode, because not 
everybody may be aware of it, as I think you are, and, to some ex- 
tent, I am. 

THE NUCLEAR CHASE AT FALLUJAH 

Mr. Davis. On the second U.N. inspection, the team was in Iraq 
to look for the technology of electromagnetic isotope separation, the 
redeployment of the uranium enrichment program employed by 
only the United States and then abandoned by us and all other 
countries. 

The equipment is large, and the pieces weigh 60 tons. So the 
Iraqis assembled a truck convoy of 100 tank transports carrying 
this equipment that had been moving around the country and stay- 
ing ahead of inspections. 

Assistant Secretary Gallucci and I, 3 days before the events at 
Fallujah, took a group of inspectors to Al Gahrib. The Iraqis denied 
us access to that facility. We withdrew back to Baghdad. When the 
U.N. gained us access 3 days later, the facility was inspected and 
found empty. To our surprise, we got an intelligence update to go 
to Fallujah. And after some planning, which I will describe further, 
we ran the first-ever unannounced, zero-notice inspection carried 
out by any agency. 

In the process of that inspection, we were able to panic the 
Iraqis. They tried to flee from the compound with the equipment. 
We were successful in photographing that equipment, producing 
evidence of a covert program and Iraqi activities to not comply with 
the U.N. resolution. It involved shots being fired at U.N. inspec- 
tors, but it was a very successful and aggressive operation. 

Mr. Lantos. Well, if equipment or documentation or materials 
that the Iraqis don't want the world to find they move around, even 
equipment as vast and as complex as this, 100 trucks carrying 
huge pieces of equipment, and they attempt to hide this, doesn't it 
make elementary, common sense that materials which are much 
easier to hide or documentation that is much easier to hide, they 
clearly will also attempt to do? 

Therefore, the statement that "we know what they have, what 
they are doing," is really a very naive statement because Iraq is a, 
physically, large country with enormous capabilities for hiding such 
materials or facilities or documentation. 

Would you agree with that, Mr. Davis? 



30 

Mr. Davis. I might disagree in a small sense, Mr. Chairman, in 
that the events at Fallujah so totally shocked the Iraqis, the 
threats made by both the United States and the Security Council, 
after we were withdrawn from the country were quite substantial, 
that they divulged much more than we expected and perhaps much 
more than they needed to. We have likened the process to peeling 
an onion. 

And I think we have been able to combine the divulgations they 
made and the inconsistencies in those divulgations to draw a pretty 
complete picture. I think the bottom line is that you have stated 
it properly: We will never know what we don't know by staying on 
the ground. We must inhibit, irritate, and postpone. And that may 
be the future character of this activity. 

It is useful for the committee to understand a bit of my personal 
background to put these comments in perspective. 

I am an experimental nuclear physicist. I also have other activi- 
ties. I have been both an emergency duty officer for the Livermore 
Laboratory and a senior scientific advisor for the Department of 
Energy's Nuclear Emergency Search Team and Accident Response 
Team. In both of these roles, I have trained with and operated with 
security personnel at Livermore and trained with the FBI and U.S. 
military. I am both medically and psychologically screened for high- 
stress field work. So I look at the Iraqi inspections with an attitude 
somewhat different from that of a scientist on a site visit to a for- 
eign facility. 

The three questions you have posed, I will answer very briefly. 
How successful have the efforts of the international community 
been in identifying and rendering unusable Iraqi resources? 

I think the U.N. has been very effective in finding, dismantling, 
and destroying Iraq's programs for weapons of mass destruction. 
Aided by intelligence, the process has forced Iraqi disclosure of re- 
located equipment, of records concealed, and of personnel involved. 
At present in the ballistic missile area, completion of the process 
seems to be hindered by the lack of good intelligence leads. 

Given that the work is done by unarmed inspectors operating 
within a country in full control of its military and security forces, 
I think the results have been remarkable. 

However, the process has now quite clearly shifted from discov- 
ery and destruction of Iraqi facilities to frustration of Iraqi at- 
tempts to restart their programs. Keeping inspectors on the ground 
in Iraq inhibits Iraqi resumption of prohibited activities, but the 
process will become more dangerous as Iraqi frustration rises and 
world political support erodes. That change should be noted and its 
consequences anticipated. 

GIVE UNSCOM THE LEADING ROLE 

The second question: How well has the IAEA accomplished its 
task? I think its performance could have been improved by giving 
the leadership to UNSCOM directly and relegating the IAEA to a 
technical support role in its traditional areas of nuclear fuel cycle 
and safeguards techniques. 

Mr. Lantos. UNSCOM is the United Nations Special Commis- 
sion which was set up for this purpose? 



31 

Mr. Davis. Yes. UNSCOM has the primary responsibility for the 
inspections in Iraq. Many of the IAEA staff, and some of the lead- 
ership, was burdened by the perceived need to protect the Agency's 
role, to defend its past performance in Iraq and to protect them- 
selves from criticism and potential career damage within the Agen- 
cy. 

Institutionalizing the leadership for the nuclear inspections in 
the IAEA made it difficult to remove timid leaders and provided an 
opening between the commission and the IAEA that made possible 
both information loss and Iraqi political intrigue. The IAEA has 
been accused of being both politicized and suffering from clientitis. 

From my perspective, both of these accusations are justified. The 
IAEA shows little appetite for intrusive inspection or aggressive be- 
havior, both of which are essential to this inspection regime. The 
IAEA fielded very different sorts of team leaders in Iraq. David 
Kay, who led the two inspections in which I participated, was ag- 
gressive and active in the field, thereby, accomplishing positive 
ends. Maurizio Zifferero was more the diplomat, concerned, if not 
burdened, by politics of the situation and the IAEA's interests. 
Demitri Perricos was a classic IAEA inspector principally con- 
cerned with detailed verification of previously declared activities. 

"CLIENTITIS" AT THE IAEA 

As an example of clientitis, Perricos chided me on several occa- 
sions for my estimates of Iraqi design goals and costs. These had 
appeared in the media and had offended the Iraqi Atomic Energy 
Commission, leading them to protest that there was political moti- 
vation behind the numbers. 

As these estimates were made possible only after defeating ex- 
haustive Iraqi concealment and deception activities, partly in the 
inspection confrontation in Fallujah in which Iraqi agents had fired 
upon and detained members of our team, I felt his concerns for 
Iraqi sensibilities to be poorly considered. 

It is very important for the committee Members to realize that 
the aggressive surprise inspection of Fallujah was hardly a typical 
IAEA inspection activity. The entire scenario was orchestrated and 
carried out by David Kay, four U.S. and British technical experts, 
and two non-IAEA support staff using authority guaranteed by Rolf 
Ekeus, head of the U.N. Special Commissions. 

We quite literally wrote the script for Fallujah while walking 
through Baghdad back alleys after midnight, decidedly not the 
IAEA style. Had that operation failed, as it threatened to at several 
moments, we might never have realized the full scope of Iraqi pro- 
gram. This forced a great deal of Iraqi disclosure. 

As far as what steps can be taken to strengthen the IAEA to deal 
with such challenges in Iraq and elsewhere in the future, as my 
comments indicate, I do not believe that IAEA should have the lead 
role in these matters. 

We are at present strengthening the IAEA's analytical abilities 
both through access to their own facilities and by helping them 
field improved techniques in their own laboratories. Stan from 
Livermore and the other national laboratories are involved in these 
efforts now. I think the IAEA has a very important support role in 
sample acquisition, maintenance of chain of custody, and technical 



32 

analysis of materials returned. I am not sanguine about granting 
the Agency routine access to intelligence information or allowing it 
to acquire genuine sophistication in nuclear weapons design and 
technology. 

In the chemical, biological, and ballistic missile areas, the 
UNSCOM has shown adequate ability to field effective teams and 
to accomplish its missions without having a long, previous history 
on the ground in Iraq. 

UNSCOM has been able to evaluate and replace leaders and to 
evolve operational doctrine without institutional inhibitions. I 
strongly recommend that future nuclear inspections be run under 
direct Special Commission control in a similar fashion. 

One should allow UNSCOM, or its successor agency, to collect 
the inspection team leaders, evaluate the quality of intelligence, se- 
lect the inspection targets, and staff the teams as appropriate, de- 
tailing IAEA staff in support roles as needed. This change would 
relieve the IAEA of its conflicting roles — well described by other 
speakers — of first friendly teacher and inspector of the nuclear 
technology, and then suddenly the operator of adversarial and ac- 
cusatory special inspections. Such a change would allow more read- 
ily the fielding of teams of mixed specialists likely to be more suit- 
able for future inspections in troublesome places. 

Let me close with a comment on the future. I think it important 
to emphasize in Iraq that the IAEA and the Special Commission 
have been asked to do a task without precedent, operating under 
conditions and restraints that have been applied to no previous in- 
spections. 

A NEW INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION AGENCY IS NEEDED 

To criticize the IAEA for its performance on institutional grounds 
fails to recognize that it is trying to do a task for which it was nei- 
ther created nor enfranchised. Criticism on grounds of inadequate 
personal performance and the failure to deal with it is allowable. 
We need new institutions operating with different access to infor- 
mation, different team selection, and training approaches, and very 
different access to supporting military and political power if we are 
to be prepared for future events. 

Those of us who participated in the Iraqi inspections have come 
away feeling that their multinational character and U.N. direction 
were essential to success. We are very proud of what was accom- 
plished on an ad hoc basis by teams that made up doctrine and 
procedures as they went along. This approach will not suffice in the 
future where intrusive inspections may have to be carried out in 
states that have not recently been shocked by massive aerial bom- 
bardment and ground combat as Iraq was. An ad hoc approach will 
similarly not suffice if we are to undertake such missions as seizing 
control of the nuclear weapons of a collapsing proliferant state, an 
event of increasing probability. 

If we are to succeed in these tasks in the face of deception, frus- 
tration, organized attempts to defer us, we need doctrinal develop- 
ment, specialized equipment, and frequent practice with our peers 
from other countries. None of those useful preconditions is being 
accomplished at present. Almost all discussion of improved non- 



33 

proliferation programs has focused on technology, not on doctrine 
and operations. 

This deficiency in present planning is an error that will have 
fatal consequences, both personal and political, for participants at 
all levels. It would be very dangerous for both governments and to 
individuals to presume the successes in Iraq demonstrate a general 
case. Iraq may, in fact, be the easiest case we ever face. 

Thank you for your consideration of my insights. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Davis appears in the appendix.] 

Mr. Lantos. Our final witness today is Professor Lawrence 
Scheinman from Cornell University, who has also served as a con- 
sultant to IAEA Director, Hans Blix, and participated in IAEA- 
sponsored panels on improving the international safeguards sys- 
tem. 

We are pleased to have you, sir. Your prepared statement will be 
entered in the record in its entirety. 

You may proceed any way you choose. 

STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE SCHEINMAN, PROFESSOR OF GOV- 
ERNMENT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS, CORNELL 
UNIVERSITY 

Mr. Scheinman. Thank you. I will follow along the text of my 
prepared remarks, but I will skip over quite a bit. 

I must say that following the two previous speakers, I find my- 
self, as most would suspect, in a rather different position of assess- 
ment. I would like to be able to respond point by point to many of 
the observations that were made, but I hope that my testimonial 
statement will accomplish part of that task. 

As in the case of the other members of this panel, I was asked 
three questions: how well the United Nations has accomplished the 
task of eliminating weapons of mass destruction from Iraq; how 
well the IAEA has done; and what can be done to improve IAEA 
safeguards. I will try to focus most of my remarks on that last 
question. However, I would like to say something about each of the 
previous two in at least an abbreviated form from my formal testi- 
mony. 

I think — and this goes to a point that everybody I believe agrees 
with — that a fundamental point of departure in answering a ques- 
tion about whether we have succeeded in eliminating weapons of 
mass destruction from Iraq, is that it is virtually impossible to be 
certain about success. 

The only prudent approach is to be certain of uncertainty. Leav- 
ing aside the obvious problems of scientists, engineers, theoretical 
knowledge, technical expertise, records, reports, design activities 
which would be very easy to hide and difficult to ferret out, there 
also can be no definitive assurance that nothing remains in Iraq in 
terms of tangible resources and capabilities to produce weapons of 
mass destruction; and there never can be. 

I think we have to have that as our fundamental point of depar- 
ture. This reality is one of the reasons for long-term monitoring in 
Iraq as described in United Nations Security Council Resolution 
715. You may recall that it would provide for full and ready access 
to sites, materials, and persons and give the Agency the ability to 



34 

restrict and/or stop movement of suspected material, equipment, 
and the like. 

Such a verification system, even if based and implemented on a 
presumption that Iraq will again try to build nuclear weapons, can 
severely limit but not absolutely foreclose a successful clandestine 
effort. And we have today a complicating factor, and that is the 
breakup of the former Soviet Union and the risk of the possibility 
that Iraq or others might be able to purchase, directly, weapons — 
usable material, or compete nuclear devices, thereby bypassing the 
need for mounting a program for producing fissile material which 
would be highly vulnerable to detection by a robust verification sys- 
tem. 

This underscores a fundamental point that the ultimate effective- 
ness of a verification system is not self-contained but contingent on 
other considerations such as a vigorously applied comprehensive 
export control system and resolute political support by the United 
Nations Security Council and the key states in the international 
system. 

As Mr. Gallucci testified earlier, a great deal has been done. 
Given the adverse conditions described by Mr. Davis, under which 
the IAEA and UNSCOM have had to operate, those achievements 
are even more impressive. UNSCOM and IAEA, despite these dif- 
ficulties, appear to have substantially exposed the Iraqi develop- 
ment. 

There is a sense that while not everything has been found, the 
vast majority of what existed has been identified. 

Mr. Lantos. Could I stop you there for just a moment? 

You listened, along with me and everybody else, to Mr. Davis' 
rather dramatic description of 

Mr. Scheinman. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Lantos [continuing]. Really a cops and robbers chase scene 
of the Iraqis running away with 100 trucks of heavy equipment, 
hiding it when unexpectedly the inspectors appeared. They pan- 
icked. They shoot at them. They don't let them into the facility. 
These people go back to Baghdad. A couple of days later they come 
back. The place is clean. And the materials have been moved far- 
ther north. 

This clearly doesn't give me a great deal of confidence in our abil- 
ity to state that the danger is gone. 

Mr. Scheinman. I fully agree. And I didn't say that the danger 
is gone. 

Mr. Lantos. I am not saying you do. But here you have the 
international community acting through the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, the United Nations Special Commission, with a 
whole team of highly qualified people, and as it were, through cre- 
ativity and good luck, they chase down the big secret. And had that 
episode not occurred, we wouldn't know anything about it. 

Isn't that true? 

Mr. Scheinman. That I agree with. 

However, I would, in turn, ask a question: Can we conceptualize 
a viable alternative method of getting at this kind of a problem 
than the one that was put forth in trying to deal with Iraq? 



35 

THE IAEA SOLUTION IS THE ONLY IMAGINABLE ONE 

I have thought about this. And I find it very difficult to conceive 
of an effective multilaterally supported approach to the problem 
that is fundamentally different from what we had in the case of 
dealing with Iraq. 

The United States could choose to be an international policeman 
for all and to walk around the world and enter and push its way 
into doors and into sites as it saw fit because its intelligence serv- 
ice told it that that is where it ought to go. But I don't think that 
would produce that world under the rule of law that we all under- 
stand is fundamental if we are going to have a stable international 
order. 

So we do have to find international strategies or internationally 
supported strategies to deal with these problems. And it seems to 
me that whatever deficiencies may still exist — and they do still 
exist in the case of Iraq under these extraordinary circumstances — 
the task before us is to improve our capabilities, to strengthen and 
build our base, and to create the possibility to more effectively car- 
ryout the mission of limiting, if not ultimately preventing states 
tnat have undertaken to not acquire nuclear weapons, from doing 
so. And I think this would apply to all other weapons of mass de- 
struction, as well. 

If I may just go on, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the bal- 
ance sheet seems to say that we have done pretty well in Iraq, but 
we still have a large number of uncertainties. 

The second question is really like the first, but it deals only with 
the International Atomic Energy Agency. And I have a different 
answer to that question than the ones given by previous speakers 
on this panel. 

THE IAEA HAS PERFORMED WELL 

It seems to me that the IAEA has fulfilled its responsibilities, 
professionally and effectively, earning it the confidence of the Secu- 
rity Council, the Secretary General, and many governments for 
whom resolute implementation of the provisions for the elimination 
of weapons of mass destruction and the ability to produce them by 
Iraq are of paramount concern. 

I think the best judges of this are not any one of us sitting here 
as an outside observer, nor is it the IAEA. But I believe that those 
who are close to the situation, outside the IAEA, may be able to 
offer us a better insight. This is an insight that is based upon a 
2-year experience and not a one-time situation. And it is based 
upon an overall institutional assessment rather than on the assess- 
ment of the performance or behavior of specific individuals who 
were specified in testimony just a few moments ago. 

An UNSCOM spokesman, in a recent article in Arms Control 
Today, made the comment that, the initial understanding in imple- 
menting the verification regime was that Iraq would, in good faith, 
make declarations about its former activities that are now banned. 

Instead, it quickly became evident that Iraq was consistently 
concealing the extent of its programs. As a result, the verification 
regime had to be tightened; and the UNSCOM teams — and in the 
nuclear sphere, the IAEA — were forced to change the basic prem- 



36 

ises of their approach to the inspection relationship. Iraq, it seems, 
had to be presumed guilty until proven innocent. 

It would appear that if the IAEA approached its tasks with some 
naivete and caution, as has been noted, it was not at all alone in 
this regard. That judgement relates to the period at the early 
stages of the now 19 completed inspections. 

The assessment that I would like to note, again turns to the 
statement of the UNSCOM spokesman. That comment, in the same 
article that I referred to a moment ago, was that, through their 
diligent work, the IAEA inspection teams with the assistance and 
cooperation of UNSCOM, uncovered three major programs for the 
enrichment of uranium to weapons grade materials, laboratory 
scale preparation of plutonium, and a full-scale program of 
weaponization. 

This is a public document in a popular journal, so you might 
want to go further in your assessment. The Deputy Executive Di- 
rector of UNSCOM, Ambassador Michael Newlin, speaking before 
The Washington Council on Nonproliferation, and now in a pub- 
lished document, commented that the Agency had to adapt to an 
intrusive type of inspection primarily at undeclared sites as man- 
dated in Resolution 687. He went on to say that in his view, "the 
IAEA has adjusted to the new inspection requirements with re- 
markable success, a fact illustrated to UNSCOM by IAEA's very 
thorough, excellent reports. Beyond inspections, the IAEA has also 
done well in the destruction phase of Resolution 687." 

THE IAEA HAS LEARNED IN IRAQ 

And we can go further still. At Mr. Davis's institution, the Law- 
rence Livermore Laboratory last November, Ambassador Ekeus 
himself made the statement that "Iraq's nuclear program has been 
halted. The IAEA did a truly magnificent job in this respect." 

And again that is in the written record. This conformed with 
similar statements that Ambassador Ekeus reportedly made in 
periodic reports to the Security Council itself. So I think the record, 
on the whole, and taking the institution as a whole, seems to indi- 
cate that the IAEA, while it may have started out slowly and with 
a bit, perhaps, of uncertainty and hesitation that was just de- 
scribed a moment ago, certainly has gone on the traditional learn- 
ing track and has become a much better institution for dealing 
with the kinds of problems and responsibilities that have been as- 
signed to it under Resolution 687, and that may come afterward. 

This brings me to the third question about improving IAEA safe- 
guards. And here is where I would like to focus my remaining re- 
marks. 

What can be done to strengthen the ability of IAEA to deal with 
Iraq-type challenges in the future? 

I fully concur with what has been said by previous speakers, that 
Iraq is not the last and probably not the most difficult problem we 
are going to have to face. 

Mr. Lantos. The reason you are saying it is not the most dif- 
ficult problem is because, as a result of Iraq's defeat in the war, 
it had to accept intrusive inspection, which clearly North Korea or 
Iran currently do not have to put up with? 

Is that your point? 



37 

Mr. Scheinman. Those two countries do not have to put up with 
as intrusive inspection as Iraq has to put up with under Resolution 
687; but there has been a change in the IAEA attitude, and behav- 
ior, and implementation of safeguards in the course of the last 2 
years as part of that learning process, and that is what I would 
like to focus on. That change makes it more difficult for a Korea 
or an Iran to get away with something. But this is not just because 
of the defeat of Iraq; it is because the IAEA has learned what Iraq 
could hide and where Iraq was or was not successful with respect 
to acquiring materials, equipment, et cetera, from outside. In tact, 
my memory is that North Korea is probably better at hiding things 
than anybody, including Iraq, over past history. 

I think in approaching the question of what we do for the future, 
it is absolutely essential to understand that the Draconian and pu- 
nitive measures applied in Iraq under the Security Council Resolu- 
tions cannot be taken as a standard for normal international ver- 
ification by any institution whatsoever. 

It is absolutely implausible that sovereign states would freely 
and voluntarily submit themselves to so onerous and intrusive a re- 
gime. 

If anything underscored this truth, it is the reversal of the Unit- 
ed States' position regarding "any time, any place" inspection 
under the chemical weapons convention. For many years we pro- 
moted that idea; but when it came down to the rock and the hard 
place, we backed down. 

But in recent arms control agreements and in changes brought 
about by IAEA safeguards, there is considerable support for taking 
significant steps to ensure credibility and to reinforce confidence. 
States are willing to accept more today than they were willing to 
accept 20 years ago. 

However, any regime of the future is still going to have to strike 
a balance between the demands of international confidence and na- 
tional sovereignty. A point that I feel cannot be repeated too often 
is that the safeguard system applied by the IAEA in support of the 
NPT was commensurate with the expectations and desires of the 
international community at the time that system was put in place. 

THE NPT WAS DESIGNED TO BE NONINTRUSIVE 

The NPT was devised to apply comprehensive safeguards prin- 
cipally to the fuel cycles of advanced industrial states, which were 
at the time that the NPT was being negotiated, the only states 
with significant nuclear activity. These states, Germany, Japan, 
Sweden, and Italy, and so on were determined to minimize any risk 
that the distinction between themselves and the nuclear weapon 
states inherent in the NPT would extend into the peaceful realm 
of nuclear activity and competition. 

To ensure the adherence of these states to the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union endorsed a verifica- 
tion regime that kept intrusions to the minimum, consistent with 
credible verification that resulted in a system that focused on the 
flow of declared nuclear material that we have heard a lot about. 
It is important to understand as well that governments — and I will 
come back to this — speaking through their representative on the 
Board of Governors of the IAEA, establish the tone of the times. 



38 

And the tone of the time was verify, but don't push all that hard. 
Just make sure that you feel reasonably confident that you know 
what the situation is and that you independently verify that safe- 
guarded material can be accounted for, but don't go overboard. 

Now, given the structure of global competition at the time be- 
tween the Russians and the Americans, it was also presumed that 
those two would control any real threat of proliferation among their 
allies or clients and as their competition reached to every region of 
the world that assumption applied to the world at large. 

The periodic 5-year reviews of the NPT have resulted in endorse- 
ments over the years of the efficiency and credibility of the safe- 
guard system, despite differences raised by activist nongovern- 
mental institutions over the adequacy of the material control in 
large scale facilities. 

The end of the cold war 

Mr. Lantos. You are referring to activist nongovernmental insti- 
tutions? 

Mr. Scheinman. Not in a pejorative way. 

Mr. Lantos. Not in a pejorative way. I appreciate that. 

Don't we need these activist nongovernmental gadflies to keep 
governments honest? 

Mr. Scheinman. Absolutely. That is why I say it was not a pejo- 
rative statement. 

Mr. Lantos. Maybe we could refer to them as treasured activist 
nongovernmental institutions. 

Mr. Scheinman. Yes. I think they have as a rule done very good 
public service in the questions that they have raised. 

A NEW PROLIFERATION ENVIRONMENT 

The end of the cold war changed one of the assumptions about 
superpower predominance and control. The discovery of a massive 
and largely unknown nuclear weapons development program in an 
NPT state, Iraq, changed another. It changed the notion that it is 
only the advanced industrial states that are capable of mounting 
a sophisticated nuclear weapons program. 

In this new environment, the expectations are that, with the dif- 
fusion of technology, more states that are no longer under the 
watchful eye of the superpowers can engage in nuclear weapons de- 
velopment and, because of security and political concerns, no longer 
are being subordinated to the superpower competition. Some of 
these states may seek to satisfy their security interests with nu- 
clear arms, and Korea, Iran, and Iraq are certainly on that list. 

All of these factors have had an impact on international institu- 
tions, not the least of which the IAEA; notably, the credibility of 
safeguards is now seen to be a function of their capacity to detect 
undeclared or clandestine nuclear activities. 

Both Mr. Davis and Mr. Milhollin described the IAEA verifica- 
tion system as it was several years ago. They did not describe it 
as it is today. The concept of verifying declared nuclear material 
and activities no longer exists. It is now a total verification of de- 
clared or undeclared activities. 



39 

CAN THE IAEA RELIABLY SEEK OUT UNDECLARED ACTIVITY? 

Mr. Lantos. May I just ask, Mr. Davis and Mr. Milhollin to com- 
ment on this point at this stage, if you care to. 

Mr. Milhollin. My comments had to do with the Agency's his- 
tory and capability up until the time of the Gulf War. I think the 
Agency still has the basic problem that I pointed out: it has a fatal 
conflict of interest which produces a culture in which they really 
don't want to find things that have gone wrong. 

And I think that still exists and will exist as long as the Agency 
has a promotion function. And so, even though the Agency, having 
suffered a tremendous defeat in Iraq, is now talking bravely about 
changing its ways, I don't believe it really can. 

Mr. Lantos. Mr. Davis, would you care to comment? 

Mr. Davis. I think my only comment is that I acknowledge the 
conflict of interest problem, which has been with us for a long time 
and is of concern. I am unsure that we understand the mechanisms 
by which we will pursue undeclared activities with or without the 
IAEA. This is a difficult task, and I have seen no clear road map 
that suggests how we will pursue such things with any confidence 
of success. 

Mr. Scheinman. As long as Mr. Davis says "with or without the 
IAEA," I think I concur on the difficulty of the problem. 

THE IAEA HAS REFORMED ITSELF 

However, the IAEA has done a number of things to try to bring 
itself into the modern world, if you will. Mr. Milhollin referred to 
this as tinkering, but I think it is more than tinkering. There has 
been the examination of existing safeguards authority that pre- 
vailed through the statute and safeguards documents. And upon 
that analysis was built a new approach. The main focus has been 
the so-called special inspections. 

And as the Chair is aware, the Board of Governors, a year ago, 
a year and a half ago, concluded that the Director General's assess- 
ment that the authority to conduct special inspections in full scope 
safeguard states extended to undeclared activities and that the use 
of outside information, including national intelligence information, 
was appropriate information upon which to base a request, was en- 
dorsed. 

Now, the authority to invoke an inspection of this nature is one 
thing. The willingness to do it is another. And I think that we are 
very fortunate at this time to have a case in point. That case is 
North Korea. It provided the testing ground, in my view, for agency 
determination. 

As the Chair is aware, there was a discrepancy with respect to 
the initial inventory. The Agency came to the conclusion that the 
North Koreans had not revealed all that they should have revealed; 
and as a consequence of this, the Director General and subse- 
quently the Board of Governors called for special inspections. Upon 
refusal, the Board of Governors reported the failure to comply with 
safeguard obligations by North Korea to the Security Council. 

I submit that the IAEA acted with deliberation and decisiveness, 
giving a clear indication that the new political environment was, 



40 

indeed, well understood and that it was prepared to exercise its au- 
thority. 

I think it is also interesting to note that the board came to a de- 
cision to report noncompliance while the United Nations Security 
Council had more difficulty in deciding whether or not and what 
nature of sanctions to apply. And the reason was that there is a 
veto power in the Security Council, and China was unwilling to go 
along with the more severe sanctions, and so we have a modified 
sanctions arrangement now in place in North Korea. That does not 
occur at the level of the IAEA where no veto is possible. 

MORE TRANSPARENCY 

As vou know, early submission of information, including report- 
ing of design information and the like, was included in a Board of 
Governors measure reinforcing the safeguards system. 

The point I want to make is that the IAEA has moved to estab- 
lish increasing transparency in the nuclear arena to acquire a bet- 
ter early warning basis, a basis upon which it can call into question 
the integrity or the completeness of the record provided by states 
with respect to their total nuclear activities. 

Again, I refer to the North Korean case as a case in point. I also 
think that there have been changes on the cultural side. There is 
increased awareness. There is now a system of country officers in 
place to consolidate all available information, all sources regarding 
the nuclear activity of states under safeguards and to assist witn 
briefing and debriefing of inspectors as they go into and return 
from the field. 

Still other measures are being considered now to improve the in- 
ternal dynamics of the agency. But this brings me to my last point, 
Mr. Chairman, and that is that we cannot stop with just improving 
the quality of safeguards, reorganizing activities within the context 
of the IAEA secretariat, or the like. We need to make some addi- 
tional things. I would like to mention four things that need to be 
done. 

ADDITIONAL CHANGES ARE STILL NEEDED 

First I think it is unequivocally clear that the ability of the 
IAEA, or any other institution, to optimize safeguards capabilities 
and to create the greatest probability for detecting clandestine ac- 
tivities depends to a substantial degree on the availability to it of 
sensitive information which only a limited number of states are 
able to provide. The flow of relevant information to the IAEA 
should be regularized and institutionalized. 

Contrary to the remark made by Mr. Davis, to my knowledge, 
there have been few, if any, questions seriously raised about the 
ability of the IAEA to receive and utilize national intelligence infor- 
mation provided to it pursuant to its responsibilities under Resolu- 
tion 687. And there is every reason to think that they have been 
pretty good about protecting the source and the nature of the infor- 
mation that has been provided. 

I think that the United States should take a lead in moving for- 
ward on such regularization as well as ensuring any other oper- 
ational or logistic support the IAEA may need to fulfill our expecta- 
tions. 



41 

Second, it is a truism that international organizations lack mean- 
ingful enforcement power. The exception is the United Nations Se- 
curity Council which, if it invokes Chapter VII of the U.N. charter, 
as it did in the Gulf War, can take enforcement action and pass 
mandatory resolutions binding upon member states. 

The January 1992 summit statement of Heads of State and Gov- 
ernment of the Council declared that the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons constitute a threat to international peace and security, 
which is the key to opening the door to Chapter VII and enforce- 
ment. 

That same statement acknowledges the integral role of IAEA 
safeguards in implementing the NPT and asserted that members 
of the Council will take appropriate measures in the cases notified 
to them by the IAEA, which is what they did when the North Ko- 
rean case came before them. 

Given that the statement was made in the midst of a continuing 
crisis in Iraq and a strong sense of uniformity of purpose on the 
Council, I think it would be pertinent to the strengthening the 
international consensus against safeguards or nonproliferation vio- 
lations to codify this statement in a formal United Nations Security 
Council Resolution. 

This would provide an important element of enforcement and en- 
forceability to IAEA safeguards, especially in view of the fact that, 
by statute, the IAEA has direct access to the Security Council in 
cases of safeguards noncompliance. 

I believe it is the only international organization in the U.N. 
family that has this direct access. 

A third measure requiring political leadership and action is to 
ensure that the IAEA is adequately funded to meet growing re- 
sponsibilities, responsibilities flowing from North Korea, Argentina, 
Brazil, South Africa, and eventually, we hope, the non-Russian 
states of the former Soviet Union. 

USE THE IAEA TO VERIFY NUCLEAR WEAPONS MATERIAL 

Finally, the United States should take the lead with the Russian 
Government to make use of the IAEA to verify dismantled nuclear 
warhead material. I am going in a opposite direction of my col- 
leagues. Such a measure would be a strong demonstration of con- 
fidence in the system and the openness it implies could have a po- 
tentially powerful precedent setting value. 

The consignment of verification responsibility for dismantled 
warhead material would be less costly and more useful than apply- 
ing safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities in the weapons 
states. I think it is a step the United States should take now. 

But the single most important element in strengthening the abil- 
ity of the IAEA to meet the challenge of verification is the political 
will and the political support of its member states and of the Secu- 
rity Council. 

International organizations, as we know, are creations of sov- 
ereign states. They lack sovereignty or independent political au- 
thority, and they are dependent on the political will of their sov- 
ereign members. Secretariats can influence and cajole, but it is the 
governing bodies of the international organizations that are reposi- 
tories of political authority. 



42 

Sovereignty is a vigorous and contradictory force against empow- 
ering international institutions with far-reaching authority. But 
threats to international peace and security cannot be successfully 
addressed unilaterally. They do require a collective action. While 
international verification may have to be supplemented by region- 
ally verified arms control and security arrangements, it is some- 
thing that cannot be done if there is to be any confidence in the 
world at large regarding the status of nuclear programs and the 
absence of clandestine nuclear activity. 

That is why it is all the more important that governments like 
ours that are committed to international verification, take what- 
ever measures are possible to strengthen the hand of our chosen 
international instruments, in this case, the IAEA. We and others 
have developed expectations for our international institutions. 

Now, we must ensure that the necessary authority, operational 
and financial support and political backing for vigorous implemen- 
tation is made available to them. 

My closing comment is that the best of all possible verification 
arrangements is only the first step on a very tall staircase to 
achieving a global order free of the threat of nuclear proliferation 
or the proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction. We are 
talking about a regime strategy which embraces many, many as- 
pects, only a few of which have Deen touched upon today. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Scheinman appears in the ap- 
pendix.] 

Mr. Lantos. Well, I want to thank all you for excellent state- 
ments and for shedding a great deal of light on what may well be 
the single most important issue facing the globe, the danger of nu- 
clear proliferation. 

EXPORT CONTROLS SHOULD BE TIGHTENED 

You mentioned that this is only the first step. Would you not 
agree that the first step, perhaps, is to dramatically tighten export 
controls and to bring about a degree of cooperation we certainly 
have not seen for years? 

Isn't it infinitely easier to prevent technology and materials and 
high-tech equipment getting into the hands of countries like Iran, 
Iraq, Libya, North Korea, rather than, once there, trying to pursue 
this cat and mouse game of chasing trucks as they runaway with 
materials? 

I mean, it seems to me if there is a Western failure — and I pro- 
foundly believe that there was both Western failure — when I say 
Western, I include Japan in that — both Western failure and irre- 
sponsibility in, say, during the decade of the 1980's. 

It really was focused on not controlling Western companies from 
supplying rogue regimes with lethal capabilities. 

Would you agree with that? 

Mr. Scheinman. I do, Mr. Chairman. I pride myself on having 
been one of a few outside experts invited by the German Bundestag 
several years ago to testify about their nonproliferation organiza- 
tion, law, policies, and the like. Export control was one of the very 
fundamental points that was addressed in that Bundestag hearing. 
And it was the first of a number of hearings that led to fundamen- 



43 

tal changes in internal German law, which has certainly come 180 
degrees from where it was a few years ago. 

But when I spoke of a regime, I meant precisely the idea of ver- 
ification, export control, and delegitimizing nuclear weapons, estab- 
lishing the concept that they are not only not usable, but that there 
is no legitimacy to having them as a deterrent in the final analysis. 

I am referring also to the question of enforcement and to the 
question of working to resolve regional controversy, which is at the 
core in most cases, but not all, of the interest of states in acquiring 
nuclear weapons. 

There is always the renegade problem. A Kim Il-Song or a Sad- 
dam Hussein, who may see nuclear weapons not as defensive or as 
a means of deterring others from attacking them, but as a means 
of promoting an expansionist policy. That is the problem that the 
world has confronted since the state system emerged at the Treaty 
of Westphalia in the 17th century. And it is a problem that we will 
have to deal with until we have transcended the basic order of the 
world community that we have known for the past century. There 
is no final answer to that one either. 

It is a question of striving and organizing and bringing to bear 
as much of a concerted multilateral effort that provides a legiti- 
mate basis for dealing harshly with the recalcitrant state, and that 
deals with the good states in a constructive and positive way and 
helps to reensure security that we have to work toward. 

Mr. Lantos. I mentioned earlier I will ask each of you the same 
question with respect to the sanctions regime. And the question 
that I would like, first, Mr. Milhollin to respond to, do you favor 
lifting sanctions on Iraq, weakening sanctions, maintaining them 
as they are, or strengthening them? 

Mr. MILHOLLIN. I Favor strengthening them. 

Before I go into that, I would like to make a request of the Chair. 

Mr. Lantos. Sure. 

Mr. Milhollin. I have, as I am sure you know, written a couple 
of articles recently on this subject, one in The New Yorker maga- 
zine and another in the New York Times in April. The one in the 
New York Times lists those things that we have found in Iraq and 
the things that are still missing. 

I would request that they be included in the record. 

Mr. Lantos. Without objection, they will be included in the 
record. 

[The articles appear in the appendix.] 

Mr. Milhollin. I think that the sanctions on Iraq should be 
strengthened. Certainly they should be maintained. 

I believe that the inspectors have now, in effect, shifted into a 
monitoring mode in Iraq rather than a search mode. I think that 
such a shift may be premature. 

I think there have been suggestions — the U.S. Government has 
suggested an inspection arrangement that would be far more ag- 
gressive, and that I think, will be more likely to yield results than 
the one that has been used. The Special Commission and the IAEA 
have not adopted however. 

As a substitute for it, the helicopter flights over Baghdad were 
proposed. Of course, they are not happening now. So there was a 
time when it was agreed that we needed a more aggressive effort; 



44 

we needed to engage the Iraqis more frequently; we needed to con- 
centrate on certain areas where the government believes — our Gov- 
ernment believes — that Iraq has the infrastructure and the people 
and the communications equipment, for example, to carry on the 
nuclear research effort. 

And we thought — the U.S. Government — thought that it would 
be possible to concentrate on those areas and flush things out and 
get things to move so that we could see them from above. Those 
plans were not adopted. 

And so I think we are moving into a phase in which we will sim- 
ply monitor what we have found. I think it may be premature to 
do that. So this goes a little beyond your question, but I think one 
safeguard could be more aggressive inspections. Arid I recommend 
that that course be adopted. 

Mr. Lantos. Mr. Davis. 

Mr. Davis. It is always dangerous, Mr. Chairman, to ask a sci- 
entist a political question, but I will give you an answer as the only 
person here who nas been on the ground in Iraq and has seen the 
pain inflicted on the citizens of Iraq. 

I think I would favor altering them to make them more effective. 
And perhaps a suggestion is to let the Iraqis sell their oil, but de- 
clare that all exports will come down the Jordan highway — or all 
imports come down the Jordan highway. And inspect the 20,000 
trucks a day that Mr. Kroll says crosses that border very, very rig- 
orously to see what is brought in. 

I think in so doing, it would strengthen the support of the Arab 
countries in the region who are both concerned about the impact 
on 18 million people and have a vested interest in seeing that this 
regime is contained and controlled. 

It strikes me as much less risky and cheaper to put a powerful 
and effective inspection process on that border than to continue to 
impose an unsuccessful set of economic controls. 

THE FIRST U.S. BOMB WAS BUILT WITH THIRD WORLD TECHNOLOGY 

There is one additional remark I must make. I am not very san- 
guine about export controls as a way of deterring nuclear weapons, 
and I have taken to stating that in a rather blunt way. It is useful 
for people to remember that the first nuclear weapons were con- 
ceived, built, and used by a Third World country. The United 
States, at the end of the World War II, was a Third World country 
by our definitions: no computers, no numerically controlled ma- 
chine tools, no jet aircraft; very primitive systems by the standards 
we now use. 

A particular problem of the Iraqi business has been to shock peo- 
ple currently involved in the weapons program who look at Iraqi 
accomplishments and say they are not significant because they 
tend to think of it as we now do or as the Russians are doing it 
rather than as we did 50 years ago. Much of the discussion about 
dual-use technologies is, I think, flavored by that. 

There were interesting arguments on the inspection teams be- 
tween the scientists and the engineers and the politicians over 
when dual-use technology should be destroyed. Most of the weap- 
ons people thought that many of these things were essential for a 
country to play in the first world economy. And if you deny that, 



45 

then you have said to the Iraqis, we will hold you in the Third 
World. That is a very powerful political statement. I think part of 
the enigma is how ao we achieve the degree of transparency that 
lets us override many of these dual-use problems. 

Mr. Scheinman. I concur with the idea that the sanctions should 
at least be maintained, possibly strengthened; but I really haven't 
given much thought to what kind of strengthening I would pursue. 

However, when we speak of strengthening or maintaining the 
sanctions, we have to remember that it is not us alone. There are 
other countries that would have to concur. This would require a 
collective decision, again, at the level of the Security Council. 

I think we have to proceed carefully to know that we have got 
a concurrence of view, that a strengthening of sanctions, in one 
way or another, is going to achieve a desired outcome before we 
will be able to proceed to bring about stronger sanctions. 

I would also like to comment that the remark that was just made 
by Mr. Davis goes to the heart of the point, that preventing pro- 
liferation or bringing about a favorable result can only be done 
through an interdependence of measures or an interdependence of 
action. 

Not one of these safeguards or export controls or anything else 
is going to prevent a state from acquiring nuclear weapons. The 
only thing that will ever prevent that from happening is the politi- 
cal decision of the leadership of that country that it is not in their 
interest to acquire such weapons. We have to bring about the con- 
ditions in which that frame of mind can prevail. That is the biggest 
challenge of all. 

Mr. Lantos. Well, if you cannot change the mind of the political 
leadership on that point, then perhaps change the political leader- 
ship. 

I want to thank all of you for an insightful series of comments. 

The hearing of the joint subcommittees is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:50 p.m., the subcommittees adjourned to recon- 
vene at the call of the Chair.] 



APPENDIX 



TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE 

ROBERT L. GALLUCCI 

TO THE 

HOUSE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 

June 29, 1993 



Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have the opportunity to 
discuss our assessment of the nuclear situation in Iraq and the 
UN's capabilities to deter or detect any efforts by Iraq to 
regenerate its nuclear weapons program. In these remarks, I 
would like to briefly describe the work the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iraq, some lessons learn3d. and 
the continuing need to give our fullest support to the IAEA as 
part of our overall non-proliferation efforts. 



Impact of Inspections 

Under the auspices of UN Security Council Resolution 687, 
and with the assistance of UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), the 
IAEA has conducted 20 nuclear inspections of Iraq since the end 
of the Gulf War in April 1991. These inspections have forced 
Iraq to disclose, destroy, or render harmless all of the major 
nuclear weapons facilities and equipment that we are aware of, 
including several enrichment sites, research facilities, and 
weapons design facilities. Along with the damage inflicted by 
the war and subsequent military actions, we believe these 
inspections have effectively put the Iraqi nuclear weapons 
program out of business — at least for the near term. 



Regeneration a Problem 

Over the long-term, however, Iraq still presents a iiuclear 
threat. We believe that Saddam Hussein is committed to 
rebuilding a nuclear weapon capability, using indigenous and 
imported resources. 

Iraq retains its most critical resource for any 
nuclear weapons program, namely skilled personnel and 
expertise. 

Iraq also retains a basic industrial capability to 
support a nuclear weapons program, including a large 
amount of dual-use equipment and facilities. 

If sanctions are lifted, Iraq would have access to 
additional financial resources to refuel overseas 
procurement activities. 

Finally, Iraq has still refused to provide the UN with 
details of its clandestine procurement network, a 
network which could therefore be reactivated in the 
future . 

(47) 



48 



Focus On Long-term Monitoring 

To deter or detect regeneration, we need to ensure that the 
IAEA and UNSCOM receive the political, technical, and financial 
support to implement their plans for long-term monitoring in 
Irag. These plans are contained in Security Council Resolution 
715 -- a resolution that Irag has so far refused to accept. 

The Security Council will need to enforce the rights 
of the IAEA and UNSCOM under Security Council 
resolutions 687 and 715, especially the right to 
conduct challenge inspections without obstruction from 
the Iragi authorities. 

We must also provide technical support and information 
to the IAEA and UNSCOM, including assistance in the 
use of technical monitoring devices, such as water 
sampling, to detect covert "''"nuclear activities. 

To address the risk of overseas procurement, we must 
continue to press Irag to reveal its foreign 
suppliers, and work with other suppliers to ensure 
effective monitoring of exports to prevent diversion. 



Sustainabi litv 

Irag no doubt will continue to test the UN's resolve to 
continue vigorous inspections — especially if it perceives 
that support for them is waning. As in the past, Irag will use 
tactics such as delaying or refusing access to sites, denying 
information, harassing inspectors, and refusing to accept UN 
Security Council Resolution 715 to reduce the effectiveness of 
the inspections. 

Recently, Irag's efforts to undermine long-term monitoring 
has focused on two issues: 

Irag has refused to allow the Special Commission to 
install cameras at two rocket motor test stands and 
has refused to destroy certain chemical weapons 
precursors and related eguipment. 

On June 18, the Security Council adopted a 
Presidential Statement that Irag's refusal to 
cooperate with the Special Commission in these matters 
constitutes a "material and unacceptable breach" of 
UNSCR 687, and a violation of UNSCRs 707 and 715. The 
Statement warned of "serious consequences." 

On June 22, UN Secretary General President Boutros 
Bout ros-Gha 1 i met with Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister 
Tariq Aziz to discuss the Presidential Statement. 
Aziz said that the issues could be discussed in a 
technical meeting on with UNSCOM on July 12. 



49 



On June 24, UNSCOM Chairman Rolf Ekeus told the Iraqi 
Foreign Minister that technical meetings between the Commission 
and Iraq cannot take place until Iraq complies with the 
Council's demands. We strongly support Chairman Ekeus in this 
decision . 



Strengthening of IAEA Safeguards 



Finally, I would like to relate the lessons of Iraq to the 
strengthening of the overall IAEA safeguards system — a system 
that plays a critical role in the international effort to 
prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. Fundamentally, the 
revelations about Iraq demonstrated the need for the 
international community to strengthen the Agency's ability and 
authority to detect undeclared nuclear activities outside 
declared safeguarded facilities. In response, the IAEA's Board 
of Governors has taken a number of important steps to improve 
safeguards, reflecting the view that the IAEA should give a 
higher priority to detecting covert nuclear activities. The 
Board has : 

Reaffirmed the Agency's right to perform special 
inspections whenever necessary to permit it to fulfill 
its safeguards obligations, including access to 
undeclared sites. 

Determined that the Agency may rely on information 
supplied by Member States when seeking a special 
inspection . 

Strengthened obligations to provide notice and early 
submission of design information on new nuclear 
facilities or changes to existing facilities. 

Established a voluntary system for reporting on 
nuclear exports and imports. 

In our view, these changes have substantially strengthened 
the IAEA safeguards system, which is essential to ensuring that 
fullscope safeguards under the Non-Prolif eration Treaty are 
fully implemented. We have already seen evidence of this new 
determination in the Agency's performance in North Korea, South 
Africa, and Iran. We believe that the IAEA's experience in 
Iraq has resulted in a substantial improvement in the IAEA 
safeguards system and, with the support of member states, it 
will continue to be a important part of the international 
non-proliferation regime. 



50 



Jules Kroll 
Chairman 
Kroll Associates 



June 29th, 1993 - Testifying before the Subcommittee on 
International Security, International Organizations and 

Human Rights 



Kroll 's involvement with the issue of Iraq's military 
procurement program began as an outgrowth of our assignment 
for the Government of Kuwait. In October of 1990, Kroll 
Associates was hired by the Government of Kuwait to locate 
covert assets of the current Iraqi regime and identify the 
individuals and/or companies controlling those assets. As the 
investigation progressed, it became apparent that prior to the 
war, Iraq had set up two worldwide networks: a military 
procurement network that used front companies to acquire 
restricted technology and a financial network used to hold and 
invest the hidden funds of the Iraqi regime. 

The financial network, until recently under the control of 
Barzan Al-Tikriti (Saddam's half-brother and formerly Iraq's 
permanent representative to the United Nations in Geneva) , 
continues to transact business out of Switzerland. 

The military procurement network, under the control of Hussein 
Kamel (Saddam's son-in-law and former head of the Ministry of 
Military Industrialization) , has received more publicity as a 
result of the Matrix Churchill investigations in the U.S. and 
abroad. Although several of the individuals and companies 



51 



involved in this network have been exposed, we believe that 
this network either has been, or will be, re-established. 

While there is no doubt that the sanctions have had a 
devastating effect on the people of Iraq, the evidence 
suggests that the current regime, with the apparent help of 
several countries, has not suffered and in fact, has 
solidified its control over the country. 

It should be noted that Jordan, frequently cited for its aid 
to Iraq, appears to be making a serious effort to cooperate 
with the international community's efforts to control Iraq. I 
have insufficient knowledge at this point to evaluate the 
current level of these efforts. 

From an historical perspective however, any discussion of the 
regime's survival begins with Jordan, as its role both during 
and after the Gulf War cannot be overestimated. 

After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, we received numerous reports 
of Iraqi government funds being transferred into Jordanian 
bank accounts to shield them from the international freezes on 
all Iraqi assets imposed shortly thereafter. 

After the end of the Gulf War, Jordan provided a safe haven 
for the Iraqi government to conduct business and Amman 
subsequently became Iraq's business center for all trading 



52 



operations. These trading operations were funded by 
previously transferred funds held in Jordanian banks as well 
as periodic shipments of gold from Baghdad. 

In addition to its role as depository for Iraqi assets, Jordan 
allowed the formation of trading companies controlled by 
Saddam Hussein's family members including his son, Udai, and 
his half-brothers. These companies are believed to handle the 
import of all types of materials. However, Khaled Marzoumi, 
Iraq's commercial attache in Amman, reportedly has primary 
responsibility of trade in military goods. 

Numerous sources have also reported on the frequent appearance 
of several Iraqi officials in Jordan including members of 
Iraq's Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization as 
well as Safa Habobi, a major player in Iraq's procurement 
network who has been indicted in the United States for his 
role in the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro scandal. 

Jordan, however, does not bear sole responsibility for the 
regime's ability to survive under international sanctions. 
Several other countries, including Turkey, Iran and Syria have 
all contributed on some level to Iraq's sanctions-busting 
activities. 

More importantly, international pressure on countries to abide 
by the sanctions has not eliminated the network of individuals 



53 



and companies willing to assist the current Iraqi government. 
In addition to those listed as "specially designated 
nationals" of Iraq by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, I 
believe that a substantial network of Iraqi bankers and 
businessmen continue to assist the regime while operating in 
coalition countries. 

If the manner in which Iraq built up its military prior to the 
Gulf War is any indication, the mere existence of covert 
networks may not be as significant as the ease with which 
these networks conducted business. In particular, the ability 
of Iraq to purchase, through the use of front companies, 
stakes in companies in countries such as the United States, 
Great Britain and Switzerland provided it with ready access to 
military materials while decreasing the effectiveness of 
export laws. 

Events of the last few years suggest that we must address both 
the short-term and long-term issues affecting Iraq's ability 
to re-establish itself as a threat to peace . in the region: 
Without pressure from the international community, countries 
will continue to assist Iraq in breaking sanctions; without 
increased attention to Iraq's covert networks, Iraq's agents 
will continue to conduct business as usual; and without 
monitoring of foreign investments in companies dealing in 
sensitive technology, Iraq will continue to have access to the 
materials necessary to rebuild its military capabilities. 
In closing, I would like to thank the committee for the 
opportunity to share my thoughts on this matter. It has been 
a honor to assist in this matter and I am available at the 
committee's convenience if additional questions arise. 



54 



JT7LBS B. KROLL 
CHAIRMAN 



Jules B. Kroll is the founder of Kroll Associates and is 
its Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. He has been 
credited with creating a new professional service of 
international corporate investigations and consulting which 
matches sophisticated fact-finding and investigative 
techniques to the needs of the multinational business, 
financial and legal communities. Kroll Associates has 
offices throughout the United States as well as London, 
Paris, Hong Kong and Tokyo. - 

Mr. Kroll is recognized as a leading authority on the 
prevention and detection of white collar crime, defensive 
tactics in contests for corporate control, industrial 
counter-espionage, and the management of complex investi- 
gations. He has been featured on Sixty Minutes, ABC's 
Nightline, BBC, ITN and in such noted publications as Time , 
Newsweek , The New York Times . Fortune , Business Week . 
Corporate Finance , The Times of London, and many other 
leading international publications. 



55 



Wisconsin Project 

on Nuclear Arms Control 



Cdi: Viilholiin 

Professor L'nt\-erstt\ ->r IV/jt/J/ii/n School ot Lu» 

Director 



PREPARED STATEMENT OF GARY MILEOLLIN 

PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN LAW SCHOOL 

AND DIRECTOR, WISCONSIN PROJECT ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL 



Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, 

Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade and Environment, 

and 

Subcommittee on International Security, International 

Organizations and Human Rights 



June 29, 1993 
10:00 a.m. 



56 



Good morning. I am pleased to have this opportunity to 
address these three distinguished Subcommittees of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee. 

The Subcommittees have asked me to address the question of 
the inspections in Iraq and the effectiveness of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. 

In roughly one month, we will pass the third anniversary of 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. If Iraq had not invaded Kuwait, it is 
very likely that Saddam Hussein would be passing a different 
milestone about now: he would be assembling his first atomic 
bomb. Two former U.N. inspectors, David Kay and Jay Davis, have 
estimated that at the time of the invasion, Iraq was 18 to 30 
months away from producing its first critical mass of nuclear 
weapon material. We have now passed the 30-month mark. 

One of the most frightening things about this possibility is 
that the International Atomic Energy Agency did not, and never 
would have, detected it. The Agency's inspections were not set 
up to do so. Before the invasion, the Agency consistently rated 
Iraq's compliance with its inspections as "exemplary." In fact, 
Iraq's cooperation was exemplary at the locations the Agency was 
inspecting. The problem was that the Agency was not inspecting 
the locations where Iraq was making the bomb. The Agency only 
inspects locations declared by the country being inspected, and 
so far, no country has made a bomb at a declared site. All A- 
bomb programs have been carried on at secret, undeclared sites. 

Iraq is a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, 
which means that Iraq promised not to make nuclear weapons and 
also promised to declare all of its work with plutonium and 
enriched uranium to the Agency. (Plutonium fueled the Nagasaki 
bomb; enriched uranium the Hiroshima bomb) . But Iraq secretly 
broke both of these promises at the very time that the Agency was 
rating its Treaty compliance as exemplary. 

To make matters worse, Iraq broke its promise by diverting 
equipment that the Agency's current chief inspector in Iraq had 
helped sell — over U.S. objections — to the Iraqis in the late 
1970s. Thus, the very equipment that the chief inspector helped 
supply was used to break the promise he is now supposed to be 



57 



enforcing. Worse still, the Agency was later told about the 
violation by an Iraqi official who was himself a former Agency 
inspector. The former inspector had used his experience at the 
Agency to help outwit the current inspectors. 

It is now clear what Iraq's strategy was. Iraq joined the 
Nonproliferation Treaty, enjoyed the diplomatic and trade 
benefits that come from membership, but still tried to make the 
bomb by outwitting the inspectors. If Saddam had not been 
foolish enough to invade Kuwait, the strategy would have worked. 
Iran is now following this same strategy, and so are Libya and 
North Korea. These countries cannot be expected to invade their 
neighbors on the eve of nuclear capability. 

It is unfair, however, to criticize the Agency for not doing 
a job that it was not set up to do. The Agency's primary duty is 
to promote the spread of nuclear energy, especially to developing 
countries. It does a good job of that by running training 
programs, by sending out exports of its own, and — most of all — by 
agreeing to inspect exports made by the more advanced nuclear 
countries to the less advanced ones. 

When a nuclear supplier wants to sell a reactor to a country 
like Pakistan or India, the Agency provides a "guarantee" that 
the reactor's plutonium won't be used to make atomic bombs. 
Without such a guarantee to make the export palatable, such 
transfers would be politically impossible. The result has been 
to encourage the proliferation of nuclear technology around the 
world. India and Pakistan both got reactors under Agency 
guarantees, and both have since made atomic bombs. 

The Agency's conflict of interest is obvious. If the Agency 
catches somebody making bombs, it means that the nuclear exports 
were too dangerous to have been sold in the first place and 
should not have been promoted. Thus, the institutional incentive 
is always to find that nothing is wrong. 

In the United States, the old Atomic Energy Commission had 
the job of both promoting and regulating nuclear energy until 
1974, when Congress wisely split the functions. The Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission now regulates; the Department of Energy 
promotes. The U.S. regulatory process gained great credibility 
from this separation. 

The situation in Iran illustrates the Agency's dilemma. 
The Chinese are now planning to sell Iran at least one 300MW 
power reactor. The reactor will make enough plutonium for at 
least ten atomic bombs per year. The world will be relying only 
on a piece of paper, signed by Iran, promising that the plutonium 
will never be diverted. 



58 



The United States opposes the deal because it will be a 
giant nuclear technology transfer, moving Iran a long way down 
the road toward a bomb. James Woolsey, Director of Central 
Intelligence, told Congress in February that Iran intends to make 
nuclear weapons. The IAEA, however, stands ready to facilitate 
this export by promising to inspect it — providing the necessary 
political cover. I hope the Subcommittees will ask the IAEA 
witnesses here this morning why the IAEA is willing to cooperate 
with this deal. 

The Subcommittees have asked specifically about Iraq — about 
the progress in destroying Iraqi weapons of mass destruction 
since the Gulf War. According to the U.N. Special Commission in 
New York, which is in charge of the chemical and missile 
inspections, there has been good progress in destroying chemical 
agents, munitions and precursors. More than one thousand tons of 
chemical weapon precursors have been destroyed so far, but a 
large amount remains. The Commission expects to have destroyed 
all of the identified nerve gas, mustard gas and precursors by 
the end of this year. 

With respect to missiles, the U.N. inspectors report that 
they have narrowed the uncertainty as to how many Soviet-supplied 
Scud missiles remain in Iraq. The uncertainty is in the number 
launched from 1980 to 1982. The Iraqis have not provided the 
documents necessary to verify their claims. 

Both the missile and chemical inspectors are now being 
defied, however. The U.N. Security Council has just condemned 
Iraq for refusing to move chemical equipment to a site for 
destruction, and for refusing to allow surveillance cameras to be 
installed at rocket test sites. The Special Commission believes 
that these refusals threaten the core of its inspection effort, 
so the question is what action to take if Iraq does not back 
down. The matter is now under consideration. 

With respect to the nuclear program, there is less progress 
and more uncertainty. I have described the nuclear inspections 
in an article that I wrote for the New Yorker in February. Also, 
in April the New York Times published a list of the main nuclear- 
related items that still appear to be missing in Iraq. The list 
is an estimate, compiled by the Wisconsin Project from Agency 
reports and other sources. It gives a general picture of what 
the Agency is still looking for. I would like to submit both 
articles for inclusion in the record. 

The Subcommittees have asked me to comment on the adequacy 
of the Agency's inspection effort in Iraq. The Agency is in 
charge of the nuclear inspections. I think that the inspectors 
themselves deserve our deepest gratitude and admiration. They 
have carried out a difficult, dangerous job that is both 
physically and mentally exhausting. The inspectors are entitled 



59 



to the greatest possible support from the Agency's management, 
but they have not always received it. 

One of the main problems has been the chief inspector's 
statements to the press. As early as February 1992, he said that 
"practically the largest part of Iraq's nuclear program has now 
been identified — probably what is missing is just details." And 
in September, he told Reuters that Iraq's nuclear program "is at 
zero now," and "they [the Iraqis] have stated many times to us 
that they have decided at the higher political level to stop 
tnese activities." Ke eve*! made the improbable statc^er.t that 
"this we have verified." 

The U.N. Special Commission flatly rejects these statements. 
The Commission believes that Iraq has not given up on any of its 
mass-destruction weapon programs, including the nuclear one. 
Because of his press statements, the chief inspector has 
undermined the other inspectors' credibility. How can they 
plausibly search for things that their leader says don't exist? 

The Special Commission still wants to find the following: 

* parts of the giant machines the Iraqis used 
to purify uranium to nuclear weapon grade, to 
find out how much of this uranium the Iraqis 
made 

* a suspected experimental array of 
centrifuges, also used to purify uranium to 
weapon grade 

* a suspected underground reactor that could 
secretly make plutonium for bombs 

* the identities of Iraqi nuclear personnel, to 
find out what these persons are doing 

* records of explosive tests, to find out 
whether the Iraqi bomb design succeeded 

* other records of the nuclear weapon program, 
to find out whether all of its components 
have been discovered 

* Iraq's foreign sources of technical advice, 
to cut them off 

* Iraq's network of foreign equipment 
suppliers, to make sure that it does not 
revive as soon as the embargo is lifted. 



60 



Finally, the Subcommittees ask how the Agency can be 
strengthened. I believe that the United Nations should follow 
the lead of the Congress and separate the Agency's promotion 
function from its inspection function. This would increase its 
credibility by removing its conflict of interest. The 
inspections in Iraq, for example, would be carried out better by 
the Special Commission, which has no promotion function and acts 
directly under the United Nations Security Council. 

In other countries, the Agency could continue to inspect 
declared locations, but inspections of undeclared locations 
should be done by a new entity whose sole job would be 
verification; no promotion function would interfere. This new 
entity could concentrate its resources on inspecting countries 
where the threat of proliferation is greatest, rather than 
dissipate its inspection resources as the Agency presently does. 
The Agency currently spends most of its scarce inspection funds 
looking at Germany, Japan and Canada, hardly the most acute 
proliferation risks today. This leaves fewer resources for 
countries like Iran. 

This new entity should report to the U.N. Security Council, 
rather than to the Agency's Board of Governors. The Board 
typically includes countries like Algeria, China, India, Iran, 
Iraq, Libya, Pakistan and Syria. This amounts to letting a 
committee of arsonists decide where to send the fire truck. 

This new entity should also be able to receive, use and 
protect intelligence information. The Agency has never had that 
ability, which is why it has never been able to do anything more 
than inspect declared locations. Even in the case of Iraq, where 
the Agency has been provided intelligence information, the 
Agency's secrecy rules have kept the providers from finding out 
what their intelligence produced. U.S. intelligence officials 
say that the Agency has been a one-way street: information goes 
in, but nothing comes out. 

I would like to end with an important reminder, which is 
that the Agency's inspections play only a minor role in the 
effort to stop the spread of the bomb. In countries like Israel, 
India, Pakistan and South Africa — countries that have 
successfully proliferated — the Agency's inspections have been 
virtually irrelevant. These countries made the bomb at places 
where the Agency never had any right to look. To stop the bomb 
from spreading further, more powerful tools are needed. They 
include tougher diplomacy, trade sanctions, aid cut-offs, and 
denials of technology through export controls. It is important 
to make the Agency's inspections as strong as possible, and it is 
certainly possible to improve them, but it would be a mistake to 
think that by tinkering with them we are going to seriously 
affect proliferation. 



61 



The United Nations Inspections of Iraq: 
Accomplishments and Operational Lessons 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Joint Hearing 

Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East 

Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade and Environment 

Subcommittee on International Security, International 
Organizations, and Human Rights 

June 29, 1993 



Dr. Jay C. Davis 
Director, Center for Accelerator Mass Spectrometry 

and 

Program Leader, Geoscience and Environmental Research 

Physical Sciences Directorate 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 



62 



Chairman Hamilton, Chairman Gejdenson, Chairman Lantos and 
Members of the Subcommittees, I am pleased to appear before you to discuss my 
insights from the Iraqi inspection process. Properly learning the lessons of these 
inspections, clearly an on-going process, is vital to the success of future efforts to 
control and inhibit proliferation of nuclear weapons to states or non-national 
organizations that might readily choose to use them. Today's hearing is 
particularly timely, as yesterday was the second anniversary of the unannounced 
inspection and subsequent truck chase at Fallujah. That inspection and 
confrontation produced the first irrefutable evidence of Iraq's covert nuclear 
weapons program, its violation of its obligations under the Nonproliferation 
Treaty, and its efforts to evade the requirements of Resolution 687. As a 
principal in the events at Fallujah, I must confess that I never imagined that two 
years later we would still be dealing with so many uncertainties regarding both 
Iraq and the inspection process. 

I should begin with an important caveat. I speak to you as an individual, 
not as a representative of either the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory or 
the Department of Energy. My impressions of the inspections and the inferences 
with respect to policy that I draw from them are mine alone; neither Livermore 
nor DOE should be burdened with them. 

It is perhaps useful for the Subcommittee to understand a bit of my 
personal background to help put my comments in perspective. I am an 
experimental nuclear physicist, having spent over twenty years at Livermore as 
both a research leader and engineering project manager. I have built several 
accelerator facilities and am familiar with nuclear weapons design, fabrication 
and testing and with the various technologies used to produce plutonium or to 
enrich uranium for weapons purposes. My principal research interests are in the 
application of accelerator and isotopic techniques to problems as disparate as the 
dosimetry of carcinogens and mutagens, the mechanisms of global climate 
change, and the development of verification techniques for nuclear arms control. 
I served as a technical expert detailed to the United Nations Special Commission 
(UNSCOM) on two of the early confrontational and productive inspections, 
Nuclear 2 and Nuclear 4 in the summer of 1991, to assess Iraqi efforts in these 
areas. 

In addition, I have been both an Emergency Duty Officer for the 
Livermore Laboratory and a Senior Scientific Advisor for DOE's Nuclear 
Emergency Search Team (NEST) and Accident Response Group (ARG). In both 
these roles, I have trained and operated with security personnel at Livermore and 
have trained with the FBI and US military for NEST/ ARG activities. I am both 
medically and psychologically screened for high-stress field work. In 
consequence, I look upon the Iraqi Inspections with an attitude somewhat 
different from that of a scientist on a site visit to a foreign facility- 



63 



You have posed three questions. I will answer them as directly as is 
possible for a scientist, feeling that your subsequent questions will elicit further 
detail as necessary. 

1. How successful have the efforts of the international community since 
the Gulf War been in identifying and rendering unusable Iraqi resources and 
capabilities to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction? 

The United Nations has been very effective in finding, dismantling, and 
destroying Iraq's programs for weapons of mass destruction. Aided by 
intelligence, the process has forced Iraqi divulgement and disclosure of 
relocated equipment, of records concealed, and of personnel involved. At 
present, particularly in the ballistic missile area, completion of the process 
seems to be hindered by lack of good intelligence leads. Given that the 
work is done by unarmed inspectors operating within a country in full 
control of its military and security forces, I think the results have been 
remarkable. However, the process has shifted from discovery and 
destruction of Iraqi facilities to frustration of Iraqi attempts to restart their 
programs. Keeping inspectors on the ground inhibits Iraqi resumption of 
prohibited activities, but the process will become more dangerous as Iraqi 
frustration rises and world political support erodes. That change should 
be noted and its consequences anticipated. 

2. How well has the International Atomic Agency accomplished the 
tasks in Iraq that were given to it by the United Nations Security Council? 

Performance could have been improved in the nuclear inspections by 
giving the leadership role to UNSCOM and relegating the IAEA to a 
technical support role in nuclear fuel cycle and safeguards techniques. 
Many of the IAEA staff, and some of its leadership, were burdened by the 
perceived need to protect the Agency's role, to defend its past 
performance in Iraq, and to protect themselves from criticism (and 
possible career damage) within the Agency. Institutionalizing leadership 
for the nuclear inspections in the Agency made it difficult to remove timid 
leaders and resulted in an opening between UNSCOM and the IAEA that 
made possible both information loss and Iraqi political intrigue. The 
IAEA has been accused of being both politicized and of suffering from 
clientitis. From my perspective, both these accusations are justified. The 
IAEA shows little appetite for intrusive inspection or aggressive behavior, 
both of which are essential to this inspection regime. 

The IAEA fielded very different sorts of leaders in Iraq. David Kay, who 
led the two inspections in which I participated, was aggressive and active 
in the field, thereby accomplishing positive ends. Maurizio Zefferero was 
more the diplomat - concerned, if not burdened - by the politics of the 



64 



situation and the IAEA's interests. Demitri Perricos was a classic IAEA 
inspector, principally concerned with detailed verification of previously 
declared activities. As an example of clientitis, Perricos chided me on 
several occasions for my estimates of Iraqi design goals and costs. These 
had appeared in the media and had offended the Iraqi Atomic Energy 
Commission, leading them to protest that there was political motivation 
behind the numbers. As these estimates were made possible only after 
defeating exhaustive Iraqi concealment and deception efforts, partly in the 
inspection confrontation at Fallujah in which Iraqi agents had fired upon 
and detained members of our team, I felt his concerns for Iraqi sensibilities 
to be poorly considered. It is very important for Committee Members to 
realize that the aggressive surprise inspection at Fallujah that forced the 
Iraqis to disclose their covert program was hardly a typical IAEA 
inspection activity. The entire scenario was orchestrated and carried out 
by David Kay, four US and British technical experts, and two non-IAEA 
UN support staff, using authority granted by Rolf Ekeus, head of the UN 
Special Commission. We quite literally wrote the script for Fallujah while 
walking through Baghdad back alleys after midnight, decidedly not the 
IAEA style. Had that operation failed, as it threatened to at several 
moments, we might never have realized the full scope of the Iraqi 
program. 

Placing leadership for the nuclear inspections in the hand of UNSCOM, as 
was done for the chemical, biological, and ballistic missile inspections, 
would have allowed evaluation of team leaders based on their 
performance in the field and their replacement if needed without 
institutional questions arising. This step would have also provided the 
IAEA with a useful mechanism for evading the political costs associated 
with the conduct of intrusive inspections. I strongly recommend such an 
arrangement in the future. The Security Council's direct authority is much 
stronger than that of the IAEA and should be appropriately utilized. 

3. What steps can be taken to strengthen the IAEA to deal with such 
challenges in Iraq and elsewhere in the future? 

As my comments above indicate, I do not believe that the IAEA should 
have the lead role in such matters in the future. We are at present 
strengthening the IAEA's analytical abilities, both through access to our 
own facilities and by helping them field improved techniques in their own 
laboratories. Staff from Livermore and the other national laboratories are 
involved in these efforts now. I think that the IAEA has an important 
support role in sample acquisition, maintenance of chain-of-custody, and 
technical analysis of materials returned. I am not sanguine about granting 
the Agency routine information to intelligence information or allowing it 
to acquire genuine sophistication in nuclear weapons design and 
technology. 



65 



In the chemical, biological and ballistic missile areas, the United Nations 
Special Commission has shown adequate ability to field effective teams 
and to accomplish its mission without having a long previous history on 
the ground in Iraq. UNSCOM has been able to evaluate and replace 
leaders and to evolve operational doctrine without institutional 
inhibitions. I strongly recommend that future nuclear inspections be run 
under direct Special Commission control in a similar fashion. Allow 
UNSCOM (or its successor agency) to select the inspection team leaders, 
evaluate the quality of intelligence, select inspection targets, and staff the 
teams as appropriate, detailing IAEA staff in support roles as needed. 
This change would relieve the IAEA of its conflicting roles of first friendly 
teacher and inspector of nuclear technology, and then suddenly operator 
of adversarial and accusatory special inspections. Such a change would 
allow more readily the fielding of teams of mixed specialists, likely to be 
more suitable for future inspections in troublesome places. 



There is perhaps one consequence of the Iraqi program that has not been 
fully realized and that is appropriate to point out to the Subcommittee Members 
concerned with economic effects. Much of the Iraqi investment in the covert 
uranium enrichment program was dual purpose. The Iraqis intended not only to 
create weapons but to produce an infrastructure of trained people and state-of- 
the-art production facilities that would make them a first-world nation in 
economic terms. They discussed this goal in terms of human capital and return 
on investment in a fashion that would be perfectly understood by the Clinton 
Administration. It is useful to remember that Jaffar Dhia Jaffar, the head of their 
covert program, is both Vice-Chairman of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission 
and Deputy Minister of Industry. Although they failed to produce nuclear 
weapons, the Iraqis succeeded in creation of first-world production facilities for 
mechanical and electrical hardware, a fact verified and broadcast by our 
inspections. While much of the dual use infrastructure has been destroyed, the 
Iraqis quite cheerfully state that they can rebuild it. The size and sophistication 
of this act of industrialization, unprecedented among the Arab countries of the 
Middle-East, is a threat to their Arab neighbors and a destabilizing force, even if 
the Iraqis magically adopt a pacific and democratic governmental style. The 
Iraqis openly express a desire for educational, economic and political leadership 
of the Arab states. Many of us on the teams feel that they have the capability to 
emerge as the Japanese of the Middle-East; that such emergence may not be 
welcomed by their neighbors should be anticipated. 

Finally, let me close with a comment on the future. I think it important to 
emphasize that in Iraq the IAEA and the Special Commission have been asked to 
do a task that is without precedent, operating under conditions and restraints 
that have been applied to no previous inspections. To criticize the IAEA for its 
performance on institutional grounds fails to recognize that it is trying to do a 



66 



task for which it was neither created nor enfranchised; criticism on grounds of 
inadequate personal performance and the failure to deal with it is allowable. We 
need new institutions, operating with different access to information, different 
team selection and training approaches, and very different access to supporting 
military and political power if we are to be prepared for future events. 
Those of us who participated in the Iraqi inspections have come away feeling 
that their multi-national character and UN direction were essential to success. 
We are proud of what was accomplished on an ad-hoc basis by teams that made 
up doctrine and procedures as they went along. This approach will not suffice in 
the future where intrusive inspections may have to be carried out in states that 
have not recently been shocked by massive aerial bombardment and ground 
combat as Iraq was. An ad-hoc approach will similarly not suffice if we are to 
undertake such missions as seizing control of the nuclear weapons of a 
collapsing proliferant state, an event of increasing probability. If we are to 
succeed in these tasks in the face of deception, frustration, and possible violence, 
we need doctrinal development, specialized equipment, and frequent practice 
with our peers from other countries. None of those useful preconditions is being 
accomplished at present. Almost all discussion of improved nonproliferation 
programs has focused on technology, not on doctrine and operations. This 
deficiency in present planning is an error that will have fatal consequences, both 
personal and political, for participants at all levels. It would be very dangerous, 
both to governments and to individuals, to presume that the successes in Iraq 
demonstrate a general case. Iraq may in fact be the easiest case we ever face. 
Thank you for your consideration of my insights. 



67 



Biography 

Jay C. Davis 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

University of California 

P.O. Box 808, L-397 

Livermore, CA 94551 

Jay C. Davis is a nuclear physicist at the Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory. At Livermore since 1971, he has worked as a research scientist and 
as an engineering manager, having led the design and construction of several 
unique accelerator facilities used for basic and applied research. He has also 
worked as a manager in magnetic fusion and laser isotope separation. 

In 1988, Dr. Davis was appointed Director of the Center for Accelerator 
Mass Spectrometry, a multi-disciplinary, multi-organizational group applying 
accelerator analytical techniques to problems in biomedicine, geochemistry, 
materials science, and arms control. In 1993, he also became Program Leader 
for Geoscience and Environmental Research at LLNL, overseeing the 
Laboratory's efforts in global climate change, environmental sciences, earth 
sciences and the emergency response to airborne release of toxic or radioactive 
materials. 

Dr. Davis received his BA in Physics from the University of Texas in 1963, 
his MA in Physics from the University of Texas in 1964, and his Ph.D. in Physics 
from the University of Wisconsin in 1969. From 1969 to 1971, he was an AEC 
Postdoctoral Fellow in nuclear physics at the University of Wisconsin 

Dr. Davis has numerous publications on research in nuclear physics, 
nuclear instrumentation, plasma physics, accelerator design and technology, 
nuclear analytical techniques and analytical methods, and treaty verification 
technologies. He holds patents on spectrometer technologies and methods for 
low-level dosimetry of carcinogens and mutagens, and the study of metabolic 
processes. He has been a scientific advisor to the UN Secretariat, several US 
agencies, and to scientific agencies of the governments of Australian and New 
Zealand. He participated in two UN inspections of Iraq in 1991 He is an avid 
backpacker, biker and cross-country skier 

6/22/93 



68 



Prepared Testimony of Professor Lawrence Scheinman, Cornell University: Joint Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, the Subcommittee on Economic 
Policy, Trade and Environment, and the Subcommittee on International Security, 
International Organizations and Human Rights, of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
June 29, 1993 



Thank you very much for the opportunity to participate in these important hearings on 
UN and IAEA efforts to identify and destroy Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and establish 
a long-term monitoring regime. I propose to focus most of my remarks on the questions of 
how well the IAEA has accomplished the tasks assigned to it by the United Nations Security 
Council under Resolution 687, and what steps can be taken to strengthen the IAEA's ability 
to deal with the challenge of proliferation in Iraq and elsewhere in the future. However, I 
would like to begin with a few remarks on the general question of how successful have been 
the efforts of the international community in identifying and rendering unusable Iraqi 
resources and capabilities to produce nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass 
destruction. 

A fundamental point of departure in answering this question is the understanding that 
it is virtually impossible to be certain about success. The only prudent approach is to be 
certain of uncertainty. Leaving aside the obvious problems of the continued presence of 
thousands of scientists, engineers and technicians, and the consequent residual theoretical and 
technological knowledge and expertise, accrued technical and experimental experience, and 
copies of records, reports, and design activities related to nuclear weapons development, 
which are easy to hide and difficult to ferret out, there can be no definitive assurance that 
nothing remains in Iraq in terms of tangible resources and capabilities to produce weapons of 
mass destruction, and there never really can be. 

This reality is one of the underlying reasons for long-term monitoring in Iraq as 
prescribed by UNSC/RES.715. Long-term monitoring is intended to ensure continuous 
verification of Iraqi compliance with extensive nonproliferation undertakings defined in the 
Security Council cease-fire resolution that go beyond those agreed by Iraq as a party to the 
NPT, and to minimize the risk that Iraq could successfully reconstruct a nuclear weapon 
development program. RES. 715. among other things, authorizes the IAEA to carry out 
anytime/anyplace on-site inspections; to secure full and free access to all sites, material and 
persons that the Agency judges necessary to fulfill its monitoring and verification activities; 
and to restrict and/or stop movement of suspected material, equipment and other items. As 
the Committee is aware, Iraq has thus far refused to formally accept this Resolution, insisting 
that it is an unwarranted intrusion on its national sovereignty, although elements such as a 
water-sampling program already are under way. 

So far-reaching a verification system, especially if based and implemented on a 
presumption that Iraq will try again to build nuclear explosives, can severely limit, but not 
absolutely foreclose, a successful clandestine effort. An additional complicating factor that 



69 



did not exist at the onset of the Gulf War, is the breakup of the former Soviet Union and the 
increased risk that would-be proliferators such as Iraq might be able to purchase directly 
weapons-usable material, or even acquire complete nuclear devices, thereby bypassing the 
need for mounting a program for producing fissile material which would be highly vulnerable 
to detection by a robust verification system. This underscores a fundamental point: the 
ultimate effectiveness of the verification regime is not self-contained, but contingent on other 
considerations such as a vigorously applied comprehensive export control system embracing 
all relevant suppliers, and, of course, resolute political support by the United Nations 
Security Council and the key states in the international system. I will return to this theme in 
addressing the question of steps to strengthen the IAEA. 

This having been said, it is clear that a great deal has been accomplished in stripping 
Iraq of its capability to develop weapons of mass destruction. Given the rather adverse 
conditions under which the IAEA and UNSCOM have had to operate, the achievements are 
all the more impressive. Inspection in Iraq is not a cooperative venture. Although accepting 
the terms and conditions of the cease fire resolution that established the rights and 
responsibilities of the IAEA, UNSCOM and Iraq, Iraqi authorities have attempted to redefine 
their obligations and the rights of inspecting authorities and have interposed difficulties all 
along the way. This includes failing to disclose information until it was clear that inspectors 
had irrefutable evidence of the existence of a facility, material or equipment; attempted 
continuous concealment of equipment and documents; denial of use of airfields to UN 
personnel; complicity in hostile behavior toward inspectors, and so on. This is a continuing 
problem. As noted by the UNSCOM spokesman, rather than making good faith declarations 
of former activities that were now banned, Iraq consistently concealed the full extent of its 
programs. UNSCOM and the IAEA were forced to change the basic premises of their 
approach to the inspection relationship from good faith to using information from 
independent sources and backed by threats of continuing the embargo and resuming 
hostilities. (T.Trevan, Arms Control Today , April, 1993, p. 11). 

Despite these impediments, UNSCOM and the IAEA have substantially exposed the 
Iraqi programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. There is a sense that while not 
everything has been found the vast majority of what existed has been identified; that the 
broad infrastructure for the production of nuclear weapons has been identified and rendered 
harmless, destroyed or taken into custody; that all declared nuclear material and quantities of 
undeclared material have been accounted for and where relevant either already removed or 
readied for removal; that dual-use equipment has been identified although the question of its 
ultimate disposition in a number of instances remains unresolved. Uncertainties persist about 
the continued presence of unacknowledged and undiscovered items or facilities such as an 
alleged hidden reactor, with the IAEA following up all plausible leads regarding the possible 
location of such a facility, a process that will continue as long as plausible information is 
made available or other indicators arise suggesting the existence of an undeclared facility. 
The possibility that more undeclared nuclear material may exist in Iraq has not been 
excluded. There is also a widely shared presumption that Iraq has not given up in its quest 
for weapons of mass destruction, and that given the opportunity it would reinstitute its 



70 



program. As well, it is recognized that given its human resource and technical experience 
base a rejuvenated program could move forward more rapidly than in the case of newly 
aspirant states. Remaining gaps in information regarding the possible existence of hidden 
components as well as incomplete information on the Iraqi supply network both in the 
nuclear and missile areas are well understood by UNSCOM and IAEA, and this guides their 
definition of future actions. 

In short, the efforts of the international community in identifying and disabling Iraqi 
resources and capabilities to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction appear to 
have been remarkably successful even if incomplete and limited by the reality that the only 
certainty is uncertainty. But if policy is developed and implemented on that premise the risks 
associated with uncertainty will be commensurately reduced. 



The second question asks how well the IAEA accomplished the tasks in Iraq that were 
given to it by the United Nations Security Council. The short answer to this question is that 
the IAEA has fulfilled its assigned responsibilities professionally and effectively, earning it 
the respect and confidence of the UN Security Council, the Secretary General, and many 
governments for whom resolute implementation of the provisions for the elimination of 
weapons of mass destruction, and the capability to produce them by Iraq, are a paramount 
concern. 

There are also those who have criticized the Agency's performance of its assigned 
tasks. Some have done so because of what they considered to be deficiencies in how the 
IAEA carried out its mission. A second kind of criticism reflects the intrinsic distrust of 
international organizations to deal with security-related matters that some people share. Still 
other criticism is based, in my view, less on the question of how the IAEA performed in Irac 
than on a concern that an organization that has a mandate both to promote and to safeguard 
the peaceful use of nuclear energy and that has been focussed on verifying declared nuclear 
materials and activities and operating more as a confidence-building mechanism than as a 
verification mechanism (searching for clandestine activity and invoking mandatory no-notice 
on-site inspections of declared or undeclared sites) might not be able to adequately 
accommodate to the requirements of a more demanding verification regime that will have to 
deal not just with declared nuclear activities, but increasingly with the threat of future Iraqs 
and of undeclared and clandestine nuclear operations. In part this reflects a misunderstanding 
of the process of international safeguards, in part, an intuitive preference not to rely on a 
technically-anchored international organization to carry out what is seen to be a political and 
security function. This raises sizable issues about the future of the non-proliferation regime 
and its supporting institutions that cannot be adequately addressed in the time available today 

Turning back to the first criticism concerning quality of performance, there are 
several points to make. First, a number of the tasks assigned by the Security Council to the 
IAEA broke new ground. While the Agency had a long experience in material control and 



71 



accounting and in identifying and evaluating the capabilities of nuclear plant, it had not 
before been called upon to deal with national military activities or to take physical control of 
nuclear materials and assets. Yet RES/687 charged the IAEA with responsibility to identify 
and evaluate weaponi2ation facilities and nuclear weapons infrastructure, and to take control 
of and supervise the removal, destruction or rendering harmless of items specified in the 
resolution. The earlier cited remark of the UNSCOM spokesman is particularly relevant 
here: he noted that "The initial understanding in implementing the verification regime was 
that Iraq would, in good faith, make declarations about its former activities that are now 
banned." Instead, it quickly "became evident that Iraq was consistently concealing the full 
extent of its programs. As a result, the verification regime had to be tightened, and the 
UNSCOM teams, and in the nuclear sphere, the International Atomic Energy Agency, were 
forced to change the basic premises of their approach to the inspection relationship; Iraq, it 
seems, had to be presumed guilty until proven innocent." (Trevan, loc.cif ) It would appear 
that if the IAEA approached its tasks with some naivete and caution, it was not at all alone in 
this regard. 

In the course of 18 nuclear inspections in Iraq the IAEA-led teams have, as indicated, 
mapped out a substantially comprehensive picture of Iraq's nuclear development program, 
while acknowledging that they do not,and cannot ,have an absolutely complete picture. All 
known major facilities that could contribute to a weapons development program have been 
destroyed and all dedicated or single purpose equipment and components either destroyed or 
placed under seal. Some quantities of dual-use equipment have been left intact. This appears 
to follow the UNSCOM policy, as described by its spokesman of "not destroying many dual- 
use items that could be irreversibly converted for permitted purposes." (Trevan. op.cit , 
p. 14). The full extent of the weapons development program however, is not clear; knowledge 
of the sources of supply for equipment and components is incomplete; and it is uncertain that 
all special nuclear material in Iraq has been located and taken into custody. Recognizing that 
some activities, especially those involving small-scale research and progress in theoretical 
work and design, cannot be known except under the circumstance of extraordinary luck, the 
IAEA emphasizes the monitoring of nuclear material pursuant to the very broad range of 
inspection rights referenced earlier, as approved by the Security Council in the long-term 
monitoring plan (RES/715). 

How should one assess IAEA performance in all of these tasks? That judgment is best 
made by those outside the IAEA closest to the events. In the course of evaluating two years 
experience under RES/687, the UNSCOM spokesman remarked that "Through their diligent 
work, the IAEA inspection teams, with the assistance and cooperation of UNSCOM, 
uncovered three major programs for the enrichment of uranium to weapons-grade material, 
laboratory-scale preparation of plutonium, and a full-scale program for nuclear 
weaponization." (Trevan, op.cit p. 13) The Deputy Executive Chairman of UNSCOM. 
Ambassador Newlin, speaking before a small professional group assembled by the 
Washington Council on Nonprol iteration this past October, after noting the past limitations of 
IAEA inspections commented that "...the Agency has had to adapt to the intrusive type of 
inspection, primarily at undeclared sites, as mandated by resolution 687. In my view, the 



72 



IAEA has adjusted to the new inspection requirements with remarkable success, a fact 
illustrated to UNSCOM by IAEA's very thorough, excellent reports. Beyond inspections, the 
IAEA has also done well in the destruction phase of resolution 687. The Agency.... 
performed magnificently at the Al Atheer site in supervising the destruction of a very large 
number of.. .buildings that were involved in the weaponization program." Finally, 
Ambassador Ekeus, the UNSCOM Executive Chairman, while questioning the current 
adequacy of the nonproliferation regime to halt the spread of nuclear weapons in a talk at the 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory last November, remarked that "Iraq's nuclear 
programme has been halted-the IAEA did a truly magnificent job in this respect." This 
conforms with similar statements he has reportedly made in periodic reports to the Security 
Council. 

If, as some others contend, the IAEA record has been less than sterling, I submit that 
one should look not at isolated instances, but at the record as a whole; and that one should 
focus on the institution in its entirety rather than on any single individual. Perfection is 
beyond human reach. The consensus among those objectively viewing events seems to be that 
the IAEA has performed very competently in meeting its responsibilities under RES/687. 



This brings us to the final question raised, namely what steps can be taken to 
strengthen the ability of the IAEA to deal with Iraq-type challenges in the future. As the 
Committee is well aware, this question has been the focus of attention for several years 
dating in some respects to pre-Iraqi times. But the events in Iraq and the implications of the 
end of the Cold War for non-proliferation have served to concentrate the mind and energy of 
governments, IAEA leadership and non-governmental organizations. In approaching this 
question one must, of course, understand that the draconian and punitive measures applied 
under the UNSC resolutions in Iraq cannot be taken as a standard for normal international 
verification. It is implausible that states would freely and voluntarily submit themselves to so 
onerous and intrusive a regime. If anything underscores this truth it is the reversal of the 
United States position regarding anytime/anyplace inspections under the chemical weapons 
convention. On the other hand, as demonstrated in recent arms control and disarmament 
agreements, and in changes brought about in IAEA safeguards, there is considerable support 
for taking significant steps to ensure credibility and to reinforce confidence. But any regime 
of the future will still have to strike a balance between the demands of international 
confidence and national sovereignty. 

A point that cannot be repeated too often is that the safeguards system applied by the 
IAEA in support of the Nonproliferation Treaty was commensurate with the expectations and 
desires of the international community. The NPT system was devised to apply comprehensive 
safeguards principally to the nuclear fuel cycles of the advanced industrial states which at the 
time were the only states with anv significant nuclear activity at all. These states. Germany. 
Japan. Italy, Sweden and so on were determined to minimize any risk that the distinction 
between themselves and the nuclear weapon states inherent in the NPT would extend into the 



73 



realm of peaceful nuclear activity and competition. This deep-seated concern, parenthetically, 
was the reason why President Johnson offered to submit all US peaceful nuclear activities to 
the IAEA safeguards regime to be applied to the non-nuclear weapon states under the Treaty. 

To ensure the adherence of these states to a non-proliferation treaty the United States 
and the Soviet Union endorsed a verification regime that kept intrusion to the minimum 
consistent with credible verification. This resulted in a system that focussed on the flow of 
nuclear material and resulted in certain constraints on how the IAEA exercised the rather 
liberal rights originally granted it in its statute. Governments, speaking through their 
representatives on the Board of Governors, established the tone of the times. Participating 
non-nuclear weapon states were obligated to declare all of their nuclear material to the IAEA 
which would then verify that the material could be accounted for. 

Given the structure of global competition between the two superpowers it was always 
presumed that they would control any threat of proliferation among their allies or clients, and 
as their competition reached into every region of the world, that assumption applied to the 
world at large. The periodic five year reviews of the NPT have resulted in consensus 
endorsements of the sufficiency and credibility of the safeguards system despite some 
differences [raised by activist non-governmental institutions] over the adequacy of the 
material control and accounting system upon which the regime was based to detect diversions 
of quantities of nuclear material suitable to produce a single nuclear explosive device in 
certain large-scale facilities. 

The end of the Cold War changed one of the assumptions upon which the 
nonproliferation regime had been built; the discovery of a massive and largely unknown 
nuclear weapons development program in an NPT state, Iraq, changed another. In this new 
environment the expectations are that with the diffusion of technology more states that are no 
longer under the watchful eye of the superpowers can engage in nuclear weapons 
development and that, because of security and political concerns no longer being 
subordinated to the superpower competition, some of these states well may seek to satisfy 
their political/security interests with nuclear arms. 

All of these factors have an impact on international institutions, not least the IAEA. 
Most notably, the credibility of safeguards is now seen to be a function of their capacity to 
detect undeclared or clandestine nuclear activity. And the measure of the IAEA is to be its 
willingness and capability to agree and implement a more intrusive verification regime -- a 
regime for which the basic authority is already essentially in place. An underlying concern 
for some, as mentioned earlier, is whether an organization that simultaneously promotes and 
regulates nuclear energy can focus sufficiently and firmly enough on regulation to provide 
the necessary credibility; whether, given the strong emphasis on confidence-building in the 
past, it can apply rigorous verification. 

The effort to meet the new circumstances and new expectations has centered on re- 
examining existing safeguards authority and clarifying or building upon it as appropriate. 



74 



The main focus has been special inspections, authority for which derives from the statute and 
the governing safeguards document, INFIRC/153. In February, 1992 the Board of Governors 
confirmed the Director General's conclusion that authority to conduct special inspections in 
full-scope safeguards states extended not only to other locations within an already declared 
facility, but also to facilities and locations other than those notified to the Agency by the 
state. It was also confirmed that a request for a special inspection could be based on plausible 
information from sources other than safeguards inspections, including information from 
national intelligence sources. 

The authority to invoke special inspections is one thing; the willingness to do so, 
given its potential political ramifications is another. North Korea provided a testing ground 
for Agency determination. Faced with a discrepancy regarding how much plutonium may 
have been produced by the North Koreans when measured against findings derived from the 
procedures to establish an initial inventory pursuant to the North Korean safeguards 
agreement, and provided with corroborative non-safeguards information concerning the 
existence of undeclared waste storage facilities, the Director General called for a special 
inspection. When North Korea refused, this was reported to the Board of Governors which 
reaffirmed the need for a special inspection without further delay. North Korea's refusal to 
accede to this demand resulted in a finding and report of noncompliance to the United 
Nations Security Council. The IAEA acted with deliberation and decisiveness giving a clear 
indication that the new political environment was well understood, and that it was fully 
prepared to exercise its authority. Besides giving evidence of Agency will, this says 
something about the value of initiating challenges in a technical institution that is not 
encumbered with veto powers. 

Other measures reinforcing the safeguards system have been taken including a Board 
of Governors decision requiring states, under a safeguards provision calling for design 
information to be submitted "as early as possible", to inform the agency at the time 
authorization to construct or modify a facility is given rather, than as has been the practice, 
no less than 180 days prior to introducing nuclear material into the facility. Together with a 
further Board decision calling upon states to adopt a policy of universal reporting of exports 
and imports of nuclear materials, sensitive non-nuclear materials and specialized equipment 
especially relevant to nuclear activity, the IAEA has moved to establish increasing 
transparency in the nuclear arena. The expectation is that as these early warning measures 
become institutionalized, the insight of the Agency into the world's nuclear programs will 
deepen and the proficiency of safeguards will increase. 

Within the secretariat itself additional changes have been made. The inherent 
conservatism that prevailed in safeguards over the past two decades is giving way to greater 
political awareness about the linkage between safeguards and proliferation. The emphasis in 
reaching beyond declared nuclear activity is altering the mind-set of the inspectorate and 
organizational leadership is emphasizing the total nature of nonproliferation on a continuing 
basis. A system of country officers to consolidate all available information from all sources 






75 

regarding the nuclear activities of states under safeguards and to assist in briefing and 
debriefing of inspectors has been established. 

These developments signify important progress in adapting to a changing international 
environment and to changing political expectations. The process is dynamic, not a one time 
adjustment. The actions and decisions taken thus far work to strengthen the ability of the 
IAEA to respond to the challenge of verification in new political circumstances. Other 
measures are under consideration including adaptation of environmental monitoring and 
sampling techniques to increase confidence about the non-existence of undeclared facilities or 
activities, introducing institutionalized short-notice inspections and the like. 

These and other measures are valuable potential additions to the arsenal of capabilities 
at the disposal of the IAEA. What is necessary now is to consolidate the gains that have been 
made, to institutionalize new procedures, to build on what has been done and to identify and 
address remaining problem areas. 

There are some building blocks that need early attention and action. Some of them are 
discussed in material I would like to ask the committee to incorporate in the record. I will 
limit myself here to four points. First , it is unequivocally clear that the ability of the IAEA 
to optimize its safeguards capabilities and to create the greatest probability for detecting 
clandestine activities depends to a substantial degree on the availability to it of sensitive 
information which only a limited number of states are able to provide. The flow of relevant 
information to the IAEA should be regularized and institutionalized. To my knowledge there 
has been little if any question raised about the ability of the IAEA to receive and utilize 
national intelligence information provided to it pursuant to its responsibilities under RES/687. 
There is every reason to take steps to ensure that information enhancing the IAEA's ability to 
carry out inspections or to request visits (a measure that is of recent vintage) in safeguarded 
stateslfTne united States should take a lead in moving forward such regulanzation as well as 
ensuring any other operational or logistic support the IAEA might need to fulfill our 
expectations for its safeguards activities. 

Second , it is a truism that international organizations lack meaningful enforcement 
power. The exception is the United Nations Security Council which, if it invokes Chapter 
VII as it did in the case of the Gulf War, can take mandatory' action and pass mandatory 
resolutions binding upon member states. The January. 1992 summit statement of Heads of 
State and Government of the Council declared that the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
constitute a threat to international peace and security which is the key to opening the door to 
Chapter VII and enforcement. That same statement acknowledged the integral role of IAEA 
safeguards in implementing the NPT and asserted that "members of the council will take 
appropriate measures in the case of any violations notified to them by the IAEA." (UNSC, 
S/23500, January 31, 1992) Given that the statement was made in the midst of a continuing 
crisis in Iraq, and a then strong sense of unity of purpose on the Council, it would be 
pertinent to strengthening the international consensus against safeguards or nonproliferation 
violations to codifv this statement in a formal Security Council resolution. This would 



76 



provide an important element of enforcement and enforceability to IAEA safeguards 
especially in view of the fact that by statute, the IAEA has direct access to the Security 
Council in cases of safeguards noncompliance. 

A third measure requiring political leadership and action is to ensure that the IAEA is 
adequately funded to meet the growing safeguards responsibilities with which it is 
confronted. Studies are under way, and have been for some time, to ascertain whether and 
how increased efficiency can be built into the safeguards system without sacrificing quality of 
knowledge and an adequate basis for confidence in the integrity of the system. Whatever 
streamlining might be achieved it stands as a stark reality that with Argentina, Brazil, and 
South Africa now under comprehensive safeguards and with former Soviet Union republics 
hopefully joining the NPT and negotiating comprehensive safeguards agreements with the 
IAEA added resources will be necessary if the agency is to operate a credible safeguards 
system. This is all the more the case with enhanced safeguards that address problems of 
possible undeclared or clandestine nuclear activity. 

Fourth , the United States should take the lead, with the Russian government, to make 
use of the IAEA to verify dismantled nuclear warhead material. Such a measure would be a 
strong demonstration of confidence in the system and the openness it implies could have a 
potentially powerful precedent setting value. The distinction between weapon and non- 
weapon states in so far as safeguards is concerned has long been an item on the agenda of 
the non-aligned, with support from other quarters. The idea of applying comprehensive 
safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in weapon states is attractive in principle but 
costly in implementation. The consignment of verification responsibility for dismantled 
warhead material would at one and the same time be less costly and more useful. It is a step 
that the United States government should take now. 

But the single most important element in strengthening the ability of the IAEA to 
meet the challenge of verification is the political will and political support of its member 
states and of the United Nations Security Council. International organizations are creations of 
sovereign states; they lack sovereignty or independent political authority and are 
fundamentally dependent on the political will of their sovereign members. Secretariats can 
influence, cajole and help to define collective interests, but it is the governing bodies of 
international organizations that are the repositories of political authority. 

Sovereignty is a vigorous and contradictory force against empowering international 
institutions with far-reaching authority. But threats to international peace and security as 
nuclear proliferation is, cannot be successfully addressed unilaterally; they require a 
collective action. While international verification may have to be supplemented by regionally 
verified arms control and security arrangements, it is something that cannot be done without 
if there is to be any confidence in the world at large regarding the status of national nuclear 
programs and the probable absence of clandestine nuclear activity. That is why it is all the 
more important that governments, like ours, that are committed to effective international 
verification, take whatever measures are possible to strengthen the hand of our chosen 
international instruments, in this case the International Atomic Energy Agency. We and 
others have developed expectations for our international institutions; now we must ensure that 
the necessary authority, operational and financial support and political backing for vigorous 
implementation is available to them. 



77 



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Subcommittee on International Security, 
International Organizations and Human Rights 



Iraq Rebuilds Its Military Industries 



A Staff Report 

prepared by Kenneth R. Timmerman for the House Foreign Affairs 
Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and 

Human Rights 



June 29, 1993 



78 

Letter of Transmittal 

June 21, 1993 



The Honorable Tom Lantos 

Chairman, Subcommittee on International Security, International 
Organizations, and Human Rights, of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
U.S. House of Representatives 
Washington, DC 20515 

Dear Mr. Chairman: At your direction, I have prepared this staff report on 
the current status of Iraq's weapons manufacturing capability. 

While UN Council Resolution 687, which Iraq accepted, obligated the 
Baghdad government to renounce all production, stockpiling, and use of 
unconventional weaponry, Iraq has rebuilt many of the weapons plants damaged 
during the Allied air campaign, and has resumed the production of a very wide 
range of conventional weaponry. Iraq has also succeeded in in returning to 
service most of the tanks, artillery, and combat aircraft damaged during Desert 
Storm. If unchecked, the Gulf could face the threat of renewed Iraqi agression 
during this administration. 

In addition to published reports, mainly from the Iraqi press, information 
for this report was gathered from personal interviews with UN Special 
Commission staff in New York, with inspectors from the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in Vienna, and from a trip to Jordan in April 1992, prior to my 
joining the subcommittee staff. Other interviews were conducted in Paris with 
French government officials, with German Customs officials in Cologne, and 
with German export authorities in Bonn and Eschborn. At no time during the 
preparation of this report did the author have access to classified material. 

Some of the information on Iraqi procurement networks was developed by 
Jules Kroll, president of Kroll Associates, a private financial investigative firm on 
Wall Street under contract to the Kuwaiti government to identify hidden Iraqi 
assets abroad. For material on Crescent Petroleum, I am indebted to British 
journalist Alan George. My colleague Dennis Kane, of the House Banking 
committee staff, has generously made available some of the vast documentation 
he gathered while investigating the Atlanta branch of Italy's state-owned Banca 
Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL). 

In addition, I would like to gratefully acknowledge the assistance of 
Kenneth Katzman and Zachary Davis of the Congressional Research Service. 

The conclusions drawn in this report are my own, and do not necesarily 
reflect the views of the Committee on Foreign Affairs or any member thereof. 

Sincerely yours, 

Kenneth R. Timmerman 



79 



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80 



TJie weapons industry 

The scope of Iraq's weapons industry was largely unknown before the 
invasion of Kuwait 1 . More than forty major weapons-manufacturing complexes 
were built during the 1980s, most of which are beyond the scope of the UN 
inspections. Many have already started operating again. Little or no attention has 
been paid to these activities by Congress or the press. 

Saddam's son-in-law and cousin, Hussein Kamil al-Majid, who was the 
driving force behind the military industrialization of Iraq before Desert Storm, 
was officially rehabilitated in February 1992 after a brief fall from grace. He is 
once again in charge of the weapons industries. His principal technical assistants, 
Lt. Gen. Amir Hammoudi Al-Saadi (now Minister of Industry and Minerals), and 
Lt. Gen. Amir Rashid al-Ubaidi, continue to occupy positions of prominence. 
Both are men of vision, and are extremely gifted in managerial skills. They are 
assisted by a large number of experienced weapons designers and production 
technicians. 

Iraq announced in January 1992 that it had already repaired and tooled up 
more than 200 factory buildings associated with various military production 
lines 2 . On May 4, 1992, Lt. Gen. Amir Al-Saadi announced that "more than 50 
establishments" of the former Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization 
had been put back into commission, using equipment taken out of the weapons 
plants and hidden before Desert Storm. 3 



IThe author of this Staff report chronicled the growth of Iraq's military industries in 
The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq (Houghton-Mifflin, 1991. Boston & New York). 
Information in this report is drawn from the author's previous experience in Iraq, interviews 
with the directors of Iraqi weapons programs, and a broad range of government and 
industry sources in France, Germany, Britain, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, and the 
United States, in addition to those sources mentioned in the letter of transmittal. 

2Middle East Defense News (MEDNEWS), March 9, 1992. Michael Eisenstadt, a 
military fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy- wrote in a March 1993 
paper entitled "The Iraqi Armed Forces since the Gulf War: "Significant reconstruction 
activity has been observed at more than two dozen militarv-industrial sites and more than 
200 buildings have been partially repaired. Iraq has now reportedly resumed assemblv of T- 
72 tanks, and limited production of artillery, short-range missiles and rockets, ammunition, 
and spares at some factories, although production is likely to remain limited as long as 
sanctions remain in place." 

3"Minister Pledges 'Surprises' in Industrial Output," Iraqi News Agency, May 4 1992. 



81 



Among those facilities that have been "thoroughly reconstructed," accorded 
to inspection reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are the 
notorious Saad 16 ballistic missile research and development center near Mosul, 
and the Al Rabiya plant in Zaafarniyah, which was bombed by Allied warplanes 
on Jan. 17, 1993. 4 

Iraq has already reactivated many of its black market procurement 
networks to acquire spare parts for conventional weapons-manufacturing 
facilities. Once United Nations sanctions are lifted, Iraq will be free to procure 
most of what it needs on the open market, to complete any gaps in technology. 

Speaking before the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on March 24, 
1993, the Chairman of the UN Special Commission for the Disarmament of Iraq 
(UNSCOM), Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, said he believed Iraq fully intended to 
restore its military industrial base. "The capabilities are there, the supply system 
including banks and payments is there. The day the oil embargo is lifted, Iraq 
will get all the cash and that will be a great concern... With the cash, the 
suppliers, and the skills they will be able to re-establish all the weapons 
programes," Ekeus said. "It may grow up like mushrooms after the rain." 5 

It should be emphasized that Iraq's success in rebuilding its military- 
industrial base has occured despite the most rigorous international economic 
sanctions imposed on any nation since World War II, and despite intrusive 
inspections of certain weapons facilities by UNSCOM and the IAEA . 

Hidden Equipment 

Iraq's industrial purchases from the West in the 1985 through 1989 ran to 
$14.2 billion - excluding armament. The vast majority of this equipment went 
into Iraqi weapons plants and has not been found by the UN Special 
Commission. It was purchased either directly by the Ministry of Industry and 
Military Industrialization (MIMI), which was run by Saddam Hussein's son-in- 
law, Hussein Kamil Hasan, or by entities directly reporting to that ministry. 

Production equipment found in Iraqi^nuclear weapons plants has been 
catalogued in part by the IAEA. Some has been placed under seal to prevent 
further use; other production tools have been slated for future monitoring, to 



4 IAEA 18th inspection report, page 5; released April 28, 1993. 
5Reuter, March 24, 1993. 



82 



ensure Iraq does not use them for its weapons of mass destruction. Only a 
handful of state-of-the-art tools and application-specific fixtures have actually 
been destroyed, however. The IAEA argues that Iraq should be allowed to retain 
production equipment that has a potential civilian use, since Iraq's nuclear 
weapons program has been fully dismantled. Chief IAEA inspector, Maurizio 
Zifferero, has been arguing for months that Iraq's nuclear program "stands at 
zero now." 6 Few independent experts agree with this sanguine assessment. 
Indeed, even IAEA director general, Hans Blix, has expressed his scepticism. In a 
discussion before a non-proliferation study group in Paris on May 26, 1993, Blix 
acknowledged that Iraq has refused to allow the IAEA to establish permanent 
monitoring of its nuclear facilities. 

Throughout the 1980s, West Germany was Iraq's largest supplier of high- 
technology, with sales totalling $4,243 billion during the 1985-1989 period, or 
four times the level of U.S. sales. 

Iraqi purchases in Germany included: 

• $2.4 billion worth of heavy machinery and transportation equipment 

• $1.3 billion worth of manufactured goods 

• $425 million worth of chemicals, and 

• $114 million worth of controlling instruments. 7 
The vast majority of this equipment is still missing. 

Main- frame computers 

Iraq's extensive purchase of mainframe, mini-supercomputers and process 
control systems provides an eloquent case of the type of supplier information the 
UN Special Commission would require in order to better identify and dismantle 
Iraqi unconventional weapons programs. 

It is widely acknowledged today in scientific circles that advanced 
computers give the edge to Third World countries such as Iraq, who seek to 
develop a nuclear device without going through the costly and political perilous 
process of a nuclear test. Using high-speed computers and graphics work 
stations, it is now possible to simulate a nuclear blast, thus allowing design 
improvements to be developed in a matter of months that used to require long 



6"Iraq Nuclear Effort Is 'at Zero,' UN Says, International Herald Tribune, Sept. 3, 1992. 
7Figures derived from OECD monthly trade statistics. Cf "Who's Been Arming Iraq," 

Middle East Defense News (MEDNEVVS), Paris, France, April 15, 1991. 



83 



The Men Who Built Iraq's 
Military Industries 



Hussein Kamal Hasan 
al Majid, 

former Minister of 
Industry and Military 
Industrialization, cur- 
rently in charge of the 
Military Industries and 
4iead of clandestine 
procurement 




Lt. Gen (Dr) Amer Hamoodi Al-Saadi, 

the industrial mastermind. 




Lt. Gen. Amer Rashid Al Obeidi 

the engineer 




All photos copyright © Kenneth R. Timmermun. /WsV 



84 



and arduous live testing. The UN nuclear inspectors discovered documents in 
Iraq which proved beyond a doubt that Iraq was using mainframe computers in 
precisely this way, and had gone through five major design upgrades of a 
nuclear explosive device, without undertaking a live nuclear test. 

Most is known about U.S. high-tech exports to Iraq, although the United 
States was bottom on the list of Iraq's Western suppliers (a situation set to change 
had Iraq not invaded Kuwait). This is because intense pressure from the press 
and Congress forced the U.S. government to release detailed lists of export 
licenses requests for Iraq. An analysis of Department of Commerce records 
shows that in the United States alone, Iraq received a total of 354 export licenses 
for computers and advanced scientific analysis equipment from May 1985 
through August 1990, worth a total of $113,760,714. 

Of these licenses, at least 157, worth $57,792,275, were for advanced 
computing systems. The most widely selling item were VAX machines from 
Digital Equipment Corp. Other frequently sold items included high-speed 
oscilloscopes, radio-spectrum analyzers, integrated circuits, gas chromatography 
equipment, spectrophotometers, and a wide range of electronics manufacturing 
and test equipment. All were used in Iraqi weapons plants, many in the 
manufacture of ballistic missiles and in nuclear weapons research and 
development. Typical purchasers were the Iraqi Ministry of Industry, the 
Ministry of Defense, and weapons establishments including Saad, Huteen, Badr, 
and Nassr. 

Of the 157 computers, Iraq has acknowledged to possessing a single IBM 
370 mainframe - just one - located at the Thuwaitha nuclear research center. 
When the 8th UN nuclear inspection team demanded in writing a full accounting 
of all mainframe computers Iraq had purchased for use in its nuclear weapons 
program, this was the full text of the answer they received: 

"The Computer Office at Tarmiya was initially designed to accommodate 
the option of a large computer (mainframe). Due to the special circumstances in 
operating individual separators [ie, calutrons for uranium enrichment], it was 
discovered through experience that the best condition would be to connect the 
separators to small dedicated computers. After achieving the steady operating 
conditions for the separators, the small computers would have been connected 
through a network located in the above-mentioned office. This approach was 
adopted at Tarmiya. It also applies to the design of the Computer Office at Ash- 
Sharqat. although computers were never introduced at this site. 



85 



"At the Al Thuwaitha site, the large computer was an IBM-370; in addition 
there were a number of personal computers (PCs) including IBM PS/2. The 
approach adopted at Al Tuwaitha was to use the computer capability available in 
the country when needed in addition to the above-mentioned computers." [8th 
IAEA inspection report, p 13]. 

Iraq's consistent refusal to provide detailed supplier information is one of 
the most daunting problems facing the UN inspection teams. Without detailed 
lists of equipment, suppliers, and the Iraqi purchasers, they have been hard put 
to penetrate the sophisticated shell game Iraq has been playing since April 1991, 
when the first inspections began, to hide its unconventional weapons capabilities. 
In some cases, they do not even have the necessary data to ask the Iraqis the right 
questions. 

On Feb 12, 1992, UN inspectors demanded to visit computer centers in 
Baghdad, where they discovered six mainframe computers made by Digital 
Equipment Corp, IBM, and Hewlett Packard Three machines had been 
purchased by the Scientific Research Council (SRC), a procurement front run by 
Lt. General Amer Rashid al-Ubaidi. Iraq had never admitted to possessing any of 
them. 

Two of Iraq's major computer suppliers deserve to be singled out, since the 
scope of their deliveries puts them in a case all by themselves. 

Hewlett Packard received 57 licenses to export computer systems to Iraq 
from the United States, worth $3,147,608, from 1984 until 1990. HP systems can 
be found throughout the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, at Thuwaitha, at the 
Saad 16 research and development center, and at a variety of heavy engineering 
complexes that were manufacturing parts of uranium enrichment centrifuges 
and calutrons. Hewlett Packard maintained an office in Baghdad throughout 
most of the 1980s, and was a major exhibitor in the yearly Baghdad international 
trade fair. 

The second company, International Computer Systems Ltd, was established 
in 1986 in the UK by a Jordanian of Palestinian origin, Esam Samarra. ICS 
received 49 export licenses from the Department of Commerce in the United 
States to sell computers to Iraq, worth $16,377,132, in addition to extensive sales 
it made directly from Britain. Samarra currently owns 70% of ICS. 

ICS serves as a distributor /front for Digital Equipment Corp (DEC) VAX 
and MiniVAX computers, which have proven their worth to weapons designers 
the world over. It is no accident that ICS's clients were primarily Iraqi weapons 



86 



establishments, including: Nassr, Saad 16, me Scientific Research Council, the 
Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization, and the State Establishment 
for Heavy Engineering Industries (SEHEE), which was deeply involved in the 
manufacture of centrifuges and calutrons for uranium enrichment. 

Esam Samarra subsequently set up a service company to maintain DEC 
computers in Iraq, called Computer and Communication Services Company 
(CCS), located in Amman, Jordan. Samarra told the author of this report during 
an interview in his Amman office in April 1992 that he had also been selling Iraq 
data systems made by McDonnell Douglas Computer Systems. 

ICS was a major purveyor of VAX workstations to Iraq, importing 
equipment from the United States and from Great Britain, depending on where 
licenses could be obtained. It should be noted that during this same period (1985- 
1990), DEC only applied directly for four U.S. export licenses for Iraq. 

Machine-tools 

Machine-tools are the basic building blocks for any heavy industry, and are 
particularly critical for the weapons industry. Because of this, machine-tool sales 
were carefully regulated throughout the 1970s and 1980s by the Coordinating 
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), an informal group of 
NATO partners which attempted to prevent the sale of strategic technologies to 
the Soviet Union and its allies. In many countries, machine-tool exports required 
an export license regardless of the destination, because of the COCOM controls. 
This led Iraq to devise a particularly ingenious method for sidestepping controls, 
which has since become one of the hallmarks of Iraq's secret network. 

In 1987, as plans to build an atomic weapon accelerated dramatically, the 
Iraqis decided to purchase a Western machine-tool manufacturer, Matrix- 
Churchill, as a means of securing unlimited supplies of advanced machine-tools 
and as Iraq's principal partner for establishing its own machine-tool industry. 
Matrix Churchill was purchased through a web of front companies controlled 
directly by Baghdad. The main procurement front was the London-based 
Technology and Development Group (TDG), run by Safa Habobi, a former 
director of the giant Taji weapons complex. 

Once it became an Iraqi company, Matrix Churchill used its subsidiary in 
Solon, Ohio as a front to procure additional controlled technologies in the United 
States. 



87 



Key documents detailing the construction by Matrix Churchill and an 
American composite materials manufacturer, Glass International Incorporated, 
were uncovered during the investigation of the Atlanta branch of the Banca 
Nazionale del Lavoro, conducted by the House Banking Committee. The ceramic 
and glass fiber plant was used by Iraq for the manufacture of uranium 
enrichment centrifuge rotors and possibley for missile nose cones. None of this 
production equipment has been found by the UN Special Commission during its 
inspections in Iraq, although shipping documents and plant progress reports 
show that deliveries were virtually complete by July 1990. The plant appears to 
have functioned as a stand-alone unit at the Taji weapons complex in the 
northern suburbs of Baghdad, according to corporate site drawings. 

Similarly, little work has been done to date on the very large volume of 
industrial purchases by Iraq from Japan, Yugoslavia, China, and East European 
countries such as Czechoslovakia. Sources in Prague, for instance, indicate that 
Czech state enterprises had a hand in Iraqi chemical weapon plants, while the 
IAEA has identified a Czech company as the source of the HMX explosives 
found at that were to be used in constructing nuclear bomb cores. 

A declassified U.S. Army intelligence document, obtained by privately 
funded Nuclear Control Institute in Washington, reveals that China was 
suspected of having built a top secret underground plutonium reactor in Iraq in 
the late 1980s, which the IAEA has sought to locate, without success. So strong 
were IAEA suspicions that Iraq had built an underground reactor that in 
September 1992 plans were drawn up to begin long-range monitoring of Iraqi 
waterways, in order to detect the minute traces of radioactivity the operation of 
such a reactor would emit. 

Finally, much Japanese high-tech gear has been discovered by the IAEA in 
Iraqi nuclear weapons establishments, although procurement information has 
remained unavailable and unsolicited by the Japanese press. 

Tlie UN Inspections 

UN inspection teams have found only a portion of the dual-use 
manufacturing equipment known to have been purchased by Iraq in the mid and 
late 1980s. 

From April to June 1992, during its 11th and 12th inspection tours in Iraq, 
the IAEA catalogued 603 machine-tools that had been found in facilities related 



88 



to Iraq's nuclear weapons program. However, approximately 2,000 machine-tools 
show up in Western export licensing records as having been sold to Iraq in the 
late 1980s, primarily from the UK, Germany and Italy. Because export controls on 
machine-tools were being relaxed at the same time, and because certain 
governments were seeking to expand their machine-tool exports to Iraq by 
decontrolling items that normally would have been controlled, it is impossible to 
estimate how many more machine-tools were actually delivered to Iraq without 
individually validated licenses. 8 

For instance, of the 603 nuclear-relevant machine tools found in Iraq, IAEA 
records showed that 502 were not licensed by exporting authorities. In the case of 
Great Britain, 49 of the 83 machine-tools found by the IAEA were subject to 
export licensing restrictions. However, British export licensing records, made 
available to Parliament as part of its inquiry into British arms sales to Iraq, show 
that the Department of Trade and Industry licensed 313 machine-tools to Iraq 
from 1987-1989 - and by all accounts, only a fraction of what was actually 
shipped 9 . By the most conservative estimate, therefore, at least 264 British tools 
are currently missing. 1() 

In the two months preceding Operation Desert Storm, Iraq worked day and 
night stripping its manufacturing facilities of valuable production equipment, 
computers, records, and materials. According to a senior Jordanian official, 
interviewed in Amman in April 1992, this effort was supervised by Lt. General 
Amer Rashid al-Ubaidi, Undersecretary at the Ministry of Industry and Military 
Industrialization (MIMI). The Jordanian official was a frequent visitor to Iraqi 
weapons plants, ballistic missile tests, and research centers in the late 1980s, in 
his official capacity as a scientific and technical advisor to King Hussein. He 
claimed that General Amer boasted to him after the war of his success. 

U.S. spy satellites photographed this activity only days before the air war 
began, leading one Operations intelligence officer interviewed subsequently to 



"The U.S. Department of Commerce licensed only a handful of machine-tools; much 
production equipment was shipped without licenses. One example: 30-foot long boring 
machines intended for making long-range artillery tubes. 

""Exports to Iraq: Minutes of Evidence," House of Commons, Trade and Industry 
Committee, Tuesday, 26 Nov. 1991. 

^An additional 94 Matrix Churchill tools were found in March 1993 during the 18th IAEA 
inspection at the Al Huteen State Establishment, bringing the total number of Matrix Churchil 
machine-tools found in Iraq to 148. See below. 



89 



observe that the Pentagon had "solid evidence" Iraq had been stripping its 
weapons plants in preparation for war 11 . 

Underground storage sites used to hide industrial equipment were not 
high-priority targets during the air war. Besides, they were so numerous as to 
render a bombing campaign against them extremely costly. After the Israeli 
bombing of the Osirak nuclear research reactor in June 1981 every government 
building in Iraq was constructed on top of large underground shelters. Airbases 
and entire factory complexes were buried, with exact copies constructed 
elsewhere to fool enemy warplanes and reconnaissance satellites (so-called 
"potemptkin" facilities) . This accounts in part for the difficulties in bomb- 
damage assessments during the air campaign. 

In mid-April 1992, following the destruction of the nuclear weapons design 
center at Al Atheer, Western intelligence photographed Iraqi trucks hauling 
equipment back into known manufacturing facilities. This signalled Iraq's 
conclusion that it had reached the end of the intrusive UN inspections and was 
free to rebuild its weapons plants at will. 

Declarations in recent months by senior Iraqi leaders have only highlighted 
this intent. On Jan. 13, 1993, Lt. Gen. Amer Rashid boasted that Iraq had rebuilt 
its air defense network "better than before" Desert Storm 12 . On Feb. 7, Lt. General 
Amir Hamoudi Al-Saadi announced that Iraq had succeeded in rebuilding the 
war-damaged Al Qaim industrial complex, which had been used to extract 
uranium from phosphates ore and for the manufacture of CW precursors. Al- 
Saadi also hinted that Iraq had resumed production of main battle tanks. "I think 
every country is entitled to produce what it can for its legitimate defence and 
Iraq is no exception," he said. 13 Meanwhile, Russian ballistic missile expert Nikiti 
Smidovitch returned from an inspection tour to announce that Iraq had begun 
work on a new family of surface to surface missiles, with a range just under 150 
km. 14 



11 Confidential interview with the author, Nov. 14. 1991. 

12 Iraqi News Agency, Jan. 13, 1993 
13 Reuter, Feb. 7, 1993. 
14 Reuter.Jan. 29, 1992. 



90 



The flbabil MLRS program 




The Ababil is a multiple rocket launch system which Iraq developed jointly with 
Yugoslavia's Federal Directorate of Supply and Procurement. Two versions were built: a 50- 
km range launch vehicle, with 12 rocket tubes, and a 100-km range version, with 4 tubes. 
Both were designed to launch chemical as well as a variety of conventional warheads 
(cluster, hollow charge, HE, mine-laying), making it a powerful offensive weapon. Proto- 
type launchers were put on display at the Baghdad International Arms Fair in May 1989 
where they were photographed by the author. Contractual information obtained from sources 
in Yugoslavia shows that the first two unassembled launchers were shipped to Iraq in 1988 
from Yugoslavia . The solid-fuel rockets and warheads were made in Iraq at the Saddam 
Engineering Complex (Saad 5). while most of the electronics were manufactured at the 
Salah-al-Din (Saad 13) plant. The Yugoslav designation for the system was M87. 



91 



The Limits of the UN Inspections 

None of the UN Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq calls for the 
dismantling or future monitoring of Iraq's conventional weapons plants. This is a 
loophole that has never been examined very closely in open fora. 

UN teams have inspected some of these plants, but only within the very 
limited framework of the contractual relationship between the facilities and Iraq's 
nuclear weapons complex or with the ballistic missile or CBW programs. As one 
senior analyst with the UN Special Commission put it, "We can't be bothered 
with counting how many 155 mm shells the Iraqis can make, as long as they do 
not violate the terms of [UN Security Council Resolution] 687... We have too 
much to do as it is." 

In other words, Iraq is fully allowed by the terms of the ceasefire to 
continue manufacturing conventional weapons and ammunition and whatever 
rate it desires, even in the same plants that have been identified for their 
relevance to the nuclear weapons program. In theory, Iraq can even save 
equipment slated for disposal by the UN Special Commission by declaring that it 
will "only" be used for the manufacture of conventional weaponry. Allowable 
activity includes the manufacture of artillery rockets and ballistic missiles with 
ranges of 150 kilometers or less. What is not allowed is research or production of 
weapons of mass destruction, defined as nuclear weapons, chemical or 
biolological warfare agents, or ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 
kilometers. 

Iraq has tried to take advantage of this loophole to prevent the destruction 
of equipment used for the production of the Badr 2000 (Condor II), a 1000 
kilometer-range ballistic missile believed to be far more accurate than Iraq's 
upgraded SCUDs. (Its solid-fuel motors also make it easier to conceal and 
quicker to deploy). Starting in 1985, the United States government led a major 
Western campaign to prevent the sale of critical manufacturing equipment to the 
Condor II program, parts of which were being conducted jointly with Argentina 
and Egypt. Before the UN inspections began in Iraq, it was widely claimed that 
halting the Condor II program was the largest single success of the Missile 
Technology Control Regime. 

UNSCOM ballistic missile teams soon discovered not one but four separate 
facilities in different parts of Iraq that were heavily engaged in the production of 



92 



the solid-fuel Badr 2000 only days before the Allied bombing of Iraq began. One 
of the facilities, south of Fallujah, was also manufacturing liquid-fueled al 
Hossein and al Abbas missiles, Iraq's improved-range SCUDs. 

All four missile plants appear to have been built by German and Italian 
firms, although the bulk of the solid fuel technology is said to have originated in 
the United States and to have reached Iraq via France and Italy. 15 

Nevertheless, in letters dated Nov 19, 1991 and Feb 28, 1992, Iraqi officials 
informed the UN Special Commission that they intended to "modify and alter the 
equipment for the Badr-2000 project with a view to its reuse... [for] the 
manufacture of civilian explosives [and] in the manufacture of 100 kilometer 
range Ababil missiles" - both of which were allowable activities. 

In particular, the Iraqis wanted to save from destruction a series of solid 
fuel mixers, made by the Draiswerke company in Germany, installed at the Taj 
al-Ma'arik missile plant south of Baghdad. They argued that since the mixers 
could also be used for "allowable" activity, they should not be destroyed. 

While UNSCOM rejected Iraq's reasoning in this particular case and began 
destroying Condor II manufacturing equipment in April 1992, it left the vast 
majority of Iraq's "dual-use" equipment untouched. 

Thirty-one machine-tools were destroyed by the UN Special Commission 
during the March and April 1992 inspections Ten of these were designated as 
missile-related, the other 21 as nuclear-related. Twenty-five other pieces of 
production equipment were destroyed, most as part of Iraq's ballistic missile 
program (solid fuel mixers, induction furnaces, hot and cold isostatic presses, 
etc). Specialized jigs and mandrels were destroyed, as were calutron and 
centrifuge assemblies used in uranium enrichment. Isolated pieces of equipment 
have been rendered inoperational since then. 

This extremely modest destruction of Iraq's unconventional weapons 
capability has left major military manufacturing programs virtually untouched. 



15 "UN Inspectors destroy Condor II equipment," MEDNEWS, March 30, 1992. 



93 



The Zaafarniyah complex 

The case of the Zaafarniyah industrial complex, located some 20 kilometers 
south of Baghdad, illustrates the limits of the inspection process as currently 
structured. 

Two distinct facilities were located on the same site, both of which were 
inspected by the IAEA because they had been producing parts for the nuclear 
weapons program. The Digila electronics plant was inspected twice because it 
had produced electronic parts for the calutron uranium enrichment program. 
The Al Rabiya heavy machining plant (aka al Rabee) was inspected on four 
separate occasions - twice by UNSCOM for missile activities, and twice by the 
IAEA. 

Like most Iraqi weapons plants, Al Rabiya was designed and operated as a 
dual-use facility, under the auspices of the Ministry of Industry and Military 
Industrialization. Seventy-eight machine tools at this site were catalogued by the 
IAEA as related to the nuclear weapons program. These included large German 
machines used to make the calutron casings. Despite this known activity, the 
plant was never disabled by the IAEA, nor were these key manufacturing tools 
placed under any kind of monitoring that would have prevented their use in 
nuclear projects in the future. Inexplicably, the IAEA eventually dropped it from 
its list of potential inspection sites. 

In January 1993, U.S. military planners concluded that Al Rabiya continued 
to operate, and that the Iraqis considered it a safe haven for illicit activity 
including the production of calutrons and uranium enrichment centrifuges 
assemblies. 

Confidential informants have told the Subcommittee staff that one Western 
government (not the U.S.) had urged the IAEA to destroy Al Rabiya prior to the 
U.S. air strike against the site on Jan. 17, 1993. Despite the plant's clear relevance 
to both the calutron and centrifuge programs, however, the IAEA refused. 

Three days after the strike, Saddam Hussein vowed to rebuild the plant. 
And on March 16, the head of Iraq's Military Industrialization Organization, 
Hussein Kamal Hasan, announced that reconstruction was not only complete but 
that the "enterprise is now operating even better than before." 16 In his 



16 Baghdad INA, March 16, 1993. 



94 



announcement, Kamil renamed the plant the "al-Nida State Enterprise for 
Manufacturing Molds, Construction Works and Machines." Al-Nida is the 
codename for a project to build mobile missile launchers. Indeed, al-Rabiya plant 
equipment was perfectly suitable for casting large steel and aluminium 
assemblies for missile launchers. The reconstruction of Al Rabiya/ Al Nidaa was 
documented during the 17th and 18th IAEA inspections. 

Another example, drawn from the 18th IAEA inspection report, is the 
notorious Saad 16 ballistic missile R&D plant near Mosul, built by Guildemeister 
and a consortium of German and Austrian companies in the mid-1980s. By any 
interpretation of the UN ceasefire resolutions, this plant should have been 
thoroughly monitored and kept out of commission. Just the opposite has 
occured. According to the 18th IAEA inspection report, 

"Al Kindi (SAAD 16)... is a facility for military research and development, in 
particular, the pyrotechnics and propellants used in rockets. The site has been 
thoroughly reconstructed after severe destruction during the Gulf War. The 
facilities at the site have features that could be useful in development of small 
quantities of explosives such as those used in a nuclear weapons development 
program. It has also some good quality machine shops for fabricating non- 
explosive materials, an electroplating capability and a primitive capability for the 
machining of high explosives. The reconstruction effort has proceeded since the 
visit in November 1992. More buildings have been completed and additional 
equipment has last been installed.No nuclear related activities prohibited under 
UNSCR 687 were observed." 17 

As a general rule, the IAEA has been loath to destroy dual-use equipment to 
avoid giving the impression it is seeking to prevent Iraq's scientific and 
technological development. Rather than shut down an entire factory, the IAEA's 
approach has been to target isolated pieces of equipment spread across a number 
of sites. This has left virtually untouched the largest military manufacturing base 
in the Arab world. 

Sometimes this has led to extreme cases. Also during the 18th IAEA 
inspection in early March 1993, Chief inspector Dimitri Perricos chanced upon no 
fewer than 242 machine-tools, many of them potentially subject to UNSC 687 
monitoring, in a single nuclear weapons facility, Al Huteen. Earlier IAEA teams 



17 IAEA 18, April 28, 1993, page 5. 



95 



had simply missed them. 94 of these machine-machine tools were 3 and 4-axis 
turning machines manufactured by Matrix Churchill. 

The IAEA is unlikely to become more severe with Iraq, and indeed, can be 
expected to argue that Iraq should be allowed to retain its dual-use equipment 
and production facilities - indeed, even nuclear facilities. During an extended 
conversation in Vienna earlier this year, the head of the IAEA inspection team, 
Professor Maurizio Zifferero, said he could see "no reason why Iraq should not be 
allowed to pursue legitimate civilian nuclear research again. I can imagine the 
day where they might want to rebuild the Thuwaitha research reactor, or build 
nuclear power plants." Such activity, Zifferero believed, would be "legitimate and 
innocuous" since the IAEA has reduced the Iraqi bomb program "to zero." 18 

Since Zifferero's comments were publicized in the Wall Street Journal, he 
has backed away from this position in his public statements. 

Industrial strategy 

Iraq has been steadily building up the industrial infrastructure necessary for 
a broad-based weapons industry since Saddam Hussein took charge of military 
procurements and security questions in 1974. 

At that time, Saddam set up a three-man Strategic Planning Committee that 
took charge of arms purchases, military-industrial planning, and the secret 
financial networks. 

In the early days, Saddam's partners on the three-man committee were his 
cousin, Adnan Khairallah (who went on to become Defense Minister in the 1980s 
before his death in a mysterious helicopter crash in May 1989), and Adnan 
Hamdani, Saddam's personal secretary. Trained as a lawyer, Hamdani was in 
charge of contractual negotiations and financing, and went on to become 
Planning Minister. 19 



^Comments reproduced in the Wall Street journal Europe, "What the IAEA Hasn't Found 
in Iraq," Jan. 28; a similar account of Zifferero's attitude toward dismantling Iraq's manufacturing 
capabilities can be found in Gary Milhollin, "The Iraqi Bomb," The New Yorker, Feb. 1, 1993. 
Milhollin notes that Zifferero, who has been given the task of dismantling Iraq's nuclear weapons 
program, had sold Iraq plutonium reprocessing hot cells and other equipment in the mid-1970s 
as the lead Italian government official in charge of nuclear exports. 

19 For more background, see chapters 1-4 of The Death Lobby: Hoxo the West Armed Iraq, 
opcit. 



96 



Part of Hamdani's job was to slip strategic weapons projects into large 
contracts ostensibly devoted to developing Iraq's civilian manufacturing or 
agricultural potential, which in turn were buried in Iraq's Soviet-style Five-Year 
Plan. Under the heading "agricultural development," for instance, Hamdani 
inscribed a little-noticed entry that called for "the creation of six laboratories for 
chemical, physiological, and biological analysis." To operate the laboratories, 
which were devoted to biological weapons research, the Plan called for the 
training by foreign companies of 5,000 technicians. One of these labs was the now 
famous Salman Pak "baby milk" plant, identified by UNSCOM as Iraq's largest 
biological weapons facility. 

Every "civilian" plant Iraq built in the late 1970s and 1980s was also geared 
for military production. Chemicals plants at Fallujah, for instance, also churned 
out precursors for poison gas. Heavy engineering plants in the southern suburbs 
of Baghdad produced uranium centrifuge parts as well as machine-tools and 
railroad ties. Steel plants were built so they could just as easily manufacture 
reinforcing bars for the construction industry as armor-plate for tanks. To fully 
grasp the scope of Iraq's weapons-manufacturing capability, one must examine 
in detail Iraq's industrial base with an eye to dual-use. This was the case before 
the UNSCOM inspections, and it remains the case today. 

The imbrication of military with civilian production made procurement of 
most materials an easy task throughout the 1980s. Under the guise of building a 
$1 billion "super-phosphates" plant at Al Qaim, for instance, Iraq also procured 
processing lines to separate uranium from phosphate ore. As part of the gigantic 
steel complex at Taji, they purchased a foundry for tank barrels; or again, under 
the cover of electrical generating equipment they purchased large steel casings 
which were used for the uranium enrichment calutrons. 

Key Installations 

While many Iraqi weapons plants were heavily destroyed during Allied 
bombing raids, extraordinary efforts have been spent over the past two years to 
get military production back up and running. According to Israel's top private 
analyst on Iraq, Amatzia Baram, "Saddam must continue his military efforts, 
since his whole raison d'etre over the past twenty years has been to transform 



97 



Iraq into the Prussia of the Middle East. Arms manufacturing is built into his 
system. Without it, Saddam will lose prestige, and perhaps lose power." 20 

Of the forty-seven main weapons plants listed in the Appendix, thirty-three 
have been cited by the IAEA for having contributed to Iraq's crash effort to 
develop an atomic weapon, ten were engaged in chemical or biological weapons 
production, twelve were involved in ballistic missile research, design, 
development, and manufacture, while twenty-four were making conventional 
armaments. 

Much remains of this vast industrial infrastructure. As mentioned above, 
most production equipment was dismantled before the Allied bombings and was 
stored in underground bunkers or civilian industrial sites for the duration of the 
war. Over one hundred pieces of production equipment from the Samarra poison 
gas works, for instance, were stored in the Mosul sugar factory, and discovered 
only by accident by UN inspectors. It is not known how much of this equipment 
has been subjected to monitoring. 

The following is a brief summary by factory of the conventional weapons 
production capability still believed to exist in Iraq: 

• Al Ameen: 1-72 tank assembly, under Polish and Czech licenses; 
machine-tool assembly line. 

• Al Amil: liquid nitrogen production 

• Al Muthena (Fallujah chemicals plant): HMX,.RDX explosives. 

• Al Qaqaa: aerial bombs, TNT; solid rocket propellants 

• Al Rabee: precision machining 

• April 7: proximity fuzes for 155 mm and cluster munitions 

• Badr: aerial bombs, artillery pieces; tungsten-carbide machine-tool bits 

• Base West World: major armor retrofitting center 

• Digila: computer software; assembly of process-line controllers for 
weapons plants; plastics casting 

• Fao: cluster bombs; fuel-air explosives 

• Huteen: explosives, TNT, propellants; potential for armored vehicle 
assembly 

• Mansour: defense electronics 

• PCI: ethylene oxide for fuel-air explosives 



20 Interview with the author in Haifa in Feb. 1992. 



98 



• Saad 5 (Saddam Engineering Complex): 122 mm howitzers; Ababil 
rockets; tank optics; mortar sites 

• Saad 13 (Salah al Dine): defense electronics, radars, frequency-hopping 
radios radios 

• Saad 21: Nonferrous metal plant for ammunition cases 

• Saad 24: gas masks 

• Sawary: small patrol boats 

• SEHEE: heavy engineering complex capable of a wide variety of military 
production (artillery, vehicle parts, cannon barrels) 

• Taji: wheeled APCs (East European license); armor plate; artillery 
pieces. 21 

This very broad-based capability gives Iraq the possibility not only of 
refurbishing the 250 or more fighter aircraft and 2,500 main battle tanks that 
survived the war, but of expanding its military inventory in the very near future. 
Noting this development, the Chairman of the UN Special Commission, Rolf 
Ekeus, noted earlier this year that Iraq "considers its obligations ended once 
destruction of its weapons of mass destruction is completed, and has said it will 
not accept UN monitoring of any future arms buildup." 22 

UNSCOM believes that Iraq is systematically preserving its options in all 
four areas of unconventional weapons production - nuclear, ballistic missile, 
chemical, and biological. Furthermore, UNSCOM inspectors say they have 
seen no signs that Iraq has dispersed the teams of scientists that had worked 
on these weapons projects. Iraq has jealously guarded and protected its foreign 
suppliers network, and refuses to accept monitoring of its future capabilities, 
both of which constitute clear violations of the UN ceasefire agreements. 
Instead of cooperating with the UN, the Iraqis have tried to conceal as much 
production equipment as possible, redeploying it to "conventional" military 
production." 



21 "Rebuilding the Defense industry," MEDNEWS, March 9, 1992; "Does Iraq have the 
Bomb?," MEDNEWS, Jan. 25, 1993. 

22 Wireless File, USIS, Feb. 6, 1993. 



99 



Ongoing Procurement Efforts 

Iraq continues to operate an extensive clandestine procurement network in 
Europe, the Middle East, and possibly in the United States. Some of the most 
notorious agents who helped Iraq obtain sophisticated Western technologies for 
its long-range ballistic missile programs and its nuclear weapons effort are still at 
large. Among these: 

• Safa Habobi, the President of Technology Development Group (TDG), 
London. TDG led the Iraqi procurement effort in Europe, serving as the front for 
the purchase of the machine-tool company, Matrix Churchill Ltd. British 
Customs inexplicably waited several months after the international embargo on 
Iraq and Iraqi assets was in place before raiding the TDG offices, allowing the 
Iraqis to cart of critical documents that might have exposed their network. 
Habobi was allowed to leave Britain and return to the Middle East. On 
September 27, 1992 he was involved in a non-fatal car crash and was identified in 
hospital in Amman, Jordan. He is believed to have moved his procurement 
operations to Tunisia. 23 

• Khaled Marzoumi, the former Commercial attache at the Iraqi Embassy in 
Paris in the late 1980s, now operates out of the offices of the State Oil Marketing 
Organizaiton (SOMO) in Amman, Jordan, where the author briefly encountered 
him in April 1992. In 1988-89, he was instrumental in the operation of Babil 
International, an Iraqi front company registered in France that was controlled by 
Safa Habobi of TDG and was used for procurement and financial transactions on 
behalf of the Iraqi government. 

• Pierre Drogoul, the father of indicted BNL-Atlanta banker Christopher 
Drogoul. Until recently, the elder Drogoul worked as a consultant for Babil 
International. The French government has never closed Babil or seized its 
accounts, which are held at the Neuilly-sur-Seine branch of the Union des 
Banques Franchises et Arabes (UBAF). Drogoul continues to operate a trading 
company, Technique Materiel Commerce International (TMCI), in the Paris 
suburb of Garches. 

• Sam Namaan, aka Saalim Naman, served as Vice President of Matrix 
Churchill Corp, the U.S. branch of the British tool company that fitted out a 



23 Jim Hoagland, International Herald Tribune, Oct. 15, 1992 



100 



dozen Iraqi weapons plants in the late 1980s. Although the Solon, Ohio offices of 
MCC were raided by U.S. Customs agents in 1991 and Namaan was sought for 
questioning, he was reportedly allowed to re-enter the United States at Detroit on 
Oct. 10, 1992 on an immigration visa. 24 

• Anis Mansour Wadi, one of the original members in Europe of the Iraqi 
procurement network, established several companies in Britain and later in the 
United States that were used to purchase equipment for the nuclear weapons 
program. One of these, Bay Industries, of Century City, California, was searched 
and closed down by U.S. Customs agents on March 22, 1991. However, Wadi is 
believed to have continued operating in the United States. 

German companies breaking sanctions 

The investigative arm of German Customs, the ZKI (Zollkriminalinstitut), is 
currently investigating more than 150 German and Iraqi-owned companies based 
on German territory for possible breaches of the UN sanctions against Iraq. 
Among the companies on the "active" list, which was made available to the 
subcommittee by private sources in Europe, are some of Germany's largest 
industrial concerns, such as Thyssen, MAN, and Strabag Bau AG. 

Some companies are familiar to investigators for their role in helping Iraq to 
develop its upgraded SCUD missiles, such as ABC Beaujean of Stuttensee. Others 
are under investigation for selling technologies with a potential nuclear end-use, 
including calutron magnets, and special piping for use in a centrifuge enrichment 
plant. This suggests that Iraq indeed intends to continue its nuclear weapons 
program, despite its commitment to UN Security Council Resolution 687. 

Iraq-owned fronts constitute another category of companies on the ZKI case 
list. Among these are the Iraqi Shipping Lines in Bremen, and the German office 
of the Technology Development Group, known as TDG-SEG, Krefeld, which is 
believed to be purchasing machine-tools and other goods in Germany using fake 
Jordanian end-use certificates. Equipment purchased in this manner is shipped 
legally to Jordan, where it is subsequently diverted to Iraq by truck. 

The German subsidiary of Minolta, based in Arensberg, is under 
investigation for a potential export of a flash x-ray camera. A similar item was 
discovered by the IAEA at Iraq's Al Atheer nuclear weapons lab, where it was 






24 John Fialka, Wall Street Journal , Dec. 11, 1992. 



101 



signing false end-use and embargo-compliance certificates. Key to obtaining 
Jordanian support was the cutoff of U.S. aid to Jordan in 1991. 

Jordan has been allowed, however, to continue purchasing Iraqi oil by the 
UN Sanctions Committee. These purchases, estimated at 60,000 to 70,000 b/d, 
were specifically tied to the repayment of Iraq's debt to Jordan. This debt stood at 
around $400 million when the initial waver was granted in August 1990. By all 
estimates, even at the reduced price of $16 per barrel, Iraq's oil deliveries should 
have wiped out the debt by late December 1991 However, the oil deliveries to 
Jordan continued on the same scale as before throughout 1992. 

According to Western diplomats interviewed in Amman, this is because the 
Central Bank of Jordan had been purchasing Iraqi debt from commercial banks, 
and reclassifying it as "official" debt. Debt officers at the Central Bank of Jordan 
confirmed that the Iraqi government debt to Jordan still stood at around $400 
million in April 1992, despite the oil deliveries, but refused to comment on how 
this had come about. 

Wall Street investigator Jules Kroll, who has been tracking Iraq's 
procurement effort in Jordan, alleges that the Iraqi government transferred 
$5 2 billion in government funds to the Arab Bank in Amman just as 
Operation Desert Storm was ending to establish a new trading infrastructure 
for Iraq. In addition to this, he alleges that the Central Bank of Jordan is 
laundering secret Iraqi government funds in Switzerland through 
commercial banks such as Jordan's Housing Bank, the Jordan Gulf Bank, and 
the Arab Financial Corporation. 



Oil and Arms 

Already in March 1992, two French major oil companies, CFP Total, and Elf 
Aquitaine, acknowledged that they were engaged in active negotiations with the 
Iraqi government over future oil production-sharing agreements in Iraq. 27 Since 
then, oil ministry and private businessmen from Russia, Italy, and Belarus have 
also attempted to renew contact. 



^"Jordan reverses embargo policy,'' MEDNEWS. April 13, 1992. 
17 Le Monde, March 6, 1992. 



102 



used to develop nuclear explosive "lenses." Minolta has strenuously denied 
accusations in the past of having supplied Iraq with dual-use equipment. The 
IAEA in Vienna continues to look with great interest Iraq's suppliers of flash x- 
ray equipment. Another unit was obtained from IMACON in Switzerland, 
apparently through the intermediary of a Geneva-based trading company, 
Bonaventure (Europe) Inc. 

In Hamburg, Stinnes Interoil AG is suspected by German Customs of 
having organized purchases of Iraqi oil, in contravention of the embargo. It is not 
known whether they played the role of intermediary for foreign sales of Iraqi oil, 
or whether they imported oil into Germany itself. As in all other cases cited, no 
criminal proceedings have been initiated. 

Some new names appear on this latest list of German companies suspected 
of embargo-busting, including Krupp Atlas, of Bremen, and machine-tool 
manufacturers such as Condux Maschenbau, of Hanau, and Moller 
Maschinenfabrik GmbH, of Bekum. Reman Enterprises-Raouf Mahdi, of 
Nurenburg, is suspected of having sold weapons. Companies under 
investigation for unspecified embargo breaches include: Allgemeine Nah-ost 
Handelsgesselshaft (Hamburg), Alloy Pipe and Metal (Rattingen), Benteller AG 
(Vienslacke), China Project and Investment (Hamburg), Comaco GmbH 
(Gellhausen), Commerce und Finance Service, Pan Trade GmbH (Bensheim), and 
Rotermund GmbH (Munich). None has been indicted. 25 

Smuggling through Jordan 

Until recently, Jordan had served as Iraq's primary conduit to the West. 
Goods were imported for use in Jordan through the port of Aqaba, and shipped 
up through the desert to Baghdad on trucks operated by the Iraq-Jordan Land 
Transportation Company, which is owned jointly by the governments of Iraq and 
Jordan. 

Under intense pressure from the United States, and from public exposure of 
Jordan's role as a conduit for embargoed goods reaching Iraq, in early 1992 King 
Hussein ordered a crackdown on illicit activities, in an attempt to clear his 
country's name as an Iraqi ally. However, it took several months before key Iraqi 
agents were weeded out of the Jordanian bureaucracy, where they had been 



^"German Companies Break Iraq Embargo," MEDNEWS, July 6, 1992 



103 



In March 1993, the State Department formally accused Iran of having 
violated the oil embargo on Iraq, after U.S. observation satellites detected what 
was described as a "large convoy of oil trucks" leaving Iraq for Iran. Iran denied 
the charge, which was reiterated in the daily State Department briefing on March 
30 by spokesman Richard Boucher. 

Unconfirmed reports from Kuwaiti sources warned that commercial 
contacts have intensified in recent months between major French defense 
exporters and Iraqi agents in Europe, in view of renewing the supply of spare 
parts for Iraq's fleet of Mirage Fl fighter-bombers. The Franco-German 
Eurocopter consortium was also said to have been probing new sales. Given the 
public support of the UN embargo by the French government, however, most 
foreign diplomats in Paris believe it highly unlikely that the French government 
would approve such sales. One report, from a French source that claimed 
personal knowledge, alleged that a major French defense electronics company 
had established an office in Amman, Jordan for the sole purpose of servicing 
equipment sold to Iraq in the 1980s. This has not been confirmed. 

What is certain is that the Iraqi Air Force Mirages have been performed 
training missions in recent months in an increasingly brazen manner, notably 
along the borders oaf the southern exclusion zone. 

Furthermore, according to Andrei Volpin, a a Russian research fellow at the 
Washington Institute for Near East Studies, some 200 Russian military 
technicians remain in Iraq and are servicing Soviet-built equipment. Russian 
officials from Oboronexport, the government's arms export agency, confirmed 
the presence of the Russian technicians in Iraq but insisted that they had been 
engaged on "private" contracts. 28 

Crescent Petroleum 

The Office of Foreign Assets Control continues to investigate a $700 million 
independent oil company, Crescent Petroleum Company International, on the 
suspicion it may be acting on behalf of the Iraqi government. 

Crescent operates out of the Emirate of Sharjah and is controlled by Hamid 
Dhia Jaafar, the brother of Jaafar Dhia Jaafar, the acknowledged head of Iraq's 
clandestine nuclear weapons program. Jaafar Jaafar currently serves as senior 



28 Interview with Oboronexport officials at the Paris Air Show. June 17, 1993. 



104 



Undersecretary of the Ministry of Industry and Minerals, formerly known as the 
Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI), and is the principal 
interlocutor for International Atomic Energy Agency inspection teams 
investigating Iraq's nuclear weapons capabilities. 

If Crescent has been acting on behalf of Iraq then its assets worldwide could 
be seized under the terms of UN Security Council resolutions. Crescent has a 
registered office at 5847 San Relipe, Suite 2150, Houston, Texas. 

The allegations, which Crescent's owner of record, Hamid Jaafar, 
strenuously denied, revolve around the company's ties to MIMI. In 1989, 
Crescent was appointed sole agent on MIMI's behalf to negotiate the 
acquisition of technology for a large-scale aluminum smelter to be built near 
Nassiriyah in southern Iraq. In the "Chairman's letter" introducing the 
company's 1989-1990 Annual Report, Hamid Jaffar states that the project was 
halted by the UN embargo. In the 9th inspection report of Iraq's clandestine 
nuclear facilities, IAEA inspectors note that special aluminum parts used in 
Iraq's uranium enrichment centrifuges were melted down in May or June 
1991 at the old Nassiriyah smelter, identified by the Iraqis as the "Ur 
Establishment" and described by the United Nations as "the only aluminum 
smelter in Iraq." Since then, the IAEA and the UN Special Commission have 
catalogued the Nassiriyah site as being "linked" to Iraq's clandestine nuclear 
weapons program. 

Crescent appears to have been doing business directly with the head of 
Iraq's unconventional weapons programs, MIMI Senior Undersecretary Lt. Gen. 
(Dr.) Amir Hamoodi Al-Saadi. In an apparently unrelated deal, Al-Saadi 
empowered Hamid Jaafar to purchase financial interests in foreign oil refineries 
by using Iraqi oil as collateral. This led to an attempted purchase by Crescent of 
the entire Petrofina network of refineries and 3,000 filling stations in the United 
States, and would have vastly expanded the financial assets available to MIMI for 
weapons development. 

While Crescent may not have been in the business of arms manufacturing 
or procurement per se, it was certainly linked to the principal Iraqi government 
organization that was. Crescent has repeatedly denied any wrong-doing. 
However, in a libel suit company lawyers brought against independent journalist 
Alan George for having written about Crescent's ties to MIMI, a London court 
ruled that no libel had been commited and awarded damages to Mr George. 



105 



Unconventional Weapons timetable 

Former CIA Director Robert Gates put a timetable on the Iraqi rearmament 
effort, addressing Iraq's capabilities in the areas of nuclear technologies, chemical 
and biological weapons, and ballistic missiles in testimony before the U.S. Senate 
Government Operations Committee on Jan 15, 1992. 

The most immediate threat following the easing of UN sanctions would be 
from Iraqi biological weapons, because of the small amount of specialized 
production equipment required. Iraq "could be producing BW materials in a 
matter of weeks of a decision to do so," Gates said. 

Some chemical warfare agents could also be produced almost immediately, 
since much of the hard-to-get production equipment was removed and hidden 
before Operation Desert Storm began. However, heavy bomb damage to Iraqi 
CW plants and continued monitoring by the UN Special Commission will 
partially retard Iraq's effort to regain the CW capability it had previously 
enjoyed. Gates believed that a full CW capability would take "a year or more" for 
Iraq to accomplish - a very short lead time, indeed. 

The CIA continues to estimate that Iraq has hidden away around 200 
improved SCUD missiles (al-Hossein and al-Abbas variants, with ranges of 650 
and 900 km respectively) - an estimate Ekeus reiterated recently. 29 Added to this 
is a suspected capability to indigeneously produce liquid fuel for these missiles, 
making Iraq independent of outside sources or technology. 30 

Iraq's nuclear program took the hardest hit, Gates claimed. Even here, 
however, the CIA estimates the time Iraq would need to reconstitute its nuclear 
weapons program at "a few, rather than many, years." 

Gates concluded: "In our opinion, Iraq will remain a primary proliferation 
threat as long as Saddam remains in power." A similar view was expressed in a 



29UPI, March 24, 1993. 

30The facility, code-named Al Amil, or Project 7307, is located approximately 6 km 
west of the Tarmiyah Electro-Magnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS) plant, and was inspected 
in 1992 by the IAEA. The Iraqi authorities told the IAEA that while Al Amil was no longer 
doing work for the Iraqi nuclear program, production of liquid nitrogen - which can be used 
for liquid-fueled ballistic missiles - was continuing under German license. "Rebuilding the 
Defense Industry," MEDNEWS, March 9, 1992. 



106 



recent Rand Corporation study on Iraq by former National Security Council staff 
member, Graham Fuller. 

To insist that Saddam Hussein's commitment to rebuilding the most 
powerful military machine in the region is an obstacle to peace, is not a 
"personalization" of the conflict between Iraq and the United States; it is merely a 
statement of fact. 

After World War I, Germany was banned altogether from rebuilding its 
military industries, and from moving troops into the Ruhr Valley. The 
comparison with Iraq's current situation is illustrative. While demilitarized zones 
have been created to protect Kurds in the north and Shiites in southern Iraq, no 
restrictions have been placed on Iraq's military industries beyond the ban on 
unconventional weapons development, manufacture, and possession. Iraq has 
pumped all available resources into rebuilding its military plants, without a 
thought to international sanctions or to treaty restrictions. As a result, Iraq is 
likely to reemerge as the predominant military power in the region in very short 
order. 



107 



Machine-Tools Found in Iraqi Nuclear 
Facilities by UN Inspectors 





The 11th and 12th Mission Lists 








Source: IAEA 






Manufacturer 


Country 


Location Ouantitv Tvpe Machine 


Use 


Ultradex 


? 


Badr 1 


Plasma Cutting MDI (not 
CNC) 




Kunming 


China 


Saddam < 


Sphencal Crinder 46mm 
Diameter 


Gun Sights 


To* Hulin/Bosch 


CSSR Germany 


Daura 


Turning VTL 


Heat excha 


Skoda/Phillips 


CSSR Netherlands 


Daura 


Milling Bonng 


Heat excha 


Skoda/Phillips 


CSSR Netherlands 


Daura 


Milling Boring 150 mm spindle 


Heat excha 


Stenhoj Hydraulik 


Denmark 


Tuwaitha \ 


Press vertical 1600kg 




Heckert WMW 


East Germany 


Badr 1 


Gantry Mill 




Colly 


France 


Salah Al Din < 


Shear Press 




Fromat/Industio 


France 


Taji (Nassr) 


Drilling/Bonng 




HES 


France 


Salah Al Din 1 


2 Milling not CNC 




HES 


France 


Salah Al Din < 


• Milling (notCNQ 
-400 x250x150 mm 




Hure 


France 


Salah Al Din 1 


Milling 




Petit Jean 


France 


Taji (Nassr) 


Shear 




Petit Jean 


France 


Taji (Nassr) ; 


Shear Press 




Sciaky 


France 


Al Rabiya 


EB Welder 


Cent 


Renault HP/ Rennishaw-Probe 


France US UK 


Al Rabiya 


CMM 1600mmxl300mm 




Renault HP/ Rennishaw-Probe 


France US UK 


Al Rabiya 


CMM 1300mmx800mm 




Renault HP/ Rennishaw-Probe 


France US UK 


Al Rabiya 


CMM 600mmx800mm 






Germany ? 


[skandariya 


Flowforming Horizontal (not 
CNC) 




Adolph Waldrich Coburg 


Germany 


Badr 1 


Piano Mill not CNC 




Adolph Waldrich Coburg 


Germany 


Taji (Nassr) 


Piano Crinder 




BHG Hermle/ Heidenhain 


Germany 


Al Rabiya I 


' Milling 




Biller/ Heidenhain 


Germany 


Saddam 


Turning ~10m 


Cun/ Barre 


Blohm 


Germany 


Saddam 


Grinding not CNC 




Deckel 


Germany 


Al Radwan 


Milling 




Deckel 


Germany 


Badr < 


Milling 




Deckel 


Germany 


Salah Al Din 


! Milling 




Deckel 


Germany 


Taji (Nassrl 


Milling 




Denug 


Germany 


Salah Al Din 


Horizontal Press 




Donau 


Germany 


Badr 


1 Milling Knee Type (not CNC) 


CP 


Domes 


Germany 


Al Radwan 


Turning VTL - 4m 


EMIS 


Domes 


Germany 


Al Ameer 


Turning VTL -10m table 


EM1S 


Domes 


Germany 


Al Rabiya 


Turning VTL -2.5m table 


EMIS 


Domes 


Germany 


Aqua Bin Nan 


Turning VTL 


EMIS 


Domes 


Germany 


Taji (Nassrl 


Turning Vertical -2.0m table 


EMIS 


Domes 


Germany 


Taji (Nassrl 


Turning Vertical -2.0m table 


EMIS 


Domes Siemens 


Germany 


Badr 


Turning -2m table VTL 


EMIS 


Droop & Rein 


Germany 


Badr 


Milling 




ESAM 


Germany 


Aqua Bin Nan 


3 Flame Cutter 





108 



Company 


Countrv 


Location OuantitY Tvpe Machine 


Use 


Frolich 


German]/ 


Taji (Nassr) 


Press 




Gerber/ Boehringer 


German]/ 


Saddam i 


Turning 




Gildermeister 


Germany 


Al Atheer 1 


Turning 




Gildermeister 


Germany 


Saddam ! 


> Turning 




H+H Metalfonn 


Germany 


Taji (Nassr) ' 


Flowforming Vertical 


Rotors 


H+H Metalfonn 


Germany 


Taji (Nassr) 


Flowforming Vertical 


Rotors 


H+H Metalfonn 


Germany 


Taji (Nassr) 


Flowforming Verticle 


Rotors 


H-t-H Metalfonn 


Germany 


Taji (Nassr) 


Flowforming Vertical 


Rotors 


H+H Metalfonn 


Germany 


Taji (Nassr) 1 


How forming verncal 


Rotors 


H+H Metalfonn 


Germany 


Taji (Nassr) 


Flowforming vertical 


Rotors 


H+H Metalfonn 


Germany 


Taji (Nassr) 


Rowforming vertical 


Rotors 


H&H 


Germany 


Shuala 


Rowforming 


Rotors 


H&H 


Germany 


Shuala 


Flowforming 


Rotors 


H&H 


Germany 


Daura 


Flowforming 


Rotors 


H&H 


Germany 


Daura 


Flowforming Horizontal non 
CNC 




Hahn & Kolb 


Germany 


Aqua Bin Nafi 


Milling 




Hahn & Kolb 


Germany 


Aqua Bin Nafi 


Measuring 




Hahn&Kolb 


Germany 


AlRadwan 


Milling 




Hennig/Siemens 


Germany 


Saddam 


Milling 




Hennle/ Heidenhain 


Germany 


Al Rabiya ; 


) Milling 




Keilinghaus 


Germany 


Daura 


Spin Forming non CNC 




Kieserling & Albrecht Siemens 


Germany 


Taji (Nassr) 


! Spinforming/flowrorming 


Warheads 


Kuhlmann 


Germany 


Al Ameer 


Milling 


Electrodes 


Kulhmann 


Germany 


Al Radwan 


Milling 




Ueber 


Germany 


Tuwaitha 


Turning non CNC 


Uranium 


Magdeburg 


Germany 


Taji (Nassr) 


Turning 


Shell Casir 


Magdeburg 


Germany 


Taji (Nassr) 


Turning 


Shell casir 


Magdeburg 


Germany 


Taji (Nassr) 


' Turning 


Shell Casir 


Magdeburg 


Germany 


Daura 


Turning Special 


Rotors 


Magdeburg 


Germany 


Daura 


Turning Special 


Rotors 


Magdeburg 


Germany 


Daura 


Turning Special 


Rotors 


Maho 


Germany 


Aqua Bin Nafi 


Milling 


Weapons 


Maho/ Heidenhain 


Germany 


Al Rabiya 


i Milling 




Maho/ Heidenhain 


Germany 


Al Rabiya • 


1 Milling 




Maho/ Heidenhain 


Germany 


Al Rabiya 


l Milling 




Maho/ Heidenhain 


Germany 


Al Rabiya 


Milling 




Maho/ Heidenhain 


Germany 


Al Rabiya 


Milling 




Maho Heidenhain 


Germany 


Tuwaitha 


Milling 




Messer Gersheim Balzers 


Germany 


Al Radwan 


EB Welder 




Peddinghaus 


Germany 


Taji (Nassr) 


Press 




Petzing & Hartman 


Germany 


Badr 


Cutoff Mach Bar 


Prepare B-: 


Petzing & Hartman 


Germany 


Badr 


Cutoff Mach Bar 


Prepare B 


Petzing & Hartman 


Germany 


Badr 


Cutoff Mach Bar 


Prepare B 


Pfauter Gildermeister 


Germany 


Badr 


Cear Cutter 


M a i n t 


Ravensburg 


Germany 


Saddam 


Turning -15m long 


Gun/ Barr- 


Ravensburg 


Germany 


Saddam 


Turning -10m long 


Gun Barrt 


Ravensburg/ Siemens 


Germany 


Saddam 


! Turning -20m long 


Gun /Barr- 



109 



Compaox 


Countrv 


Location Ouantity Tvpe Machine 


Uii 


Ravensburg/ Siemens 


Germany 


Saddam 


2 


Turning Vertiacl lm table 




R a vensburg/ Siemens 


Germany 


Taji (Nassr) 


4 


Turning -15m long 


Cun/Barre 


SHW 


Germany 


AlRadwan 


3 


Milling 




SHW 


Germany 


Al Radwan 


2 


Milling 




Scheiss 


Germany 


Al Ameer 


1 


Milling Boring 4.5-7.0 diam 


EMIS 


Scheiss Froreip 


Germany 


Al Ameer 


1 


Milling 




Scheiss Froreip 


Germany 


Aqua Bin Nafi 


3 


Milling Bonng 


EMIS 


Scheiss Siemens 


Germany 


Al Radwan 


1 


Milling Boring -150mm 
spindle moving column 




Sharmann 


Germany 


Al Ameer 


1 


Milling 




Shannann 


Germany 


Al Ameer 


1 


Milling 150mm Spl. 




Sheiss 


Germany 


Taji (Nassr) 


1 


Turning Vertical two heads 
-6m table 


EMIS 


SHW 


Germany 


Taji (Nassr) 


1 


Milling 


Weapons 


SHW 


Germany 


Taji (Nassr) 


1 


Milling 




SHW 


Germany 


Taji (Nassr) 


4 


Milling 




SHW 


Germany 


Al Ameer 


6 


Milling 




SHW 


Germany 


Al Ameer 




Milling 




SHW 


Germany 


Al Ameer 




Milling 




SHW 


Germany 


Al Ameer 




Milling 




SHW 


Germany 


Badr 




Milling 




SHW 


Germany 


Badr 




Milling 




SHW 


Germany 


Al Rabiya 




Milling 




SHW 


Germany 


Al Rabiya 




Milling 




SHW 


Germany 


Al Rabiya 




Milling 




SHW 


Germany 


Al Rabiya 




Milling 




SHW 


Germany 


Aqua Bin Nafi 




Milling 


Weapons 


SHW 


Germany 


Aqua Bin Nafi 




Milling 




SHW 


Germany 


Al Ameer 




Milling 




SHW 


Germany 


Al Ameer 




Milling 




SHW 


Germany 


Aqua Bin Nafi 




Milling 




SHW 


Germany 


Taji (Nassr) 




Milling 




SHW Siemens 


Germany 


Badr 




Milling 




SHW/Heidenhain 


Germany 


Al Radwan 




Milling 




SMS 


Germany 


Taji (Nassr) 




Horu Press 




Tiefbohrtenik 


Germany 


Taji (Nassr) 




Turning/ Bonng Mill 




Trennj agger 


Germany 


Taji (Nassr) 




Press 




Trumpf 


Germany 


Al Rabiva 




Laser Cutter 




VDF Wohlenberg/Siemens 


Germany 


Saddam 




Turning -20m long 


Cun/ Barr 


VDF Wohlenberg/Siemens 


Germany 


Saddam 




Turning -5m long 


Gun/ Barr 


Walter 


Germany 


Badr 




Tool Grinder 


Tooling 


Walter Seigen 


Germany 


Al Radwan 




Milling 


Repair m 


Walter Seigen 


Germany 


Al Ameer 




Milling 


Repair m 


Walter Seigen 


Germany 


Al Ameer 




Milling 20 m bed -6m bridge 


Repair M 


Wanderer 


Germany 


Saddam 




Milling 




Weiger 


Germany 


Daura 




Shear Press 




Werner 


Germany 


Saddam 




Milling 




Werner 


Germany 


Saddam 




Milling Horizontal heads 




Wotan Siemens 


Germany 


Taji (Nassr) 




Milling Bomg 


Weapsr- 



110 



Company 


Country 


Location Ouantitv Tvpe Machin* Use 


YVota it/Siemens 


Germany 




Saddam 


5 


Milling /Bomg 


SHW/Aqua 


Germany 


Iraq 


Aqua Bin Nafi 


3 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany 


/Netherlands 


Taji (Nassr) 


2 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany 


/Netherlands 


Taji (Nassr) 


1 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany 


/Netherlands 


Taji (Nassr) 


3 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany 


/Netherlands 


Al Atheer 


1 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany 


/Netherlands 


Al Atheer 


1 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany 


/Netherlands 


Al Atheer 


1 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany 


/Netherlands 


Al Atheer 


1 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany 


/Netherlands 


Al Atheer 


1 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany 


/Netherlands 


Al Ameer 


1 


Milling Weapons 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany 


/Netherlands 


Al Ameer 


1 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany 


/Netherlands 


Al Ameer 


1 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany 


/Netherlands 


Al Ameer 


2 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany 


/Netherlands 


Al Ameer 


1 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany 


/Netherlands 


Al Ameer 


1 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany 


/Netherlands 


Badr 


2 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany 


/Netherlands 


Al Rabiya 


10 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany 


/Netherlands 


Al Rabiya 


1 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany 


/Netherlands 


Al Rabiya 


3 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany 


/Netherlands 


Al Rabiya 


2 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany 


/Netherlands 


Al Rabiya 


1 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany 


/Netherlands 


Al Rabiya 


1 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany 


/Netherlands 


Al Rabiya 


3 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany 


/Netherlands 


Al Rabiya 


1 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany 


/Netherlands 


Al Rabiya 


3 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany 


/Netherlands 


Al Rabiya 


5 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany 


/Netherlands 


Al Rabiya 


1 


Milling 


Leitz/ HP/DEC 


Germany/ 


US 


Al Atheer 


1 


Coordinate Measuring (CMM) Centrifuge i 


Maho/Phillipes 


Germany/Netherlands 


Aqua Bin Nafi 


1 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany/Netherlands 


Taji (Nassr) 


1 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany/Netherlands 


Taji (Nassr) 


1 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany /Netherlands 


Aqua Bin Nan 


1 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany/ 


Netherlands 


Saddam 


5 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germany /Netherlands 


Saddam 


3 


Milling 


Maho/Phillips 


Germanv/Netherlands 


Taji (Nassr) 


1 


Milling 


Boldrini 


Italy 




Daura 


1 


Press 


Carvaghi 


Italy 




Badr 


1 


Canrry Mill 


Ceruti 


Italy 




Badr 


1 


Milling horizontal 


DEA 


Italy 




Tarmiya 


1 


CMM EMIS 


DEA 


Italy 




Al Radwan 


1 


CMM 


DEA 


Italy 




Al Radwan 


1 


CMM 


DEA 


Italy 




Al Radwan 


1 


CMM 


DEA 


Italy 




Al Radwan 


1 


CMM-7mx3 5m EMIS 


DEA 


Italy 




Al Ameer 


1 


CMM EMIS 


DEA 


Italy 




Al Ameer 


1 


CMM 


DEA 


Italy 




Al Rabiva 


1 


CMM -2x1' 


DEA 


Italy 




Al Rabiya 


1 


CMM 2x1 


DEA 


Italu 




Salah Al Din 


1 


CMM 



Ill 



<, ompanv 


Country 


location Oi 


ilii 


lity Type Machine 


llu 


DEA 




Italy 


Saddam 




CMM 




Famup 




Italy 


Salah Al Din 




Milling 




Innoccnti 


Italy 


Badr 




Gantry Mill 


Weapons 


DEA/ DEC 


Italy US 


Al Rabiya 




CMM 1000mm 




Fanuc 




japan 


Salah Al Din 




Turret Drill CNC 




Waida 




japan 


Al Atheer 




Jig Grinding (not CNC) 




Infratriena 


Romania 


Daura 




Radia Dnll 




Titan 




Romania 


Badr 




Gantry Mill not CNC 




Sacem 




Spam 


Al Radwan 




Milling 




Zaher 




Spam 


Aqua Bin Nafi 




Milling 




Zayer 




Spam 


Al Ameer 




Milling 5m bed 


Weapons 


Zayer 




Spam 


Al Ameer 




Milling 




Zayer 




Spam 


Al Ameer 




Milling 




Zayer 




Spam 


Al Ameer 




Milling 




Zayer 




Spam 


Aqua Bin Nafi 




Milling 




Zayer 




Spam 


Aqua Bin Nafi 




Milling 




Zayer 




Spam 


Al Radwan 




Milling 


Weapons 


Zayer/ 


Heidenhain 


Spam Germany 


Saddam 




Milling 




Zayer Siemens 


Spam Germany 


Aqua Bin Nafi 




Milling 


Weapons 


Zayer/Heidenhain 


Spam Germany 


Saddam 




Miling 




Zayer 




Spam Netherlands 


Al Ameer 




Milling 




Zayer/ 


Heidenhain 


Spam/Germany 


Al Radwan 




Milling 




Zayer/ 


Heidenhain 


Spam/Germany 


Saddam 




Milling 




Zayer/ 


Heidenhain 


Spam/Germany 


Saddam 




Milling 




Zayer/ 


Heidenhain 


Spam/Germany 


Saddam 




Milling 




Zayer/ 


Siemens 


Spam/Germany 


Taji (Nassr) 




Milling 




Zayer/ 


Siemens 


Spam/Germany 


Al Radwan 


3 


Milling 




Aciera 




Switzerland 


Al Radwan 


5 


Milling 




Aciera 




Switzerland 


Al Radwan 


2 


Milling 




Aciera 




Switzerland 


Badr 


2 


Milling 




Aciera 




Switzerland 


Badr 




Milling 




Aciera 




Switzerland 


Badr 


3 


Milling 




Aciera 


Phillips 


Switzerland 


Al Ameer 


1 


Milling 




Agie 




Switzerland 


Taji (Nas^rl 


1 


EDM ram 




Agie 




Switzerland 


Al Atheer 


1 


Electncal Discharge 




Agie 




Switzerland 


Al Atheer 


1 


Electrical Discharge Rjm 


tvpe 


Agie 




Switzerland 


Al Radwan 


1 


EDM Wire 




Agie 




Switzerland 


Al Ameer 


1 


EDM 




Agie 




Switzerland 


Al Ameer 


1 


EDM 




Agie 




Switzerland 


Al Rabivj 


2 


EDM Ram 




Agie 




Switzerland 


Al Rabiva 


1 


EDM Wire 




Agie 




Switzerland 


Al Rabiva 


1 


DEM Wire 




Agie 




Switzerland 


Al Rabiva 


1 


Edm Ram 




Charm 


illes 


Switzerland 


Tap (Nassr) 


1 


EDM Kam 




Charmilles 


Switzerland 


Taji (Nawl 


1 


EDM Ram 




Charmilles 


Switzerland 


Badr 


3 


EDM Ram 




Charm 


illes 


Switzerland 


Saddam 


1 


EDM Ram type 




Dixi 




Switzerland 


Salah Al Din 


1 


Jig Bore/ Mill non C\C 




Dixi 




Switzerland 


Ta|i (Nassrl 


1 


Jig Bore 





112 



Company 


Country 


Location Qu 


intitv Tvpe Machine 


Use 


Hauser 


Switzerland 


Al Radwan 


Jig Grinding 




Hauser 


Switzerland 


Al Ameer 


Jig Grinder 


Tooling 


Hauser 


Switzerland 


Al Rabiya 


Jig Bore 




Hauser 


Switzerland 


Al Rabiya 


Jig Grinder 


Tooling 


Hauser 


Switzerland 


Al Rabiya 


Jig Bore 




Hauser 


Switzerland 


Badr 


Jig Grinder 


Tooling 


Hauser 


Switzerland 


Salah Al Din 


Jig Grinder 


Tooling 


Hauser 


Switzerland 


Saddam 


I Jig Grinder non CNC 




Kellenberger 


Switzerland 


Al Atheer 


Grinding (not CNC) 




Kellenberger 


Switzerland 


Al Ameer 


Grindind OD 




Mikron 


Switzerland 


Saddam 


Milling 




Oerlikon 


Switzerland 


Taji (Nassr) 


Milling 




Oerlikon 


Switzerland 


Taji (Nassr) 


Milling 




Oerlikon 


Switzerland 


Saddam 


Milling 




Reishauser 


Switzerland 


Saddam 


Grinder 




Rigid 


Switzerland 


Iskandanya 


Vertical Milling; 2 Spindle 




Schaublin 


Switzerland 


Badr < 


i Turning 


End Ops 


Schaublin 


Switzerland 


Badr \ 


I Turning 


End Caps 


Schaublin 


Switzerland 


Badr 


Turning 


End Caps 


Schaublin 


Switzerland 


Badr : 


! Milling 




Schaublin 


Switzerland 


Saddam 


3 Turning non CNC 




Schaublin 


Switzerland 


Saddam 


2 Turning non CNC 




Schaublin Siemens 


Switzerland 


Al Rabiya 


Milling 




SIP 


Switzerland 


Al Radwan 


Jig Bore 


Precision 


SIP 


Switzerland 


Al Ameer 


Jig Bore 


Precision 


SIP 


Switzerland 


Al Ameer ', 


! Jig Bore 


Precision 


SIP 


Switzerland 


Saddam 


Jig Bore 




S ruder 


Switzerland 


Al Atheer 1 


OD/ID Crdng (not CNCO 




S ruder 


Switzerland 


Saddam ' 


Turning non CNC 




Tomos Bechler Sinumerix 


Switzerland 


Badr 1 


Turning (Bar) 


CP 


Wahli 


Switzerland 


Salah Al Din 


Milling 




EWAG 


Switzerland France 


Badr ; 


Tool Crinding 


Tooling 


Mikron/Heidenhain 


Switzerland Germany 


Saddam ; 


.5 Milling -250mm, 200mm. 
150mm 




Mikron/Heidenhain 


Switzerland Cermanv 


Saddam 


Milling 




Tarex/Bosh 


Switzerland Cermanv 


Saddam 1 


Milling 




Schaublin 


Switzerland fapan 


Al Atheer 1 


Turning 


End caps 


Matrix Churchill 


UK 


Taji (Nassri 


Grinding OD 




Cinn/Milacron 


UK 


Badr 1 


Milling 




FMT 


UK 


Taji (Nassr) 


Milling 




Harrison 


UK 


Badr 1 


Turning 




Matrix Chruchill 


UK 


Al Radwan 


Turning 


End Caps 


Matrix Churchill 


UK 


Taji (Nassri 


Turning 


Ammo 


Matrix Churchill 


UK 


Taji (Nassri 


Turning 


Ammo 


Matrix Churchill 


UK 


Taji (Nassri l 


Turning 


Ammo 


Matrix Churchill 


UK 


Taji (Nassr) ; 


2 Turning 


Ammo 


Matrix Churchill 


UK 


Shuala 


Turning 


End Caps 


Matrix Churchill 


UK 


Al Ameer ; 


Turning 


End Caps 


Matrix Churchill 


UK 


Badr 1 


Turning 


End Caps 



113 



C p m p a n v 

Matrix Churchill 

Matrix Churchill 

Matrix/Churchill 

Morgan Rushworth 

Wickman 

Wickman 

Wickman 

Colchester/ Fanuc 

Matrix Churchill/ Fanuc 

Matrix Churchill/ Fanuc 

Matrix Churchill/ Fanuc 

Matrix Churchill/ Fanuc 

Matrix Churchill/ Fanuc 

Matrix Churchill/ Fanuc 

Matrix Churchill/ Fanuc 

Matrix Churchill/ Fanuc 

Bridgeport/Heidenhain 

Bliss 

Pacific 

Pangbom 

Hardinge 



Skoda 

Ivo Lola Ribar 
Ivo Lola Ribar 

Total machine-tools: 



Country 


Location Ouantitv Tvpe Machine 


L'se 


UK 


Badr 


1 


Turning 


Cent 


UK 


Aqua Bin Nafi 


1 


Turning 


End Caps 


UK 


Tap (Nassrl 


1 


Turning 


End Caps 


UK 


Tuwaitha 


1 


Shear Press 




UK 


Taji (Nassrl 


17 


Turning 


Ammo 


UK 


Taji (Nassrl 


2 


Turning 


Ammo 


UK 


Taji (Nassrl 


2 


Turning Bar type 


Ammo 


UK Japan 


Badr 


2 


Turning 




UK Japan 


Taji (Nassr) 


1 


Turning 


End Caps 


UK japan 


Taji (Nassr) 


1 


Turning 


End Caps 


UK japan 


Taji (Nassrl 


1 


Turning 


End Caps 


UK Japan 


Taji (Nassr) 


1 


Turning 


End Caps 


UK Japan 


Taji (Nassrl 


1 


Turning 


Ammo 


UK japan 


Al Rabiya 


1 


Turning 


Piston Val\ 


UK Japan 


Al Dijjla 


1 


Turning 


Cent 


UK lapan 


Taji (Nassrl 


1 


Turning 


End Caps 


UK/Germany 


Taji (Nassr) 


4 


Milling Knee 




US 


Salah Al Din 


2 


Press (1 medium) (1 smaih 




US 


Taji (Nassr) 


6 


Press 




US 


Taji (Nassr) 




Small Rolling Mill 




US/UK (?) 


Al Atheer 




Turning (notCNO 


Centrifuge 


USSR 


Taji (Nassn 




Drilling 




USSR 


Al Radwan 




Milling 




USSR 


Badr 




Gantry Mill 




USSR 


Badr 




Milling horizontal 




USSR 


Badr 




Radial Drills not CN'C 




USSR 


Daura 




Turning Vertical 




Yuqoslax'ia 


Saddam 




OD Grinding not CN'C 
Morpass Gaging 




Yugoslavia 


Saddam 


4 


Milling 




Yugoslavia 


Saddam 


1 


Milling 





605 



114 



Iraqi Weapons Plants and 
Their Foreign Suppliers 



Name: 

Type: 

Location: 

Production: 

Foreign Contributors: 

Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Abu Sukhayr 

Nuclear 

Abu Sukhayr 

Uranium prospection in the desert near Samawa 

NATRON (Brazil) 

Akashat 

CBW* 

Akashat 

Nerve agents and precursors from organic phosphorus 

compounds; UN says site of a second calutron uranium 

enrichment plant. 

Klockner Industries, Karl Kolb (Germany); Sybetra (Belgium) 

Al Ameen 

Conventional; Nuclear 
Al Yusufiah 

Headquarters of Auqba bin Nafi establishment and machining 
center for calutron ("Baghdadatron") parts. Initially built for 
assembly of T-72 tanks on license from Poland and 
Czechoslovakia. HQ located within the Badr complex. Also 
made parts for hydroelectric power stations and assembled 
CNC machine tools (tool assembly resumed in 11/91). Most 
damage to the plant repaired. 

Polish and Czechoslovak state enterprises; Western machine- 
tool manufacturers 

Al Amer 

Nuclear; Missile 

Fallujah/ Amiriya 

One of three turning/ machining centers of the Auqba Bin 

Nafi Establishment, dedicated at 70% to manufacturing 



Chemical and biological weapons. 



115 



Foreign Contributors 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 



assemblies for uranium enrichment calutrons and to al- 
Hossein and al-Abbas ballistic missiles. Products included 
magnet cores, return irons, ion sources, and collector parts. Al 
Amer had 2 large capacity turning and milling machines, 
plasma cutting machines for shearing metal sheets, jig-boring 
machines, and surface heat-treatment equipment used for 
improved SCUD missile casings. 

Rexroth, Maho, Waldrich-Siegen, Dorries, Schiess-Frohripp, 
ABA, ESAB, DEMAG, Liebherr, Hahn & Kolb, Sharmann, 
SHW (Germany); DEA (Italy); Kaldyf, Zayer (Spain); Aciera, 
Agie, SIP-Hauser, Kellenberger, Kuhlmann (Switzerland); 
Raving Mayer (USA); Morris, Matrix Churchill (UK). 

Al Amil (aka Project 7307) 

Nuclear; Missile 

6 km west of Tarmiyah 

Liquid nitrogen for EMIS diffusion pumps. Other uses (rocket 

fuel?) also suspected. Foreign-built. No significant bomb 

damage; production continuing as of Nov 1991. 

Unknown 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 



AlAtheer(PC3) 

Nuclear 

Al Musayyib 

Nuclear warhead casting and assembly; co-located with PC2. 

Contained a Plasma coating facility (Powder building); a 

polymer lab, a carbide building (to make tungsten carbide for 

the Badr plant). Plant inaugurated by Hussein Kamil on 7 

May 1991; blown up under UN supervision on April 14, 1992. 

Approximately 85 km south of Baghdad. 

ABRA, Hahn & Kolb, Maho, Gildermeister, Vakuum Technik 

GmbH.Plasmatechnik, Schaublin, Leitz (Germany); Philips 

(Netherlands); Hardinge Brothers (UK); Kennametal. Matrix 

Churchill Corp, XYZ Options, Digital Equipment Corp, Hewlett 

Packard (US); Hamamatsu, NEC, Waida (Japan); Asea Brown 

Boveri, Agie, Kellenberger, Studer (Switzerland) 



116 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign contributors: 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



AlFurat 

Nuclear 

An Walid 

Industrial production of maraging steel centrifuges scheduled 

to start in mid-1991; German-built workshop to house 100- 

centrifuge enrichment cascade. 

Interatom/Siemens (Germany) 

AlHadre 

Nuclear 

West of Mosul 

Hydrodynamic studies and explosives testing for nuclear 

weapons program. Included open firing range for FAE and 

cluster bombs, and well equipped control bunker 

Unknown 

Al Hakan 

CBW 

Unknown 

Biological weapons lab discovered by UN Special Commission, 

for production of unicellular proteins. Inspectors discovered 

virus strains imported from the US. 

US and German firms. 

Al Jezira 

Nuclear 

Mosul 

Uranium processing plant for industrial quantities of 

enrichment feedstock; U02, UC14 (for EMIS process); UF6 for 

centrifuge. (Previously identified as located at Makhour. in the 

Jebel Qarachoq). Heavily bombed during Allied air raids. 

Inspected by the UN during 3rd and 4th IAEA teams. 



Name: 

Type: 

Location: 

Production: 

Foreign Contributors: 



Al Mutasm 

Conventional weapons 

Unknown 

Towers for field observation posts; 4x120 mm rocket launcher, 

mounted on tracked AFV 

Yugoslav state-owned defense establishments 



117 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 

Foreign Contributors: 

Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 



Al Mutbena 

Conventional; CBW 

Al Fallujah 

Naval mines, explosives; HMX, RDX; CW precusors. 

Identified by Iraq in 4/91 report to the United Nations Special 

Commission as a chemical weapons plant and depot 

WET, Preussag, WTB Walter Thosti Boswau and numerous 

other West German companies 

Al Qadissiya 

Conventional; Nuclear 

An Walid 

Sniper rifles, optical sights; robotics R&D (for handling of 

nuclear materials); gun barrels. 

Unknown 

Al Qaim 

CBW; Nuclear 

Al Qaim 

Organic phosphorus compounds for chemical weapons; 

extraction of uranium from U-bearing phosphates ore 

(production capability: 103 tons/year, according to UN 

inspection reports). Dual-use facility. 

Sybetra, Six Construct International, Spie Batignolles 

(Belgium); Davie Power Gas (UK); Copee Rust (France); F.R. 

Schmidt (Denmark); Alesa Alusuisse Engineering Ltd 

(Switzerland) 

Al Qaqaa 

Missile; Nuclear; Conventional 

Al Hillah 

Aerial bombs (500 kg); TNT filling; explosives; ammonium 

perchlorate for solid rocket propellant. An explosion heavily 

damaged this plant on August 17, 1989. The Al Qaqaa State 

Establishment also maintains facilities at Al Fallujah and 

Karbala, variously identified as Project 395 or the Space 

Research Center, and has been linked to the Iraqi nuclear 

weapons program. 

Multiple U.S. companies, licensed by DoC; SNPE (France)?; 

SNIA Bpd (Italy)? 



118 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign contributors: 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 



Al Rabee (Al Rabiya) 

Dual-use; Nuclear 
Zaafarniyah 

Precision machining; large-scale pieces in steel, stainless 
steel, and aluminium, including parts for calutron 
enrichment process. Run by MIMI; co-located with Digila plant 
Agie, Hauser, Shaublin (Switzerland); BHG Hermle, 
Siemens, Maho, Dorries, Heidenhain (Germany); DEA 
(Italy); Digital Equipment Corp, Hewlett Packard, Rennishaw 
Probe (USA); Philips (Netherlands); Matrix Churchill (UK); 
Fanuc (Japan); Renault, Skiaky (France) 

Al Rad wan 

Missile; Nuclear 
Baghdad (Khandri) 

Part of the Auqba Bin Nafi Establishment, dedicated at 70% to 
manufacturing assemblies for "Baghdadatrons" (Iraqi 
calutrons). Included five 6-meter diameter vertical turning 
machines to produce pole pieces for Tarmiyah separators. Also 
known as the Batra SCUD assembly plant. Inspected by 4th 
IAEA team and by UNSCOM 8. 

Waldrich Siegen, Doerries, Scharrman, Deckel, Hahn & Kolb, 
DEMAG, Liebherr (Germany); Goimendi (Italy); Sacem, SIP- 
Hauser , Aciera, AGIE (Switzerland); machine-tools from 
state suppliers in USSR, Bulgaria, and China 

AlRafah 

Missile 

At Taqtaqanah 

Also known as the Al Shahiyat Liquid Engine Research, 

Development, Test & Engineering Facility, or as the Rufhah 

testing grounds. Located 135 km east of Kufa. Adjacent to this 

missile production site is a second facility, identified as 

Project 328, still under construction following Desert Storm, 

believed to be a missile test site for Silkworm and Russian 

"Volga" missiles. 

Matrix Churchill (UK); Soviet, Chinese, and Bulgarian state 

companies; DEMAG (German; Baltimore Aircoil (USA) 



119 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 

Foreign Contributors: 

Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 

Name: 

Type: 

Location: 

Production: 

Foreign Suppliers: 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 



Al Shaheed 

Missile 

Unknown 

License of x-ray equipment from Great Britain in 1989, 

intended for "metallographical research" 

UK companies 

An Anbar Space Research Center 

Missile; nuclear 

Karbala 

Ballistic missiles, and dedicated missile testing range; 

suspected location of nuclear warhead plant. Run under the 

aegis of the Al Qaqaa State Establishment 

Numerous German companies; Consarc (U.S.); 600 Group (UK) 

April 7 (Narawan fuze factory) 

Conventional 

Baghdad 

Cardoen/ISC fuze factory for 155mm munitions. 

Industrias Cardoen (Chile), Matrix Churchill (USA), ISC 

(USA); Getplantrade, Switzerland 

Atomic Research Center 

Nuclear 

Thuwaitha 

Site of Osirak nuclear reactor, supplied by France and 

destroyed by Israel; Soviet 5 MW research reactor; nuclear fuel 

fabrication plant; four hot cells; pilot centrifuge plant for 

uranium enrichment; manufacturing site for calutrons; 

production of trial quantities of UC14 for EMIS enrichment. 

Iraq's only nuclear site registered with the IAEA and partially 

subjected to international safeguards 

Snia Techint (Italy), Techniatome, St. Gobain Nucleaire, 

Framatome, CEA (France); Morgan Rushworth (UK); Maho, 

Heidenhain, Leybold Heraeus, Lieber (Germany); Veeco, 

Hewlett Packard (USA) 



120 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 

Foreign Contributors: 

Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 



Badr 

Conventional; Nuclear 
Al Yusufiyah 

Aerial bombs; artillery; tungsten-carbide machine-tool bits. 
A.k.a. Badr General Establishment. Contains the Al Amin 
workshop (qv) 

Skiaky (France); Centrifugal Casting Machines, American 
Bank & Trust, XYZ Options, Pratt & Whitney, Moore Special 
Tool, International Computer Systems/DEC, TI Coating Inc, 
Cincinnati Milacron (US); Aciera, Charmilles, EWAG , 
Schaublin, Tomos Bechler, Hauser (Switzerland); Waida, 
Fanuc (Japan); Adolph Waldrich Coburg, Donau, Deckel, 
Dorries, Siemens, Droop & Rein, Petzing & Hartman, Pfauter 
Gildermeister, SHW (Germany); Carvaghi, Cerutti, Innocenti 
(Italy); Colchester lathes, Harrison, Matrix Churchill (UK) 

Baiji 

CBW 

Baiji 

Chemical warfare agents. Run under the aegis of the Arab 

Detergent Chemicals Company 

Technipetrole/TPL (Italy) 

Base West World 

Conventional 

Samawa 

Maintenance and retrofitting of Iraqi armored vehicles of 

Western origin. Originally built using plans for a "vehicle 

assembly plant" provided by a West German consortium 

Weidleplan, Integral, and Kohlbecker (Germany); Giat, Sofma 

(France) 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 



Digila 

Conventional; Nuclear 
Zaafarniyah 

Computer software, hardware; process-line controllers. Plastics 
casting, using Matrix Churchill V2K machining centers 
licensed by the UK in 1989. United Nations inspectors found 
that it also made magnets and calutron parts for uranium 
enrichment. Co-located in suburb of Baghdad with Al Rabee. 
HAL Computers. Matrix Churchill (UK) 



121 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 



Dhu Al Fiqar 

Missile 

Fallujah 

Condor II and upgraded SCUD missile cases. Significant 

equipment slated for destruction by UN, 14 Feb 1992. A.k.a. 

Project 124; Project 1728; Project 395. 

Werner & Plheiderer, Siemens, Hengstler, Lincoln GmbH, 

DEMAG (Germany); Carlo Banfi Rescaldina, Italargon, 

Generale Controlli, Galbadini, DEA, Tomi Tachi, ECS, 

Resistanze Industrial^ SNIA-BPD (Italy); Stankopromexport 

(USSR); Philips (Netherlands); Instom (UK); unidentified 

(Hungary) 



Name 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 



Factory 10 

Nuclear 

Taji 

Manufacture and assembly of gas ultracentrifuges for 

uranium enrichment. Specialized workshop located within the 

Taji complex; foreign purchases organized by Nassr State 

Establishement for Mechanical Industries 

H+H Metalform, MAN Technologie, Inwako, Export Union 

Dusseldorf GmbH (Germany); TDG, Euromac (UK) 

Fao [aka Saad 38] 

Conventional; Missile 

South of Baghdad 

Future aircraft factory for advanced jet trainers, run by the Al 

Fao State Establishment; proximity fuzes; Cardoen cluster 

bomb plant; Fuel Air Explosives . Identified in 7/91 House of 

Commons report as part of Project 395 

Carlos Cardoen (Chile), Potain (France), Trebelan SA, Forjas 

Extruidas (FOREX) (Spain); Matrix Churchill (UK); ISC (USA) 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Huteen 

Conventional; Nuclear 

Al Iskandariyah 

Explosives, TNT, propellants, fuzes, tungsten-carbide 

machine-tool bits. A very large facility with diversified output; 

possibly vehicle manufacture. IAEA discovered high 

explosives testing for nuclear device at the Al Atheer firing 



122 



Foreign Contributors: 



bunker, within the Huteen walls. Foreign purchases by the 
Huteen General Establishement 

Carlos Cardoen (Chile), TS Engineering (Germany); GTE 
Valenite, XYZ Options, Pratt & Whitney, General Industrial 
Diamond Co, Modern Machinery Associates, Moore Special 
Tool, Matrix Churchill Corp, Shalco, American Export Import 
(U.S.); Matrix Churchill Ltd (UK); Hertel (Germany); Sandvik 
(Sweden) 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 



Mansour 

Conventional 

Baghdad 

Transistors, linear integrated circuits (sister factory to Salah 

al Dine), run under the aegis of the Saad General Establishent. 

Foreign purchases also listed as intended for the Scientific 

Research Council and various University research projects 

Thomson-CSF (France); multiple U.S. and UK companies 



Name: 


PCI 


Type: 


Dual-use; Conventional 


Location: 


Basra 


Production: 


Ethylene Oxide for fuel air explosives. 


Foreign Contributors: 


Multiple U.S., Germany, and UK suppliers 


Name: 


PC2 


Type: 


Dual-use; CBW; super-gun 


Location: 


Al Musayyib 


Production: 


Ethylene Oxide for FAE bombs; CW precui 



Foreign Contributors: 



s. Foreign 

purchases handled by Technical Corps for Special Projects 
Space Research Corp (Belgium, Switzerland); Walter 
Summers, Sheffield Forgemasters (UK); Bechtel , Lummus 
Crest (U.S.) 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 

Foreign Contributors: 



Saad 16 

Missile; Nuclear 

Mosul 

Large ballistic missile research and design center, run by the 

Saad General Establishement 

Consultco, Ilbau (Austria); SRC (Belgium); WTB International 

AG (Egypt); Sagem (France); Aviatest Blohm Maschinbau, 

Carl Zeiss, Degussa, Gildemeister AG, Heberger Bau, 



123 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 

Foreign Contributors: 

Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 

Foreign Contributors: 

Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 



Integral/Sauer Informatic/ICNE, Korber AG, MBB, MBB 
Transtechnica, Mauser-Werke, Scientific Computers GmbH, 
Siemens AG, Korber AG, TS Engineering, Water Engineering 
Trading (Germany); Snia Techint (Italy); IFAT Corp. Ltd. 
(Switzerland); Scientific Computers (UK), Electronic 
Associates Inc., Gould Inc., Hewlett Packard, Tektronix Inc., 
Scientific Atlanta, Wiltron (U.S.) 

Saad21 

Missile 

Mosul 

Nonferrous metal plant for cartridge cases, Condor missile 

parts 

Steyr-Daimler-Puch (Austria) 

Saad24 

Conventional; CBW 

Mosul 

Gas masks, CBW protective clothing. Major rubber and 

plastics plant. Aka the Mosul Military Production Facilities 

Unknown 

Saddam Engineering Complex (Saad 5) 
Conventional; Nuclear; super-gun 
Al Fallujah 

122 mm howitzers; Ababil multiple launch rocket system: 
possible site for supergun barrel manufacture. Aka Kol 7 or 
Saad 5. Built by Yugoslav firms over a 9-year period (1980-1989. 
IAEA discovered manufacturing equipment for Type 1 
(Beams) centrifuges. The Saddam State Establishment for 
Optics, believed to be a sister organization, manufactures 
sniper rifles and optical sights for mortars and artillery 
Unisys, Dale Toler, RD&D International, Applied Systems, 
West Homestead Engineering, Kennametal, Matrix Churchill 
Corp (USA); Bratstvo, Zrak , Ivo Lola Ribar (Yugoslavia); 
Biller, Heidenhain, Blohm, Gerber, Boehringer, 
Gildermeister, Hennig, Siemens, Maho, Ravensburg, VDF 
Wohlenberg , Wotan, Werner, Wanderer (Germany i; Zayer 
(Spain); Reishauser,Mikron, Schaublin, SIP, Studer, Tarex, 
Hauser, Charmilles (Switzerland); DEA (Italy); Kumming 
(China) 



124 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 



Salah al Dine (ex Saad 13) 
Conventional (electronics); Nuclear 
Ad Dawr 

Hybrid circuits, printed circuit boards and components; 
licensed production of battlefield computers, Rasit ground 
surveillance radars, Tiger G 2-D radar, Jaguar frequency 
hopping radars. Bubble memory production planned. 
Procurement by the Saad General Establishment, Scientific 
Research Council, and various University research projects 
Thomson-CSF, CIMSA, Elno S.A, Colly, HES, Hure (France); 
Deckel, Demag (Germany); Bliss (USA) ; Racal (UK); DEA, 
Fanup (Italy); Dixi, Wahli, Hauser (Switzerland); Fanuc 
(Japan) 

Salman Pak 

CBW 

Salman Pak 

Chemical and bacteriological weapons research; United 

Nations inspectors in July 1991 discovered large-scale 

production facilities. Virus, fungi, and protozoa purchases 

made by the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission 

Noske Kaeser, Thyssen Rheinstahl Technik, Identa Co. 

(Germany); Atlanta Centers for Disease Control, American 

Type Culture Collection (U.S.); multiple UK companies 

Samarra 

CBW 

Samarra 

Large-scale chemical weapons manufacturing site and 

research center, run under the auspices of the State 

Establishement for Pesticides Production (SEPP); biological 

weapons; unit for manufacturing centrifuges for nuclear 

weapons. Aka the Muthena State Establishment (sister plant in 

Fallujah) 

Karl Kolb GmbH, Preussag, WET, Ludwig Hammer GmbH. 

Neuberger Wood and Plastics Industry, Ltd, Heberger Bau 

GmbH, Pilot Plant , Quast, Klaus Union (Germany); Protec 

SA, Carbone Lorraine, Le Vide Industrie!, Pirep, Prevost, 

SVCM (France) 



125 



Name: 

Type: 

Location: 

Production: 

Foreign Contributors: 

Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 

Name: 

Type: 

Location: 

Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 



Name: 

Type: 

Location: 

Production: 

Foreign Contributors: 



Sawary 

Conventional 

Basra area 

Small naval patrol boats 

Multiple U.S. companies 

Sharqat 

Nuclear 

Ash-Sharqat 

Site of calutron magnetic isotope uranium enrichment plant, 

still under construction when Allied bombing raids partially 

destroyed it in 1/91; under the control of the Iraqi Atomic 

Energy Commission. Included dedicated 100 MW power plant. 

Near the Jebel Makhour site, on western bank of the Tigris 

almost due west of Kirkuk. 

Unknown 

State Establishment for Heavy Engineering Equipment 

(SEHEE) 

Nuclear; Conventional; super-gun 

Al Dura 

Mechanical assemblies for super-gun; magnets and 

assemblies for calutrons and gas centrifuges, including 

vacuum chamber parts. Production line to make components for 

the maraging steel Model 21 centrifuge (joint venture with 

Badr). Nuclear-specific equipment slated for IAEA destruction 

includes flow turning machine, expanding mandrel, electron 

beam welding chamber, 2 oxidation furnaces, one MIG welder. 

one brazing furnace, one heat treatment furnace, and 3 CNC 

machine-tools. 

ATI (Belgium), Destec International (UK), Destec Engineering 

B.V., Philips (Netherlands); H+H Metalform, Leybold Heraeus 

AG, Degussa, Magdeburg, Bosch (Germany); TechnoExport, 

Tos Hulin, Skoda (Czechoslovakia) 

Suleimaniyah 

Nuclear 

Suleimaniyah 

Alleged site of centrifuge cascade for uranium enrichment 

Unknown 



126 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 



Foreign Contributors: 



Taj al-Ma'rik 

Missile 

Latifiyah 

Solid fuel mixing plant for Condor II/Badr 2000, and Sakr 200 

missile; casting of solid-fuel rocket motors and production of 

APC (ammonium perchlorate), under an Egyptian process. 

Aka the "Soviet motor plant. Located within the perimeter of the 

giant Al Qaqaa complex, but administratively part of the Bilat 

Ash Shuhadaa Establishment. 

TMS, Draiswerke, Demag (Germany); Varian Linatron 

(USA); Consen group (Germany, Switzerland); Snia Techint 

(Italy); Abu Zaabal Specialty Chemical Co (Egypt) 

Taji (Nassr State Establishment) 
Conventional; nuclear 
Al Taji 

Artillery; T-72 tanks; production site for Gerald Bull's super- 
gun (Babylon Project). A.k.a. Nassr State Establishement for 
Mechanical Industries, run by Safa Haboby. Initial project 
called for 1,000 artillery pieces/year. Very large, dual use 
facility, including steel rolling mills 

ABB (Mannheim), Buderus Wetzlar, SHW, Wotan, Siemens, 
Magdeburg, H&H Metalform, Schloemann SIEMAG, Dango & 
Dienenthal, Ferrostaal AG, Graeser Technology Transfer 
GmbH, Hochtief (Essen I, Klockner Industrie Anglage GmbH, 
Leifeld & Company (Leico), Leybold AG, LOI Industrie 
Anlagen, M.A.N., Machinenfabrtik Ravensurg, Maho, 
Dorries, Mannensmann Demag Hitttentechnik, Blohm 
Maschinen, Thyssen Rheinstahl, Ravensburg, Rheinmetall, 
Ruhrgas, Saarstahl, Schmidt, Kranz & Co., Siemens AG, SMS 
Hasenclever, TBT Tiefbohrtechnik, Feld-Muehle, TuV, Zublin 
(Germany); Teco, Nassr State Enterprise for Mechanical 
Industries (Iraq); Danieli, Officina E. Biglia, (Italy), HMT 
International Ltd. (India), Georg Fischer. Von Roll, Oerlikon 
& Shaudt, Schmeidemeccanica (Switzerland); Bull Oak Tool 
& Gauge, Gerber Systems Technology, Pacific, Pangborn 
(USA), International Computer Systems, Matrix Churchill, 
FMT, Wickman Bennett, Bridgeport (UK); Petitjean, Fromat 
(France) 



127 



Name: 
Type: 
Location: 
Production: 

Foreign Contributors: 



Tarmiyah 

Nuclear 

At Tarmiyah 

Site of calutron uranium enrichment plant. Heavily damaged 

during Allied bombing. 

Unclassified technologies provided by Hypotronics and other 

U.S. companies 



128 






"- ' Ov " '/v' ...II,- 



.->.__/ 



/. 



7 

'] 



/ 



) 

* 

1 8 



4 



A. O \ / \ / C / J...JI 







Rt run Lie of iraq 



MINISTUV OK INDUSTRY and 
MILITARY MANUFACTURE 

BAGHDAD 



Mr. Ha mid U. Jalar 

Chairman and Chief Executive 

Crescent Petroleum Company International Limited 

P. 0. Box 2222 

Siiarjall, United Arab Emirates 



14th May 1989 



International Downstream Integration 
Petroleum Industry 



Dear Mr, Jaf.ar: 



This letter is to confirm the establishment of the Joiiit Venture 
between the Ministry of Industry and Military Manufacture of the 
Republic of Iraq and Creocent Petroleum Company International 
Limited ( "Crescent" ) , for the purpose of acquisition of joint 
ownership interests in international petroleum refining, market- 
ing and pet roehemical assets outside of the Republic of Ir^y. 

Crescent is hereby authorized to contact the owners and/or 
rrionoger3 oi appropriate companies in .order to discuss and nego- 
tiate the potential purchase or participation of the Joint Ven- 
ture in such companies arid/or in the appropriate petroleum as- 
sets . 

Crescent is also authorized to discuss with the aforementioned 
owners/ma lagcmcnt the terms for provision of Iraqi crude oil to 
such asset; on a long term basis in support of such transactions. 
The formal contract negotiations and execution will be undertaken 
by the relevant Agency of the Government of Iraq. 

If the parties which are contacted by Crescent should require 
direct confirmation from the Ministry of the authority hereby 
vested in Crescent. they may contact the undersigned at the Min- 
istry in Uaghdad en telex number 213670 "SAFAN IK", or telefax 
(9G41) 538 4634. 

Youra sincerely. 



> 3 



Lt. Gen. Dr. Amir H. Al-Saadi 
Senior Deputy Minister 



!' 



Y 



t 1 



129 



THE NEW ARMJ RACE 



THE IRAQI BOMB 

Because the International Atomic Energy Agency is ineffectual, 
Saddam Hussein zsiU continue to outwit U.N. inspectors. 

BY GARY MILHOLLIN 



AST week, as the United States and 
its coalition partners sent cruise 
missiles crashing into a nuclear 
site near Baghdad, the message to 
Saddam Hussein was clear: Don't inter- 
fere with international inspectors — let 
them look anywhere, any time, and at 
anvthing, in accordance with the United 
Nations resolutions. The allies know 
that Saddam is still hiding part of his 
atom-bomb program, and they're eager 
for the inspectors to find it. What the al- 
lies did not say is that, even though 
Saddam has now allowed the U.N. 
nuclear inspectors back in. thev probably 
won't find what he is hiding. They are 
being thwarted by their own manage- 
ment as well as by Saddam Hussein. 

The inspection trips are a constant 
test ot nerves. The inspectors usually stav 
at the Sheraton Ishtar Hotel, in Bagh- 
dad. "It is unlike any other Sheraton in 
the world." one of them told me. "The 
most gruesome thing is the dove. It's on 
a poster in the lobby, stretched out on a 
cross — crucified — with blood dripping 
down. And on the top ot" the cross is 
written 'U.N.' " This inspector is dis- 
couraged, and so are manv others. For 
almost a vcir. they have found practically 
nothing new. The Iraqis are outfoxing 
them at even- turn, harassing them, and 
making it more and more likely that 
Saddam Hussein will wriggle out from 
under the current embargo with large 
part? ot his A-bomb effort intact. In 
fact, some inspectors believe that if 
SacJ.im escapes the embargo soon, he 
could get the bomb within five to seven 
year?. 

The best chance to deter him has al- 
ready been lost. When the inspections 
began, in May of 1991, the Iraqis were 
Still reeling from the Gull War and were 
no: able to deceive the inspectors. In 
June, the inspectors flushed out a convov 
o: trucks earning A-bomb-making 
equipment, and in September they 
:■ md trunkfuls ot classified nuclear 
documents in Baghdad office build- 



ings — apparendv left there by mistake. 
These finds produced invaluable leads, 
which, if thev had been followed aggres- 
sively, might have unveiled the essentials 
of the Iraqi nuclear program. The op- 
portunity was lost, many inspectors be- 
lieve, because of the timidity of the In- 
ternational Atomic Energy Agency, an 
arm of the U.N. based in Vienna. The 
I.A.E.A. was created in 1956 with two 
conflicting goals: to encourage the pro- 
liferation of atomic energy and. at the 
same time, to insure that the civilian 
nuclear projects it spawned did not make 
atomic bombs. .After the Gulf War, the 
Security Council created a Special Com- 
mission to uncover the Iraqi missile, 
nuclear, and chemical-and-biological- 
weaoon programs, but left control ot the 
nuclear inspections in the hands of the 
I.A.E.A. The Special Commission and 
the I.AE.A. immediately began to feud. 

It is the Special Commission that 
gets intelligence about Iraq from the 
United States and other governments; it 
then designates sites for the I.A.E.A. to 
inspect, and it controls the inspection 
budget. The Special Commission also 
persuades friendly governments to sup- 
ply technical experts, who are used to 
augment I.A.E.A. inspection teams. But 
the I.A.EA. runs the inspecdons in the 
field, and it tends to rely on Iraqi disclo- 
sures, as it does in its civilian inspections. 
It also hoards anv information it finds. 
The Special Commission docs have in- 
spectors of its own — on loan from 
friendly governments — but when they 
go to Iraq they arc under the IA.E.A. s 
thumb. 

The agency's timid managers, several 
inspectors sav, gave the Iraqis the crucial 
time thev needed to spin^a web of de- 
ccption — a web now too cense for tr.e 
inspectors to penetrate. Representative 
Hcnrv B. Gonzalez, the most prominent 
congressional investigator ot L.S. ex- 
ports to Iraq, told me that he :s cr.t:c.L 
of "the ineffective manner in which the 
. has addressed Iraq's secret net- 




THE NEW YORKER. 



FEBRUARY I. 1993 



130 



work of Western suppliers," and he 
added, "The whole effort to stop the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons de- 
pends on making the I.A.E.A. much 
more effective than it has been to date." 
Most of the inspectors I've spoken 
with — all of whom insist on anonvm- 
ity — despair of finding anvthing more in 
Iraq as long as the I.A.E.A. remains in 
charge. 

Kere is how one inspector describes a 
team's arrival in Iraq: "You fly in from 
Bahrain on a C-160 Transall, operated 
by the German Air Force — the Luft- 
waffe. You sit on canvas seats made for 
paratroopers, and it gets cold. You take 
everything in with you — food, water, 
money, equipment, even tires. You need 
the tires to replace the slashed tires on 
U.N. vehicles. You land at Habaniva, 
an airport about sixty miles from Bagh- 
dad. The first thing you see is a di- 
lapidated bus, in the green-and-white 
colors of Iraqi Airways. It's low-slung, 
belching, and stinking. It 
takes you to the operations 
center, where you get vour 
visa stamp. Then you load 
your bags on another bus, 
which takes you to Baghdad. 
On this bus you meet your 
'minders.' These are the Iraqis 
who will be your hosts. 
They're always with vou, 
wherever you go. You assume 
the bus is bugged. 

"At the hotel, everything is 
dimlv lit — the lobbv, the res- 
taurant, the hallwavs, the 
rooms. Deliberately. The ho- 
tel is also bugged. In the 
lobbv, there is an enormous portrait ot 
Saddam, looking down on evcrvthing. 
There is also the poster of the dove. This 
is when you first notice the sccuritv guys. 
They're not the same as the minders. 
They stand around the lobby and watch 
evcrybodv. Most of them wear dark 
lackers. Thev are also in the hallwavs up- 
stairs. At about seven in the evening, you 
have the first team meeting, in a confer- 
ence room off the lobby. The whole 
team usually has one or two dozen in- 
spectors. Sonic arc from the I.A.E.A. 
and some are from the U.N., but most 
are technical experts lent bv friendly 
governments. The chief inspector breaks 
the team up into subgroups, and each 
group has a different mission, After the 
team meet: i et the Iraqis — or 




their representatives. These are vour 
counterparts — the technical guvs who 
are the experts. They ask vou where 
vou're going. They want to know, be- 
cause they're going with you. They pro- 
vide vour security and arrange vour 
visits. You tell them about the routine 
inspections — the ones where you go 
back to sites you've already been to — but 
vou don't tell them about the surpnse in- 
spections, where you go to new sites. 
You save these until the next morning, 
at the last minute." 

THE I.A.E.A. chief inspector for 
Iraq is Maurizio Zifferero. a sixtv- 
two-year-old nuclear chemist from Italv 
who is a specialist in plutonium process- 
ing. He was asked to join the I.AE.A. 
in 1980 as a deputy director-general — a 
high post for which he needed his 
government's backing. Several U.N. in- 
spectors condemn his conduct of the en- 
tire inspection operation and cite a string 
of incidents involving him 
which, they claim, have en- 
abled the Iraqis to stav ahead 
of the game. Last week. I 
gave him an opportunity to 
comment on these incidents 
in a telephone conversation 
with him at I.A.E.A. head- 
quarters in Vienna. 

Two U.N. inspectors who 
were present at secret pre- 
inspection discussions last 
February in Baghdad sav that 
thev believe the Iraais were 
alerted to several surprise in- 
spections because Zifferero 
discussed them in areas the 
Iraqis had bugged. The result, a United 
States official says, was that on one "sur- 
prise" inspection, the Iraqis were waiting 
for the inspectors with coffee and 
doughnuts. Rejecting this charge of 
careless talk. Zifferero told me, "I as- 
sume that even-thing is bugged in the 
hotel, and I never mention sites in meet- 
ings." The inspectors insist that it hap- 
pened, and that United States intelli- 
gence and several inspectors warned 
Zifferero beforehand that the areas were 
bugged. 

The same U.N. inspectors sav that 
Zifferero has been lax about the security 
of documents. Inspection-team mem- 
bers arc supposed to keep their back- 
packs with them at all times, but thev 
sav thev saw Zifferero relaxing in the 



hotel without his backpack, which at 
the time contained line drawings of 
Iraqi nuclear sites based on recent .Amer- 
ican intelligence photographs. Again. 
Zifferero disputes the charge. He told 
me he always wears his backpack and al- 
ways keeps his documents in it. (The se- 
riousness ot the Iraqi effort to find out 
what the inspectors know manifests it- 
self' outside the country. In New York, 
Marjarta Rautio, Finland's representative 
to the Special Commission, got a shock 
in her hotel room when she emerged 
from the bathroom to find a man who 
had been let in by the bellboy going 
through her wastebasket. The U.N. in- 
spectors assume he was an Iraqi agent. I 

The anxieties about Zifferero's per- 
formance go beyond concern over his 
carelessness. He is also charged with 
"spoiling" fresh intelligence. A few 
months ago, documents seized in Iraq 
revealed that the Iraqis had been doing 
secret research on plutonium metal. 
Some thirteen pounds of this substance 
destroyed Nagasaki in 1945. .Although 
plutonium can fuel nuclear reactors, 
there is no real use for plutonium metal 
other than in atomic bombs, so the fact 
that the Iraqis were working on it 
proved their dedication to bomb- 
making. It was assumed that ZLfferero. 
as the I.A.E.A.'s chief inspector, would 
use the tip as a lead and do additional 
research. That might have produced 
enough detail to force the Iraqis to reveal 
more leads, or might have brought about 
a surprise inspection. Instead, to the dis- 
may of his colleagues. Zifferero mere!'. 
took the information to the Iraqis and 
asked for an explanation. Thev coolly re- 
plied that thev were planning to srudv 
neutrons. This was not credible techni- 
cally, but Zifferero simplv quoted the 
Iraqi replv. without comment, in his 
December 10th inspection report, which 
did not even note that Iraq was experi- 
menting with bomb material. Last week, 
Zifferero told me that the IAEA, 
didn't consider the matter closed, and 
might pursue it further. 

Zifferero's behavior has not escaped 
1 the eye of the United States Con- 
gress. Senate Intelligence Com." 
staff members have specifically requested 
information about Ziftcrero from the 
C.I.A. The committee should h.v. 
told, among other things, that ir. the 
mid-ninetccn-scventics Zirlercr . 



131 



THE NEW AHMJ KACE 

was then working for the Italian Atomic 
Energy Commission, went to Baghdad 
to, as he put it to me last week, help "ne- 
gotiate a bilateral agreement" tor Italy to 
sell plutonium-production equipment to 
Iraq. The equipment was essential to 
Iraq's plan for the bomb, and would 
complement a reactor that France was 
preparing to build there: the Italian 
equipment would extract plutonium af- 
ter the French reactor irradiated ura- 
nium. Other Italian equipment, also part 
of the deal, would fabricate uranium into 
reactor fuel rods suitable for irradiation. 
Iraq had bought a complete plutonium- 
production line. 

"We raised hell about the Italian 
deal," a senior American official who op- 
posed it at the time told me. ZifFerero 
says that in 1976 he visited an Iraqi ra- 
diochemistry lab to help Iraq determine 
whether it could do "fuel-cycle re- 
search" — plutonium research — in its ex- 
isting facilities. He says that he never 
went back to Iraq — and never visited the 
facilities that were using the Italian 
equipment — until he was sent bv the 
I.A.E.A. after the Gulf War. 

The Israelis, who were not fooled by 
Iraqi promises of peaceful use, destroyed 
the French reactor with precision bomb- 
ing in 1981. But the Italian equipment 
survived. In fact, it lived on to become 
the hottest topic of conversation during 
the I.A.E.A.'s fourth inspection, which 
began in late July of 1991. Before a 
shocked group of inspectors, a senior 
Iraqi official calmly revealed that Iraq 
had used the Italian equipment to ex- 
tract plutonium in violation of Iraqi 
promises to the I.A.E.A. 

This was a watershed for the 
I.A.E.A. It was the first time in history 
that a country was known to have bro- 
ken its pledge to report all work with 
plutonium to agency inspectors. Thus 
the very equipment that ZifFerero helped 
supplv was used to break the promise 
that he is now responsible for enforcing. 
To make matters worse, the Iraqi official 
was himself a former I_A.E.A. inspector. 
He told his outraged ex-colleagues that 
his I.A.E.A. experience had made it 
easier to dupe them. "He really rubbed 
their noses in it," said David Kay, a 
former inspector and I.A.E.A. em- 
ployee, who has led several inspections 
in Iraq, and was present at the meeting. 

The Italian equipment was not 
all that survived the 1981 attack. The 



132 



THE NEW YOftKER. FEDKUAHY 1, 1993 




"Before we get started, are we showing pony tail or not?" 



U.N. inspectors believe that Israel's 
bombs also missed the French reactor's 
control panels, instrumentation system, 
and computers. These are vital compo- 
nents, and the Iraqis would have a hard 
time replacing them if they decided to 
build a second reactor. Some U.N. in- 
spectors think they have tried to build a 
new, underground reactor; otherwise, 
the plutonium research makes no sense. 
The inspectors have searched for this re- 
actor with no success. 

The French components were yet an- 
other lead that was not followed up. The 
components are on an I.A.E.A. list of 
sensitive nuclear items that the inspec- 
tors know the Iraqis have, and which the 
Iraqis are required to account for, but 
when Zifferero asked where the compo- 
nents were, the Iraqis refused to produce 
them (while admitting that thev ex- 
isted). Zifferero accepted this refusal 
without challenge. Last week, when I 
pressed Zifferero about the components, 
he said, This is a lead that will be fol- 
lowed up soon. It may have been an 
oversight not to follow it up earlier." 

Senate Intelligence Committee staff 
members are still puzzled about 
Zifferero. The committee asked the 



C.I. A. months ago about his back- 
ground, but still has no answer. Some 
senior officials at the Pentagon say they 
have been complaining about Zifferero 
for months, but they say the State De- 
partment has done nothing to have him 
removed. Our government is divided on 
this issue. Officials in at least one other 
major Western government also have 
doubts about him. According to a well- 
placed official, its intelligence analysts 
find his behavior inexplicable. 

AN inspector described to me a 
l. typical day in the field: "The 
loudspeakers in the mosques come on at 
5 A.M. with the first call to prayer, so you 
don't need an alarm. You assemble in 
the lobby by seven. If you are driving, 
you go in a bus or a van, usually a blue- 
and-white Toyota. All the vehicles are 
Tovotas, usually with broken windows. 
Behind vou is a U.N. vehicle driven by a 
U.N. medic or radio operator. It's loaded 
with water, communication equipment, 
medical kits, and food. The Iraqis pro- 
vide all the other vehicles, including the 
one vou ride in, and the drivers. In front, 
there's an Iraqi police car — an Olds 
Cutlass Ciera, with a blue light on 



top. If you get caught 
in traffic, the Iraqi po- 
lice stick their arms 
out the windows and 
wave their guns. Then 
evervbodv gets out of 
the way." 

The teams alwavs 
take along a portable 
IMARSAT — Inter- 
national Marine Sat- 
ellite dish. The size of 
a big suitcase, it beams 
its signal up to an 
IMARSAT over the In- 
dian Ocean, enabling 
team members to talk 
to the U.N. in New 
York If a team is go- 
ing to a new site, its 
leader shouldn't tell 
the Iraqis where until 
the team actually gets 
in the car. Then the 
Iraqis radio ahead. 
This usually gives the 
site a half hour to an 
hour's notice. And, of 
course, the Iraqis can 
drive slowly. The site 
is usually protected bv a high fence and 
anti-aircraft guns. Team members go 
first to the headquarters building to 
meet the director-general in his office. 
In many of the factories, there is a model 
of the site after it was bombed, showing 
every piece of damage in detail. Next to 
it is a model of the new site — rebuilt to 
the highest standards. (As they ap- 
proached one site, team members saw 
huge piles of debris that the Iraqis had 
bulldozed to clear the way for a new 
building. The Iraqis told the team that 
they had taken all the machines out of 
the site to escape the bombing. Thev hid 
them between people's houses, and after 
the war they moved them into the new 
building.) 

The team leader will ask the director- 
general for a historv of the plant, 
whether it made anv nuclear equipment, 
and other questions. The Iraqis always 
deny everything. The interview cakes twenty 
or thirty minutes. Then the team tours 
the plant, looking for proscribed activi- 
ties and for equipment on Annex 3 — the 
list of items that Iraq is not allowed to 
possess under U.N. resolutions. It also 
looks at the plant's potential for going 
back into weapons production. Team 



THE NEW ARMJ HACE 



133 



members can take notes, or samples, or 
photographs. 

The inspector says, "Normally, you 
don't find anything. After two or three 
hours, vou eat lunch. Usually it's Ameri- 
can M.R.E.s — meals ready to eat — and 
bottled water. Then you go to the next 
site. By the end of the day, you're tired, 
because it's hot and you've walked so 
much. Everybody is also demoralized, 
because you haven't found anything. 
You do this every day for about ten 
davs" — the usual duration of a team's 
tour. "Back at the hotel, you have the 
team meeting, which is a debriefing. 
The subgroups report on what they did, 
but you can't be very specific, because 
the room is bugged. Then you shower, 
eat dinner, and go to bed." 

BEFORE the war, IA..EA. inspectors 
had visited Iraqi nuclear sites twice 
a year for a decade. Their job was to 
verify that Iraq was keeping its promise 
not to make an atomic bomb. As late as 
1990, they rated Iraqi cooperation as 
"exemplary." But all that time Saddam 
was running a vast A-bomb program 
under their very noses. The inspectors 
spent their time at a huge complex called 
Al Tuwaitha, where they visited only the 
buildings that Saddam designated; they 
never looked at what was going on next 
door. If they had, they would have found 
laboratories busily engaged in research 
on both plutonium and uranium for 
atomic bombs. In the words of an 
American official, "the I.A.EA. missed 
the Iraqi bomb before the war, and now 
it's missing it again." 

One U.N. inspector accuses the 
agency of "playing information games." 
The process of gathering information 
about Iraqi activities is fairly complex. 
The Iraqis are watched by satellites, by 
U-2 spy planes, and by U.N. helicopters 
flying out of Baghdad. They are also be- 
ing informed on by a number of defec- 
tors. Most of this intelligence pours in to 
the C.I.A.. which sifts it and prepares a 
package of promising sites to visit. The 
package then goes to both the State De- 
partment and the Pentagon, which to- 
gether decide what sites to propose to 
the Special Commission. The British, 
French, German, and Russian intelli- 
gence agencies do the same. The Com- 
mission weighs all this advice and de- 
cides where to strike next. 

The process has worked well for mis- 



sile and chemical-and-biological inspec- 
tions, but it hasn't worked for nuclear 
inspections. When the missile inspec- 
tors, who work independently of the 
I.A.EA. , find something — a rocket- 
engine diagram, say — they immediately 
inform the governments that provided 
the leads. The governments then funnel 
the data back to their missile experts, 
who evaluate it and provide more leads. 
The Special Commission's missile in- 
spectors thus get the benefit of concerted 
expert analysis, which they could never 
provide themselves. Each inspection 
builds on the previous one. 

The I.AEA. doesn't work that way. 
It deems the results of its inspections 
confidential, and puts only a fiacrion of 
what it knows in its written reports; it 
gives data to the Special Commission 
only upon specific request. The Special 
Commission's inspectors complain that 
they don't know what to ask for, because 
they don't know what the agency has. 
Nor does the agency generally report its 
findings back to the governments that 
have supplied its intelligence leads. The 
result is a gap in the information loop, 
isolating the nuclear inspectors from 
competent intelligence work. The 
agency has no expertise in nuclear weap- 
ons, because since its inception it has in- 
spected only civilian nuclear plants. 
Most of its employees are from countries 
without nuclear weapons, and thev lack 
security clearances. "Your typical 
I.A.E.A. inspector wouldn't know a 
nuclear-weapon part if it fell on him," 
says one American bomb expert who 
was an inspector in Iraq. The agency has 
no photo interpreters — essential for un- 
derstanding data from satellites. Its few 
available analysts cannot possibly match 
the power of the American, Russian, 
British, and French nuclear-weapon 
laboratories. (Incidentally, the I.A.EA.'s 
practice of including as many nationali- 
ties as possible on the inspection teams 
allows inspectors from countries without 
nuclear weapons to learn in Iraq what 
machines are needed to build them, 
where" to get the machines, and how to 
avoid detection.) 

ONLY two of a total of sixteen 
nuclear inspections in Iraq have 
produced major intelligence leads, and in 
both the inspectors had to violate 
I.A.E.A. policies to get them. Late in 
June of 1991, at the beginning of the 



134 



THE NEW YORKER. FEBRUARY 1. 1993 



second inspection, the inspectors were 
giving the Iraqis between six and twelve 
hours' notice before each site visit. This 
was the rule laid down bv I.A.E.A. 
headquarters in Vienna. The Iraqis 
understood the rule far too well; they 
were moving equipment from one site to 
another during the notice period. In 
June, as American satellites watched, the 
Iraqis went to hiding places in the 
desert, dug up giant machines for pro- 
cessing uranium, loaded them on trucks, 
and drove them to a site called Abu 
Gharib, to which the inspectors had been 
denied entry. Then the satellites saw the 
trucks move the equipment from Abu 
Gharib to a second site, at Al Fallujah. 

David Kay, the American who led 
the team, says that he got this informa- 
tion in Iraq at about 3 A.M. He then 
called together six inspectors "for a long 
walk in Baghdad," during which they 
could talk without being bugged. They 
agreed to do a zero-notice in- 
spection at Al Fallujah that 
morning, despite the policy of 
giving six to twelve hours' no- 
tice. Kay told the Iraqis that 
he was going "in the direction 
of a site the team had already 
toured — a site that happened 
to be on the road to Al 
Fallujah. Kay managed to get 
his vehicle in front of the col- 
umn and went right bv the 
first site. The Iraqis "went 
crazy," Kay says. "They 
turned on red lights, pulled us 
over, and argued with us, but 
we got to Fallujah anyway." 
There they were denied entry, 
but they managed to photo- 
graph trucks leaving through another 
gate, while the Iraqis fired bullets over 
their heads. 

The moment was dramatic: the in- 
spectors had the first clear proof that 
Saddam was trying to make a bomb. 
The equipment included huge seventeen- 
foot magnets, weighing more than fifty 
tons, which could be used onlv for en- 
riching uranium — raising it from its 
natural state to nuclear-weapon grade. 
Kay saw it as a vindication of the team. 
"We all pulled together and it worked," 
he said. "Even though we had to break 
IA.E.A. rules to do it." 

The I.A.E.A. then sprang into ac- 
tion. It and the Special Commission 
rushed to Iraq a high-level delegation 




that included Mohamed El Baradei, an 
Egyptian on the I.AEA legal staff. The 
delegation found the Iraqis arguing 
lamely that the equipment had nothing 
to do with uranium enrichment. El 
Baradei, fresh on the scene, embodied 
the tradition of the I.A.EA. Before an 
incredulous group of inspectors, he de- 
clared, as Kay recalls it, "The Iraqis do 
not have a uranium-enrichment program. 
I know so, because they are my friends 
and they have told me that they don't." 

El Baradei was wrong, of course. But 
he was following the line laid down bv 
his I A.E.A. superiors. If they had had 
their way, Kay's inspection might never 
have occurred. After the first inspection, 
in May, Iraq had accounted for all the 
imported nuclear material it had previ- 
ously informed the I.A.E.A. about, 
which balanced the agency's accounts. 

"The I.A.EA. was lucky," a former 
inspector who was on the first team says. 
Kay and this inspector say that 
Zifferero and his boss, Hans 
Blix, the director-general of 
the I.A.E.A., wanted to put 
out a report at the end of May 
concluding that everything 
was fine. But a minority of in- 
spectors, mostly Americans, 
wouldn't go along. They 
couldn't understand why the 
Iraqis had left some of the 
bombed buildings untouched 
while razing others, even tear- 
ing out foundations as far as 
several metres down. The 
Americans thought that the 
Iraqis might be concealing 
nuclear-weapon work, and 
they wanted the report to say 
so. "It all looked very suspicious," the in- 
spector said. "But the I.A.E.A. wasn't 
interested. It wanted to pasteurize our 
language and put the report out any- 
wav." The I.A.E.A. was saved from hu- 
miliation by a defector, who turned up 
just before the report was to be released 
and told Western intelligence about the 
equipment. A few weeks later, Kay suc- 
ceeded in finding and photographing it. 

Kay also led the only other team that 
produced major intelligence leads. After 
arriving in Baghdad late in the afternoon 
on September 22, 1991, the team set out 
early the next morning. Kay pointed 
toward the Al Rashid Hotel, and told 
the Iraqis simply to "drive that way." By 
6 A.M., the team was searching a nine- 



story building in Baghdad from the top 
down. It turned out to be where the Iraqis 
were designing facilities for their first 
atomic bomb. When thev reached the base- 
ment, a few hours later, the team found 
trunkfuls of classified documents from 
the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission. 

This discovery sparked an intense 
confrontation. The Iraqis kept the team 
in the parking lot until 7 P.M., confis- 
cated the documents until 2 A.M. the 
next day, and then gave onlv some of 
them back. What the Iraqis didn't know 
was that the inspectors had spirited out 
two reports marked "Top Secret." These 
crucial papers contained the bomb de- 
sign. The design was crude but workable, 
and would have produced a weapon with 
nearly twice the power of the Hiroshima 
bomb. 

EARLY on the morning of Septem- 
ber 24th, Kay's team began a 
search of two other buildings, using the 
same tactics. These buildings turned out 
to be the headquarters of the entire Iraqi 
A-bomb program, code-named Petro- 
chemical 3. The team turned up person- 
nel lists and procurement records, and 
four hours later there was another con- 
frontation. The Iraqis demanded that 
the team surrender its records, its photo- 
graphs, and its videotapes. When the in- 
spectors refused, the Iraqis held them at 
the site. This was the celebrated "parking- 
lot incident'' — a four-dav standoff in the 
scorching Baghdad heat. The team lived 
near its immobilized bus until the Iraais 
finally backed down. 

Eventually, the team hauled out pav 
records, computer files, and more than 
sixty thousand pages of documents, in- 
cluding the two top-secret reports on 
bomb design. The reports were a gold 
mine of intelligence nuggets: thev re- 
vealed numerous aspects of Saddam's 
bomb-manufacturing effort and still 
constitute the primary evidence of how 
close he was to the bomb when the war 
broke out. 

The aggressive tactics required for 
this breakthrough did not please the 
I.A.E.A. Zifferero, who was not in Iraq 
at the time of that inspection, later told 
an inspector who was there that the epi- 
sode was "one of the worst things that 
ever happened." .And. according to Kav. 
Hans Blix reacted by saying that Kav 
was not going to be assigned to any 
more inspections in Iraq. Kav then re- 



THE NEV AI\MJ l\ACE 



135 



signed from the agency. He and another 
American inspector who" was in the 
parking-lot standoff maintain that "ev- 
erybody associated with the parking-lot 
incident became persona non grata" at 
the I.A.E.A. As tor the sixty thousand 
pages of documents, onlv about fifteen 
per cent of them have been translated 
from the Arabic, although summaries of 
most documents have been completed. 
The titles alone show that the docu- 
ments are rich in procurement data and 
other leads. The I.A.E.A. has farmed 
most of them out to coalition govern- 
ments for translation, but none has com- 
mitted the resources to do the job 
effectively. Thus, the inspectors are like 
treasure hunters who can read only 
scraps of a map. 

Acting on an intelligence tip from a 
United States ally, Zifferero finally had a 
chance to lead his own team into the 
Petrochemical 3 headquarters last De- 
cember. The team was an unusual com- 
bination. It had Special Commission in- 
spectors from New York, who were 
looking for missile and chemical-and- 
biological-weapons documents, and 
I.A.E.A. inspectors who suspected the 
Iraqis of having moved nuclear docu- 
ments back into the building. On this 
particular trip, I'm told, Zifferero ap- 
peared to observe security precautions 
more closely. Nevertheless, the differ- 
ence in methods and attitudes between 
the I.A.E.A. and the Special Commis- 
sion was striking. 

When Zifferero gave the order to 
begin, the Special Commission's 
"document-exploitation 
team" tanned out quick- 
ly to surround and oc- 
cupy the building. Zif- 
ferero, however, had no 
experience with rapid 
engagement. "As team 
leader, he had to be 
readv to order teams to 
go here, go there — im- 
mediately — and to or- 
der Iraqi escorts to go 
with them," a missile 
inspector later said. 
"But he was totally un- 
able to do that — he 
couldn't keep up." 

The result was a 
breakdown in com- 
mand and control. The 
Special Commission 



and I.A.E.A. inspectors started to de- 
bate procedures in front of the Iraqis, 
and the Iraqis themselves began to move 
documents. One threw a bundle out a 
window, and another picked it up and 
ran with it to a city bus. A Special Com- 
mission inspector dashed in front of 
the bus to stop it, but had to leap out of 
the way to avoid being run over. (The 
Iraqis later returned what they said were 
the documents.) In this instance, the 
I-A.EA. procedures were probably harm- 
less, because Petrochemical 3 had been 
turned into a fundamentalist seminary 
with low security, making it an unlikely 
hiding place for sensitive information. 
The intelligence tip from the allied gov- 
ernment was probably a dud. 

To put the blame on Zifferero or 
Hans Blix for the I.A.EA.'s attitude and 
its unwillingness to run intrusive inspec- 
tions is to miss the point. Many inspec- 
tors don't see Zifferero as a villain. They 
say that he is simply the wrong man for 
the job. One inspector sums it up this 
way: "Zifferero has poor organizational 
skills in the field, and he is out of his ele- 
ment when it comes to getting things 
done if the opposition doesn't want you 
to." Other inspectors agree that he 
doesn't have the temperament for con- 
frontation. The fundamental problem is 
the I.A.EA. itself. "The agenev's charter 
didn't have in mind the amplitude of in- 
spections called for by the U.N. resolu- 
tions" on Iraq, says Gerard C. Smith, 
who was Ambassadot at Large for Non- 
proliferation Matters in the Carter Ad- 
ministration and represented the United 



States on the IA..E.A.'s board of gover- 
nors. The agency was established in the 
glory days ot nuclear power, when 
people thought that electricity from the 
atom would be "too cheap to meter." It 
was given the job of spreading nuclear 
technology to developing countries, 
mostly by promoting exports from ad- 
vanced countries. At the same time, it 
was supposed to inspect the exports to 
make sure they weren't used to make 
atomic bombs. The conflict of interest is 
obvious: if the agency catches somebodv 
making bombs, it means that the nuclear 
exports were too dangerous to have been 
sold in the first place, and should not 
have been promoted. 

Iraq is the perfect example. The 
I.A.E.A. gave Saddam a clean bill of 
nuclear health for a decade before the 
invasion of Kuwait. Whv would the 
agency now want to find even more 
evidence of how badlv it was duped? 
"It's against the I.A.E.A.'s culture to 
find anything," savs an American expert 
who was on one of the eorlv inspection 
teams. Only this "culture" can explain 
Zifferero's statements to the press. Just a 
year ago, in February, he told Reuters 
that "practically the largest pan of Iraq's 
nuclear program has now been identi- 
fied — probably what is missing is just 
details." He made this statement after 
his team's tenth inspection trip — the one 
during which he is said to have discussed 
surprise-inspection sites in the bugged 
hotel. 

On September 2nd, Zifferero told 
Reuters that Iraq's nuclear program "is at 




"I'm behind on my carrots. 



136 



THE NEV YOftKER. FEBRUARY 1. 1993 



zero now," and that the Iraqis "have 
stated many times to us that thev have 
decided at the higher political level 
to stop these activities." He also made 
the spectacularly improbable statement 
"This we have verified." Even the 
I.A.E.A. had to disavow that", it put out 
a statement the next day blaming the 
press for giving "a misleading impression 
ot his understanding of the situation," 
and saying that it is "too earlv to conclude" 
that Iraq's entire nuclear program had 
been uncovered. Zifferero, undeterred, 
reiterated the same day that "there is no 
possibility of a substantial organized 
[nuclear] program going on in Iraq 
now." And, for good measure, he said a 
few days later. "I don't believe in the ex- 
istence of an underground reactor." 

When I asked Zifferero about these 
statements last week, he insisted, "The 
Iraqi program is now dormant. Iraq has 
other priorities, and now has no labs in 
which to continue the program." 

ZIFFERERO stated in his latest re- 
port that the inspection team "was 
not harassed." If that was the case, it was 
unique. On most trips, the inspectors tell 
me, the harassment is unrelenting. The 
Iraqis stan calling about 1 A.M.," one of 
them said. "They threaten you or thev 
just dial to wake you up. You also get 
notes under the door." The Special 
Commission inspectors sav the notes are 
often death threats. Some of the Ger- 
man members got notes saying that 
what the United States did to Iraq dur- 
ing Desert Storm was the same as what 
the United States did to Germanv dur- 
ing the Second World War, so the Ger- 
mans shouldn't cooperate with the 
"American" inspections. 

Another inspector says, "Thev also 
come into your room, whether vou're 
there or not. You have to put evervthing 
valuable in your backpack, and vou have 
to assume that if you don't sleep with it 
tied to you, voull lose it. This creates a 
lot of tension and makes it hard to 
sleep." Team members are also harassed 
in restaurants, another inspector adds. 
"Somebody will stop at your table, pick 
up your plate, and dump your food in 
your lap. This is alwavs a young, well- 
dressed, physically fit Iraqi male." 

On two occasions, while groups of 
inspectors were standing in the hotel 
atrium, someone threw a light bulb 
down on them from three stories up. It 



terrified everybody, because when it hit 
the floor it sounded like a rifle shot. A 
Special Commission inspector says, 
"They even came up to one of our 
people in the street and threw diesel fuel 
on him." Another inspector tells me that 
"after two weeks of this, you're ex- 
hausted. Nobodv is sad on the trip back 
to the airport. When the plane takes off, 
everybody applauds." 

THE Special Commission flatly re- 
jects Zifferero's rosy picture of 
Iraq's nuclear status. In its reports to the 
Security Council, the Commission ac- 
cuses the Iraqis of "non-cooperation, 
concealment and sometimes false infor- 
mation" in all areas that are being in- 
spected, and goes as far as to say that 
they have "actively falsified the evi- 
dence." The Special Commission's in- 
spectors still want to find (1) parts of the 
giant machines that the Iraqis used to 
raise uranium to nuclear-weapon grade, 
to learn how much progress they made; 
(2) the identities of Iraqi nuclear person- 
nel, to learn what those people are do- 
ing; (3) records of test explosions, to 
learn the status of the Iraqi bomb de- 
sign; (4) other records of the nuclear- 
weapon program, to team whether all its 
components have been discovered; (5) 
Iraq's foreign sources of technical advice, 
to cut them off, and (6) Iraq's network of 
foreign equipment suppliers, to make 
sure that the network- does not revive as 
soon as the embargo is lifted. 

These inspectors also fear that 
Saddam may be hiding experimental 
centrifuges used to raise uranium to 
weapon grade, and an underground re- 
actor that could secretly make plutonium 
for bombs. Thev are not likely to find 
anv of these things under the aegis of the 
I.A.E.A. Zifferero's press statements 
alone have undermined his credibility. 
Can he plausibly search for something 
that he savs doesn't exist? The solution 
to the problem, these inspectors argue, is 
to transfer authority for the nuclear in- 




spections to the Special Commission, 
which would require a U.N. resolution. 
The I.A.E.A. knows how to do onlv one 
thing: visit declared sites. In civilian in- 
spections, a country tells the agency 
what it is doing and invites it in. and 
then the agency inspects only agreed- 
upon items at agreed-upon sites. It 
closes its eyes to anything else. And, 
worse, it usuallv doesn't reveal what it 
finds. But no bomb-builder ever admits 
what he is doing, let alone where he is 
doing it. And Saddam Hussein is cer- 
tainly no exception. (However, some 
United States government analysts think 
that Saddam is likely to make a spec- 
tacular offer soon to President Clinton. 
It will probably contain a dramatic rev- 
elation about one or more of the weapon 
programs and will probably include in- 
formation — and disinformation — about 
Western companies that provided cru- 
cial help. Saddam's goal will be to drive a 
wedge into the Gulf War coalition bv 
convincing some of its members that he 
has finally come clean, and that the em- 
bargo should be lifted.) 

There are still two big jobs to do in 
Iraq: find the rest of Saddam's bomb 
program and prevent him from gaining 
control of resources already found and 
reconverting them to bomb-making. To 
accomplish the first task, the inspectors 
need to change tactics. "We have diplo- 
mats when we should have detectives." a 
knowledgeable American official says. 
"This is a shell game, and you have to 
stop the other guy from moving the 
shells." The inspectors are reluctant to 
go into government ministries, universi- 
ties, and private homes, but that is their 
best chance of finding the nuclear-bomb 
program. United States intelligence is 
convinced that the program is on com- 
puter data bases. Only a data base could 
keep track ot the design, manufacturing, 
testing, and procurement data essential 
to continuity. The computers are be- 
lieved to be at universities or in the 
homes of key members of the nuclear 
program. "We think that if the inspec- 
tors went into these places they would 
find some important stuff." savs an in- 
formed United States official. 

The United States government has 
also proposed that the Special Commis- 
sion adopt an "area strategy," in which 
the Commission would pick an area and 
search every building and everv cave be- 
fore movine on to the next area. "There 



137 







"You know you have my support on pork and beans, but where do you 
stand on chicken and dumplings?" 



are only a few places where Iraq has the 
people, communications, and infrastruc- 
ture to continue to run the program," an 
American official says, "so you can des- 
ignate the areas." The goal is to freeze 
Saddam's shells in place so that any 
moves by the Iraqis could be detected. 

This strategy would require more in- 
spectors. The United States proposes 
that a score or more move into Iraq per- 
manendy. The plan is that thev would 
work in prefabricated, bug-free quarters 
flown in from America, enabling them 
to talk to New York without Iraqi ears 
bent over their telephones. When new 
intelligence develops, they could strike 
quickly, hitting two or three areas at a 
time, thus overwhelming Saddam's 
disinformation specialists. 

The United States proposal was sub- 
mitted to Rolf Ekeus. of Sweden, the 
head of the Special Commission. Ekeus 
has been a tenacious leader of the Spe- 
cial Commission inspectors, but, with 
the exception of the proposal for secure, 
prefab quarters, he has rejected the Amer- 
ican plan, out of concern that the U.N. 
might lose control of the inspections in 
the held. The inspectors would be 
mostly British and American, and he 
tears that once they began to generate 
hot intelligence leads, which would be 
analyzed in London and Washington, 
the U.N. could be pushed out of the in- 



formation loop. He also points out that 
Saddam would have more ammunition 
for his charge that the inspections are re- 
ally an Anglo-Saxon operation. 

It may be that Ekeus can no longer 
afford these qualms. The information 
tug-of-war between the C.I. A and the 
I.A.E.A. has reached a deadlock. As 
David Kay desenbes it, "The I A.EA. is 
saying, Tell us where to go,' and the 
C.I. A. is saying, 'Do something to get 
something moving, so we can see it.' " 
The C.I.A. has the better argument: 
some action is needed to flush Saddam's 
nuclear covey from its hiding place. 

The other big job in Iraq is to guard 
what has been found. By mid-November, 
the I.A.E.A. had compiled a list of six 
hundred and ninety pieces of sensitive 
equipment, of which eighty-tour have 
direct nuclear-weapon applications. Vir- 
tually all the equipment was imported, 
and most of it is "dual use" — capable of 
making either civilian products or weap- 
ons of mass destruction. The U.N. must 
decide whether to destroy it, monitor it, 
or release it to the Iraqis. 

The United States wants the inspec- 
tors to destroy any item that was either 
used to make nuclear weapons or in- 
tended for such use. The I.A.E.A. 
doesn't want to go along with that pro- 
posal. It argues that Iraq would still have 
manv machines — some still in their 



crates — equivalent to the ones 
destroyed, and therefore de- 
struction would not reallv derail 
the Iraqi bomb program but 
would only be punitive. The 
I.A.E.A. would rather let the 
Iraqis use the machines under 
its monitoring. 

But Iraq smuggled many of 
those machines out of Western 
countries illegally, and it falselv 
promised to confine others to 
peaceful use. For example, in 
the late nineteen-eighties, the 
Iraqi government secretly took 
over a British machine-tool 
maker called Matrix Churchill, 
which apparendy lied to British 
customs about the uses to 
which its exports would be put 
in Iraq. According to a U.N. 
report. Matrix Churchill sup- 
plied thirty-three machines 
with nudear-weapon potential 
Matrix Churchill also sold Iraq 
nineteen additional machines, 
which were found in damaged condi- 
tion. Letting Iraq keep these machines 
rewards Iraqi fraud. 

If the inspectors were allowed to de- 
stroy any sensitive equipment not 
bought honesdy, they would catch most 
of the machines now in dispute. Iraq is 
already supposed to disclose its supplier 
network, to comply with U.N. resolu- 
tions. But that network is one of its most 
important secrets. If Iraq won't say 
where it got the machines, the inspectors 
should assume that it got them dishon- 
estly. To leave the machines in Iraqi 
hands, one inspector savs, would be follv, 
for "Iraq already has the people and the 
know-how, and it will still have the dual- 
use equipment, so if the world gets rued 
of monitoring, Iraq is back in business." 
Without new leadership and protec- 
tion, the inspection effort will die by de- 
moralization. The stakes are enormous. 
An .American A-bomb expert who served 
on one of the inspection teams sal's that 
if Saddam had not invaded Kuwait, "he 
could have had a first crude device by 
now, deliverable with great accuracy in a 
Ryder truck." There is no evidence that 
any of Saddam's nuclear scientists have 
been laid off, and unless the inspectors 
find the test of his nuclear program and 
neutralize it, the world will face the same 
uncertainty about the Iraqi bomb in 
1993 that it faced before the war. ♦ 



138 



(Etjc $eUr fjork eimcs 



MOND^y. /*pr;l :«. iwj 



Iraq's Bomb — an Update 



By Diana Edenswortl 
and Gary MUhoi Un 



WAtMtmermm 
^ oow pwWMf this •««*. uw 

U N wiM raport 1AM HI 

Iraq U«i 




IAEA rrwnrfl rrrularTv 

d Mi Kuwaa 
ar. tat m>«M navy had hu nm bomb 
mm H* HOI hat ham«su«i it* 
mi and ha a prwrrtcd thr iofmhm 
■an 0> hit global tuopiarr* Hr haa 
a aianao to «n European and Amrr- 
■» on Muit oti uvi i*"t> 
o Bomb cllon 

■ar war mated 
i ai lead iwijy li drawi an 
1 rrcorai and rrooni Bv •mpretasn 
■a rhc umn al manulanurrn «rno 
1 an havy tuoomd iranr produrii 
fit* to Irao, «t iivan a-harc known 
i claimed i»«u«hik"i »ai tor cmt- 
Mr rht U S Govammam *ami nwai 
ht material Octtrovad thy I A E-A 
1 ■- trig uit it under <*r atenrv i 
i tuu tufP montior 
tailed io detect 
b proaram at in* dm place 

■ fcuVtt-orO ■> O rcM-orcn onuli I 

•r *>«->Mini PnneCt na NuClM 

■ (.munW i.ijf i M'lhoJIm it i fir 



Found but Not 




• aa* ions of natural aranawm (Branl. 
WajaY ami Pomnul) 

• I.? loan a* awrajaaa acaawaaai 4 lialyi 

• 111 torn a* HMX a h.idi iqawi 
kar anoninn) aioaaar baaMas. 

a aa aiacftaan mat anaoa Banal traa 
aainluaa Bant, br Damn. HAH Me- 
jaJaarn. Kta**rttra| m AandR. LritoW 



bsaaMuH Birafcriatav by raatajia II IT 

• Ta^ eaacinc I reowea^rv convi nen 
ta pvaai namK bom* lurl prymariaaa. 
by Acomn (SxittUmi 

a Mara than TM vaNa* that can pro 
ceaa atomar bomb furl o-» liUm VAT 
(SanuarbMd) and Nunra (Ul) 

a Two to afdawp-mra i naa . ma- 




by DE a (tiaiyi 

a fa mi.frr<iin uaui io eat ran pfc> 
toanuna aom* by Mctaiarnrahian Aft 
(Saao a w) 

a Machaw-a lor mittwia. metal by 
MaM achata*. SHW and area an iGerma 
ny» I nw arawn f Italy > ■"* Zayay 
(Spaaal 

a Two aucrnbty praiaca and too bai- 
M —l mioiiwi to miir rmtnfuaaa 

a One re-savmtaana and diacfiarae 
marhntr to auopon rtecir u maanrcir 
urtmiiM eemehmeni bv Mtlhtorr iHm 

•Ml 

a imr *i motuinc mjrnw m mjar 

ceaanltaw mot on nv Artwqi tCc^maitvt 
a (jnr aM-tun nvdr juIk (V>* "• uupr 

rapaawwa atomic noma nana 

a One m».nir«T>r compuiar uvt) to 

pnarraa nwcatar aiocnar Dontb rtxan bv 

NEC IJaoani 
• tan* oiNjaiam lurnacr* tar maitnt 

cpmnluircpana bv Oaiuiu tGcrnanvi 

a Ora? fWirwBrim welder 10 ■» 

wme*rwr.iu|ti bv Scuav tFrancrt 
a Tanialwnt mrtal ahrvt* tor maaini 
cnartbiaa to ran atomar bomb com 



SU3 Mhtine 



paat to atomar bomn nuihoVra bv Hrw- 
■Mt Packard (U S I 

a Mara tnaa I .* milltaat aronh nt mm- 
!■■! 1 1 iKTftaM lor liupnant to atamtc 
i buitdera bv 




a Cr-rbaui iFranrc) 
a Oaaapwwri and aaaala a aa B aH rapa- 
Mr tt (Mi*tnt nanala and poaorn lor 



K"-Mmiiw U S ) 

• MM awit. ot conapwipri lar a 
aaatarar anpaejaa imaai utc lic t w io lor 
afaaprjan*. O* CZ Loaat Uaia i L S I 

a IJD ooa »onn ot rarcinanc and tvttt- 
□uama couapn<f aj la naeaaaanr nrwrom 
aad «*mm* rav*. lattaiartl lor arttppana 
by Canbrrra Indamrara and Cantarrra 
Eatftintma (US r^>rmaayt 





Ifavam 

a Kant ilui roHmrd tntmh L * ura- 
aaaaa m chctfum—jwuf mnrttawia 

a Onr a^-naraaatai mar haw to maar 
rvatnluar naatorv bv Arhwra h-'h«m»i 

a Unr p u aOf r ami aaaahtr lor r<im~ 
paciaaa. nurlcar lorta by KV7 Optnan-t 
rUS.) 

a 1 1 i mtltaaa ananh >•> rvttnd n rat 
prr**r% bv I nlrtd f>rrmanvi 

• HI mtllaaa amrth ral MimpiHrrv I. 

cmrd to hr wiiranrd to an auamw n>mh 
hun-jrf hv Unnva (U S > 

• 12M POO rwih H f ompwrr* and rapr 
tranar and photaarapmc rgwapmrni lor 
awekrar an-apam uaarataram timtwiJ u, 

i itnallwf »L h . 



a MR 0o> anarth 



I'dri sv-nm- III SI 

a t Wiitn pi .n- iitf i **. t. millaw pt.int 
ta pr»arr^» urjiivm bv Njiioii ilir.i/tli 

a Mi-i Hud IUB mtatf snm • uaM* lu 
fiinii IMiiKMnint hv Mr.jlk.in»i«« 
AH (SanPdrat 

a CfMriluwr- ra^cadr lu c*>'k h ofj 

a Lndrrt round nr art nr and hr.-iw w^ 

trr lu rinaJt* r pniuatHim 

a Nn i>ra* (it Ir jq « lurnan \.»n. . ■ <>l 
Ciprnivr ut uranium fnrtthinrnt lor 
"«n muipmrm unptarr* and PIpKvuvr 
im«ni atomic niimh rnmnnnrnit 

a Record* runummff lOrniiiio .>r..i 
eorrrm idimm nl tragi nm i- .- nrf 
aannri mcHidina tnnw irainr^i n\ mn 
Mnallorm Intrr^tum I . >. i..m i nr|i 
and 'Si IGcriMfn'l Bal/cr* ism/n 
land! Chrmaora tfi.ljndi I M . tlir.< 



putrri rlrcirontr icinna marnm 
tomnuir-r arapntrl rquipmrnt and f 
Quencv »vnihr»ncr» tirpn^nd Inr \r 



nit ana Matrii ( hitrm 

a < ompuirr HalblWM 

and cwicni nl itw cnnir 






139 



EljciN T ctuJ]orkSimc*j 



OP-ED fhiimy Ai'Hii. 14. mi 



Iraq's Bomb, Chip by Chip 

ThtUS Commtrtt Dtvanmtm HOMOO? *A9 t cUO** *i UrOl rflC A imnetm liven lK*A*Mt mroroi: th* toiler omcuM of *ocA lro«\joclwn (I ai rlojmrO 

riponi /or Soodom JfiuitM'a oioomc ■ Maw on>froou eeli«ooo IUS M by loo oiponjnf romtnmy It ■•«■ comprint or Gory Mt(MJm.a low pro/titor 

IB* Vitiuouy all o/ !»• B»mi «w» WippW 10 Irof ; alt ert lurM <m imM| „ M Oiwniir W WHconuo omt Olmur M uw wmia Prorm o» 

onm* Oemoi or ionf-ronfo »i«W UnBOO Hollow IMOOCMW w If— pro I4 m. *m um COMna. ow Ckoao EoVwaenL • roioorrk iirinl oi 1*1 
■Ur Ir )in| 10 |>nO noil 0) l»»P«. 1*0 «« " fU* •» ClIUIIIII >■ ' 




Atomic Bomb Builders 



Salei io froari Atom* Emtrfj C*mm 
laboratory; I ad r u. Dun $i I as, trfcare i 
wft«rt detonators were mode*. 



tht rnou oiomtc research 
'wrJ «M mod*. A I Qooaal .iif 



Canberra Ckbirwik: compuien lor meaewnng |imm« rays and) lm m» 
irtna — 130.000 

Cerberva Lid.: computer* — lll.lll 

■lew-ten Pwkii.: computer a: etKirenw tenant, calibration anal graorrtc* 
equipment — Hi 000 

International Computer Syeiame. eortspaftera unlui (or graphic dealt* of 
atomic pomes snemissiies — ll.KW.OOO 

PtfiinEimrr compuiers and Inairumenta uaaful (or quaint control ol bomb 
Tuc la — $110 000 

Tl Coating Inc. : equipment lor coaling metal pana. uatful (or bomb produc- 
tion — 1373.701 

Atomic Bomb and Missile Builders 

Solei io Mi»inr> if fudajiry °"* Military tndaelrtellfaile*. whKh tan the 
oiom.f pome rmtnlrond cnemrecU -««oon focionei: Maatr it are r a terpen « 
w*ere eouipmeni for enriching atomic pome fuel woa mad«: Sals* ai Ola site. 
-«•-'»- electronic equipment /or mni"»i ond atomic borne* -oi mad* 
Mimiu v o/ Dtftmit. which oversow missile end atomic bomo <l<v»ioomim 

Aatl Electronics: capaciiort — Ul.000 

BDM Corporation: compwicra: compuier-aesiaied design equipment — 

isjooo 

CmMt'i EMlrwatt! computers (or computers settled design — 111. Ml 
Carl Itltt microcomputers (or mopping — (101 5*1 

Censere Corporation: compuicra to run maenma toota capable of menuleciur- 
>ng atomic bomo parti (lIUI aatt »il • looped by Prtatdemial ordtr in Juna 

i*»0» - ISJliM 

Data General Corparailoa: compuicra lor mapping — 1.3 < 000 

C*>otr Syatama: compuiert io run mocnine tooli capable et manufacturing 

atomic Mme and mitiile parta — HIT. 431 

Hewlett Packard: compuicra lor maamg molda; Ire-juancy lyniheauara and 

other eouirmrm uaclul lor operating aecured mimary communtcailona 

lyitemi — 11 Ot) MM 

Honeywell Inc.: compuiera — U33 333 

International Computer Syaiema: compuicra (or mami(aciuring. tool dealgn 

■ ••d gf ipnwi — It '*> '00 

Intemationai Compuiera Ltd.: computer* — IUT I9< 

Lr>boid Viruvim Syitemi computer coniroticd welder .icd bv Iroqii io 



praouct crmrKugtt far mabang aiomac baeab luart — Il.aM.fJOO 

Uaaaataaa C real : Kadkaiparinjraiatialytrri. dntfn computer!, compuiert lor 

factor*-, producing muitard gaa i/igrcdMTMa — 1330.000 

Racharwil Cellini lattrmauaaaal: eq uipme nt lor navigation, directional finding. 

radar comirrunicaiiona or aUborna comraiwucaiinaaa — 1117.514 

Sacbmao AaaacUiaa: compuiera and matrumema capdMa at analyilng met 

*M aad po-ed a ra (or aiomtc bomb and mnuie manulaciur* — IdO.OOO 

3 1 a mean Canaaiailaaii computeri and bujirtjineTHa capobta ol analyilng 

rmnals and pew ear a lor ata«a.ic bom a and miaiUa maaawlactura — II 00B 

Soacara Phyoica: laaara datactaon and iracbknaj equrpmem lor laaart - 

lit 000 

Umiiy. CaraMHaihaai: comeMtari - II.M0OO0 

Wild Magnavaa laialHle Survey: compvtera lor proreaamg aaiellite lm«|rt 

Uiai are uaa(ul tor military mapping and eurveHlanre — 1370 000 

In. Laboratartea: quani crynala lor milHary radar — 11.104000 



Missile Builders 



Sofea io 5o*d II ine motn mtaitlr reiraurn me. Hair OrgaMiatlan far 
Trthmlcnl Indttiiry. Hie prontremrM organtrainan for mlilila Hlfl tnot 
bouffii moil Scud miiiile pcvrii and rowtpmem 

■ DM torpor.ii... compuiera lurarrconducttng enrcironKa — lltaOS 

Carl Schenck: computeri — 1 1 III 

£1 Logic Data: computer! — IJT ioo 

naalga* MAT: computera that U N Inapoctora be he** monitored uranium 

enrichment lor atomic bomb (uel — I *1J 0O0 

llawleit •■ekard- elecironic leating cqurpment; cemputeri: frequency if" 

ImTiuera radio inecirum anaiytfra — lit* Z3)T 

laiarnaiHMal Computer Syliemo: computers — 11.373 000 

laiarnatUMai Imaging Syaiema: compuiera lor protesting aaieilHe dua 

infrared equipment capable ol aerial reconamance and military aurveii'antr 

- till 000 

Lvmmua Crttl' compuiers to aid factory dattgn — 111 330 

Parfcln.eimer- compuiers — 111 MO 

Scientific Atlanta rqutpmeni lor producing radar eniewnea - U30 000 

Sametea Corporaiian: compuiers — 13 133 711 

Spoetral Daia Caroaraiiwn: latellite data pruceasine. equ»pmem — It* ••* 

Tebtrania: nigh speed elmronKi uieful in developing aiomK bomPt a-w 

misitiei radio ipccirum anaiytcrt lor dr*eloping microwave equipment 

II01000 

Thermo Jarrell Aah Corporation: compuiera lor truing materieia — H30 III 

Unlaya Corporation- computrri (or ptoduction control — 17 TM 

Voeeo Inairumeoia Inc : compuicri lor fectory deugn — H •«• 

win ton Company: cquipmeni lor fn.i*in« radar *™rnn»» - 1*1 W 



140 



SljeJfeUf JJork Sime* JHagarine 



MARCH 



BUILDING SADDAM 
HUSSEIN S BOMB 



BY GARY MILHOLLIN 



"ABOUT THIS BIG" HIGH IN THE UNITED 
Nations building in New York, a U.N official is 
holding his arms out in a circle, like a man 
gripping a beach ball "About a yard across, 
weighing about a ton " 

This is the Iraqi bomb — slightly smaller than 
the one drupped on Hiroshima, but nearly twice 
as powerful — packing an explosive force of at 
least 20.000 tons of TNT The official is dramatiz- 
ing a drawing he has made in his notebook, based 
un documents seized in Iraq He is sure that the 
bomb, if built to the specifications in the drawing. 
will work 

At the bomb's center is an explosive ball of 
weapon-grade uranium Around this is a layer of 
natural uranium to boost the yield and a second 
layer of hardened iron to keep the core from 
blowing apart prematurely If the bomb is In 
jjctnuule properly, these pans must have just the 
right dimensions, and there must be a firing 
circuit accurate to billmnths ill a second Docu- 
ments in the United Nations' possession show 
that the Iraqis have all the right dimen- 
sions and the necessary firing circuit 

This is the bomb that, according to 
U N estimates. Saddam Hussein was 18 
to 24 months from building when the gulf 
war started It is the bomb he is still 
likely to build, despite the war and the 
most intrusive nuclear inspections in 
history, unless the United Nations 
changes its tactics 

"They are pouring concrete as we 
speak." says a U N official at the next 
desk Saddam, he says, is rebuilding the 
bombed nuclear sites in plain view of 
UN inspectors "He is even planting 
tiees and re-landscaping." he adds, "to 
boost employee morale" Another UN 
ollicial has a similar story During a 
visit io the Iraqi nuclear weapon testing 
site at Al Alheer. he says, his Iraqi hosts 
looked him in the eye and said. "We are 
waiting for you to leave " 

Since the inspections started last spring, 
the iiaqi disinformation specialists who 
serve as guides have done their best to 
oullox the inspectors In one instance, the 
Iraqis hid reactor fuel by loading it on the 
back of a truck and driving it around the 
reactor Mi'-, always staying about 200 
\ ml. in [null ol the inspection team The 
fuel contained weapon grade material 

limy Milhulhn directs t/ie Lmnersifi of 
Wisconsin's Project on Nuclear .Arms 
Control, no orgriMirtinon in IVcisniiMjfun 
(lint trots", nuclear exports (ind (lie 
spread of nuclear ucupons 



I'erhaps the most notoi iims conlrun- 
lalion occurred when inspectors fol- 
lowed an intelligence tip to a cache til 
sensitive documents In an attempt to 
elude the Iraqis, each of the -14 team 
members hid a stack of papers inside 
his clothing Rather than strip-search 
the inspectors before video cameras. 
the Iraqis simply forbade them to 
leave, leading to a four-day standoff in a Baghdad 
parking lot under a scorching summer sun. Only 
after a unanimous vote ol suppoit by the Securiiy 
Council did Iraq finally relent 

That spn ited encounter is now as nun h a pan 
of history as the briel triumph ol the 100-hour 
war Under the cease-fire terms, inspectors for a 
UN. Special Commission were charged with the 
"destruction, removal or rendering harmless" of 
Iraq's nuclear weapon potential But after 
months of chasing increasingly fruitless intelli- 
gence leads, morale on the Special Commission is 
scraping rock bottom 

The Iraqis know it. too. "They've suited laughing 
at us." one U N. official says, adding that the I raqis 
have even threatened individual inspectors "They 
have basically told our people ihat ihey know where 
we live." he says in exasperation 

The problem is that the inspectors have ex- 
hausted their information I he first mspc is 

were fueled by leads from Iraqi defectors and the 
chance discovery of the sensitive- .Jo. uincilt i in 
Baghdad But that luck has iuii out just as the 
Iraqis have organized their resistance to the 
inspections Recently, in fact, they told the inspco 
tors that "you won't find any more documents in 
this country." 

Th4i remark came after a IJ N team had 
chai-ged into several suspected reactor sues, 
following intelligence leads that turned out Io lie 
duds. "All we found were empty warehouses, 
cement factories making real ccinenl .mil pris- 
ons with real pi isooers," one inspector .ays I he 
inspectors believe they have reai lied a dead end 

The inspectors' deleat raises a chilling pros- 
pect: In the absence of a major new U N efliilt, 
Saddam Hussein is still likely to get ihe bomb 
Thos./tTaq Uas become a lest case (or nuclear 
proliferation If war and a full-COIII't press b) the 
United Nations cannot stop an outlaw nation like 
Iraq from making the bomb, what will it take to 
stop countries like Iran. Not Hi Korea ami I ibya ' 

In a sense, what is being played mil in Iraq is 
the first battle of a new cold war, fought with 
spies, i me i national pressure anil export controls 
The West may have won Ihe lirsl i <il.l war .n: linsl 
Ihe Soviet Union, but it is lnsin h ihe se< olid In Iraq 
and inner nations that want tu get ihe boiuli 

SADDAM HAS HAULED HIMSU.I-' UP MIL 
nuclear mountain on a .ham of high tech expm is, 
sold by the very Western countries whose inspec- 
tors — now on loan Io the United Nations — are 



141 




142 



trying tu find (hem. Other similarly 
(avored nations could easily follow 
Saddams example, given existing 
export laws. Iran and Libya are now 
maneuvering into this position. 

Iraqi scientists know, (or exam- 
ple, how to cast uranium metal into 
bomb parts in a vacuum furnace. 
The vacuum prevents molten ura- 
nium from burning in air. At Al 
Atheer. U.N. inspectors found vac- 
uum furnaces made by a German 
firm. Arthur Pfeiffer Vakuum Tech- 
nik. The inspectors rejected Iraq's 
claim that the furnaces were for 
scientific research. 

The inspectors also found a large 
"isostatic" press, made by a Swed- 
ish-Swiss firm, Asea Brown Boveri. 
This, too, the Iraqis claimed was for 
research. But the U.N. team thinks 
the machine was for shaping the 
high-explosive charges that set off a 
nuclear chain reaction. These spe- 
cially shaped charges are wrapped 
around the bomb core and set off 
simultaneously, creating a shock 
wave that travels inward, "implod- 
ing" and compressing the core. 
When the core is compressed to suf- 
ficient density, the nuclear chain re- 
action begins. 

How did the Iraqis learn to use 
such specialized equipment? In 
large part from the United States 
Government. In August 1989, the 
Pentagon and the Department of 
Energy invited three Iraqis to at- 
tend a "detonation conference" in 
Portland, Ore. Financed by Ameri- 
can taxpayers, the meeting brought 
together experts from around the 
world to explain to the Iraqis and 
others how to produce shock waves 
in any desired configuration. There 
were even lectures on HMX, the 
high explosive of choice for nuclear 
detonation, and on flyer plates, de- 
vices that help produce the precise 
shock waves needed to ignite A- 
bombs Both HMX and flyer plates 
have turned up at Al Atheer, which 
should surprise no one. The three 
Iraqis who attended the conference 
came from the laboratory that even- 
tually provided Al Atheer with its 
first shaped charges. 

To design a successful bomb, the 
Iraqis also needed computing power 
to solve the hydrodynamic equa- 
tions that predict the behavior of 
shuck waves. The inspectors discov- 
ered that Iraq was running the equa- 
tions on a mainframe computer 
from the Japanese company NEC. 
Another Japanese firm, Hamama- 
tsu. sold Iraq two "streak cameras," 
sensitive instruments that can pho- 
tograph a high-speed shock wave as 
it implodes. The inspectors confis- 
cated both cameras after determin- 
ing that they were rapid enough for 
nuclear weapon work 

Altogether, the Iraqis carried out 
20 detonation tests before May 31, 
1990 — the date of the last Iraqi 
progress report on Al Atheer found 
by the United Nations The Iraqis 
had winked their way through five 
versions ol the bomb design, cutting 



the weapon's total weight from one 
ton in the first version to about half a 
ton in the last — light enough to go 
on a missile 

After May 1990 the Iraqis worked 
unimpeded at Al Atheer for eight 
more months. No one knows how 
much more they achieved. The 
Iraqis started relocating vital equip- 
ment before allied bombing began in 
January 1991, and as late as last 
summer tore out concrete floors to 
prevent inspector^, from determin- 
ing which machines were used 
there. They even ripped out electri- 
cal hookups to hide power usage. 
Now that Al Atheer is "sanitized," 
inspectors fear the bomb work has 
moved elsewhere. 

Wherever the work is going on, the 
Iraqis still have plenty of equip- 
ment. During the late 1980's, Bagh- 
dad bought ^machines by the factory 
load, few of which have been found. 
The purchases included additional 
vacuum furnaces, from the German 
firm Leybold; plasma-coating ma- 
chines, which could be modified to 
coat the surfaces of the molds into 
which molten uranium is poured, 
from the American company Tl 
Coating; high-speed oscilloscopes, 
needed to develop tiring circuits for 
nuclear weapons and for nuclear 
tests, from the American company 
Tektronix; and two X-ray diffraction 
systems, capable of analyzing weap- 
on-grade uranium during produc- 
tion, from the German firm Sie- 
mens. TI Coating sold directly to an 
Iraqi factory charged with making 
A-bomb fuel; Tektronix sold to an 
Iraqi procurement agent for a 
string of nuclear and missile sites; 
Siemens sold to the Iraqi Ministry of 
Industry and Military Industrializa- 
tion, which set up Al Atheer 

These purchases followed Iraq's 
policy of "parallel sourcing." The 
Iraqis never buy just one machine or 
build a single plant. If the item is 
important, they buy or build two' So if 
one vital machine or plant is bombed 
or surrendered to inspectors, they al- 
most always have another. 

The inspectors found out one other 
thing about the Iraqi bomb — it is 
highly unstable. The design calls for 
cramming so much weapon-grade 
uranium into the core, they say, that 
the bomb would inevitably be on the 
verge of going off — even while 
sitting on the workbench. "It could 
go off if a rifle bullet hit it." one 
inspector says, adding: "I wouldn't 
want to be around if it fell off the 
edge of this desk." 

Even a "fizzle.'' when the bomb 
explodes too soon to get a full chain 
reaction, would be serious The 
minimum blast effect would be 
equal to filling 20 semitrailers full of 
TNT, parking them side by side and 
setting them off simultaneously 
The full yield would be like selling 
off 1.000 semitrailers' of TNT 

WITH A WORKABLE AND MOST- 
Iv tested buml) design. Iraq faces 
only inie more barrier: weapon- 



grade uranium fuel. Iraq started 
producing (his precious substance 
before (he war. but never got close 
to making enough for a bomb 
Wheiher it finally succeeds will de- 
pend on us foreign suppliers. 

The key will be the centrifuge By 
spinning uranium gas at high 
speeds, centrifuges separate light, 
unstable uranium iso(ope that ex- 
plodes in an atom bomb from the 
heavy, stable one that doesn't. A 
spinning tube called a rotor propels 
the heavy isotope to the outside wall 
and leaves the light one at the cen- 
ter. As the gas is run through a 
series of centrifuges called 
a cascade, the concentra- 
tion of the light isotope is 
gradually raised from less 
than 1 percent in natural 
uranium to over 90 percent 
in uranium of nuclear 
weapon-grade. This techni- 
cally demanding process is 
called enrichment. 

Iraq's centrifuges are 
based on German designs 
and were built with Ger- 
man help. Iraq somehow 
got German blueprints in 
the 1980's. By 1988 it was 
already running experi- 
mental models. When one 
model developed a hitch in 
late 1988, Iraq summoned 
Bruno Stemmler, an ex-em- 
ployee of M.A.N., the Ger- 
man company that makes 
centrifuges for the German 
national enrichment effort. 
After studying Iraq's illicit 
blueprints, Stemmler re- 
moved the hitch. 

Iraq's next goal was 
mass production. It takes 
from 1.000 to 2.000 German- 
style cenlnfuges to 
produce a bomb's worth of 
enriched uranium each 
year. German firms again 
obliged. From H & H Metal- 
form — a company subsidized by 
the German Government — came 
"flow forming" machines that are 
specially adapted to produce rotor 
tubes, the most difficult part of the 
centrifuge to make. From Leybold's 
American subsidiary came a giant 
electron beam welder, equipped 
with custom-made fixtures for weld- 
ing the rotors to their necessary end 
caps. From Dr. Reutlinger & Sohne 
came macfiines to balance the ro- 
tors vertically and horizontally 
From Neue Magdeburger came oth- 
er specially adapted machine tools. 
And from Degussa came an oxida- 
tion furnace to (rea( the surfaces of 
parts so they could withstand corro- 
sive uranium gas. 

After surveying this glittering 
array, the UN. inspectors conclud- 
ed (ha( Iraq would be able to 
produce more than 2,000 centri- 
fuges a year, enough for a full- 
fledged bomb program. From a re- 
cent inspection, we know that Iraq 
ordered parts for ID. ODD centri- 
fuges, although it is noi known how 



143 



manv parts wore arm. illy deliv- 
ered, or hnw many centrifuges Iraq 
may have made 

I'lie U N teams have nnw de- 
stroyed all Ihe centrifuge parts it 
could find But Ihe inspectors don't 
know how many more centrifuge 
parts there are. because Ihey don't 
know how many were sold to Iraq by 
Western companies. They are espe- 
cially worried about a "missing cas- 
cade." They assume that Iraq would 
not have built a plank^to mass- 
produce centrifuges without first be- 
ing able to connect them in an ex- 
perimental cascade. No cascade has 



Saddam permanently tin-re must lie 
"strict maintenance of export con- 
trols by the industrial nations." But 
mulling in recent history suggests 
that the industrial nations will exer- 
cise such restraint. 

In Ihe five years before the Per- 
sian Gulf war, for example, the 
Commerce Department licensed 
more than $1.5 billion of strategical- 
ly sensitive American exports to 
Iraq. Many were for direct delivery 
to nuclear weapon, chemical weap- 
on and missile sites. Companies like 
Hewlett-Packard, Honeywell. Inter- 
national Computer Systems, Rock- 



THE IRAQI BOMB 

-Anil Where ti Came Front 



BelJedor:l00fo250fcg 
bt natural urani 

MACE WITH HELP FBOrl:" 
Germany: Arthur PfeHfet- ' 

Valftium technlk 



ttigk e«t>JoJl»«r - 
2S0l»S00kg ._ 

MADE WITH HELP FBOH: 

Sweden/Switzerland: 
Asea Brawn Boverl 

United States: 
Departments bi 
Energy and Oefense- 



betanators: iA ' 

HADE WITH HELP FBdH: 

United States: Departments bt bierfly and befehst- 




Firing set: Energy source, liner-, switches 



MADE WITH HELP FBOM: United Statesr 
Departments of Energy and Defense 

s. j — Core: 15 lo 18 kg or- 

\/ high-enriched uranium; 

\ \/\\ HAn E WITH HELP FBOH: 
yV Belgium: Sebatra 
"h^ , / ^C^sAX Brazil: Atomic Energy Comirtalon 
Germany: Arthur Pfelffef Vakuunt 
'4 1 1 \ 1/ Technilt*. Degussd, Flnnlgan-MATi 

>T I HsHMetalform.lnwalcO.leybold; 
/\ // NeueMagdeburger, 
/ \/l Dr.BeutllngefASohne 
/ Niger Oranertt 

Poland: Chemadex 
Switzerland: Acomel. tSalzer. 
Schmledemeccanlca, VAt 
. United States: Flnnlgan-HAf; 
Leybold Vacuum Systems 



Sources Wisconsin Protect on Nuclear Arms Control and U.N Insocctlon reports 

Tim is the actual Iraqi bomb design described in secret documents seized in Ba 
Saddam was within 18 to 24 months of producing this bomb before the g 



been found As the inspectors warn 
in their report, Iraq "may still have 
an undisclosed program." 

The inspectors are also worried 
about a possible cache of weapon- 
grade uranium. Last July, they 
found four traces of this material in 
samples taken from Tuwaitha, 
Iraq's primary nuclear site. Be- 
cause of the possibility that the sam- 
ples were contaminated after they 
left Iraq, however, the evidence was 
not considered conclusive New 
samples were taken in October, but 
Ihe test results are still not nf Thus, 
the UN inspectors cannot pursue 
the lead 

There is also the matter of a hid- 
den reactor Western intelligence 
sources believe (hat the Iraqis have 
at least started to build one. but the 
inspectors have not been able to find 
it Even a small. 20-lo-tO-megawati 
reactor would be large enough to 
fuel a few nuclear weapons a year 

And. finally, the inspectors are 
worried about outside suppliers 
They have concluded that In stop 



well and Tektronix sold high-per- 
formance electronics either to Saad 
16, Iraq's major missile research 
center; to the Ministry of Industry 
and Military Industrialization, 
which set up Al Atheer: to Ihe Iraqi 
Atomic Energy Commission, re- 
sponsible for atomic-bomb re- 
search; or to Nasr State Enterprise, 
in charge of Iraq's missile and nu- 
clear procurement Honeywell even 
did a feasibility study for a powerful 
gasoline bomb waihead. intended 
for an Iraqi-Egyptian missile 

The computer giant Speny and its 
successor. Unisys, also hoiielited 
They got licenses to sell multimillion- 
dollar computers designed to handle a 
"personnel data base " The powei ful 
machines — ordered by Iraq's Minis- 
try of the Interior, which houses the 
secret police — are ideally suited to 
tracking and suppressing civilians 

The Commerce Depaitmenl ap- 
proved all these exports despite 
strong warnings from the Pentagon, 
the first coming in November l'jsii 
concerning Saad IH Commerce nev- 



ertheless permitted the sale of hun- 
dreds of thousands of dollars' worth 
of sensitive computers and electron- 
ics to Saad lf>. all after the warning. 
And there was the strange case of 
(he Badr General Establishment, a 
factory outside Baghdad. In the sum- 
mer of 1989 it wanted to bdy a com- 
puter-controlled lathe from Cincin- 
nati Milacron and a high-accuracy 
measuring system from Brown' & 
Sharpe. Badr said the equipment 
would make "crankshafts, camshafts, 
and gears" for automobiles. But the 
Pentagon was skeptical. Commerce 
therefore agreed to a "pre-license 
check," in which an Ameri- 
can official would actually 
visit the site. 

After a 30-kilomcier trip 
out from 'ae capital, two em- 
bassy officials loured Badr 
with its production man- 
ager. Salam Fadl Hussain 
The verdict was unanimous 
The American Ambassador. 
April Claspie. cabled the 
good news to Commerce on 
Sept. 13. "We believe thai 
Badr General Establish- 
ment is a tellable recipient 
of sensitive United Stales or 
igin technology and techni- 
cal data " We now know that 
Badr and another organiza- 
tion were jointly in charge ol 
all the centrifuge production 
in Iraq 

As bad as the American 
record is. Germany's is 
worse Germany supplied 
more of Iraq's mass-de- 
struction machinery than .ill 
oilier ( oiiiin us i oinbuieil 
Germany not only sold liaq 
most of its centrifuge equip- 
ment, it also furnished an 
entire (heoin.il woutMiii in- 
dustry amj was Iraq's i;ie.il 
glidad. est supplier of missile lorn- 
If war. niilngy. including a flood of 
parts that enabled Iraq lo 
extend Ihe range of its Scud missiles 
During the Persian Gulf war. en- 
hanced Scuds hit Tel Aviv and a Unit- 
ed Slates Army barracks in Saudi 
Arabia, killing 2H sleeping soldiers 

To develop an even longer-range 
missile. Iraq turned to the German 
armament giant Messersi hmilt, 
now doing business as MBB (Mes- 
serschmittBolkow-Blohm) MBB 
supplied (he know-how lor a filll). 
mile nuclear-capable missile called 
the Condor II that Iraq tried to de- 
velop jointly with Egypt and Argen- 
tina before (he war I lie missile's 
range and configuration an 1 similar 
to that ul the American Pershing, 
which MBB worked on at the Penta- 
gon The same MBB employee who 
worked on the Pershing at the Pen- 
tagon also represented MBB in Iraq 
for the Condor, and (hus was in a 
position In transfer American mis- 
sile technology In Baghdad 

SINCE THE INSPECTIONS BE 
gan. critics have quest toned wheth- 
er < ivilian volunteers winking iiu- 



144 







United 
Nations inspectors 
Uncovering 
Weapon-grade 
reactor fuel in a 
pit Hear Til waitha, 
Iraq's primary 
nuclear site. The 
fUel had been 
hidden 16 avoid 
allied bombing 
during the Persian 
Gulf war. 




Above: A United 
Nations inspector, 
Douglas M. . 
Englund, chief ...- . 
of operations 
of the Special 
Commisiioh, "■*. 

confronts the 
Iraqis at a ballistic- 
missile inspection ■ 
ilTaji.One- 
U.N. inspector was 
(old. "We are 
waiting for . 
VoU to leave." 



145 



ilcr United N.ilicins auspic- 
es could eradicate Iratj's 
weapons of mass destruc- 
tion Tliat question has now 
been answered. Despite 
great courage and enthusi- 
asm, (he inspectors . still 
have not found the hun- 
dreds of Scud missiles Iraq 
is known to be hiding, or the 
headquarters of the centri- 
fuge program, or exposed 
the supplier network. NSr 
have they solved the mys- 
tery of the weapon-grade 
uranium. Obviously, strong- 
er methods are needed. 

First, the United Nations 
has to change tactics. "We 
have diplomats when we 
should have detectives," 
says a knowledgeable Unit- 
ed States official. "It's like 
looking for an escaped mur- 
derer You question every- 
body who might have a lead 
and you keep on asking until 
you get answers." 

In other words, shift to po- 
lice-style investigations. 
Only the Iraqis know where 
their nuclear treasure is 
buried; only they can reveal 
it. To make headway, the 
United Nations will have to 
deploy inspectors by the 
hundreds, station them in 
Iraq instead of New York, 
and use soldiers as well as 
civilians. The inspectors 
must be free to interrogate 
every Iraqi scientist or engi- 
neer who might have rele- 
vant information and to fol- 
low Up the leads immediate- 
ly^ And they must have the 
power to push aside Saddam 
Hussein's disinformation 
specialists 

The inspectors also need 
to know exactly what Iraq 
has bought. So far, though, 
not a single country has 
been willing to tell the in- 
spectors what its companies 
sold. Only Germany has pro- 
vided leads, and when it did, 
the inspectors quickly 
turned up centrifuge parts. 
As lung as other suppliers sit 
nn their export data, the in- 
spections will be reduced to 
lishing expeditions, wnh the 
liaqis steering the boat 

The United Nations must 
also put Us own house in or- 
der While the Special Com- 
mission has run the missile 
and chemical inspections 
wnh great zeal, the nuclear 
inspections are assigned to 
the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, the equiva- 
lent of an oxcart with its 
brakes on. 

In late September, lor ex- 
ample, the agency seized 
more than 60,1)1)0 pages c>[ 
Iraqi documents, many of 
ilicm describing the supplier 



nclwoik l-"ive months later 
practically no translations 
have been done 

The agency is also timid 
about destroying illicit 
equipment. While the Spe- 
cial Commission is destroy- 
ing every machine it can 
find that the Iraqis bought, 
built or used to make chemi- 
cal weapons or missiles, the 
Atomic Energy Agency has 
been willing to destroy only 
small parts of the machines 
used to make nuclear weap- 
ons. For example. Iraq 
bought a giant electron 
beam welder to fabricate 
centrifuges, but the agency 
destroyed only the small fix- 
ture that holds the centri- 
fuge in place, leaving the gi- 
ant welder intact. This 
means that if the Iraqis have 
extra fixtures — which is 
likely, given their parallel 
sourcing plan — they can go 
back into the bomb business 
with the same machines. 

Assuming the United Na- 
tions does manage to eradi- 
cate Iraq's nuclear, chemi- 
cal and missile programs, it 
still faces the problem of 
preventing Baghdad from 
starting over. One solution 
is to expose Iraq's supplier 
network, which is still in- 
tact. The United Nations 
has compiled lists -of the 
companies in the network 
and what they sold, but it 
has furnished them only to 
the involved governments 
The United States is report- 
ed to (avor making the lists 
public, but Germany and 
France are said to be 
resisting 

Another way to defeat the 
network is to toughen export 
laws Most of what Saddam 
bought was licensed. Gov- 
ernments knew he was get- 
ting dangerous equipment 
but hated to see their com- 
panies lose a sale. The re- 
sulting debacle should have 
taught the world a lesson, 
but Western export controls 
are no stronger now ihan 
they were before the gulf 
war. In fact, wnh the end of 
Ihe cold war, the NA fO 
countries and the European 
Community have been eas- 
ing export controls. 

The outcome in Iraq is 
now in Ihe hands of Presi- 
dent Bosh and Ins gulf war 
allies If they are willing to 
turn the United Nations into 
a vehicle for curbing the 
spread of the bomb, the bat- 
tle in Iraq can still be won 
If not. Iraq's bomb makers 
will pick up where they 
left off, and the new world 
older will fail Hs first im- 
port. nil lesi ■ 



146 



Written statements submitted by the International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA) at the hearings jointly held by 
three sub committees of the Committee of Foreign Affairs 
of the 1 03rd Congress of the United States - Washington 

29 June 1993 



Question 

How successful have the efforts of the international community since the Gulf 
War been in identifying and rendering unusable Iraqi resources and capabilities 
to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction? 

Answer 

Insofar as UN Security Council resolution 687 [1991] assigns to the UN Special 
Commission the tasks related to ballistic, chemical and biological weapons, 
these remarks will be limited to the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme. 

The IAEA has been successful in identifying, destroying, removing or otherwise 
rendering harmless the key components of a hitherto secret and broadly-based 
Iraqi programme aimed at the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities. 

1. Identification 

The identification of the various elements of the clandestine Iraqi programme 
was largely completed at the end of September 1991, i.e. six months after 
the adoption by the Security Council of the cease-fire resolution. Charting 
the map of this programme has entailed a number of difficulties, including 
dramatic confrontations on several occasions between Iraqi authorities and 
IAEA inspection teams. The Iraqi government has employed a strategy of 
obstruction and delay in its efforts to conceal the real nature of its nuclear 
projects, while, on the other hand, demonstrating a level of co-operation in 
some less sensitive areas. 

As to the completeness of the picture obtained, it is the considered opinion 
of the IAEA, based on the results of nineteen inspection missions, the 
analyses of thousands of samples, the evaluation of several hundred 
documents confiscated in Iraq, the assessment of procurement and other 
information obtained from Member States of the IAEA, that the essential 
components of the clandestine program have been identified. Even if the 
picture lacks detail in some areas, the efforts in identifying the scope of the 



147 



Iraqi nuclear weapons programme have been successful. 

While leaving the summary description of the Iraqi nuclear weapons 
programme to a fact sheet appended to this statement, this is maybe the 
appropriate occasion to place on record that success in the rapid 
identification of the secret Iraqi program is due, in no small measure, to the 
support extended to the IAEA by its Member States through the provision of 
intelligence information and of experts who expanded the competence of the 
IAEA inspection teams in particular areas. The combination of intelligence 
information and experts with rapid and intrusive field inspections to verify 
and follow up intelligence leads has proved to be the most powerful tool in 
achieving success. This is an important lesson learned from the Iraqi 
experience. 

2. Destruction 

The second main task laid upon the IAEA by resolution 687 concerns the 
destruction, removal or rendering harmless of the essential ingredients of 
the Iraqi nuclear weapons development programme, including the nuclear- 
weapons-usable material known to have been in Iraq in the form of 
safeguarded reactor fuel. 

Extensive destruction of Iraqi nuclear installations occurred during the Gulf 
War as a result of the air raids by Coalition forces. Additional destruction of 
equipment and material was carried out by the Iraqi army at the end of the 
war and prior to the start of IAEA inspections, in an attempt by Iraq to 
remove evidence of its secret programme. Also, important equipment, 
machine tools, instrumentation, spare parts, stock materials and components 
were salvaged and hidden by Iraqi personnel. An important exception was 
Al Atheer, the site where weaponization activities (i.e., activities relevant to 
weapons design development and assembly, as distinguished from activities 
for the production of nuclear-weapons-usable material) had been planned 
Facilities at this site were still under construction at the time of the war, 
which is probably one of the reasons it went practically unscathed through 
the conflict The association of this site, as well as several others, to the 
clandestine Iraqi programme were not known at the time of the Gulf War to 
either national or international authorities The role of these facilities was 
only uncovered through the inspection process. Since September 1991, i.e. 



"7i_/in/i n 



148 



when the scope of the clandestine Iraqi programme came into focus, the 
IAEA has been supervising a systematic destruction of facilities, technical 
buildings, equipment and other items proscribed under UN Security Council 
resolution 687, which had escaped destruction or which had been only 
slightly damaged. Details on the destruction activities may be found in the 
attachment to this statement This process cannot yet be considered 
complete as the possibility of finding more items cannot be ruled out and 
surprises are always possible. As to the quantities of weapons usable 
nuclear material (highly enriched uranium in the form of reactor fuel 
elements) known to have been in Iraq under IAEA safeguards, these were 
found untouched and have been fully accounted for. The removal operation 
has involved extensive negotiations with Member States, who have recently 
agreed to accept this material. The task has entailed a complex technical 
effort by Iraq to clear part of it from the rubble of a bombarded research 
reactor. The removal of this material will be completed by February 1994 if 
funds, in the order of US$20 million, are made available. 



3. Is the job finished? 

By no means. The IAEA and the Special Commission are facing increasing 
resistance by the Iraqi authorities to compliance with Iraq's obligations under 
resolutions 687, 707 and 715 in two areas which bear particular importance 
for future monitoring activities aimed at preventing a resurgence of the of 
activities proscribed by the cease-fire resolution. 

Since the beginning, Iraq has refused to disclose the names of foreign 
suppliers and intermediaries, including the network of front companies 
established abroad, which provided materials, equipment and technical 
know-how essential to Iraq's weapons programme. This information is 
necessary to permit verification of the completeness of available 
declarations and information, to provide adequate basis for the long term 
monitoring activities and to ensure that any loopholes in export regulation 
are identified and closed. The persistent refusal of Iraq to disclose the 
sources of supplies is a breach of its obligations under the Security Council 
resolution 707. 

A second important obstacle that must be overcome is the refusal of Iraq to 
accept resolution 715, which approved the plans for long term monitoring of 
compliance by Iraq with the limitations imposed under resolution 687 






149 



Resolution 715 also established the rights of the IAEA and of the Special 
Commission which are deemed essential for effective application of this long 
term monitoring. 

Effective measures on Iraq applied by the UN Security Council has, in the 
past, played a decisive role in modifying the attitude of the Iraqi Government 
when it has refused or resisted compliance with its obligations. These 
measures should be maintained until full compliance with all of Iraq's 
obligations is obtained. 

Question 

How well has the International Atomic Energy Agency accomplished the tasks in 
Iraq that were assigned to it by the United Nations Security Council? 

Answer 

In response to this question, it might be more appropriate to recall that full 
satisfaction with the IAEA's activities in Iraq under UN Security Council 
resolution 687 has been expressed on a number of occasions by members of the 
Security Council and by IAEA Member States' Governments. 

Some considerations may assist the Congressional Sub-Committees which are 
holding these hearings in formulating their own judgment of the effectiveness of 
the IAEA's response Nine days after the adoption of the cease-fire resolution 
by the Security Council (6 April 1991), the IAEA established an Action Team, 
reporting directly to the Director General of the IAEA, to implement the tasks 
assigned to the IAEA by the Security Council under that resolution. The team is 
composed of five senior and experienced professionals of the IAEA, headed by 
a former Deputy Director General of the IAEA, and is empowered to draw on any 
necessary IAEA resources on a priority basis to discharge its duties. The first 
on-site inspection team was ready to enter Iraq as of 1 May 1991 , less than four 
weeks after the adoption of the cease-fire resolution. To date, 19 inspections 
have been conducted for a total of over 2000 inspector days (the 20th inspection 
team is at this moment in the field). Appropriate links and close co-operation 
have been developed with the UN Special Commission The Security Council 
and the IAEA's Board of Governors are kept constantly informed of the results of 
inspection activities as they develop Assistance has been sought and obtained 



150 



from a large number of IAEA Member States. Intelligence information has been 
shared with the Agency on an unprecedented scale. 

The tasks entrusted by the Security Council to the IAEA are essentially 
threefold: search, destroy and prevent any reconstitution. The IAEA has 
searched, has found and has destroyed. The basis has been established for 
preventing a reconstitution of the Iraqi nuclear programme. Effective control of 
future Iraqi activities can be put in place if adequate measures are maintained at 
the political level and sufficient resources continue to be provided. 



Question 

What steps can be taken in the future, to strengthen the ability of the IAEA in 
dealing with such challenges in Iraq and elsewhere? 

Answer 

The events in Iraq have not only highlighted the need to strengthen the IAEA 
safeguards system - and, in fact, the non-proliferation regime as a whole - but 
also have heightened the readiness of Governments to contribute to these 
improvements. 

During 1992 and 1993, the IAEA Board of Governors supported proposals for 
strengthening safeguards and increasing the ability of the safeguards system to 
detect the existence of, and gam access to, undeclared nuclear activities in 
States with comprehensive safeguards agreements. The proposals relate to: 

access to carry out special inspections at any location which the IAEA has 
reason to believe it needs to visit to obtain additional information relevant to 
safeguards; 

the early provision of design information about new facilities or modifications 
to existing facilities as soon as the decision is taken to construct or modify 
the facility. The IAEA's authority to verify design information is a continuing 
right that extends throughout the facility life cycle; 

the reporting of exports, imports and production of nuclear material, as well 
as exports and imports of certain equipment and non-nuclear material which 
could be relevant to a weapons programme 



151 



The use of environmental sampling as a tool to help assess the completeness of 
a State's declaration regarding its nuclear activities has been implemented in 
particular situations (including Iraq) and its applicability in the broader 
safeguards context is being considered. Additional changes involving increased 
intensity of safeguards in countries with more than a significant quantity of highly 
enriched uranium and/or plutonium distributed among small facilities is being 
implemented. 

These measures are intended to improve and broaden the scope of the existing 
safeguards system. This system has worked well in verifying the non-diversion 
of declared nuclear material at declared nuclear installations. The system was 
not geared to provide assurance that no undeclared nuclear installations 
existed. Although the safeguards system, as originally designed, provided for 
the legal authority to do this, the Secretariat lacked the information needed to 
implement this authority. Therefore, it was not timidity but the lack of information 
about undeclared sites meriting inspection that prevented the discovery of Iraq's 
clandestine programme. This situation is being corrected through actions by the 
Secretariat with the support of Member States. 

The discoveries in Iraq highlighted the importance, for effective safeguards, of 
three types of access: to information, to sites and to the Security Council of the 
United Nations. 

In using inspections as a tool for verification, the first basic requirement is for 
information regarding locations which might have undeclared nuclear-related 
items or facilities, requiring inspection. In this context the IAEA gathers much 
information of its own from its general verification activities, from States 
themselves, through in-depth analysis of information about nuclear activities 
obtained from the media and other open literature and, now, through more 
detailed reporting by States on nuclear material, equipment and relevant non-' 
nuclear material. Additionally, the IAEA now receives information obtained by its 
Member States through national intelligence means, the IAEA is of the view 
that no information relevant to safeguards, whatever its provenance, may be 
ignored but all information must be critically analyzed to determine its credibility 

The second basic requirement is for unlimited right of access for inspectors to 
locations which the IAEA considers to be relevant to safeguards, even at short 



152 



notice. Where IAEA access to information and to sites is not forthcoming, then 
access to the Security Council becomes of particular importance. The 
Relationship Agreement of 14 November 1957 between the United Nations and 
the IAEA contains provisions allowing for prompt interaction between the United 
Nations, including the Security Council, and the IAEA If a State fails to comply 
with its safeguards agreement, the IAEA is obliged to refer the matter to the 
Security Council, which may decide to take enforcement action to induce a State 
to accept inspection 

In its statement of 31 January 1992, the Security Council emphasized not only 
the integral role of fully effective IAEA safeguards in implementing the NPT, but 
also its readiness to take "appropriate measures in the case of any violations 
notified to them by the IAEA". All this attests to the fact that the Security Council 
is conscious of the risks inherent in proliferation. It is also sensitive to two 
specific requirements: that IAEA safeguards must be sufficiently effective to 
detect any breach or concealment with a high degree of probability; and that the 
international community needs to be able to continue to trust in the credibility of 
the safeguards system. 



153 



IAEA Action Team for Iraq 
(Attachment to the written statements submitted by the IAEA) 

FACT SHEET 
25 June 1993 



The IAEA Action Team was created to manage the UN Security Council Resolution 
687 as it relates to Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. This resolution mandates the 
destruction of all weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The IAEA has the sole 
responsibility under this resolution to destroy, remove, or render harmless all nuclear 
weapons and prohibited precursor materials. 

RESULTS TO DATE 

19 IAEA nuclear inspection teams have visited Iraq to inspect facilities, interview key 
personnel, inventory nuclear materials, identify prohibited items and carry out 
destruction and removal operations. 

The Iraqi Nuclear Weapons Programme consisted of eight dedicated sites. There 
were dozens of major processing buildings that represented an investment (in US 
equivalent) of several billion dollars. Most of these buildings have been destroyed by 
the war or under inspection team supervision. The remaining facilities consist of 
offices, warehouses and light industrial buildings with no unique capabilities. 

The programme involved millions of dollars in specialized equipment. Much of this 
equipment has been destroyed by the war, by inspection teams, and by the elements 
as the equipment is left outdoors or moved around. The teams have inventoried 
hundreds of pieces of equipment that may fall into prohibited or monitorable categories. 

The clandestine Iraqi nuclear programme consisted of a tremendous and well-financed 
approach to redundant and multiple paths of production of highly enriched uranium (HEU). 
The Gulf War and the subsequent inspection effort stopped this production effort well 
before any significant amounts of such material was produced. All known activities related 
to fissile material production were destroyed or rendered harmless either during the War or 
under the supervision of IAEA Inspection Teams. 

Significant quantities of HEU in the form of fresh or unirradiated fuel were in Iraq under 
IAEA safeguards and there was concern in some quarters that this material could have 
been diverted to produce a nuclear explosive. Pre-war estimates that Iraq could produce a 
nuclear explosive within a few months explicitly assumed that this material would be 
diverted It was not All of this material has been accounted for by the IAEA. The fresh 
fuel has been removed from Iraq and the removal of the irradiated fuel is imminent. 



154 



Another concern is a possible clandestine stockpile of illicitly obtained HEU or plutonium. 
This has neither been reported nor uncovered. The existence of such an undeclared 
stockpile would, however, be a major concern. It was a major consideration in deciding to 
destroy facilities and equipment that could fabricate HEU or plutonium into a nuclear 
explosive. 

All of the comments regarding times to completion of an explosive device are based on the 
assumption that the program would have continued along the same lines, keeping its 
original goals This would have taken several more years to complete because much of 
the program was just being put together and many pieces were missing. It does not 
appear that these pieces were coming together in a well-organized way. Even before the 
embargo began, it appears that the program had a long way to go both in terms of 
organization and technical progress. 

Actually, the facilities and plants are suggestive of a grandiose and over-designed 
program. If a political decision were taken today to produce a crude weapon (source of 
fissile material unspecified), it could be done without many of the specialized facilities that 
had been built for weaponization. Good equipment would be needed, however, and much 
of what Iraq had acquired has been destroyed. 

The theoretical aspect of the program is the largest worry under the current sanctions 
regime. This is an ideal time for the low visibility theoretical work to progress. It could 
lead to a more efficient experimental program in the future if, for any reason, Iraq were to 
resume. While more visible activities, such as fissile materials production, fabrication 
studies and testing, are impeded or deterred by the inspections, improved codes and 
design efforts could run on small computers even today. 

The key remaining element is the technical experience that has been gained to date. If 
this expertise is held together, the design and organization process, and possibly small 
scale research activity, may continue with a low probability of being rediscovered. These 
are low signature activities not likely to be revealed to inspectors without extraordinary luck 
or the defection of knowledgeable Iraqi personnel. 

The key to monitoring and inspecting Iraq's programme must be preventing access to 
fissile materials, either by diversion or purchase. It is also important to prevent any 
reconstitution of indigenous programmes for uranium enrichment or plutonium production. 
Such programmes are high profile in terms of cost, visibility, and foreign procurements. All 
require continuing observation. 



155 



Appendix A 

STATUS OF FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT USED IN THE IRAQI NUCLEAR 

PROGRAMME 



Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Centre - Headquarters of the programme and site 
of many R&D functions. This site was devastated and much of the equipment on 
this site was destroyed during the war Little additional destruction was 
necessary 

Al Qaim uranium concentration plant - Destroyed during the war. 

Al Jazirah feed materials plant - This plant manufactured UO2 and UCI4 to the 
EMIS 1 programme. The buildings were destroyed during the war. Most 
equipment has been accounted for and has been destroyed or is in very bad 
condition. 

Tarmiya EMIS Plant - This site was largely destroyed during the war. The 
electromagnetic separators were destroyed by the Iraqis in attempts to conceal 
them. The inspection teams supervised the destruction of the remaining process 
building (the beta calutron building) the utility system and a few other structures 
so that the site cannot be used for its original purpose. 

Ash Sharqat EMIS Plant - This was a twin of Tarmiya that had not yet been 
completed when it was heavily bombed during the war. The IAEA teams 
requested and supervised additional destruction along the lines of that carried 
out at Tarmiya. No process equipment had been installed yet at Ash Sharqat. 

Al Atheer Materials Centre - This was a partially completed nuclear weapons 
development and production site. It was virtually untouched by the war. The 
eight specialized process buildings comprising some 350,000 square feet of lab 
space were blown up by Iraqi demolition teams under IAEA supervision. A 
significant quantity of high quality fabrication equipment which had been 
installed or stored there was destroyed. 

Al Rabiyah Manufacturing Plant - This was a plant with large mechanical 
workshops designed and built for the manufacture of large metal components for 
the Iraqi EMIS programme . The main function had been to support the EMIS 
programme. The plant had high quality, but not unique, machine tool 
capabilities The IAEA inventoried the plant and has been inspecting it 
regularly. Several pieces of equipment in the plant will be monitored under the 



^MIS = ElectroMagnetic Isotope Separation 



156 



terms of the on-going monitoring plan The plant was severely damaged by a 
cruise missile attack in 1993. 

Dijila Electronics Plant - This plant supported electronics fabrication activities for 
the IAEC. It has almost no unique pieces of equipment. The plant was not 
damaged, and will continue to be monitored by the IAEA . 

A ninth site was under construction close to Al Walid to house the centrifuge 
manufacturing facility of the Al Furat project. This was also the site where Iraq had 
planned to establish its first pilot cascade of 100 centrifuges, scheduled to start 
operations in mid-1993. At the time of the Gulf War most of the key buildings at this 
site were still in an early construction stage. 

A number of other manufacturing workshops were contracted by the Iraqi Atomic 
Energy Commission for the production of components relevant to the weapons 
programme. All these workshops have been identified and are subject to IAEA 
monitoring. 



APPENDIX B 

ASSESSMENT OF THE STATE OF CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY AREAS 

Nuclear materials: All highly enriched uranium in Iraq under pre-war safeguards has 
been accounted for. About one third, in the form of fresh reactor fuel, has been 
removed from Iraq and the balance, contained in irradiated fuel, is awaiting removal. A 
contract for removal has been signed and an approximately eight-month effort to 
remove the irradiated uranium fuel has begun. 

About 500 tonnes of natural uranium has been identified and tracked through the Iraqi 
uranium processing system. Teams are currently reviewing whether the Iraqi 
declaration of uranium is complete and credible. The IAEA removed six grams of 
plutonium produced in Iraq (roughly two-thirds of which had been produced illegally). 

Assessment: Hundreds of tons of low value nuclear feed materials are under IAEA 
seal. There remains, however, accountability problems which make it difficult to 
conclude that all known nuclear materials in Irao have been discovered or reasonably 
accounted for. 

Electromagnetic Isotope Separation: This clandestine program was discovered early 
in the inspection process Most of the now known EMIS equipment was damaged in 
the war. The IAEA inventoried EMIS items, destroyed the remaining pieces, and 
verified quantities through suppliers. Several facilities that had not been completely 
destroyed during the war were destroyed by Iraq under IAEA supervision Equipment 
utilized in the manufacture of EMIS components remains under seal A cruise missile 
attack on the Al Rabiyah facility in January did additional damage to equipment which 



157 



could have been used in the future to reconstitute EMIS. Reconstitution of this 
programme seems unlikely insofar as it was a large programme that had relied on a 
blind spot in Western intelligence to get as far as it did. 

Assessment: The EMIS program is completely destroyed. It was an indigenous 
approach to isotope separation that escaped detection. The program was facing 
serious difficulties in start-up and implementation due to a lack of technical depth 
among Iraqi technicians. It would have been several years before it produced enough 
uranium for military purposes. 

Centrifuge Program: Irag declared its facilities and much of the centrifuge eguipment 
in July 1991 . Two centrifuge prototypes had been tested with some success in test bed 
experiments. All known centrifuge components and specialized tooling were destroyed 
in 1991. Other specialized, but dual use, equipment is now under IAEA seal. The Iraqi 
government has made a political decision not to name suppliers of sensitive equipment 
and materials. This complicates verification, but should not prevent it. Suppliers of 
carbon fiber centrifuge rotors have recently been discovered by German authorities. 
Iraq eventually admitted that the Rashdiya facility has had a design role in the 
centrifuge program. This disclosure came after over a year of pressure from the IAEA. 

Assessment: The Iragi centrifuge program was in a very early stage, using 
clandestinely obtained European designs and illicitly obtained materials to build a few 
research machines. The procurement of hundreds of tonnes of specialty metals and 
components, enough to build thousands of machines, was discovered. These materials 
have been seized and destroyed. 

Uranium Ore Concentration: The ore concentration plant at Al Qaim was completely 
destroyed during the war. 

Assessment: No capability to indigenously process uranium ore now exists in Irag. 
The Iragis have taken no steps to rebuild this plant. 

Nuclear Material Conversion: The nuclear materials feed plant at Al Jazirah was 
completely destroyed during the war. 

Assessment: This key capability is completely destroyed at the production plant level 
No back-up capability is known or suspected 

Nuclear Reactors and a Plutonium Program: The two nuclear reactors at Tuwaitha 
were totally destroyed in the war by aggressive bombardment. They cease to exist. 
Suspicions of the existence of an underground reactor have existed since before the 
war. All information specific enough to be checked out have proven to be negative. 

Assessment While suspicions of an underground reactor are vague and seem to be 
premised on circularly repeated rumors, the IAEA continues to search for any evidence 



158 



for an underground reactor and the requisite peripherals such as irradiated fuel 
reprocessing and nuclear waste handling. No information of any verifiable quality 
exists at this time to support the existence of such a facility. 

Nuclear Weapons Design: A program to assess a nuclear weapon design existed in 
Iraq before the war. It consisted of a plan to investigate all of the practical elements of 
designing and building a prototype nuclear weapon. A number of specialized facilities, 
including buildings for high explosives testing and radioactive materials handling, had 
been built at Al Atheer to support this programme. These facilities have all been 
destroyed by Iraq under IAEA supervision. The Tuwaitha nuclear research site was 
largely destroyed during the war as well. Continued speculation about the existence of 
a plutonium program in Iraq is uninformed, given the complexity, high visibility and 
difficulty of the plutonium route. 

Assessment: The Iraqi nuclear weapons design effort was at an early stage and 
consisted of a broadly based study of all aspects of producing a uranium core 
implosion weapon Sophisticated concepts for the future were under consideration. A 
practical design had not been achieved as a number of problems remained to be 
overcome. The hardware and facilities to support this program have been destroyed, 
but the concepts remain. 

Programme Documentation and Personnel: One of the early IAEA inspection teams 
seized about 50,000 pages of documents from the IAEC. A substantial fraction of this 
material consisted of technical progress reports. Correspondence found in this 
material indicated that other documents had been taken away and hidden by the Iraqi 
security services just before the team arrived. The Iraqis claim that all programme 
documentation had been destroyed much earlier. Virtually all of the scientists 
associated with the nuclear programs remain in Iraq. Captured documents show layoff 
records for hundreds of people whose work places were destroyed in the war. 

Assessment: Irag could reconstitute a weapons program faster than another state that 
had never tried. The capable scientists remain. How they are currently employed is 
difficult to ascertain because they have been dispersed It seems highly probable that 
a set of documents about the program remain safely hidden away The important 
physical facilities are all destroyed, however, and would have to be rebuilt at great cost, 
in order to revive the weapons programme. 



LONG TERM MONITORING 

The Action Team will monitor equipment and facilities that remain after the war and 
Inspection Team destruction activities. The first phase of a waterway monitoring 
programme has been completed with the cooperation of the Iraqi government. This 
programme is sensitive enough to detect very small quantities of radionuclides and 
other chemicals used in the nuclear industry. The first series of results show that no 



159 



unknown nuclear facility has been operating in Iraq in the last couple of years. Based 
on verification activities and available information, it is reasonable to conclude that Iraq 
is not operating clandestine nuclear facilities, especially a reactor, or a reprocessing 
plant. 

An essential prerequisite for effective implementation of the Agency's long term 
monitoring plan, is the unconditional acceptance by Iraq of UN Security Council 
resolution 715 [1991], which determines the rights of UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors 
and the corresponding obligations of Iraq. Iraq has so far refused to formally accept 
this resolution. 

Outstanding Tasks: 

Remove the highly enriched irradiated uranium still in Iraq. 

Aggressively follow-up any serious reports of clandestine facilities, especially nuclear 
reactors and their required support such as fuel reprocessing. 

Resolve remaining accountancy differences in the nuclear material balance. 

Continue periodic surveys of the waterways monitoring program and phase in gradually 
other elements of the long term monitoring plan. 

Identify suppliers and middlemen: 

centrifuge components 

explosives 

dual use equipment 

materials 

Resolve issues of dual-use industrial equipment in Iraq. 



160 




NUCLEAR CONTROL 

institi n: 



June 24, 1993 

Representative Tom Lantos 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Arms Control, 

International Security and Science 
House Foreign Affairs Committee 
2401 A Rayburn House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515-6129 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Since I will not be testifying as originally planned at your hearing on June 
29, I wanted to share with you an exchange of correspondence I have had with 
IAEA Director General Hans Blix concerning his misleading statements about the 
effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards on Iraq's bomb-grade uranium prior to the 
Gulf War. 

In preparation for my testimony. I wrote to Dr. Blix. asking him to correct 
these misstatements and to set the record straight so that 1 could insert our exchange 
of correspondence into the record of your hearing. Enclosed you will find that 
correspondence, which I submit for the record. 

The Nuclear Control Institute has long sought to direct attention to the severe 
limitations on what IAEA safeguards on bomb-grade nuclear material can deliver in 
problem NPT states like Iraq. In our view, the principal lesson of Iraq (and more 
recently of North Korea) is the danger of allowing highly enriched uranium and 
separated plutonium into civilian nuclear programs on the grounds that IAEA 
safeguards are adequate to detect and deter misuse of these materials in nuclear 
weapons. 

So long as the agency misleads the public into believing that its safeguards 
on these materials "work"— precisely the twaddle that Dr. Blix and his spokesman 
put forth in the context of Iraq— it will be all the more difficult to eliminate these 
materials from civil nuclear programs, for which they are uneconomical and 
unnecessary, in any event. 

Export controls and other nuclear non-proliferation undertakings become 
wasting assets in the face of growing stocks of safeguarded, "peaceful" bomb-grade 
nuclear materials. Civilian nuclear power and research programs run quite well 
without these materials. With them, these programs pose an undeniable proliferation 



161 



threat because the materials can be converted into nuclear weapons in a matter of 
days or weeks. This is true in major industrial states as well as nuclear threshold 
states. Nonetheless, the IAEA continues to perpetuate the myth that its safeguards 
on these materials are effective. 

The most glaring proof that these materials are fundamentally 
unsafeguardable came at the time of the Gulf War when Iraq secretly removed most 
of its supply of HEU research reactor fuel from the Tuwaitha facility near Baghdad 
and hid it. Iraq, in direct violation of its safeguards agreement under the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), did not inform the IAEA for over three months — ample 
time to convert this material into one or two first-generation fission weapons. As I 
wrote to Dr. Blix, the fact that Iraq chose not to attempt to use its hidden HEU in 
weapons should not be twisted into proof that safeguards "worked." 

Dr. Blix still refuses to acknowledge that Iraq's relocation of the HEU fuel 
was a safeguards violation, and he insists that any diversion of the HEU to non- 
peaceful uses would have been "immediately discovered." Given that IAEA did not 
even know of the fuel's relocation for months, this claim borders on the absurd. He 
also stands by his statement that the IAEA never gave the Iraqi nuclear program a 
"clean bill of health" despite the comment of the Agency's safeguards chief that 
Iraq's cooperation with the IAEA had been "exemplary." 

Since Dr. Blix's spokesman has pronounced "this particular exchange of 
correspondence closed" without acknowledging or correcting any of Dr. Blix's 
misstatements, I hope you will pursue the specific matters I raised with him when 
you question witnesses from the IAEA and other witnesses that defend IAEA 
safeguards on bomb-grade materials as effective. 

Also attached to this letter are some articles I have written on the subject of 
Iraq, the IAEA and the NPT. In addition, I have enclosed the testimony I presented 
to the House Foreign Affairs Committee over 10 years ago on "what steps are 
needed and being taken to ensure that our safeguards goals can be met." As you 
will see from this earlier testimony, things haven't changed much: our safeguards 
goals are still not being met and there remains a need for forceful leadership, such 
as you can provide, on Capitol Hill. 



I appreciate your interest in these urgent matters. 



Sincerely. 



Paul I.eventhal 



Enclosures 



162 




M CLEAR CONTROL 
INSTITITE 



-a uH s\\ Mm "ii, iAsniM.iDMii :imUi :o;«h2-»ttii i\\:i»o>- 

June 4, 1993 

Dr. Hans Blix 

Director General 

International Atomic Energy Agency 

Vienna, Austria 

BY FACSIMILE: 011-431-234-564 

Dear Dr. Blix: 

I am writing to ask that you correct certain statements you made at a press 
briefing sponsored by the Atlantic Council in Washington on May 20. It is 
important that the public record be set straight on Iraq's violations of IAEA 
safeguards. 

At the press briefing, you stated that during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Iraq 
"did not touch" the highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel for its research reactors, or 
violate IAEA safeguards on that fuel. This is quite similar to the following 
statement you made the previous month to the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum 
concerning Iraq's HEU fuel: "What had been placed under safeguards inspection had 
been left untouched presumably in the awareness that any violation in this regard 
would have been reported immediately and led to some international reaction." (Dr. 
Hans Blix. "IAEA Verification of Non-Proliferation." Panel on Non-Proliferation, 
JAIF Meeting. Yokohama. April 16. 1993. p. 3) 

In fact. Iraq moved almost all of its HEU fuel-enough for about two 
weapons-in January 1991, in anticipation of coalition air strikes. Some of the fuel 
was secretly relocated within the Tuwaitha site, and some was removed from the site 
entirely. In a letter to Mauricio Zifferero. leader of the IAEA Action Team, dated 
April 27. 1991. the Iraqi government confirmed that "nuclear material has been 
shifted during the war from the locations known to the Agency to nearby locations 
..." Further, the Iraqi government refused to disclose the location of this safeguarded 
material to the Agency for several weeks, insisting upon guarantees that the fuel 
would not be subject to further attack. 

Iraq's failure to inform the Agency promptly of the movement of the HEU 
fuel or of its new locations violated the safeguards requirement of "[i"| nventorv 
chance reports showing changes in the inventory of nuclear material . The reports 
shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within 30 days after the end 
of the month in which the inventory changes occurred or were established ..." 
(INFCIRC/153, paragraph 63a). 



163 



Further, the fifth IAEA inspection in Iraq under Security' Council Resolution 
687 reported that "[d]uring item-counting of the fresh [HEU] fuel, two of the Soviet- 
type fuel assemblies were found to have had the top and bottom inert parts cut off 
(Report on the Fifth IAEA On-Site Inspection in Iraq Under Security Council 
Resolution 687 (1991), 14-20 September 1991, p. 4). The Iraqis insisted that the 
cuts were made in a panicked attempt to fit the fuel elements into shipping 
containers prior to coalition air strikes. However, according to the fifth inspection 
report, "[t]he evidence is inconclusive as between the Iraqi explanation and the 
hypothesis that the cutting was a preliminary to removal of the highly enriched 
component of the assembly" (ibid). Regardless of the purpose of the cuts, however, 
you cannot accurately claim that the Iraqis "did not touch" the HEU material during 
the Gulf War. 

In addition, you said that the IAEA had never given the Iraqi nuclear 
program "a clean bill of health" prior to the Gulf War; rather, that it had only 
certified that all materials under safeguards were accounted for. This claim ignores 
the statement by Jon Jennekens, then-director of the Agency's Safeguards Division, 
made soon after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Mr. Jennekens stated that the 
cooperation of Iraqi officials with IAEA had been "exemplary," and that they "have 
made eve y effort to demonstrate that Iraq is a solid citizen" in the nonproliferation 
regime ("No Bomb-Quantity of HEU in Iraq, IAEA Safeguards Report Indicates." 
NuclearFuel. August 20, 1990, p. 8). This assertion, made by the Agency's top 
safeguards official, certainly gives the appearance of a "clean bill of health" for Iraq 
by the IAEA. 

I hope you will promptly correct the above-cited statements, as they have the 
unfortunate effect of misleading the public about the effectiveness of Agency 
safeguards. I have been invited to present testimony to a Congressional 
subcommittee hearing late in June on the lessons of Iraq for the IAEA safeguards 
system. I would appreciate receiving a response from you in time so that I may 
insert our exchange of correspondence into the record of the hearing. 

Thank you for your attention to this matter. Copies of all materials cited 
above are attached to this letter. 



Sincerely. 




Paul Leventhal 



Attachments 



164 




INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 
ACENCE INTERNATIONALE DE L'ENERGIE ATOMIQUE 
M£)KflyHAPOHHOE ATEHTCTBO no ATOMHOH 3HEPTHH 
ORGANISMO INTERNACIONAL DE ENERGIA KTOMICA 



15 June 1993 



Dear Mr. Leventhal, 

Your letter of June 4 to our Director General has been passed to me for 



The first is a remask 
s former Deputy 



reply. 

You ask for comments essentially on two points, 
reportedly made to an individual journalist by the IAEA!' 
Director General for Safeguards, Mr. Jennekens, in August 1990. The second lie 
the Director General's reference to highly enriched urarijium (HEU) fuel 
elements in Iraq as being "untouched" when speaking in Hlashingtoo on May 20 
this year. 

I will not comment on the personal quote attribuoec to Mr. Jennekens. 
I would point, however, to the prudent line of the IAEA jin its public 
pronouncements on safeguards inspections in Iraq. After inspections conducted 
in both April and November 1990, for instance, we issued! carefully worded 
press releases (attached) stating, in November, that "baised upon the 
information collected during these inspections it has bieen concluded that no 
change has taken place in the status of nuclear material under safeguards in 
Iraq since the last inspections ... At that time it was concluded that all 
nuclear material under safeguards was accounted for." No more, no less. 

As for the Director General's remarks, I do not think it reasonable eo 
try to construct a case concerning the failure of the safeguards system, on 
the grounds that the IAEA was not "promptly informed" of! the movement of HEL 
fuel to a hurriedly improvised location, ignoring the highly dramatic contexit 
of aerial raids in which this took place. It is also capricious .to interpret 
the Director General's reference to the HEU having been ''untouched" as 
implying that none of it had been physically moved, when! what he clearly meant 
was that none of it was ever diverted to non-peaceful use. 



Mr. Paul Leventhal 

Pres ident 

Nuclear Control Institute 

1000 Connecticut Avenue N. 

Suite 704 

Washington D.C. 20036 

fax 202 452 0892 



165 



As you know well, all the HEU supplied to Iraq was 
for. The fresh fuel was removed from Iraq in November 199 
fuel is expected to follow in the second half of this yeari 



and is accounted 
and the irradiated 



By way of further clarification, let me correct you 
Iraq moved almost all of its fuel "in anticipation of coal 
(third paragraph of your letter). The transfer of part of 
after the first bombardment of the Tuwaitha Centre (17 Jani 
resulted in the destruction of the Russian supplied IRT 50 
with fuel inside. It is worth noting that when the first 
Tuwaitha occurred during the night of 17-18 January 1991, 
in full operation, indicating that no coalition air strike 
Removal of the irradiated HEU fuel elements from their ori 
the Tammuz 1-Tammuz 2 complex to an Improvised location nej 
out under continuing air raids in which bombing might have 
radioactive contamination of the area at any time. 



statement that 
tion air strikes" 
the fuel occurred 
iary 1991), which 
)0 research reactor 
iir raid against 
he IRT reactor was 

were expected, 
inal location at 
irby, was carried 
caused serious 



As to the episode of the two Soviet-type fuel assemblies which were 
found without top and bottom fittings, and irrespective of] the explanations 
for this unusual operation, the fact remains that the HEU Contained in the two 
assemblies in question was still there and had not been diverted to 
non-peaceful uses. 



Yours sincerely. 





David R. Kye 

Director 

Public Information Division 

IAEA 



166 




NUCLEAR CONTROL 
INSTITUTE 



June 23, 1993 



Dr. Hans Blix 

Director General 

International Atomic Energy Agency 

Vienna. Austria 

BY FACSIMILE: 011-431-234-564 
Dear Dr. Blix: 

I am writing with regard to David Kyd's letter of June 15, responding to my 
letter of June 4 to you. 

I had written you in the hope and expectation that you would correct certain 
misstatements and set the record straight concerning the serious shortcomings of 
IAEA safeguards in Iraq prior to the Gulf War. Based on Mr. Kyd's response, I 
find it remarkable that the Agency seems incapable of acknowledging specific, 
significant limitations to what its safeguards on bomb-grade nuclear material can 
deliver in problem NPT states like Iraq. 

On the issue of whether the IAEA gave a "clean bill of health" to the Iraqi 
nuclear program. Mr. Kyd declines to comment on former Director of Safeguards 
Jon Jennekens* November 1990 statement that Iraq's cooperation with the IAEA was 
"exemplary" and that Iraqi nuclear experts "have made every effort to demonstrate 
that Iraq is a solid citizen" in the NPT regime. In Mr. Kyd's words, this was a 
"personal quote" and presumably not of the same weight as two Agency findings 
that vear in Iraq that "all nuclear material under safeguards was accounted for." 

An on-the-record comment made by a high-level Agency official to a leading 
nuclear trade journal cannot be dismissed in this fashion. Mr. Jennekens made his 
statement just after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, when world attention and concern was 
focused on the Iraqi nuclear program. In this context, Mr. Jennekens was surely 
aware his statement was bound to carry a lot of weight. Also, the Agency did not 
issue any statement distinguishing its official position from Mr. Jennekens', as it did 
last September when Mr. Zifferero stated that Iraq's nuclear program was "at zero." 
Mr. Jennekens had been speaking in his official capacity, and the Agency did 
nothing to dispel the clean bill of health he gave to Iraq. 



167 



As to the central question of whether Iraq violated IAEA safeguards on its 
HEU fuel without being detected, surely it is Mr. Kyd, not I. who is "capricious" in 
characterizing your remarks at the Atlantic Council press conference in Washington. 
Mr. Kyd claims that when you said Iraq "did not touch" the HEU fuel, what you 
"clearly meant was that none of it was ever diverted to non-peaceful use." This is a 
conveniently revisionist interpretation that is not supported by the transcript of your 
remarks, as follows: 

And the Iraqis never touched the nuclear highly-enriched 
uranium which was under our safeguards, which in some 
ways indicate also that the safeguard had an effect. Had 
they toached anything - (inaudible) — immediately 
discovered, and these would have been reported, and they 
would have evoked a governmental opinion and 
governmental action. They didn't want to do that. So 
they never touched the material which was under 
safeguard ... 

Thus, as with your earlier remarks in Japan, the clear meaning of your 
comment was that Iraq had not touched the HEU fuel, that safeguards on that 
material had in no way been violated, and that the safeguards had effectively 
deterred Iraq from attempting such a violation. 

In fact, the contrary was true. Iraq removed the HEU to locations unknown, 
and this was an indisputable safeguards violation. Paragraph 63a of INFCIRCT53 
clearly requires movement of safeguarded materials to be reported "as soon as 
possible." Rather than acknowledge this violation, Mr. Kyd seems to bend over 
backward to make excuses for Iraq by suggesting that an emergency in response to 
coalition air raids impeded prompt notification of the IAEA. Yet. Iraq did not report 
the relocation of the HEU fuel until more than three months later, well after the 
cease-fire took effect, and under duress. The NPT safeguards agreement requires 
that such reports be made " in am event within 30 days of the end of the month" 
when the safeguarded material is moved [emphasis supplied]. Nor are NPT parties 
permitted to place conditions upon their disclosure to IAEA of the location of 
special nuclear material, as Iraq did in its April 27. 1991 declaration. 

Moreover, you are surely aware that no Iraqi diversion of its HEU fuel could 
have been "immediately discovered" by IAEA. This material was only being 
inspected twice a year, despite the fact that it amounted to more than two significant 
quantities. Agency safeguards agreements currently allow many significant 
quantities of weapons-usable special nuclear material to be treated for inspection 
purposes as less than one significant quantin. provided that the material is split up 
in smaller amounts among several different material balance areas. This is true even 
if these material balance areas are all located at the same site, as was the case at 
Tuwaitha. 



168 



The key point is that Iraq could have quickly gathered and diverted all its 
HEU fuel for use in weapons without the Agency discovering this diversion for at 
least several months. The fact that actual use in weapons did not occur in no way 
alters the fact that safeguards were so weak that Iraq could have diverted the 
material and incorporated it into one or two first-generation fission weapons without 
detection by the Agency. Since the conversion time for HEU is on the order of days 
or weeks, this makes clear a major gap in IAEA safeguards, and it also makes a 
strong case for the Agency to acknowledge the obvious limitations of safeguards on 
direct-use material rather than to continue to obfuscate them. 

Regarding the two Soviet-type HEU fuel assemblies, Mr. Kyd sounds as if he 
is describing some mys\ery when he says that they were "found without top and 
bottom fittings." They were "found" this way because the Iraqis cut off the top and 
bottom fittings, as they later admitted. The UN Special Commission inspectors, 
realizing that this could have been the first step toward diverting the HEU for 
weapons, were not satisfied with Iraq's innocent explanation of why this was done. 

Yet, Mr. Kyd seems satisfied by the fact that "the HEU contained in the two 
assemblies in question was still there and had not been diverted to non-peaceful 
uses." Given that the IAEA was not informed of the removal of the fittings, on 
what basis is the Agency confident that it would have "immediately" discovered the 
diversion of the HEU subsequent to such removal? 

The Iraqi case makes clear why the Agency should not continue to perpetuate 
the myth of "effective" safeguards on weapons-usable nuclear material. The fact 
that Iraq chose not to use its hidden HEU in weapons should not be twisted into 
proof that safeguards "worked." 

Continued use of HEU in civil nuclear programs on the assumption it can be 
effectively safeguarded— to borrow the warning by former IAEA Deputy Director 
General William Dircks about surplus plutonium— "poses a major political and 
security problem worldwide." Better that you acknowledge that weapons-usable 
nuclear materials are fundamentally unsafeguardable. given how swiftly they can be 
converted for use in nuclear bombs. Such a warning by you would lift the cloak of 
legitimacy that now obscures these exceedingly dangerous materials: it could hasten 
their elimination from civil nuclear programs, for which they are uneconomical and 
unnecessary, in any event 

Therefore. I respectfully repeat my request that you correct your 
misstatements and set the record straight. The public should not be misled on this 
urgent matter. I would appreciate having your reply in time to submit it. as part of 
our exchange of correspondence, for the record of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee hearing on June 29. 



Sincerely, 




Paul Leventhal 




169 




INTLKNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 
ACENCE INTERNATIONALE DE l.'ENERGIE ATOMIQUE 
MDKflyHAPOflHOE AFF.HTCTBO HO ATOMHOfl 3HtPrHM 
ORCANISMO 1NTERNACIONAL DK ENERCIA ATOMICA 



24 June 1S93 



Dear Mr. Leventhei, 

In the absence of the Director General, Dr. Bans Blix, who will be away 
from Vienna until July 1. I an again replying to a letter of yours, dated 
June 23, on the same subjects you chose to raise in your letter of June 4, 
1993. 

Having given your views due consideration, I regret to inform you that 
there is nothing more of substance I can add to my earlier reply and 1 must 
therefore consider this particular exchange of correspondence closed. 



c* 



Yours slnceiely 



Vf* 




David R. Kyd 

Director 

Public Information Division 



Mr. Paul I.eventhal 

Pres ldent 

Nuclear Control Institute 

1000 Connecticut Avenue N.W. 

Suite 704 

Washington D.C. 20036 



170 



!;hc^cUfJ3orkeimc)5 



MONDAY, AUGUST M, 1990 



M'CUA« CONTROL 
INSTITUTE 



The Nonproliferation Hoax 



By PauJ L. Lcventhal 

WASHINGTON 

rhe Treaty on the Non- 
proliferation of Nu- 
clear Weapons is now 
being reviewed in 
Geneva bv many of the 
142 nations that have 
ified it. Like three previous review 
lerences held since the treaty 
ne into force in 1970. this one is 
■ly to extol the virtues of nonprolif- 
tion — the next best thing to moth- 
ooo — and ignore flaws that make 
treaty dangerously out of date In 
present form in a rapidly changing 
rid. the treaty, lor til as good in- 
(ions, invites catastrophe 
fhe Nuclear Nonproliferation 
?aty is regarded as an interna- 
nal firebreak against the further 
-ead of nuclear weapons. But Its 
'visions for containing prohfera- 
n are like the hospitals that Flor- 
:e Nightingale so abhorred. They 
ve served to spread the disease 
rag. for example, is a treaty party 
good standing despite Saddam 
issein's decade-long pursuit of nu- 
■ar weapons His exercise in bla- 
ii proliferation does not run afoul 
the treaty because only the receipt 
assembly of a complete nuclear 
vice not the acquisition of the in 
edients needed to build one. would 
olaten 

Iraq's continued nonnuclear- 
eapon status is attributable pnnci- 
illy not to its treaty membership 
it to Israel's bombing m 1961 of an 
ifimshed research reactor near 
ighdad That reactor was capable 
producing plutonium in quantities 
rge enough to make at least two 
omic bombs a year. It had been cer- 
'ied •■peaceful" by inspectors from 
e International Atomic Energy 
gency. the U.N. group that polices 
>e treaty. Israel remains outside the 
eaiy and is hardly a pillar of non- 
roliferation. but its pre-emptive 
nke capacity and undeclared nu- 
lear arsenal reflect a lack of faith in 
ie treaty's guarantees. 
Japan is a treaty member in good 
.anding It plans to recover from the 
as '.ps of its reactors more plu- 
!num than the United States and the 
ovtet Union now have in all their nu- 
lear arms combined. This plan does 
ot run afoul of the treaty because the 
lutonium is to be used as fuel for 
c*er reactors, not bombs 
No matter that Japan will have far 

^oj! L Leventhal is president of the 
Vuciear Control Insntute 




more piutoniurr. than it needs, be- 
cause it has postponed into the next 
century the new reactors for which 
the fuel was intended No matter that 
current reactors do not need this 
highly toxic, bomb-grade pluiomum 
at all but can continue to function on 
plentiful low-grade uranium that can- 
not be made Into weapons. No matter 
that IAEA Inspectors are unable to 
know m a given year, because of 
measurement uncertainties, whether 
600 pounds of plutonium (enough for 
50 bombs) has been simply lost In the 
pipes of a large processing plant or 
has been diverted. No matter that 
these uncertainties and other vulner- 
abilities make plutonium susceptible 
to theft by terrorists as well as diver- 
sion by nations intent on making nu- 
clear weapons Its all O.K. Com- 
merce in tons of surplus plutonium — 
though it u a latent form of prolifera- 
tion — is not a treaty violation 

West Germany is a treaty member 
in good standing. Its nuclear exports 
to such non-treaty countries as India 
and Pakistan which do not require 
them to accept the same all-encom- 
passing IAEA inspections that are 
required of member countries, do not 
run afoul of the treaty There are 
loopholes that even permit West Ger- 
many to export some items essential 
to producing nuclear weapons ma- 



Even Iraq 
complies with 
the treaty. 



tertals. like heavy water and process- 
ing equipment, without being in tech- 
nical violation of the treaty 

The U.S. and the Soviet Union are 
treaty parties in good standing de- 
spite their 50.000 nuclear weapons be- 
cause they "pursue negotiations in 
good faith." as the treaty requires 
Certainly, recent negotiations and the 
political realignment In Europe serve 
to make possible the first substantial 
cuts in nuclear arms by the super- 
powers But their quantitative nu- 
clear arms race Is fast being eclipsed 
by a qualitative one. Continued test- 
ing of weapons, pioduenon of materi- 
als for weapons and modernization of 
warheads and missiles keep the su- 
perpower nuclear rivalry alive with- 
out violating the treaty. 

Two aets of improvements io the 
treaty are needed. First, the tripwire 
for a treaty violation should be pos- 
session of weapons-grade materials. 



not possession of a weapon 

Second, the treaty must obligate 
the superpowers to curtail, qualita- 
tively as well as quantitatively, the 
nuclear rivalry that still serves as the 
ready excuse for other nations to 
ktep their nuclear options open. The 
superpowers could well hall all test- 
ing and weapons-materials produc 
uonas they reduce their nuclear ar- 
senals. 

Failure to consider these improve- 
ments now may make it impossible to 
upgrade and update the treaty by 
1995. when the parties must meet 
again to extend it. If the needed 
changes are not yet in place by then 
the treaty should be extended for sue 
cessive short periods only 

There should be a longer extension 
only after the treaty has been made 
relevant to the real-world dangers of 
proliferation and terrorism, and to a 
nuclear arms race that grows more 
lethal even as the superpower ar 
senals are reduced 

Unfortunately. US policy, shared 
by the U.S.S.R. and mosi industrial 
nations, is to paper over the Nonpro 
liferation treaty's problems Thai 
avoids raising concerns about the nJ 
clear industry and does not challenge 
the nuclear-weapons status quo. But 
the time has come to view the treaty 
without rose-colored glasses C 



171 



VIEWPOINTS 



Expose All Secret Nuclear Stashes 

Rigid inspections and export controls can stop a future Iraq. 



By Paul Leventhal 
and Sleven Dollcy 

IN 1979. THE partially melted 
core of the Three Mile Island 
reactor showed the world tlidt 
a major nuclear-power accident 
was mi imaginary threat Now the 
discovery of a huge Iraqi nuclear 
weapon^ program, built right un- 
der the noses of international in- 
spectors, has presented the global 
non proliferation system with iu> 
own kind of Three Mile Island 
Bui iusl as the Chernobyl melt- 
down followed Three Mile Island, 
the spread of nuclear weapons will 
proceed apace unless real reforms 
are put in place 

Until the gulf war, Iraq had al- 
ways been treated as a model citi- 
zen by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency Now, however. 
the agency and its boosters in the 
nuclear industry and burcuueracy 
worldwide have had to eat crow 
over a succession ol humiliations 
at the hands of the Iraqis First 
Iraq denied having any weapons- 
usable material or bomb-building 
plants, despite the UN ceasefire 
resolution requiring it Lu turn over 
all such materials to the Atomic 
Energy Agency and to allow the 
agency to destroy all such plants 
missed by allied bombings 

Iraq eventually agreed to reveal 
the w hereabouts of its bomb-grade 
uranium and other nuclear materi- 
als, but denied having other weap- 
ons-grade materials or weapons 
plants Then, alter a defector from 
the Iraqi nuclear program Inld 
what he knew LolJ.S experts, Irjq 
tried in conceal and then grudging- 
ly showed inspectors evidence • >'■ u 
secret indu=tn lor producing il.- 
own bomb-grjde uranium 

Then, in what must have been 
the cruelesl blow for the international in.-ruvlor- 
Iraq admitted that U had been producing plnloni- 

um. undetected in direu violdt I Ihr Nuclei 

NonprolilciiiLi'iii Treaty, of which lr,iq i- ,i iigtu 
lory Alihough the three grams ol pluionium 
shown tu the Aionnc Energy Ageiuv was l.ir lc-- 
than the few kilograms needed l.n .1 weapon, it 
demonstrated Iraq s capability to recover pi u Ioni- 
um from spent luel and raised concerns thai Iraq 
might have hidden awav a plutonium production 
program 

In the interest of world peace, then, we must 
learn some lesson? Irom tins "Three Mile Island' 
of nuclear prolileration 

First, there may be far more In Iraq s nucleai 
program Iraq cannot be expeiied t- volunUt'l 

Paul Leicnthal directed ihe I'S Senate !»■ 
vesligalton uf the Three Mile Island nuclear 
QCtldcnt He is now president uf the S'ui fair 
Control Institute in Washingum, D( iVeVC'i 
Doltn is the institute's research direi Mr 




^■^flS^ 



ments and results must be lifted 
The Atomic Energy Agency 
should be empowered to conduct 
snap inspections — now they 
must give notice — and be autho- 
rized to look wherever they sus- 
pect violation-, (Now. if a build- 
ing is declared free of nuclear 
material, it is ofT limits, and in- 
spectors may not even report sus- 
picious activities observed be- 
tween declared sites i Inspections 
also should be more frequent. In 
Iraq, inspectors were checking 
twice a year on fuel that could be 
converted into weapons in one to 
three weeks 

Of course, a stronger inspection 
system will not help without 
stricter controls over nuclear ex- 
ports U S law permits many nu- 
clear components and other items 
useful to bomb n-jking to be ex- 
ported to slates that do not ad- 
here to the nonproliferation irca 
ty or accept in-»peclions 

The Nuclear Proliferation Pre 
veniti.n Act. recently introduced 
by nVp Edward Markev D 
Mass i and Sen Timolhv Wirth 
(D-Col >, would close ihi» and oth- 
er major export -control loopholes 
It also directs the president to im- 
pose trade sanctions on nations 
transferring nuclear items under 
less stringent controls and to ne- 
gotiate stronger Atomic Energy 
Agency safeguards 

Also, there musi he a suhstan 
tial upgrading ol I' S intelligence 
gal hen ng on nucle.ir proliferation 
— an area neglected when vj-l n- 
-,ourie> were being S"'"i on .inli- 
Sovii'l intelligent Now that the 
i DldWai h , reveded major pow- 
ers cm turn .mention in tho-e 



amth.ngwc 

A partly d. 
released to I 
ample, dvsc 
building a c 

War. I! built 

Iraq was km 
before- Ihr w 



don't know or suspect 
cla<*ilivd I'S intelligence document. 
ri. Nuclear Control Institute- I'm i • 
iln - ,i Chinese ici.-abihu >tudv fi-ir 
unoulliigod reactor in Iraq by. IH9JI 
Where are i he weapons components 
wil in have been making or acquiring 
ir and ihul have vet lu -url..,.-' 



lnlenialiun.il inspection teams should i 
full time pri"»tng iiu information and look 
material and production sites Even il the 
lind everything thi'N call keep the Iraqi pi 
disarrav, minimizing chances uf a hum 

Also, the Atomic Energy Agency ni 
its safeguards in determine whethe 
spec! inn Imdings in other countries v 
liable as those in Iraq Until now 
safeguards were assumed lo be slri 
deter nations from cheating Iraq 
cheating is possible and a far stricter system i> 
needed This will require more staff and funding 
for the Alum It* Energy Agem j 

For openers, the secrecy of inspection arrange- 



!iv> dm 

-OgTHIII 

■mghui 



■ agem ■■ ■ 
•nougb to 



whn w iiu Id have nuclear weapons 
"** L "■*' '*'• '■ and threaten world order 

Then .ilsn must be the political 
will, thus far lacking lu confront wayward nucleai 
juppliei s and i usiomci - uliki li .iq ha.- taught u- 
ihe danger o! looking thculhm -.i. 

None of these reforms will Hup ilu spread of 
nuclear weapons, however unli-- the glowing 
trade in h.imh-grade nucle.ii fuels Ittr civ il nuclear 
power and research program? is ■•topped Plutoni- 
um and hlghl) enriched omnium ui wlmh only a 
few pounds are needed lor a bomb are traded b) the 
tun in world commerce The United Slate- the 
principal exporter ol bnmi gradi uranium tor re- 
search reactors, hat developed substitute, low-en- 
riched luel- unsuitable lor weapons hut rdu&ei in 
finish the program thai could eliminate the bomb- 
grade material from commerce Ihe United Stales 
also agreed Lu lei Japan recover from V S -supplied 
nuclear fuel more plutonium lhan u contained in 
ihe U S arsenal even though lh. re is no short age of 
low-enriched uranium to fuel Japan's electrical 
generating reactors A nuclear nunproliferation re- 
gime (hat tolerates, indeed promotes, use of bomb- 
grade nuclear fuels is a recipe for catastophe — ihe 
ornhferalion equivalent of Chernobyl, or worse 



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Hcralo^agifceribimc. 

rabi.hnl m ith TW V. tort TW.aidTVlMfeiigionPoM 



TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1991 



17i€ Nuclear Watchdogs Have Failed 



CAMBRIDGE, England — The 
International Atomic Energy 
Agency has just completed its annual 
conference in Vienna After the agen- 
cy's failure to detect a multibilhon- 
dollar nuclear weapons project in Iraq. 
the Dutch proposed, on behalf of Eu- 
ropean Community members, an 
emergency overhaul of a failed safe- 
guards system. The agency's powerful 
board of governors has put off action 
until February and shows every sign of 
acting like the nuclear faithful failing 
to see that the emperor has no clothes 

The 23-member board, dominated 
by industrial states concerned about 
eroding public acceptance of nuclear 
energy, is ill-equipped to recognize the 
nakedness of IAEA safeguards in the 
presence of a determined proliferator 

To do so risks acknowledging that 
there is no effective bamer between 
peaceful and military applications of 
nuclear energy. This admission could 
threaten extension of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferauon Treaty when its 25- 
year charter runs out in 1995 — as well 
as the lucTauve commerce in atom- 
bomb materials, and the technologies 
for producing them for civilian uses, 
now made possible by the treats 

Perhaps that explains why agency 
inspectors were making only twice-a- 
year calls ui Iraq on the bomb-grade 
fuel that could be converted into 
weapons in two to three weeks 
Worse still was the failure of inspec- 
tors to find or even suspect secret 
nuclear weapons plants, or to detect 
secret production and recovery of 
pluloruum in safeguarded faciuues 

To his credit, the IAEA's director- 
gencral. Hans Blix, has reported ex- 
tensively to the board on safeguards 
weaknesses exposed by Iraq The 
Dutch proposal picks up on several 
of Mr Bin's points about the need 
for surprise inspections, more fre- 
quent and more intrusive regular in- 
fections, and broader coverage of 
IAEA safeguards to include natural 
Mraruur thai cannot be used di'rciN 



By Paul L. Leventhal 

in bombs but is used to produce 
bomb-grade uranium and plutonium. 

But may of the safeguards weak- 
nesses addressed by Mr. Bin and the 
Dutch are of the governing board's 
own making. For example, the board 
has refused to authorize snap inspec- 
tions of safeguarded facilities to 
check for unauthorized activities, or 
to authorize entry by demand into 
unsafeguarded facilities to determine 
whether nuclear materials are in pro- 
duction or storage, or to authorize 
safeguards on natural uranium 

The IAEA's model safeguards 
agreement with Nonproliferauon 
Treaty members authorizes these in- 
spections, but the board of governors 
has not permitted them because of 
objections from members that they 
would be too extensive and intrusive. 
The combination of a board that ap- 
plies a lowest-common-denommator 
principle to applying safeguards and 
a nuclear technocracy that applies 
safeguards to explosive materials that 
are inherentK unsafeguardable is a 
presenpuon for catastrophe Five 
fundamental reforms are needed 

• The IAEA membership should 
vote to amend the agency's statute to 
relieve the board of governors of its 
safeguards authority and limit the 
board to pursuing the agency's nucle- 
ar promotional activities. 

• The director-general should be 
authorized b> vote of the members to 
report to and serve under the direction 
of the UN Security Council on all 
safeguards matters, via a permanent 
form of the UN Special Commission 
to. up to oversee removal of weapons 
materials and plants from Iraq. 

• Proliferation-related intelligence 
should be channeled by the U.S and 
other governments to the Security 
Council via ihe new, permanent Spe- 
cial Commission, which would autho- 
rize IAEA challenge inspevuons or 



other UN-sponsored actions in any 
country in which safeguards violauons 
or weapons activities were suspected. 

• Since there is no way of knowing 
whether the IAEA has been effective 
in verifying that countries other than 
Iraq are not diverting nuclear materi- 
als or building bombs, all of the agen- 
cy's inspection reports should be re- . 
viewed by an independent, blue- 
ribbon panel named by the Security 
Council, and the results should be 
publicly reported. 

• The Security Council should au- 
thorize the IAEA director-general to 
propose international arrangements 
for supply of low-enriched uranium 
unsuitable for bombs and for custody 
over reactor-spent fuel and any re- 
covered plutonium. This method of 
minimizing weapons-capable urani- 
um and plutonium in civil programs 
is an important "atoms-for-peace" 
approach long abandoned by the 
IAEA board of governors, but one 
that could still work. 

Changes in the IAEA statute, 
which require a two-thirds vole of 
countries attending the annual con- 
ference and acceptance by two-thirds 
of all IAEA member states, arc need- 
ed to deal effectively with a govern- 
ing board that seeks to keep safe- 
guards as weak as possible. 

Experts argue the fine points of 
safeguards, but the public simply 
wants safeguards to delect nuclear 
bomb-making The public does not 
misunderstand safeguards, as some 
defenders of the IAEA suggest; the 
agency misunderstands what the 
public rightfully expects of «afe- 
guards as the pnee of continuing 
with atoms for peace and the Non- 
proliferauon Treaty. 

The writer, president of the Nuclear 
Control Institute in Washington, a » 
railing fellow at Cambridge Unmeni- 
ty's Global Seewlry Programme Me 
contributed this comment lo the Inter- 
manorial Hcroid Tnbnne 



173 



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174 



THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY 
AGENCY (IAEA): IMPROVING SAFEGUARDS 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEES ON 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND SCIENTIFIC 

AFFAIRS 

AND OX 

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE 

OP THE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION- 



MARCH 3 AND 18. 1!>M! 



Printed for the use of the Committee oil Korean Affairs 




D.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
WASHINGTON : 1982 



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178 



Nuclear Safeguards and 

Non-Proliferation in a 

Changing World Order 



LAWRENCE SCHEINMAN ' 
Cornell University, Ithaca NY 



1. Non-proliferation and Safeguards 

INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS are an essential element of the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime. In discussing safeguards, the words element and 
regime are central: although some critical assessments of international 
safeguards tend to equate their effectiveness with preventing proliferation, 
safeguards were never designed to prevent proliferation, so to judge them 
according to this criterion is to raise the wrong question and to foster the wrong 
expectations. 

Safeguards are only one part of a regime of norms, rules, institutions and 
procedures developed to support efforts to control the spread of nuclear 
weapons. 1 The regime is anchored in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 
1968 (NPT) and, in addition to the Treaty, includes national nuclear non- 
proliferation policies, supplier-state export controls, regional nuclear weapon- 
free zones, security assurances, and verification arrangements - principally the 
safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The 
NPT codifies the norm of non-proliferation and establishes the legal basis upon 
which non-nuclear-weapon states can contract undertakings not to produce or 
receive nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, and to submit their 
peaceful nuclear programs to international verification. 

Safeguards are a technical means oi verifying that states compiy with then- 
legal undertakings^ The legal undertakings define the scope of the safeguards 
to be applied. In the case oi the NPT, the purpose of safeguards is to provide, 
through verification of operating records and reports and on-site inspection, 
assurance that states are fulfilling their commitments to use nuclear energy for 
exclusively peaceful purposes. In so doing they provide confidence about the 
character oi nuclear activity in the safeguarded state, reinforce non- 



179 



Lawrence scheinman 



proliferation, and facilitate international nuclear cooperation for peaceful pur- 
poses. Although non-nuclear-weapon states are obliged under the NPT 'not to 
receive the transfer ...of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices...; 
not to manufacture or otherwise seek or receive any assistance in the manufac- 
ture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices', 3 safeguards extend 
only to verifying that nuclear energy (specifically nuclear material) is not 
diverted from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices. 4 Creating confidence involves the capability to detect (and, by risk of 
detection, deter) violations of this undertaking regarding the use of nuclear 
energy. 

As safeguards are carried out by an international organization that lacks 
independent political authority, their capability to provide assurance and to 
build confidence is largely determined by the authorities, resources, and politi- 
cal support that the instituting sovereign member-states provide. The leader- 
ship and determination of the international secretariat, which is responsible for 
day-to-day implementation of safeguards, also is relevant to their success in 
providing the sought-after confidence. 

Preventing proliferation is a matter of political will to which the regime as a 
whole contributes. But prevention begins at home. The first and most impor- 
tant line of defense against proliferation is the political decision that nuclear 
weapons do not serve the political or security interest of the state and that they 
are not in the national interest. Many factors enter into this calculation, both 
domestic and international. 5 Decisions are influenced by perceptions of local 
and regional security and stability, the dependability of alliances or security 
commitments, and by the general international environment - whether it is 
marked by tension and uncertainty, which may increase interest in nuclear 
weapons, or by detente and stability, which may diminish that interest. If 
nuclear-weapon states continue to emphasize the importance of nuclear assets 
to national security, this is bound to affect thinking in other states - just as 
progress toward nuclear disarmament as reflected in the INF and START 
agreements can encourage reinforcement of the commitment to non- 
proliferation, as well as to an extension of the NPT in 1995, and to a strengthen- 
ing of the regime. Safeguards contribute to shaping the environment against 
which assessments of national interest are made. If perceived as effective, they 
build confidence in security and reduce incentives to acquire nuclear weapons, 
or to preserve the option of doing so; if perceived as ineffective, they can work 
in reverse. 

2. Safeguards and Security 

While safeguards have always been a critical factor in national assessments of 
the value of the non-proliferation regime, they have become even more so in the 
post-Cold War period. As long as the Cold War persisted and the superpowers 
pursued a global competition, it was always presumed that the United States 
and the Soviet Union would control the threat of proliferation among their 



71-404 0-93-7 



180 



Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Prouferation in a Changi ng World Order 

allies or clients. To have done otherwise would have been to defeat the purpose 
for which the superpowers supported the concept of non-proliferation in the 
first place. The security guarantees they provided through their alliance 
systems made it unnecessary for those states to acquire nuclear weapons. 
Safeguards were important, but they were not alone. 

Where alliances or credible security guarantees did not exist - as in the case of 
India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa - the situation was more problematic. Since 
none of these states contracted non-proliferation obligations, legal restraints on 
proliferation were non-existent; but for largely political reasons, including the 
probable costs and risks of a regional nuclear arms race and of flying in the face 
of strong normative preferences against the spread of nuclear weapons held by 
states of importance to would-be proliferators, overt proliferation was never- 
theless avoided. Safeguards in these states were limited to material, facilities, or 
equipment acquired from outside suppliers; in these situations of only partial 
verification, safeguards provided little if any confidence regarding the charac- 
ter of national nuclear activity. However, from a political perspective, since 
confidence ends where safeguards end, outside states did not harbor false 
illusions about the nuclear programs in these countries. 

With the end of the Cold War, the situation is different. The changed circum- 
stances have brought about new opportunities and new challenges - opportu- 
nities to capitalize on the end of bipolarity and ideological conflict, to establish 
a new basis for world order and to introduce a measure of collective security; 
challenges to ensure that a nuclear multipolarity does not emerge. The United 
States and Russia are no longer engaged in a global competition; their active 
involvement in regional and local controversies in the Third World has sharply 
diminished, and so, in many cases, has their influence. Local and regional 
conflicts have displaced the older 'relationship of major tension' on the interna- 
tional agenda; and some countries in unstable regions, even though they are 
NPT parties, may see nuclear weapons as a means of promoting policies and 
interests which in some cases are expansionist, and which in the new situation 
become more feasible. This change creates new challenges for the non- 
proliferation regime and, as the discovery in the wake of the Gulf War of a 
major clandestine nuclear weapons development program in Iraq has made 
clear, imposes the challenge of new expectations on international verification 
and specifically on IAEA safeguards. It is this latter set of issues that draws our 
attention here. 

3. Safeguards Before Iraq 

Successive NPT Review Conferences have considered and validated the contri- 
bution of IAEA safeguards to non-proliferation. The consensus final document 
of the 1985 conference offers a succmct statement to this effect in saying that 
'IAEA safeguards provide assurance that States are complying with their 
undertakings... promote confidence among States and. ..help to strengthen their 
collective security.' 6 These conclusions were echoed in the 1990 NPT Review 






181 



Lawrence scheinman 



Conference draft final document. Of equal significance was the decision of 
Argentina and Brazil, two non-parties to the NPT, to accept IAEA full-scope 
safeguards to verify their recent bilateral non-proliferation arrangement, 7 con- 
firming the perceived security value and legitimacy of the system. 

In short, safeguards have performed largely as expected, and the IAEA has 
had a believable probability of detecting diversion of significant quantities of 
declared nuclear material. What happened in Iraq was not a breakdown of 
safeguards on declared material, but a circumventing of the system as de- 
signed, and of the regime as a whole. Export controls failed to stem the flow of 
equipment relevant to nuclear weapons development, and national intelli- 
gence failed to identify clandestine activities. 

Importantly, from the very outset, the comprehensive safeguards system 
devised in 1970 to implement IAEA verification responsibility under the NPT 
had in view the nuclear fuel cycles of the advanced industrial states, which at 
the time were the only states capable of mounting any kind of nuclear program. 
These states were concerned to minimize the risk that the distinction between 
themselves and the nuclear-weapon states inherent in the NPT would extend to 
the realm of peaceful nuclear activity and competition. At the same time their 
joining the NPT was the main concern of the United States and the Soviet 
Union, who were spearheading the negotiation of the Treaty. This led to the 
establishment of a verification regime that kept intrusion to the minimum 
consistent with credible verification, which focused on the flow of nuclear 
material rather than on nuclear facilities per se, and which resulted in certain 
constraints on how the Agency exercised the rather liberal rights originally 
granted it in its statute. 8 

The system is based on material accountancy, supplemented by containment 
and surveillance, to verify that all nuclear material under safeguards can be 
accounted for. The frequency of inspection is determined by the amount of 
nuclear material in a facility and not by the amount of nuclear material in the 
state as a whole. Non-discrimination between states is one of the underlying 
principles of implementation; the Agency does not make political judgments 
about the credibility of a state's non-proliferation commitment. 

One consequence of this system is that the amount and the intensity of 
safeguards increase with the size of the material inventory being verified. 
States with large nuclear programs consequently account for a very large 
proportion of IAEA inspection effort. Small programs on the other hand, with 
only modest inventories of nuclear material, are subject to only limited inspec- 
tion activity. The irony is that the states that have in fact become objects of 
proliferation concern in the past few years fall into this category. These new 
realities define one of the challenges for future verification. 

While the IAEA assumes that states entering into comprehensive safeguards 
agreements will declare and submit to safeguards all nuclear material that 
should be submitted, it does not discount the possibility of non-compliance, or 
that clandestine nuclear facilities capable of producing fissile materials that 



182 



Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Prouferation in a Changlng World Order 

could be used in a nuclear explosive device might exist in a safeguarded state, 
and it takes these possibilities into account in establishing its safeguards 
implementation plan. 9 On the other hand, IAEA safeguards are not an intelli- 
gence or policing mechanism. Agency inspectors cannot roam the countryside 
of states in search of undeclared nuclear material or facilities, and the prevail- 
ing expectation has been that if there were information indicating the existence 
of undeclared activity the state having that information would bring it to the 
attention of the IAEA or the UN Security Council, as it saw fit. As indicated 
above, the system has generated substantial confidence, and there is no reason 
to think that material under safeguards has been diverted from peaceful use. 
But it is equally clear that, as devised, the system assumed that all nuclear 
material subject to safeguards actually was declared, and it was not designed to 
detect fully clandestine nuclear activity; the capability to do so would have 
been seen by key interested parties as controverting the objective of minimizing 
intrusiveness. It is fortuitous that the countries that could have diverted nuclear 
material had no interest or incentive to do so, and hence the need to intrude 
further on national sovereignty never arose. This circumstance can no longer be 
assumed. 

4. The Impact of Iraq on Safeguards: The Emergence of New Expectations 

The effect on safeguards of the discovery of the extensive clandestine nuclear- 
weapons development program in Iraq was two-fold: First, it underscored that 
even under conditions of international treaty obligations and full-scope safe- 
guards, a state that was determined to cheat on its undertakings could success- 
fully do so by pursuing a strategy of developing a totally clandestine program 
that did not rely on material under safeguards. 10 In doing so, it illurrunated 
some of the limitations of conventional safeguards and the non-proliferation 
regime — the emphasis on nuclear material rather than both facilities and 
material, which made it possible to acquire or construct facilities without 
informing the IAEA of their existence before introducing nuclear material into 
them; determining the frequency of on-site inspections by the amount of 
nuclear material in a single facility rather than the amount of material in the 
country as a whole; limitations on knowledge about the scope of national 
nuclear activities resulting from the fact that NFT verification focuses only on 
diversion of nuclear material, and does not subject other NFT obligations to 
international verification, thus providing only partial transparency; weak- 
nesses in national export control policies and laws, especially for dual-use 
items. Countries can get rather close to nuclear-weapons-capability without 
being detected in the process, and in certain respects without violating the 
black letter law of the Treaty. In a sense, Iraq was an opportune event, for it 
directed attention to the limitations and weaknesses of the regime and of 
safeguards at the very outset oi the post-Cold War world, and provided the 
justification for evaluating what would be required to sustain confidence in the 
regime under new political circumstances. 



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Lawrence scheinman 



The second effect of the Iraqi affair was to alter political expectations regard- 
ing the breadth of safeguards coverage. Hitherto, the expectation was that the 
IAEA would verify that all declared nuclear material could be accounted for. 
Now, the expectation extends to providing assurance that no undeclared mate- 
rial or clandestine facilities or activities exist in states that have ratified the NPT 
and have entered into comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA. 
Redefining expectations means reassessing the authorities, resources and po- 
litical support which the international community that now holds these expec- 
tations is prepared to provide to the institutions charged with implementation. 

5. Satisfying New Expectations 

Since strengthening safeguards is only part of the problem of strengthening 
non-proliferation, the issue is how to satisfy this new expectation — whether it 
can be achieved within the framework of existing institutions and authority, 
whether additional authority needs to be prescribed, or whether a totally new 
approach involving new institutions is required. It is imperative to keep in 
mind the interdependence between expectations, authority, and resources. To 
meet expectations, appropriate authority must be granted and adequate hu- 
man, technical, and financial resources made available. In addition, political 
support for the responsible implementing institutions is essential — especially 
the will to enforce compliance with legal commitments and to take sanctioning 
action against violations when these are brought to the attention of political 
authority. Of course, the implementing institution must have leadership and 
direction from its senior management as well as a professional and dedicated 
staff. 

6. New Institutions or Strengthening the IAEA? 

In response to the new situation, some have advocated establishing a new 
verification authority based on the United Nations Special Commission 
(UNSCOM) that was created pursuant to UN Security Council RES/687 to 
carry out the provisions of that resolution for inspection, removal, destruction, 
or rendering harmless of all chemical and biological weapons and all ballistic 
missiles and supporting materials and faculties in Iraq. (The tasks related to 
Iraq's nuclear activities were entrusted to the IAEA with the assistance and 
cooperation of the Special Commission.) Partisans of this approach include (a) 
those who are instinctively distrustful of international organizations and prefer 
to maintain control through bilateral arrangements or, if that is not feasible, 
something closely controlled by, and directly responsible to, a limited member- 
ship bodv such as the UN Security Council which is predominated by the major 
states; and (b) those who have never had much confidence in the IAEA, because 
of its promotional responsibilities which are seen as countervailing effective 
regulation, or the emphasis given to cooperation in conducting inspections, or 
the large and heterogeneous governing Board through which crucial decisions 
would have to pass. 



184 



Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Prouferation in a Changing World Order 

There is not much that can be said to those who distrust anything that they do 
not directly control, other than that this is too narrow and unrealistic an 
approach to international order. As for those who have reservations about the 
IAEA, some of their concerns are legitimate - but in the main correctable - and 
others are inherent in any organization. It is naive to assume that by creating a 
new institution one will escape attributes of bureaucracy that affect all organi- 
zations. As far as emphasis on cooperation is concerned, it is clear that even the 
'adversarial' bilateral agreements such as LNF and START require considerable 
cooperation to achieve their objectives, and that while they may have more 
adversarial roots, they are not necessarily any less cooperative. IAEA coopera- 
tion has always been predicated on the principle that, in the final analysis, 
nothing less than independent verification will suffice to allow it to reach a 
conclusion regarding accountability and non-diversion. The capacity of a 
heterogenous Board of Governors consisting of advanced and developing 
states, nuclear-weapon and non-weapon states, and both parties and non- 
parties to the NPT to take hard decisions swiftly, was demonstrated in July and 
September 1991, when the Board twice condemned Iraq for violating its safe- 
guards undertakings and reported these violations to the Security Council. It is 
also well to remember that governing bodies of international organizations act 
on the instructions of governments, and that the actions of representatives to 
the IAEA or to the United Nations are defined by the same government. There 
is no inherent reason why political determination vis-a-vis non-proliferation 
should differ, whether it entails an action by the Board of Governors or the 
Security Council acting in response to a report of non-compliance from the 
IAEA Board." 

The main effort to meet new circumstances and new expectations has focused 
on re-examining existing safeguards authority and clarifying or building on it 
as appropriate. Considerable attention has been given to the Agency's right of 
special inspection which derives from the statutory right to access 'at all times 
to all places and data...' 12 and is inscribed in the safeguards document, LNFCLRC/ 
153, that governs IAEA full-scope safeguards agreements. This is to be distin- 
guished from the inspection rights given the IAEA under the authority of 
Security Council RES/ 687, which in a number of respects extended beyond the 
rules, procedures, and techniques normally applied by the Agency. 

7. Special Inspections 

Special inspections are normally precipitated by reports submitted by the 
inspected state concerning a loss of material or change of containment, or by the 
Agency because the information made available by the state is not sufficient to 
enable the Agency to fulfill its safeguards responsibilities. 13 Pursuant to a 
recommendation of the 1990 NPT Review Conference that the IAEA take full 
advantage of special inspection rights to address questions about the complete- 
ness of the safeguards coverage of a state's nuclear material, the Agency 
examined their scope and applications and concluded that its right to conduct 



185 



Lawrence scheinman 



special inspections was not limited only to other locations within a declared 
facility, but also included locations and facilities other than those notified to the 
Agency by the state. It also concluded that the request could be based on 
plausible information from sources other than safeguards inspections, includ- 
ing national intelligence information. 14 The Board of Governors subsequently 
reaffirmed this right, and acknowledged the Director General's indication of 
how he intended to implement special inspection authority. Given the context 
in which the scope of special inspections has been discussed, it is clear that what 
had at one time been seen principally as a means of resolving uncertainties and 
ambiguities has now also become an instrument to investigate suspected non- 
compliance and clandestine activity. 

Clarifying the authority for special inspections is one thing; having the 
information upon which to predicate a call for such an inspection is another. 
The Director General has emphasized that information regarding where to look 
in a state has been an even more decisive factor in successfully carrying out 
inspections in Iraq under RES/ 687 than the extensive rights of access granted 
the Agency under that resolution. Following this line of reasoning, then, if the 
IAEA not only makes optimal use of the many sources of information available 
to it through its routine safeguards, technical assistance, and safety activities, 
but is also assured timely access to information from member states resulting 
from their intelligence activities, this can significantly enhance the scope of 
safeguards credibility. 

However important it is to have information, it also is important to have 
assured access to locations that might have undeclared material or facilities. 
Access depends on the state. Presumably, a state that has something to hide will 
not readily admit international inspectors into its territory even if it is obligated 
to do so. 15 Refusal of access can lead to a finding of non-compliance which, 
under its statute, the IAEA Board of Governors is obliged to report to the UN 
Security Council. 

8. Securing Compliance 

The convergence of responsibility for enforcing compliance with international 
undertakings in the Security Council underscores a third element, along with 
information and access, in the equation of effective safeguards. In Iraq, enforce- 
ment has been taking place pursuant to Security Council resolutions based on 
a finding of a threat to international peace "and security resulting from Iraqi 
aggression against Kuwait. Enforcing treaties is not, however, a routine Secu- 
rity Council responsibility, and unless the Council were to resolve that viola- 
tions of non-proliferation undertakings or safeguards commitments ipso facto 
constituted a threat to international peace and security, reports of violation and 
non-compliance would have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Even so, 
the very fact of sustained action to divest Iraq of all capabilities to produce 
weapons of mass destruction, puts would-be violators on notice that compara- 



186 



Nuclear Safeguards and Non-proliferation in a Changing World Order 

ble action could be agreed again, even in the absence of a compelling need to 
answer an aggression in violation of the Charter. 

In January 1992, the President of the Security Council, following a meeting of 
Heads of State and Government of Council members, stated that the prolifera- 
tion of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international 
peace and security. On nuclear proliferation, the members of the Council noted 
the importance of the decision of many states to adhere to the NPT and 'the 
integral role in the implementation of that Treaty of fully effective IAEA 
safeguards'. It was also stated that members of the Council 'will take appropri- 
ate measures in the case of any violations of safeguards notified to them by the 
IAEA.' 16 The importance of this step cannot be disputed; nor should it be 
exaggerated, given that it was made in the midst of a continuing crisis in Iraq, 
and a then present sense of unity of purpose on the Council. What would be still 
more helpful, and of even greater deterrent value, would be a formal Security 
Council resolution declaring that violations of non-proliferation and of interna- 
tional safeguards prima facie will be regarded as threats to peace and security 
and addressed under the Chapter VTI authority of the Council. 

9. Nuclear Transparency 

The second main area of attention has been in enhancing nuclear transparency. 
The more that is known about a country's nuclear profile, the more comprehen- 
sive the analysis and the verification can be, and the more confidence the 
verifying agency can have in its conclusions. The decision of the Board of 
Governors to endorse a proposal calling upon all parties to comprehensive 
safeguards agreements to inform the Agency of initial design information at the 
time of the decision to construct or to authorize construction or modification of 
any nuclear facility, and for adapting, where appropriate, the related subsidi- 
ary arrangements thus establishing a basis of obligation, paved the way to 
developing an early warning system. 17 Access to such information not only 
expands the information base upon which the IAEA can formulate verification 
strategies for the state; it also provides the IAEA with the opportunity to visit 
the construction site periodically, even though nuclear material may not yet be 
present, thus getting around the stipulation in the NPT safeguards system that 
the flow of nuclear material is what is subject to safeguards. 

Another means of increasing transparency is through a comprehensive sys- 
tem of reporting exports, imports and production of nuclear material, equip- 
ment particularly relevant to nuclear activity, and sensitive non-nuclear mate- 
rials (e.g. pure graphite, heavy water). Efforts to achieve consensus on this are 
still under discussion at the IAEA. Significant reporting requirements already 
exist, but even comprehensive safeguards agreements do not provide for 
complete reporting. A system oi obligatory reporting of all of these elements 
will require establishing new bases of legal obligation, as would other meas- 
ures that, if agreed to, could enhance transparency and build early warning into 
safeguards - such as requiring all full-scope safeguards states to provide 



187 



Lawrence scheinman 



complete information on their nuclear research and development activities in 
addition to all programs involving peaceful use of nuclear energy; or allowing 
for re-verification of design information even in the absence of a change in the 
operating conditions of the facility in question (the normal condition calling for 
a re-examination of design information). 

The point of all of this is that today, confidence in verification is being 
measured not only by the ability of a system to confirm that what a state which 
has accepted comprehensive safeguards declares to exist can be accounted for, 
but that everything that should be declared is known and under safeguards, 
and that activities or violations that put at risk the security of others will be 
detected before they become an actual threat. Thus far, the means to this end 
has been to identify the limitations of the existing safeguards system, to 
examine its authority base, to ensure that existing authority will be used to its 
fullest, and where necessary to seek to reinforce and expand that authority. All 
of this is occurring, or should be occurring, with the understanding that 
safeguards - even robust, intrusive, 'adversarial' safeguards - are not panaceas 
and cannot prevent a determined state from seeking to cheat and to acquire 
nuclear weapons. But an effective system can raise the costs of cheating, and in 
doing so, contribute to deterring the effort. 

10. Limits of the Possible 

As just suggested, even with an optimally invigorated safeguards system there 
is no 100% guarantee. If anything demonstrates this truth it is the difficulty 
encountered by the United Nations in Iraq in implementing, under exception- 
ally favorable circumstances, a draconian verification program and in achiev- 
ing assurance that all that should be known about Iraq's nuclear development 
program and assets has been discovered. 

Even if safeguards are strengthened and reinforced along the lines discussed 
above, there can be other problems, such as verifying the initial inventory of a 
state that has had an unsafeguarded nuclear program in existence for some 
time before accepting comprehensive safeguards. South Africa and North 
Korea are current cases in point; while unlikely, it is not completely out of the 
question that at some time in the future India, Pakistan, and even Israel might 
accept full-scope safeguards as part of a political settlement that removes their 
incentive for at least maintaining a nuclear option. How is one to know that the 
submitted inventory is correct? To raise a question one must have information; 
if there is no information on which to act, perhaps because activities were 
undertaken at a time when intelligence gathering was not focused on the state 
or in the right place, then one does not know where to ask to go. South Africa 
operated an enrichment facility for a number of years before joining the NPT 
and accepting full-scope safeguards. North Korea operated a 5 MVV 
unsafeguarded reactor for a penod of six years prior to completing its safe- 
guards agreement with the IAEA. Records and reports may provide a picture of 
apparent completeness, but there will always be a measure of doubt. At some 



188 



Nuclear Safeguards and Non-proliferation in a Changing World Order 

point, it must be decided to accept the risk of incompleteness and, as political 
relationships improve and the sense of security increases and normalization 
sets in, the possibility that the initial inventory was incomplete becomes in- 
creasingly irrelevant. If the world ever were to adopt agreement on zero 
nuclear weapons, this risk would have to be factored in: one would never be 
certain that all the weapons were accounted for; one only could hope that 
political relationships were moving in a direction that would make irrelevant 
any weapons that might never have been reported. 

11. Regional Approaches to Safeguards and Non-Proliferation 

Finally, there is the question of how relevant regional verification arrange- 
ments are to the efficacy of international safeguards. In some regions like the 
Korean peninsula, the Middle East, or South Asia, additive regional measures 
may be not only desirable, but in fact necessary. In South America, where 
Argentina and Brazil have long been engaged in a political competition involv- 
ing a threatening development of nuclear capabilities that could have been 
converted into a local nuclear arms race, a move to democratization, as well as 
changes in national political leadership and in the broader international envi- 
ronment, have led to mutual pledges of non-proliferation, progress toward 
ratification and implementation of the Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free 
Zone, and the establishment of a regional verification regime that relies sub- 
stantially on the safeguards system of the IAEA. The regional system is both a 
stepping stone to assimilation into the broader international verification sys- 
tem and a necessary element to support and to consolidate the foreclosing of 
nuclear weapons as a way of achieving security or promoting political status. 
In the Korean peninsula, where tensions have been high for the past four 
decades, the governments of North and South Korea in December 1991, con- 
cluded an agreement on a non-nuclear Korea. This involved commitments not 
to receive, possess, produce, test or deploy nuclear weapons; to ban both 
enrichment and reprocessing; and to establish a mutual inspection regime to 
verify implementation of the agreement. In April 1992, North Korea also 
ratified a long-overdue safeguards agreement with the IAEA. While the IAEA 
agreement is now being implemented, at the time of this writing there has been 
less progress with respect to the bilateral agreement than had been anticipated. 
Questions continue regarding the status and future of the partially completed 
reprocessing facility in North Korea which already served to produce a gram 
quantity of plutonium, and the bilateral verification system is yet to be acti- 
vated. A robust regional inspection arrangement in Korea would help to 
increase openness and transparency in what has been a very closed society; it 
would also serve to complement and reinforce IAEA safeguards. With a two- 
tiered inspection arrangement, each system could not only add to the credibil- 
ity of the findings of the other, but difficulties encountered in implementing 
one system would put the other on alert regarding its completeness and its 
integrity. 









189 



Lawrence scheinman 



The Middle East today, as in the past, poses a particularly dangerous prolif- 
eration situation. It is widely assumed that Israel has produced nuclear weap- 
ons; and the discoveries in Iraq revealed a long-standing and extensive nuclear 
weapons development program. Other countries in the region including Libya 
and Iran, both NPT parties, and Algeria, a non-party, are frequently mentioned 
as sources of proliferation concern. The challenge here is not only how to avert 
further proliferation in the region, but how to facilitate nuclear reversal by 
states which have taken steps toward weapon development. The verification 
measures incorporated in UN Security Council Resolution 687 are often cited as 
precedent for a region-wide arrangement, and language suggestive of such an 
approach is to be found in the resolution. However, 687 is more a punitive 
instrument than a precursor for verification among states that have voluntary 
negotiated a non-proliferation or nuclear weapon-free zone agreement. On the 
other hand, here as in the Korean peninsula, it seems evident that some kind of 
regional verification system providing for very liberal, swift, and assured 
access by nationals of states party to such agreements will be essential to 
securing any such type agreement. Here also a two-tiered system of verification 
could be mutually reinforcing and provide the level of assurance and credibil- 
ity necessary for confidence-building to take place. 

Whatever their value, regional verification arrangements should not be con- 
sidered as substitutes for international verification, which should remain a sine 
qua non. Rather, they should be seen as parallel structures, endowed with an 
authority which goes beyond what could reasonably be expected to be granted 
to an international organization, but which is necessary in situations where 
mistrust is the essence of relationships and mutuality and reciprocity the only 
basis for agreement. Regional arrangements can include measures beyond 
what can plausibly be agreed for an international authority which must neces- 
sarily approach its responsibilities in a nondiscriminatory fashion and which is 
unlikely to be granted the depth of authority that might be granted to a regional 
institution. Among the measures that might be included in a regional arrange- 
ment are challenge inspections in which no justification may be required and 
which may be carried out at any location designated by the challenger, and /or 
quota inspections involving a designated number of inspections at either 
previously specified sites, or at any site selected by the inspecting party. 
Regional investigative arrangements conducted by nationals of directly con- 
cerned states will enjoy a higher political credibility in the latter than even the 
most rigorous international verification system. However, international verifi- 
cation remains the only means by which to satisfy out-of-region states, many of 
whom may have fundamental interests in regional security and stability. 



190 



Nuclear Safeguards and Non-proliferation ln a Changlng World Order 

NOTES AND REFERENCES 

* Lawrence Scheinman is Professor of Government (International Law & Relations) at 
Cornell University and Associate Director of the Peace Studies Program. He has served 
in senior posts in the United States Department of State (Principal Deputy to the 
Deputy Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology) and 
Energy Research and Development Administration (Head of Office of International 
Policy Planning) as well as in the International Atomic Energy Agency (Special Advisor 
to the Director General). He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the 
Washington Council on Nonproliferation, the National Council of the Federation of 
American Scientists, the Core Group of the Programme on Promoting Nuclear 
Nonproliferation, and the Advisory Committee on Nonproliferation of the Atiantic 
Council of the United States. His most recent book on the subject of non-proliferation is 
The International Atomic Energy Agency and World Nuclear Order. 

1 For a general discussion of the concept of regime see Stephen Krasner ed. International 
Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Oran Young, 'International 
Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation', World Politics, 32, April 1980, pp. 331-356. 
For a discussion of regime as applied in the case of non-proliferation see Lewis A. 
Dunn, Controlling the Bomb, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981); Lawrence 
Scheinman, The Nonproliferation Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1985). 

2 For a comprehensive introduction to the nature and scope of international safeguards 
see David Fischer and Paul Szasz, Safeguarding the Atom: A Critical Appraisal (Stockholm 
and London: SIPRI and Taylor and Franas, 1985). 

3 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, A. II. 

4 Ibid., Article III. 

5 For analysis of the decision-making in several critical non-nuclear weapon states see 
Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Non-Proliferation (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1988). 

6 Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the NPT as reproduced in Jozef 
Goldblat, Twenty Years of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Implementation and Prospects (Oslo: 
PRIO, 1990), Appendix XII. 

7 See John R Redick, 'Argentina and Brazil's New Arrangement for Mutual Inspections 
and IAEA Safeguards', (Washington DC: Nuclear Control Institute. February 1992) for 
a discussion of the Foz de Iguaca agreement and the Argentine- Brazil Agency for 
Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material. 

8 See Jon Jennekens, IAEA Safeguards - Emerging Issues', Fourth Internanonal 
Conference on Facility Operations - Safeguards Interface', (Albuquerque, NM, 
29 September-4 October 1991). 

9 This is managed in the case of safeguarded material by use of interim inspecnons 
conducted at sufficiently frequent intervals to be able to detect a diversion of such 
material. The timeliness goal for detecting the diversion of spent nuclear fuel which, if 
reprocessed, would yield separated plutonium, is currentiy three months. 

10 It is significant that Iraq chose a totally clandestine approach rather than relying on 
diversion of safeguarded nuciear material. This suggests that Iraqi nuclear personnel 
were of the view that IAEA safeguards would detect a diversion. 

11 It cannot go unsaid that the Iraq situation was exceptional in the sense that its action 
against Kuwait had been universally condemned, and it was under severe Secuntv 
Council sanctions when the Board met to consider findings regarding the Iraqi program, 
and that under more ambivalent circumstances Board action might not have been so 
clear. But neither might Security Council acnon be as determined and unanimous 
under less egregious conditions. It may also be noted that while the Board of Governors 



191 



Lawrence scheinman 



has endorsed a number of measures to strengthen safeguards, a number of states have 
done so grudgingly and with concern that they may be opening a Pandora's box. 
.2 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Article XII.A.6. 

13 International Atomic Energy Agency, The Structure and Content of Agreements Between 
the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), para. 73. 

14 GOV /INF/6 13, June, 1991. 

15 In some cases, access may be denied for reasons other than non-compliance with 
safeguards undertakings, such as safety-related considerations: but this does not release 
the state of its obligation to satisfy the verification authority that all material and 
faculties that should be reported and placed under safeguards in fact have been. 

16 United Nations Security Council, S/23500, 31 January 1992. 

17 See IAEA Press Release PR 92/12, 26 February 1992. 



192 



Lessons From Post- War Iraq for the 
International Full-Scope Safeguards Regime 



Lawrence Scheinman 



The discovery after the Gulf War of 
an extensive Iraqi nuclear weapon 
development program severely 
shook public confidencein the nuclear non- 
proliferation regime in general, and the 
safeguards program administered by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) under the nuclear Non-Prolifera- 
hon Treaty (NIT), in particular. 

This questioning of IAEA effectiveness 
contrasts sharply with the judgment 
rendered by the NPT parties as recently as 
1990 Repeating almost verbatim the con- 
clusion reached in the 1985 NPT Review 
Conference, the final draft document of the 
Fourth Review Conference reaffirmed that 
the NPT "is vital to preventing the spread 
of nuclear weapons and in providing sig- 
nificant secuntv benefits" It stronglv en- 
dorsed the effectiveness of the IAEA. 
saying the agency's safeguards "provide 
assurance that States are complving with 
their undertakings and assist States in 
demonstranng this compliance," and that 
these safeguards "promote further con- 
fidence among states and, being a fun- 
damental element of the Treatv, help to 
strengthen their collective security." 



Original Safeguards Political Factors 

If there is now a diminished con- 
fidence in some quarters in the effective- 
ness of the IAEA, it stems from a basic 
change in the expectations brought on bv 
the Iraqi experience about what degree of 
non-proliferation assurance safeguards 
should provide. When the svstem was 
devised in 1970 to implement IAEA 
verification responsibility under the NPT. it 
wa> locused on the nuclear tuel cvcles of 
the advanced industrial states, which at the 
time were the onlv states capable oi mount- 

La'wrence SchenimtDi i> professor of $ovem- 
tnent and associate director of the Peace Studies 
Program lit Cornell Umvenitv. 



"[Iraq] provided the 
justification for 
evaluating the 
safeguards regime 
under new political 
circumstances, so that 
appropriate corrective 
measures could be 
taken when necessary. 
It is now up to the 
individual states 
within the 
international system 
to take advantage of 
this opportunity." 



ing anv kind of nuclear weapon program. 
The United States and the Soviet Union, 
which were spearheading the negotiations, 
were chiefly concerned about ensuring the 
participation of these states in the NPT 

Even conceding the political and 
secuntv benetits of non-proliferanon. the 
advanced non-nuclear-weapon states were 
intent on guarding against the nsk that the 
distinction between weapon and non- 
weapon states inherent in the NPT would 
extend to peaceful nuclear achvitv and 
competition. In particular, thev wanted to 
ensure that in agreeing to forswear nuclear 
weapons or explosives thev would not 
hamper their ability to make full use of 
nuclear energv and technologv for peaceful 
purposes, and to compete in what was seen 
js .i growing international market tor 



nuclear energy. For these states, the sa 
guards system devised toensure their coi 
pliance would have to be crafted careru 
to cause as little interference as possib 
and protect as far as possible their comnu 
cial interests and proprietary informaho: 



Limited Intnisiveness a Coal 

These considerations led to tl 
development of a venhcation system th 
kept intrusion to the minimum consiste; 
with credible verification, and to tf 
development of certain constraints on ho 
the IAEA exercised the rather liberal ngh 
granted to it in its statute. In contrast wi- 
the IAEA's pre-NPT system, NPT sat 
guards focus on nuclear matenals rath 
than on nuclear matenals and facilities i 
the theorv that with total coverage 
material there is no need to sateguar 
facilities per se The NPT system err 
phasized establishing material balam 
areas and designating kev measureme: 
points where sateguards could be applie 
and the flow and inventory of nucle:. 
matenal could be determined. It stresse 
the importance ot using instrumentatio 
wherever possible so as to minimize th 
extent ot human inspecnon 

Routine inspection activines were : 
be supplemented by excepnonal measuri 
(namelv "special inspections") onlv i: 
cases where the IAEA was unable to inch 
pendentiv venrv that all nuclear mater: 
under sateguards could be accounted fo- 
ot where it was informed of the existence* 
undeclared nuclear matenal. A few speci. 
inspections were earned out under th 
former provision but none on the basis < 
special information, because the IAE 
never received intormanon regarding pi 
sible undeclared nuclear matenal upo: 
which it could act. 

Legally, states entenng into full-scor 
safeguards agreements with the IAEA. ^ 
part ot their \PT undertakings, w-er- 



193 



obligated to declare all nuclear material 
being used in peaceful nuclear activities. In 
practice, while the IAEA assumed that 
states would comply with this obligabon, it 
did not discount the possibility of non- 
compliance, or that clandestine nuclear 
facilities capable of producing fissile 
materials that could be used in a nuclear 
explosive device might exist in safe- 
guarded states, and it took these possi- 
bilities into account in establishing its 
safeguards implementation plan. 

It is worth noting that because of the 
concerns of these states, the system, from 
the outset, was not focussed on ferreting 
out and detecting fully clandestine nuclear 
activities that did not rely in any way on 
safeguarded nuclear material. It was as- 
sumed that states would declare all their 
material. When the NPT was being created 
and consensus was being solicited, the level 
of intrusiveness necessary to find hilly clan- 
destine nuclear activities would have been 
seen by the key interested non-nuclear- 
weapon states as controverting their objec- 
tive of minimizing intrusiveness. It was 
thus generally assumed that the IAEA 
would detect the diversion of any declared 
nuclear material, but that any undeclared 
or clandestine activity would be detected 
bv other means, primarily intelligence 
sources, and presumably brought to the 
agency's attention. 



Iraq as a Case Study 

Until Iraq, safeguards, although not 
trouble free, performed largely as expected, 
and the IAEA had a reasonable probability 
of detecting diversion of significant quanti- 
ties of declared nuclear material. On bal- 
ance, the system was consistent with the 
expectations of the states that designed it. 
with the dispersion of capabilities neces- 
sary to acquire nuclear weapons, and with 
the bipolar political environment domi- 
nated by two superpowers w'hose alliance 
structures and nuclear umbrellas deterred 
most states from seeking to acquire nuclear 
weapons. What happened in Iraq was not 
the breakdown of saieguards on declared 
nuclear material, but a circumventing of the 
system, and the regime as a whole. Export 
controls failed to stem thee flow ot equip- 
ment and components relevant to nuclear 
weapon development. Safeguards, which 
were not geared to cope with a totally 
clandestine nuclear program, failed to 
identity theexistence of undeclared nuclear 
activities. Moreover, national intelligence 
apparently tailed to identify the extent of 
clandestine acnvities 



Iraq's Impact on the Regime 

The impact of Iraq on the safeguards 
regime was twofold: first, it underscored 
that even under conditions of verified inter- 
national treaty obligations and full-scope 
safeguards, a state that was determined to 
cheat on its undertakings could successful- 
ly do so, developing a totally clandestine 
program that did not rely on material or 
facilities under safeguards. This reality 
highlighted some of the limitations of a 
system that placed primary emphasis on 
nuclear material accounting when, for ex- 
ample, there was the possibility for a 
country to acquire or construct nuclear 
facilities without informing the IAEA until 
it was ready to receive nuclear material. 

Another limitation illuminated by the 
Iraqi experience was the practice of cou- 
pling the frequency of inspection to the 
amount of nuclear material in a particular 
plant or material balance area rather than 
in the country as a whole, a practice which 
could and did result in less frequent inspec- 
tions than might have been warranted by 
political concerns about the safeguarded 
state. As an international organization it 
was not feasible for the IAEA to overtly 
discriminate in the application of 
safeguards between states under a com- 
mon system. 

Moreover, there were limits on how 
much knowledge the IAEA had about the 
scope of national nuclear activities because 
NPT verification focused only on the diver- 
sion of nuclear material and not on the full 
range of obligations implied by a commit- 
ment to non-proliferation. 

In a sense, the Gulf War was an oppor- 
tune event because it directed attenhon to 
the limitations and weaknesses of safe- 
guards and of the NPT regime at the very 
outset of the post-Cold War period. 
Moreover, it provided the justification for 
evaluating the safeguards regime under 
new political circumstances, so that ap- 
propriate corrective measures could be 
taken when necessary. It is now up to the 
individual states within the international 
system to take advantage of this oppor- 
tunity. 

The second effect of the Iraqi affair was 
to alter political expectations regarding the 
breadth ot safeguards coverage. As already 
noted, until now the expectation was that 
the IAEA would verify that all declared 
nuclear material could be accounted for. 
Now the expectation extends to providing 
assurance that no undeclared material or 
clandestine facilities or activities exist in 
states that have ratified the NPT or 
equivalent non-proliferation agreements 



with the IAEA Redefining expectations 
means reassessing the authority, resources 
and political support that the international 
community, which now holds these expec- 
tations, is prepared to provide to the institu- 
tions charged with implementation of this 
broader safeguards regime." 



Focus on Special Inspections 

Thus far. the mam effort to meet new 
circumstances and new expectations has 
focused on re-examining existing safe- 
guards authority and clarifying or building 
upon it as appropriate. Considerable atten- 
tion has been given to the IAEA's right of 
special inspection, which derives from the 
statute allowing access "at all times to all 
places and data." and is incorporated in 
safeguards document DMFCIRC/153 that 
governs IAEA full-scope safeguards agree- 
ments. 

This special inspection right is dif- 
ferent from the inspection rights given the 
IAEA under the authority of UN Security 
Council Resolution 687, the Gulf War cease- 
fire resolution. In a number of important 
respects, resolution 687 extends beyond the 
rules, procedures and techniques usually 
applied by the agency, and cannot realisti- 
cally be viewed as the new standard prac- 
tice for safeguards activities in normal 
circumstances. 

The IAEA Board of Governors has con- 
firmed that the right ot special inspection 
extends not only to additional locations at 
declared sites, but also to undeclared loca- 
tions and facilities if there is plausible 
evidence that undeclared nuclear material 
may be present at these sites 

While the IAEA and the UN Special 
Commission (UNSCOM), the UN body 
tasked with eliminating Iraq s weapons of 
mass destruction, have been publicly 
ennazed as having not done the job in Iraq, 
or for having done it poorlv an examina- 
tion of the facts leads to the conclusion that 
the IAEA adapted well to the newlv im- 
posed mandate from the Security Council 
UNSCOM's executive chairman said in a 
statement before the Security Council, 
"IAEA inspections have been very success- 
ful ... the nuclear area is the most emo- 
tional and political ot the Iraqi weapons 
programs. One should not believe all that 
he reads in the media on this issue." 

The decision to invoke a special inspec- 
tion rests with the IAEA director general, 
although in all probability he would first 
consult with members oi the Board of 
Governors If an inspection team is denied 
access it would be reported to the board. 



194 



which, based on the evidence, would call 
upon the state to comply with the request 
If conditions require it, the request for spe- 
cial inspection can be declared urgent and 
the state in question must then respond 
very quickly Failure to provide access 
would result in a finding of non-com- 
pliance, which the board would report to 
the Security Council (as it did on two oc- 
casions with respect to Iraq in 1991). 

This idea of confirming the right of 
special inspections at undeclared locations 
at the initiative of the safeguarding 
authority establishes an authoritative basis 
for a more robust safeguards system in 
which states presumably can have more 
confidence. Whether such a system actual- 
ly emerges in the near future depends on 
several considerations that can be divided 
into two components: external and inter- 
nal. 



The Need for Information 

From an external perspective, as the 
IAEA director general has noted, success 
depends in the first instance on the 
availability of information upon which to 
predicate a request for a special inspection. 
Primanlv, but not exclusively, this means 
the availability of national intelligence in- 
formation, which, as noted below, must 
also include safetv analvsis, research and 
development cooperation, technical assis- 
tance and so on, if the IAEA is to have a 
comprehensive information base. 

With regard to the issue of the sharing 
of intelligence information, the iurv is still 
out on the extent to which relevant infor- 
mation would be shared, and whether, as 
some contend, another institutional filter 
such as UNSCOM is needed to receive and 
evaluate such information- 
Even now. however, some mvthology 
can be dispelled In the case of Iraq, al- 
though intelligence information was 
provided to UNSCOM for the purpose of 
site selection, virtually the same informa- 
tion was shared with the IAEA, which was 
responsible tor conducting the actual in- 
spections. In the case of the IAEA visit (not 
inspection) to Iran in February' 1992.agencv 
site selection tor that visit was based in part 
on information provided from national in- 
telligence sources While it is true that 
intelligence authorities are inherently un- 
comfortable about sharing information 
with international institutions, there is no 
basis for the argument now made bv some 
that an institutionalized UNSCOM would 
be provided with relevant information 
while the IAEA would not There mav be 



nuances between the two, but it is too facile 
a proposition to argue that the IAEA would 
a pnon be excluded. 

The possibility should not be ruled out 
that as a result of the integration and 
analvsis of information drawn from routine 
safeguards activities, coupled with infor- 
mation derived from technical cooperation 
programs, nuclear safety activities, pub- 
lished material and the like, the agency 



the previously mentioned NTT review cc 
ferences, there also has existed a cert. 
sense that the IAEA is perhaps more a 
servative or more cautious than it should 
or need be. Over the past two decades i 
agency has experienced restraints on 
rights of access, on the intensity a 
frequency of inspection efforts, and even 
the extent to which it could exerase 
discretionary judgment in planning, schi 



". . . winning the non-proliferation battle is a 
multifaceted proposition involving a range of 
national, regional and international policies, 
processes and institutions of the states involved. 



could acquire a plausible base of informa- 
tion to justify a request for further inspec- 
tion in a state. In this regard, measures now 
in place to establish country officers with 
the responsibility to assimilate and eval- 
uate information concerning the nuclear 
programs of inspected states, to brief in- 
spectors before they go into the field and to 
participate in their debriefing upon return 
from an inspection, are excellent steps 
toward the goal of achieving increased 
knowledge and sensitivity about the char- 
acter of national nuclear activities. How 
well these measures are implemented 
remains to be seen. One concern is that 
while there is now much greater attention 
to country analysis, this responsibility 
comes in addition to existing IAEA ac- 
tivities, but without the additional resour- 
ces to do a proper analytical job 

Several other external requirements 
are necessary for robust and credible 
safeguards These include assuring the 
IAEA the right of unimpeded access to 
designated locations to carry out anv spe- 
cial inspection, and, related to this, the sup- 
port of political authorities (primarily the 
Security Council) to ensure that this right is 
respected. 



'Organizational Culture' Problems 

The internal component to successful 
implementation of a regime involving a 
higher reliance on special inspections in the 
tuture involves the mind -set. attitudes and 
behavior — what is being called the "or- 
ganizational culture" — of the agency and 
of those responsible for implementing in- 
ternational safeguards While the IAEA has 
earned the confidence of its membership in 
implementing safeguards, as reflected in 



uling and conducting inspections. Patter 
of conservatism and self-constraint becar 
internalized to the extent that the agen 
occasionally gave more ground than nect 
sary in negotiating subsidiary arranj 
ments that regulate the operational side 
safeguards agreements. 

Moreover, the emphasis on mater 
accountancy has led to an almost obsessi 
focus on sharpening and improving the . 
tainment of quantitative goals, as 
precision and objectivity alone provid 
credibility This came all too often to t 
exclusion of any awareness of the setting 
which nuclear activity was taking plai 
This has led some observers to right 
criticize the IAEA tor having satisfied its. 
regarding Iraq s nuclear compliance bv a 
counting for declared nuclear mater 
while ignoring the obvious large-scale 2 
tivity going on around the safeguard, 
facilities. 



Overcoming Past Limits 

Toovercome these limitations requir 
two things: leadership at the level of t: 
Board of Governors and leadership in t: 
secretariat. The board is a reflection ot tl 
political will and interests ot memb 
states If the political will is present at tt 
national level to ensure that the IAEA 
fullv effective in carrying out its respo- 
sibilities. there is no reason such a sentime 
should not be represented in the governir 
board. If this assumption is correct, ti 
IAEA should be able to implement a me 1 
far-reaching and intrusive safeguarc 
regime, not onlv with respect to speci 
inspections, but lor routine inspection ,i 
tivitv as well. However, it should not : 
forgotten that it took extraordinary cr 



195 



cumstances to move the board to endorse 
the Secretariat's proposals accepted so far 
(special inspections, early reporting of 
design information, universal reporting of 
nuclear material and equipment particular- 
ly relevant to nuclear activity). More to the 
point, the endorsement was granted with 
some anxiety because sovereignty remains 
a vigorous and contradictory force against 
empowering international institutions 
with far-reaching authority. On the other 
hand, if governments would be willing to 
institute strong non-proliferation measures 
at the Security Council level, they should be 
equally willing to support vigorous 
measures by a technical international or- 
ganization whose conclusions regarding 
treaty compliance may ultimately be the 
source for forceful action that is then 
needed at the polibcal level. To act other- 
wise would be not only illogical but 
counterproduebve. For this reason, con- 
cerned states such as the United States 
should be taking active leadership roles in 
bringing increased political and other sup- 
port — including intelligence support — to 
the IAEA and to the Security Council (see 
p. 3). 



Strong Leadership at the Top 

Leadership within the Secretariat is no 
less important Here, the director general 
has set a tone bv making dear his intention 
to invoke agency authority where ap- 
propriate. He is also seeking to inculcate 
new values bv encouraging the staff to be 
more sensitive to the new political condi- 
tions in which the IAEA wiU operate in the 
future and to be more aware of the relation- 
ship between its technical responsibilities 
and the overriding political purpose of 
safeguards. But it is difficult to sav whether 
the necessary coherence of mission, morale 
and team building that is fundamental to 
an effective new orientation toward 
safeguards has taken firm root. Leadership 
bv example at all levels of management, 
rather than leadership bv directive, is what 
is ulhmatelv required to inspire and sustain 
a sense of purpose and to achieve the neces- 
sary' integration and coherence. The IAEA 
nas operated heretofore pnmanlv on the 
principle of leadership by direchve. 

All of this suggests what lessons the 
!AEA has — or should have — drawn (but 
not necessarily internalized) from the Iraq 
experience On one level, there is the need 
to integrate method and purpose more sys- 
tematically, to be more probing, more alert, 
more sensitive to the political environment 
and to the risk of change and unpre- 



dictability The IAEA Secretariat must un- 
derstand that achieving quantitative goals 
of accounting for declared nuclear 
materials and equipement is only one step 
toward attaining international credibility; it 
is also necessary to be aware of the total 
context in which safeguards are applied. 

On another level, member states must 
also draw lessons from the expenence with 
Iraq if international safeguards are to be 
truly effective. The idea that access to infor- 
mation and political support for implemen- 
tation of authority are prerequisites for 
effectively meeting political expectations 
must be incorporated into the consensus 
among member states in their support for 
the Secretariat. It cannot be underscored too 
heavily that the IAEA is not just a 
secretariat, but an international organiza- 
tion consisting of sovereign states that 
define the Secretariat s authority, furnish its 
resources, and provide the polibcal support 
that enables an international institution to 
function credibly and effectively Interna- 
tional organizations are the creatures of 
their constituent member states. 

A determined Secretariat can influence 
the understanding and the behavior of its 
members, and the process of interaction the 
institution can provide a learning exper- 
ience that changes how states perceive and 
interpret their national interests. But there 
are real limits to what even the most en- 
lightened and persuasive Secretariat 
leadership can achieve, and judgments 
about international institutions and their 
perceived weaknesses must keep this 
reahtv in perspective. 

These limitations and weaknesses not- 
withstanding, it must be stressed that the 
IAEA over its lifetime has done, and can 
continue to do, critical service in support of 
non-proliferation The consensus on this 
conclusion, consistently restated by the 
\PT membership at virtually all quinquen- 
nial treaty review conferences, is one to 
build upon The existence of flaws is not a 
reason tor abandoning the agency in favor 
of the uncertainties that any new institution 
would inevitably bring, or even necessarily 
to create additional institutions to support 
it, although that possibility should not be 
ruled out. Furthermore, those who favor 
alternative institutions that would threaten 
draconian action against delinquent states 
rrom the outset should recall that the UN 
action against Iraq was based on aggres- 
sion, not NTT violations, and that ultimate- 
ly legitimacy, not torce, is the soundest basis 
tor a long-term, stable order IAEA safe- 
guards provides a foundation for achieving 
non-proliteraoon legitimacy and should 
therefore be preserved and strengthened in 



the interests ot establishing universal non- 
proliferation and moving us closer to an 
eventual nuclear-weapon-free world. 



Lessons for the Future 

In making anv assessment about the 
IAEA, its safeguards and its role in the 
post-Cold War era. three factors must be 
considered: First, the international environ- 
ment is still very much in transition. The 
outcome of the mapr shifts occurring in the 
world order will be an important factor in 
determining the role and relevance of 
safeguards in building and maintaining 
states' confidence that their neighbors are 
not acquiring nuclear weapons 

Second, virtually no acceptable system 
of verification will, by itself, ever be enough 
to ensure — in anv but the smallest states — 
that there is no clandestine activitiy what- 
soever Such a system could, however, 
provide some assurance that there is no 
clandestine activity, and it could confirm or 
refute suspicion that such activities exist 
when a specific charge or challenge is 
raised 

Third, winning the non-proliferation 
battle is a multiiaceted proposition involv- 
ing a range of national, regional and inter- 
national policies, processes and institutions 
of the states involved While safeguards 
have a en tical role to pla v in this effort, they 
are not the first or even the second line of 
defense against proliferation First come 
political decisions bv governments not to 
acquire nuclear weapons (a decision that 
reflects the security and political assess- 
ments of the statel and solemn internation- 
al undertakings codifying those decisions 
The durability ot these undertakings re- 
quires a collective effort in support ot the 
totality of measures that constitute the non- 
proliferation regime all working m - a har- 
monious and mutually reinforcing wav. 
Expectations regardins safeguards and the 
IAEA must be considered in this light jct 

NOTES 

1. SeeNTT/CONTrv/DC 1 Add.3 (Al 

2 For a comprehensive analysis ot the 
problem of post-Iraq safeguards, see Lawrence 
Scheinman. Assessing the Xudea* \ on- Pvli 'ora- 
tion Safeguards Svslfn; Atlantic Council of the US 
Occasional Paper Serte? October W u 2 and 
Lawrence Scheinman. Nuclear Safeguards and 
Non-Prolileraoon in a Crangine Uorld Order 
Security Dialogue. \ 23 No 4 1""; 

3 For a useful stud', of UN Security Coun- 
cil Resolution bS~ see En: Chauviste "The Im- 
plications ot IAEA Inspections Under Secuntv 
Council Resolution 6S7 UNID1R. Research 
Paper 11.1992 



196 

August 10, 1993 

STAFF STUDY MISSION 

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 

VIENNA, AUSTRIA 

JULY 6-9, 1993 



PURPOSE 

The primary purpose of the staff study mission by David 
Barton and Walker Roberts of the Committee on Foreign Affairs was 
to receive comprehensive briefings on all activities, operations, 
and decisionmaking of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) in Vienna, Austria. There was also a strong interest in 
current IAEA activities and inspections in Irag, Iran, North 
Korea, and South Africa. 

Chairman Hamilton and Ranking Minority Member Gilman had 
reguested that staff make recommendations to them regarding ways 
to strengthen the role of the IAEA as a part of efforts to 
maintain and strengthen international nuclear nonproliferation 
controls, enforce and supplement, if necessary, existing treaties, 
and establish new stricter norms of international behavior. 

GENERAL PREMISE 

As the world has had to adjust to a new post-Cold War setting 
so the IAEA has had to adjust to new challenges and demands of the 
post-Gulf War nuclear environment. 

It is clear that the IAEA is changing dramatically as a 
result of past and on-going activities in Irag and North Korea. 
The Board of Governors, faced with politically difficult decisions 
and the need to conclude issues by consensus, is finding the 
necessary political will to address new challenges and demands 
successfully. It is essential, however, that political leadership 
and resources are forthcoming from the United States and other 
Member states in order to reinforce the pace and breadth of 
continued change. 

Since the IAEA has been the subject of criticism regarding 
the Iragi development of a nuclear weapons program, it is 
important to underline that the failure in Irag was a failure of 
the total worldwide nonproliferation regime, including the lack of 
stringent export controls and timely intelligence gathering and 
analysis, and not a failure of the IAEA-safeguarded part of the 
Iragi nuclear program. In fact, the IAEA maintains that none of 
the elements of the IAEA-safeguarded Iragi program aided Irag's 
undeclared nuclear program. 



197 



The basic philosophy of the IAEA regarding technical 
cooperation with countries around the world which do not have 
nuclear technology remains valid and an important motivator for 
political cooperation. Current funding levels for technical 
assistance should be maintained. Nuclear technology can 
accomplish things in the developing world such as the elimination 
of flies and worms harmful to domestic animals which would 
otherwise not be possible nor available to these countries. 

OBSERVATIONS 

1. Board of Governors and Decisionmaking 

The IAEA was established in Vienna, Austria in 1957. 
President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program is normally cited 
as one of the instrumental factors in stimulating the 
establishment of the IAEA. 

The IAEA consists of 114 Member States. The Member States 
meet together once a year in a General Conference to approve the 
budget for the coming calendar year and to provide overall 
direction for the agency. In addition there is a Board of 
Governors composed of 35 Members who meet five times a year to 
approve specific actions and oversee and report on the operations 
of the agency. The Board of Governors appoints the Director 
General after obtaining the approval of the General Conference. 
It is the Director General who manages the daily functioning of 
the Agency. 

New challenges in nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear safety 
have faced the IAEA in increasing frequency in the last two or 
three years and this has activated the IAEA's decisionmaking 
process. The result has been an expansion of IAEA activities, the 
exercise of pre-existing authorities which were never before used 
such as special inspections, and future planning for a more 
action-oriented agency which can address such things as the hard 
task of uncovering undeclared nuclear weapons programs, nuclear 
safety at previously unsaf eguarded nuclear facilities, support for 
implementation of a comprehensive test ban, and supervision of a 
fissile material cut-off and long-term storage. 

The Board of Governors and the General Conference have made 
the following decisions and mandated the following actions which 
illustrate the new dynamism and evolving activism of the agency: 

o ordered special inspections in North Korea; 

o reaffirmed the agency's legitimate right to carry out 
special inspections in any facilities in order to verify that 
there is no nuclear weapons program operating; 

o approved a universal reporting system for the international 
trade in nuclear material and equipment; 



198 



o mandated a thorough exploration of ways in which the agency 
can conduct long-term monitoring such as environmental sampling to 
detect any undeclared nuclear weapons programs; 

o accepted the advisability of having a centralized data and 
intelligence-gathering network to maximize the potential for 
uncovering suspect activities; 

o approved an ambitious program of inspection and destruction 
activities in Iraq even though those activities stretch way beyond 
the normal safeguards activities of the agency; 

o accepted that the IAEA must plan for a long-term monitoring 
role in Iraq; 

o responded to the South African request to involve IAEA in 
verifying information regarding nuclear materials and South 
Africa's revelation of a nuclear weapons program; 

o mandated that the IAEA's Safeguards Advisory Group (SAGSI) 
look into improvements in effectiveness and efficiency for the 
safeguards system as it exists today; 

o ordered the establishment of a Nuclear Safety Convention 
which would facilitate the international review of nuclear safety 
and assist the IAEA in responding to numerous requests to assist 
in safety provisions for many countries, Member and non-Member 
countries. 

A clear yardstick to measure the progress of the IAEA in 
becoming a more dynamic and action-oriented agency will be the 
1995 Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference. By that time the 
IAEA must show that demonstratable progress is being made or one 
can expect numerous concerns regarding extension of the NPT to be 
raised by both developed and less developed nations. 

2. More Aggressive Policy to Detect Undeclared Nuclear Weapons 
Programs 

In the post-Gulf War environment there has been a basic 
change in approach by the IAEA and its Board of Governors to meet 
the challenge of undeclared nuclear weapons programs which may 
exist in countries which are adherents to the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and which have safeguards 
arrangements with the IAEA. This change in approach is a result 
of the experience in Iraq where the system as designed did not 
work. The change is underway to a more aggressive policy by the 
IAEA to attempt to detect undeclared nuclear weapons programs 
thereby heightening the risks of detection and increasing the 
advantages of comprehensive adherence to the NPT. 



199 



The shared experience of the UN and the IAEA in Iraq has 
motivated both international agencies to pursue realistic, 
aggressive policies regarding intrusive inspections and long-term 
monitoring. The U.S. Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. R. 
James Woolsey, pointed out in testimony before the Subcommittee on 
International Security, International Organizations, and Human 
Rights of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 28, 1993 
that: "Iraq's harassment of inspectors has not deterred the UN 
from continuing to destroy a vast chemical munitions and agent 
stockpile, to dig out details about past activity, and to search 
for hidden missile, biological, and nuclear capabilities. . .Neither 
we nor the UN have lost sight of the basic fact that critical 
elements of Iraq's programs remain hidden. Therefore, intrusive 
inspections remain an important element of any monitoring regime." 

This new approach reflects the view that over two-thirds of 
safeguard activities are taking place in countries of less 
proliferation concern. While the motto should remain "we do not 
trust anyone nor suspect anyone", safeguards activities must be 
made more effective and efficient and clearly targeted to 
countries of concern. Clearly this issue cuts to the heart of the 
debate over apportionment of resources as well: activity must be 
kept high on declared facilities but increased resources must be 
dedicated to undeclared programs as well. 

The IAEA notes that this change in approach involves numerous 
aspects. First, greater information is needed by the IAEA through 
national technical means, the media, special publications and 
scientific journals and export/import data. To access this 
information requires interactive relationships with Members 
states, non-Member states and organizations such as the Security 
Council and London Suppliers Group. The IAEA believes that if the 
Member states and international organizations are willing to 
provide this information on a timely basis, the intrusiveness of 
safeguard inspections can be dramatically increased. 

A second central element of this new approach would be 
additional training seminars for IAEA safeguard inspectors. IAEA 
inspections would reflect this new approach by moving away from a 
mechanical, routine, "blinders" type of approach to a rigorous and 
intrusive inspection regime utilizing comprehensive inspection 
rights provided to the IAEA. The U.S. would be particularly 
helpful in this regard given its experience in training On-site 
Inspection Agency (OSIA) inspectors to implement U.S. -former 
Soviet Union arms accords. 

The IAEA acknowledges that it is only in the beginning phase 
of developing this new, more aggressive approach to detecting 
undeclared nuclear weapons programs. This new approach will 
include use of special inspections and perhaps the institution of 
other types of inspections to monitor suspicious activities, deter 
clandestine programs, and investigate suspected undeclared 
programs. The IAEA also would like to increase its ability to do 
enhanced analysis of waste products and soil. 



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In addition to special inspections the new approach being 
developed by IAEA would also include long-term monitoring such as 
environmental monitoring and coordinated worldwide data and 
intelligence collection. 

3. Long-term monitoring 

There must be long-term monitoring in Iraq if the 
international community is to deter the Iraqis from recreating 
their nuclear weapons development and production program. The 
IAEA is currently developing extensive plans to address this need 
including environmental monitoring of air, ground, and water 
samples; video/ground, aerial, and satellite surveillance; human 
monitoring by routine and special inspections; data collection on 
all nuclear and dual-use technology and equipment being exported 
to Iraq; and oversight of the Iraqi scientific community. 

4. Export controls 

While both IAEA officials and outside experts stress the 
importance of export controls and the need for all countries and 
private companies to recognize their own responsibility to 
restrict exports which could potentially be used in nuclear 
weapons programs, both also underline the difficulties and 
limitations of export controls. As difficulties and limitations, 
they cite: the desire of all countries to promote their own 
manufactured goods and technology in the face of intense 
international competition; the dilemma of dual-use items being 
crucial to a country's manufacturing base at the same time that 
those same items may be the key components for a nuclear weapons 
program; the relative ease with which private companies may skirt 
export controls by exporting to front-companies, transferring 
items to foreign subsidiaries, or disguising controlled items with 
false licenses or smuggling. 

Therefore, it is clear that export controls should be viewed 
as important particularly when adopted at a significant 
international level on a multilateral basis, but only as one 
element of "arms control" when it comes to controlling the 
potential development of nuclear weapons by countries which are 
determined to do so. 



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5. International Intelligence-Sharing 

International intelligence-sharing and data collection are 
essential if the IAEA is to progress successfully from its 
traditional role of safeguarding declared nuclear facilities and 
providing technical assistance to a new role of uncovering 
clandestine nuclear weapons programs, monitoring suspicious 
activities in the nuclear field, and enforcing relevant treaties. 
The IAEA depends on its Member states for information regarding 
each Member states' nuclear activities and now it must expand its 
capabilities to create a data base of information which includes 
input from a number of Member states about one country's nuclear 
program or about nuclear trade and activity in general. 
Obviously, the more countries that participate in the 
intelligence-sharing and data collection the better the product in 
terms of a reasonably accurate picture of every country's nuclear 
programs and worldwide nuclear activity. In addition, the IAEA 
should work with Member states to promote greater interaction and 
access with appropriate international organizations such as the 
London Suppliers Group. 

6. Fissile material storage and monitoring 

Unusual developments in the Ukraine and in South Africa have 
created situations regarding nuclear weapons where the IAEA might 
be asked to step in and assist with the storage, accounting, and 
monitoring of the fissile material in those nuclear weapons. The 
IAEA does not have the expertise nor the mandate to actually 
handle, transport, or dismantle the nuclear weapons themselves. 
That work has to be done by experts from the nuclear-weapon states 
such as the United States. 

The two cases of Ukraine and South Africa offer an 
opportunity to the IAEA to develop some expertise, background, and 
experience in managing this fissile material. This might be very 
useful in the future in other countries where there are nuclear 
weapons to be dismantled or if there is an international agreement 
to limit or stop fissile material production and then that 
agreement will need to be monitored and "safeguarded". 

7. Clean-up, safety, and safeguards at facilities previously 
unsaf eguarded 

There is an urgent, new concern regarding the clean-up, 
safety, and safeguards at nuclear facilities in Eastern Europe and 
in the former Soviet Union which were previously unsafeguarded but 
which may now be placed under safeguards. The IAEA is addressing 
this concern and it has set in motion a series of explorations and 
assessments to determine exactly what can and should be done with 
these facilities and what role the IAEA can properly play. 



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8 . Iraqi nuclear weapons program 

IAEA statements are clear concerning what has been 
accomplished in Iraq under UN resolutions 687, 707, and 715 and 
what remains to be done in order to provide some assurance to the 
world community that Iraq will not succeed in producing nuclear 
weapons. 

In testimony submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
on June 29, 1993 the IAEA stated that it "has been successful in 
identifying, destroying, removing or otherwise rendering harmless 
the key components of a hitherto secret and broadly-based Iraqi 
program aimed at the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities." 
The IAEA describes its assessment of just how complete a picture 
of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program it judges that it has been 
able to piece together by asserting that "As to the completeness 
of the picture obtained, it is the considered opinion of the IAEA, 
based on the results of nineteen inspection missions, the analyses 
of thousands of samples, the evaluation of several hundred 
documents confiscated in Iraq, the assessment of procurement and 
other information obtained from Member States of the IAEA, that 
the essential components of the clandestine program have been 
identified." The IAEA credits the success in rapidly unmasking 
the secret Iraqi program to the provision of experts and 
intelligence by Member states combined with rapid and intrusive 
field inspections. 

In the same testimony the IAEA describes its mandate from the 
United Nations and what it has accomplished in the following 
manner: "The tasks entrusted by the Security Council to the IAEA 
are essentially threefold: search, destroy and prevent any 
reconstitution [of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program]. The IAEA 
has searched, has found and has destroyed. The basis has been 
established for preventing a reconstitution of the Iraqi nuclear 
program. Effective control of future Iraqi activities can be put 
in place if adequate measures are maintained at the political 
level and sufficient resources continue to be provided." 

The IAEA testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
also details two areas which will hinder any future efforts by the 
IAEA to successfully monitor Iraqi nuclear activities. UN 
resolutions 707 and 715 specify that Iraq should provide the names 
of all suppliers and intermediaries who worked with Iraq on its 
nuclear weapons program and that Iraq must approve IAEA plans for 
long-term monitoring of compliance by Iraq to UN resolution 687. 
It is the IAEA's position that the UN must maintain its sanctions 
on Iraq until there is full compliance by Iraq with all of its 
obligations under all UN resolutions and particularly these two 
provisions if IAEA long-term monitoring is to be effective in 
detecting or deterring any effort by Iraq to reconstitute its 
nuclear weapons program. 

As a result of UN Security Council Resolution 687 an Action 
Team was established at the IAEA to assume responsibility for 
fully enforcing that resolution. The Action Team's report on 



203 



their activities to fully carry out the resolution's mandate to 
destroy, remove, or render harmless all nuclear weapons and 
prohibited precursor materials is included as an appendix to this 
report. 

9. People and books 

Much of the press and other media attention to IAEA 
activities in Iraq have focused on buildings, reactors, machine 
tools and other dual-use equipment. Much of this "nuclear 
hardware" has either been destroyed, sealed, tagged, or 
inventoried. Obviously, there has also been attention to Iraq's 
quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material such as its highly 
enriched uranium in the form of reactor fuel elements. However, 
several experts at the IAEA pointed out that there has been little 
focus on a very crucial element to the Iraqi nuclear weapons 
program which has not been destroyed: its scientists and engineers 
and the availability of scientific information. 

These two elements, people and books, form a crucial part of 
any Iraqi ambition to reconstitute their nuclear weapons program. 
The objective of mentioning this is to provoke thought in the 
international community of ways to address this problem of 
scientists and scientific information in order to come up with 
creative and effective solutions to diverting these people and 
this knowledge into peaceful, civilian endeavors. 

10. Technical cooperation 

Technical cooperation between nuclear and non-nuclear states 
to share the fruits of nuclear energy and power lies at the heart 
of the founding of the IAEA. In addition to IAEA's responsibility 
to ensure that nuclear energy assistance is not used for military 
purposes, the IAEA's Statute describes another basic assignment 
for the IAEA: "to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of 
atomic energy to peace, health, and prosperity throughout the 
world." 

The IAEA has undertaken a number of projects in developing 
countries which apply nuclear technology to resolve development 
problems in the fields of medicine, agriculture, health, and food. 
For example, the IAEA has succeeded in applying nuclear technology 
to the eradication of a number of pests and insects such as the 
medfly, screwworm, and tsetse fly in a number of different 
locations. This year the IAEA is embarking on a new approach of 
model projects which will include a very interesting project in 
Sri Lanka supporting a human tissue bank. This human tissue bank 
in Sri Lanka has, since the 1960's, supplied over 30,000 corneas 
to over 61 countries. With the assistance of the IAEA and new 
nuclear technology in sterilization techniques, this tissue bank 
may be able to expand its operations. 



204 



It is interesting to note that the technical cooperation 
activities of the IAEA only absorb about $42-$45 million of the 
IAEA budget but that amount funds approximately 1,000 technical 
projects per year many of which have a very rapid and high impact 
on the development process in developing countries. 

11. Iragi Action Team and Future 

In order for the IAEA to successfully continue the work of 
the Action Team in Irag and to be able to apply it elsewhere it is 
essential that the concept and practice of long-term monitoring be 
firmly established as standard operating procedure for the IAEA, 
that the strongest possible political will be maintained to 
pressure for the establishment and sustaining of long-term 
monitoring, and that substantial resources be devoted to this 
effort and remain committed for some time to come. The long-term 
monitoring in Irag will allow the IAEA to refine many monitoring 
technigues such as human and satellite intelligence, special 
technigues such as remote sensors and environmental sampling, and 
surveillance by video or aerial surveillance. 

The best way of getting a true picture of exactly what the 
Action Team is accomplishing in Irag is to include here the last 
full report of the Action Team (see below) . 

12. IAEA and CTB 

The IAEA is aware of the proposal made at the UN Conference 
on Disarmament in Geneva to have the IAEA implement and oversee a 
comprehensive nuclear test ban. The proposal would have the IAEA 
coordinate different national centers of detection in order to 
establish a worldwide system for monitoring the test ban. The 
IAEA representatives seemed open to this proposal and predicted 
that the Board of Governors would probably also be open to the 
proposal. These positive responses to this proposal can be seen 
in the same light as the other new challenges and demands being 
addressed by IAEA. The IAEA appears to be adapting and responding 
in a thoughtful and positive manner to these multiple 
proliferation challenges, demands, and needs that are being thrust 
upon it. 



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13. Safeguards vs. Technical Assistance 

It is essential that the IAEA do more to involve developing 
countries in safeguard activities. Rightly or wrongly, the 
perception remains within the IAEA that the U.S. and other 
developed nations are interested only in safeguard side of IAEA 
activities. This perception is reinforced by the fact that the 
U.S. and developed nations fund 98 percent of the safeguards 
budget. In this regard, IAEA officials indicated that it would 
not be helpful for Member states to earmark additional funds for 
safeguards activities without addressing the technical assistance 
funding as well. 

In order for LDC's and technical assistance recipients to be 
more involved in safeguards activities, it is important that these 
nations view nonproliferation as a major issue. One approach to 
this end is to integrate representatives from these nations in the 
programs which support safeguards activities, at more senior 
levels of management and on the technical teams which carry out 
the inspections; in short involve them in the management of the 
safeguards regime. 



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LIST OF OFFICIALS AND EXPERTS INTERVIEWED AT IAEA 

JULY 6-8. 1993 

Hans G. Blix. Director General, IAEA 

Qian Jihui, Deputy Director General, Department of Technical Co-operation. IAEA 

Sueo Machi, Deputy Director General, Department of Research and Isotopes, IAEA 

Bruno PeDaud, Deputy Director General Department of Safeguards, IAEA 

David Waller, Deputy Director General, Department of Administration, IAEA 

John Tileman, Special Assistant. Office of the Director General, IAEA 

Mohamed ElBaradei, Director. Division of External Relations, IAEA 

Maurizio Zifferero, Leader UNSC 687 Action Team, IAEA 

Robert Kelley, Deputy Leader, UNSC 687 Action Team. IAEA 

Demetrius Perricos, Director, Division of Operations, and Deputy Leader, UNSC 687 
Action Team, IAEA 

Richard Hooper, Section Head. Division of Concepts and Planning, Department of 
Safeguards, IAEA 

William Lichliter, Section Head, Program and Resources, Department of Safeguards 
IAEA 

Muttusamy Sanmuganathan, Secretary of the Policy-Making Organs, Secretariat. IAEA 

Michael Von Gray and Michael J. Lawrence, U.S. Mission 

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